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For my Parcnh 
"All of us arc thing and thinking ~uhjecb. What I react against is the- fact that there i~ a breach 
bdween socia I histury and the hi-;tory of idea:-.. Sued historian~ are suppu~cd to de~aihc how 
pcupk act without thinking, and historians of ideas an: ~uppost:d to dt:scrihe how people think 
without acting. Everybody hoth thinks and acts." 
Michd Foucault 
''Tu articulate the past historicctlly dot:~ not mean to rcc~)gnizc it 'tht: way it really was' {Ranke). 




The National Commillcc for Liberation ("ARM") 1960 • 196~ : sab,.)tage and the question of the 
ideological subject. 
Subject Matter 
The dissertation gives an account of the history ol the Nationai Committee for Libl!ration (NCL), an 
anti-apartheid sabotage organisation that existed between 1960 and 1964. The study is aimed both at 
narrating its growth and development in tht: contcX\ of South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
explaining its strategic and political choices. In particul.u. the n:aSQns for it,; isolation from the broader 
muggle against Apartheid and its inability h.l transcend this isolation are investigated . 
Sources 
Discussion of the conte:<t of the NCL's dcvdopment depended on secondary historical works by 
scholars such as Tom Lodge . Paul Rich, C. J . Driver and Janet Robertson as well as archival sources. 
The analysis of liberal discourse in the 1950s and ttJ60s also drew heavily on primary sources such as 
the liberal journals Contact, Africa Sf)uth and Tht> New African. 
Secondary sources were also used fvr the discussion of the NCL's strategy in the conte"t of the 
development of a theory of revolutionary guerilla warfare after the Second World War: here the work 
of Robert Taber, John Bov.yer Bell, Kenneth Grundy and Edward Fcil was central. The history of the 
NCL itself was reconstructed from trial records, ncw:.papers and personal interviews. Archival sources 
such as The Karis-Cartc:r cotl~;"ction, the Hoover Institute microfilm collection of South African 
political documenrs, the Paton Papers, the Ernie Wentzel papers w~rc also extcnsi\·cly used. 
Mt>thodology 
The discussion of the discourse of liberal NCL mc:mbers depended on a post-strucruralist theory of 
subjectivity. The conceptual underpinnings of the thtsis were provided by on the work of Jacques 
Lacan, Louis Althusser, ."v1ichcl Pechcux, Ernesto Lacluu, Chantal Muuffe and Slamj Zizek. Pcchcux's 
elaboration of the Althusserian concept of interpellation formed the basis of a discourse analy~is of 
NCL texts. In the interviews, -some use was al~n made of techniques of ethnographic interviewing 
de\eloped by qualitative !>oci~o>logist~ 5uch as Jaml!s Spradkv. 
Conclusions 
The analysis focused on the way NCL discourse construc!l!d a NCL m(mhers as "ordinary persons", a 
subject-position which implied a radical opposition hetwct:n political struggle and ideological 
commitment. The NCL's strategic difficultie!'> were rdated to the conlradiction~ this discourse. related 
to metropolitan political traditions that valorised civil society. manifested in the context of post-
Sbarpeville South Africa. These contradictions were explored in term!> of the Lacanian notion of the 
"ideological fantasy". The dissertation thus closes with a consideration, both of the importance of the 
ideological traditions identified in the analysis of NCL discourse, and the methodological importance of 
non-reductive conceptualisations of political identity and idc:ology. 
Andries du T oit 
Universit~ of Cape Town 
September 1990 
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.-\nJ you m•!l -l>~ \0)\ll\d! \\~II !H>\\ d1d I :;..:1 here'' 
.-\nd ~f.'v •ll.a\ .. "'"- \LIUl''"Jr \1n I •t;;lu ' . . \m ( ''roa,g··, 
,.\nLI.Iou m;n ~~~'"'"'"'ell \1, (j( J[) \\11.\ f II.\\ I t f)O'i· ·• 
na"<l flyrnc, One~ in a Uretime 
In the pa~tt:~ th<tl follow I ha\'c tried ,,,tell th .. ~ o,tun ,,[the ~ational Commincc for Libcratiun; 1 
of how their ml!rJl and political C1.1nccrn~ l.:t..ltn thL· tkl'i~ion to ahandun nl!n-\i1.1lcnt. ?Caccl'ul 
protes1 <lnd to l'onsidcr sab1.1tage <~nd ;Hmcd insurrL·ctiun. and hO\\ that choice leu, c\~ntually. tu 
uba~rcr and ruin for many u! its member,, In t.:!ling thi~ .,t,ny I ha'c l'ocuscu on ~CL-
mcmbn~· intentions, th..:ir hope~ • .md the lt~IUL':o. th;tt impclkd them Ill turn tu ~ab0t.tgc. But 
hc<,id.:~ thi:o. I ha\C i.tl~u tried to <,hn\1 the hroat..la Ji~cur ... il·c net work which shapct..l thcsl.' 
concern" ;mJ gan~ them lhcir particular meaning. Fur <~hhough nuthing ~ccms more nb1iow, 
than the feeling that we know ourschc~ anJ ~n.1w I\ hat 1·-.: think. thic. '>en~.: nf ~df·pr..::,..::nce, 
thi-, t'tdid lhat 0ur uwn idcntitic~ arc tr;~n~pan:nll: a\aibblc Ill us. nh~curc~ the extent to which 
our intc nt ion~ <IT~ ~hapcd by a grc.:Jtcr t..:xt. and hiJc~ th~ t'truadc•· t..li-;cur5oin: framcw0rk~ th;tl 
gi\C u~ l.lUf P'''itium '-IS subjcch. anu in'lti.tll u ... in th..:: rbc..:" fr·•m which we '>UT\'l'~ th<.: \\l~rlu . 
That i-. one \\ay of telling the ~tory. Th~·rc an; ~tlh1.·r ''ay!-. . Certainly, ~~h..:n I <...:lout ll) \tudy tt11.: 
political thought and practice nf libcrJI int-.:lh·tual-. afto.:r Sharpo.:1 ilk, I ncn:r \uSpt:d(J th;tt I 
woult..l cnt..l up focu~ing on the ~CLIAR:\1 In the e'\lent that I Jiu: that my cour~c Llf rc ... e;trch 
wuuld lci.td me fJr rrllm tht: <ITt.:hi\1.:\ amJ lihruri<.::-.t11 !01.' L ' ni\t:r~ity Llf l'ap..: Town, to into.:r\io.:w 
cx·:-.ahutcur~ in Engl:md anJ Europe. :''kith.:r JiJ l e~pc:;::t that my n:..,carch woulu lcJJ me tll 
quc ... tinn m<.~ny of my 0wn <t~~umptinn~ ;thout it..l.:ul,•g.y and :;.ubjectivit~ : that my Jccisi0n hJ m1nc 
av.ay from philo~ophy 10 history "•1•uld ch.·nlually k~J me had. tn philu.sophy. o;u that at the 
moment l do not bt:lung cumfortabh or o.:ompkotdy in ~.:ith..:r realm. In this pn.:facc. therefore. l 
hop~ tu gi\'c an account of the pr,lC.:~s. h\ \\ hich thi~ thc:o.i.:. bo.:came <\ nJrratil·c: l,f I h(: hi~l~ny or 
the N'l"L/AR~1 . and bov. th<tl narr,lli\l· camr..: to hl' 'I' dn~..:ly wncnnct..l with thr..: 11.1tun: ~lr 
idr..:ulugic .. J -.ut'tjccti\ it~. 
The f~rl that :h~ name ••I 1111~ ,>rgan":..to••n ,· l\all1:(t'd fr.1111 t:l" '>dl~t111>~1 ( "n1111111ee j,,,. l.ohtration (\.( 11 ro 
the .\ln<~n R(;>l~l~ncc \1mcmcnl 1.\R\IJ I"'' hd,Hc ''' Jclll:\c "1"~ l>c a .,nurH· •>f C"ntu~""' I hil•·.: '""'' 
I he tc~m ":'\C'L, .\R.\1" "hefl! rcko ,,, 111~ cn1nc11 uf the '"'<!~11"""'"" $ c\"T~oK~ . fn •m 1')(,() ;u \')(H \\hen 
rdcrnng. · ~· u dl ..In~ -rcnf.c llllllllOI\1. I h"' c \"CJ lh~ lloll'l10: arph.:;,l>lc ,junng I hat IIlli C. I c '"""nat 
( nmnnnee k·r loht'rallun . hdnn: June t•lfA olll<l \fl'l(oll1 Rc,~>l ance \[o,concnt " thcrcailt'r. 
My own decision to move from the Departm~nt of Political Philo~ophy at the University of 
StcUenbo~ch to the Department of History at the:: Uni\'ersity of Cape Town was in itself what 
Althuss.erians like to caJI an ·overdetermined" c,·cnt. In part it was motivated by practical 
considerations; in part to a growing se nse:: that the Socratic tradition thai informed the 
Department of Political Philosophy, a tradition that had sustained us as students in our 
commitment to philosophy, was being lhrown increasingly into crisis by the events of the mid-
l980s. That critical intellectual and moral tradition, articulat~:d above all by the Head of 
Department, prof. Johann Degenaar. had made the D~partmt:nt a crucial reference point for 
generations of students, and had turned it inro an important base from which their own dissent 
and criticism of the Nationalist hegemon~ at Stdlcnbo~ch could be articulated, As that 
hegemony became less monolithic, and as a pluralist aml reformist pragmatism started ro 
replace the ideology articulated by Malan and Verwoerd, that critical tradition was itself placed 
in an ambiguous position. For me, these ambiguities becam~ especially manifest in our Honours 
year, in 1986. I believe that these difficulities '4"ere shared in some measure by my fellow-
students in that year, Lou-Marie Kruger and Jaco Malan. I cannot. however, speak for them: 
and must set out the difficulties as I saw them. 
In the intellectual tradition articulatt:d in the Depanment, two concern~ were paramount The 
first was a commitment to rational and critical thought as essential to human freedom. The 
second was the imperative that such a critical commitment had to be lived out in engagement 
with concrete political problems. In other words. for u~ the cllmmitment to reason was a 
commitment to tmancipatory reason. and was intimat~ly concernc:d with the project of building 
a free South Africa. l.n earlier times, the Departmc:nt"s overriding philosophical character had 
been overwhelmingly e,Ostentialist. By the mid-1980s. its crit ical commitment was increa!>ingly 
being seen in terms of the te-xtual strategies of decnn!>truction and post-structuralism. The 
enterprise of a critical questioning that never lays down its tools was articulated in terms of the 
post-structuralist refusal of the metaphysics of self-pr~ence and dosure. 
But what became of this tradition when it had tu confrunt the South Africa that lay outside 
SteUenboscb, the South Africa of the first natiunal State of Emergency, of detentions. 
neddaeings, of oppre~ion and mass resistance? Not hl take a stant.l here would be t<.) fail to live 
up to the demands of the Socratic tradition. But when we tried to take our philosophical 
commitment into the struggle, it seemed euriousl} impot~nt and irrelevant. In our political 
work., it became more and more evident that the stan<.:e of a "gad-fly", concerned to problematise 
that wbich seems self-e'vident, was not at all wdwme. Indeed, such an attitude was seen as the 
symptom of an irresponsible anarchism or an obscurantist Trotskyism. 
iv 
In the 'iouth Afric<t of 19:Sh. :.1 chnko..: 1\--L~ 111'1 Jilliru!t, In ih unrcmilling. in~i~t..-ncc 11n 
pruhk m <tli~i ng <tn~ gi 1 ~.: n pP~it ion. pn~t · ~ t rud u r ;IIi ~m -.~ ~ m L"U u Ill" q u J I ll> l hc ch J I k ngo..: n!' hL· in~ 
p..trt of the proce~s L,f changing Snut h Alri~·••- I n'kaJ. 1 tdt incr..-;t-.ingl:· ..ttlrackJ tu a muro..: 
orthnJox <.~no.l rcductioni::.t \.-brxi~m. 
Thi::. mL>Ve w<.~s not cunc<."ileJ a~ .1 ~impk r..:j..:cli\11\ •'I tho..: SocratiC tr<.~Jition a~ ~uch. Rath..:r. it 
wa~ a rcjectii)O .:•f one way of ;.trlicul.tting_ that tr<tJiti111l ln fact. part 11f th~; powr.:r ,,f ... mnrr.: 
Marxi~t <tpproach ~o..:em..:d to lie in the f:..ct th..tl it ~:n.l!->kJ u~ hl ask critic;.t) que'>tinm :.~huut that 
Socratic traJition itself. In other word~. the crisi~ of the S"cratic tradition could {anJ had tn) he 
hbtorically unde r~ttwd. It _.,cemeJ to me that the cri\i~ 111.: exprrio..: need relateJ precisely to the 
unJialeuicJI way in which we uur~e ho..:~ haJ ~L'L'n thL· Jidwtumy h..:twc..- n criticism anJ political 
practice. It ~o..:cmeJ It' me !hilt thi~ wa;, hut J particular <-"\am pi>? of a wiJ~.:r pmbkm: the mJnner 
m which, in South African intellectual hi~t~,r~. 1 he pr• >ject nf critical ..:nq uirv haJ Llften been ~ecn 
J.~ \tanding nut~ide JnJ in opp11~ition 10 the te rrJin 11f p~1lit ical prJcticc. The parJdigm ca~e nf 
thi~ diqance ~<.::o..:m~.:d to he J. M. Cu.:tzcc\ mag_i,tr<tte in \\-'ailiJJg for the Barbarians: hi~ 
di-;,tancc ffL1m the ~im pic immedi3cy of experience l~.:J not tn fillional action, but \!l an ab;,nlutc 
vacuum wh.:rc no choice wa~ \ak from thnu!,!.ht"" cnrro~i11.: JnJ cynical logic. A similar prnhlem 
.. eemcd to exist in the thuught of i'<. P. \Jrt \\'~k LllUI\: his commitment to r'-!tiunalit~ was 
in~cribcd in a 11.\lr]J lil·l~ which m<~Je a ,y~t<.:m;J\Jl' aml Je.:p Ji1·i~ion bctw~.:~.:n the t..:rrJin nf 
rea::.on and that 1.1f pulit i c .tl action. R.: J~lln \\a;, a ~'-~ crcJ t raJit ion of its Lll'in, the ~..- n·ice ,,f an 
ahistorical and Jmnto.1 ua!l~ 1 a lid realm of uni1n~~tl ah'-.ulutc\. PPlit ical Jction bdnngcJ II 1 th~.: 
broken worlJ after the Fa II. the s u hI unary rc1lm tlf part ic ul ari;,t ic c!Ji m ~ and int e ro..:st s. The I v. 1' 
could ncn.:r be reconciled. Those C<Jmmitt..:J (l> truth :-.huuld ~~.;Jrch f1H it in logical argument. 
LllUW seemed Ill ~ay. while a com mitmcnt to just icc l'llulJ unl~ bo:: Ji1·cd out in term:;. of .,nmc 
kind nf m1bk mJrtyrdom th~.: cuncn::k purpo'>e llf 1\ hich wa~ 11bscurc. And thi!. v.or[J.Jenying 
vi~i•m of the nat urc of ratitln<Jlity ~C'l' m~.:J 111 furm pJTI of a kind of fJ~ci~t iJculugy. a 
glnrilication of th~.: Jrti:-.t/kaderjthinkcr. h>ncly anJ pure. ri;,ing far .1b1ll-c th~.: wmpb~.:~.:nt, 
unreasoning and, y~.:s. ;,tupiJ ma~~~.:s of the n~llc Our pr1 >blcm at Stdknho~ch was thcrdore 
part of a broader tendency to ~1.:c criticJ! n1m mit men\ as ~omdhing ~.:xtcrna\ to anJ ouhide the 
terrain of St1uth African pnlitical struggk. ~om.:!hing l>hich hcJ,mg.::J. not tu ordinary. struggling. 
penple, but ttl an intellectual elite. T11 C<Jihl'l\0.:: ,,f th~.: jlf\\j~·ct nf emancipJtury r..:;;~son in .,uch 
term::. wa~ to doom it from the out'>C't. 
That is hnw I came hl study. JS a stu1.knt at LCT\ Do..:partmcnt of Hiswry, the fate of Liberals 
in South Africa aft..::r th<-" Sharpcvilk m;~;,~.Jl'fl.:. Fur Lib~.:ralism ;,eemcd tn m~.: a key example nf 
this gcno..:ral probkm. From Jn earlier confiJ~.:ncc that Snuth Africa could bewme a '"fair and 
reasonable" social order, many committed Liberals had become pessimistic, seeing South 
African politics as a chaotic realm upo n which rational discourse could find no hold. rr one 
could understand tbe historical nature of such a ,·i~ion and shov. how this dichotomy between 
"reason" and South African politics took shape - if one wuld show from what assumptions it 
proceeded and what social processes determined its development - it would be a step towards 
transcending the false dilemmas that flowed fwm its te rms. I therefore turned to an 
examination of the political theory and social practice of the Liberal Party of South Africa, and 
set myself the task of showing how this practice was affected by the SharpeviUe massacre and the 
broader social processes that preceded and followed that e,·ent. 
Research has its own imperatives, and I quickly found that my studies were taking on a direction 
of tbeir own. firstly the problem as I stated it was impossibly vague. 1 had conceptualised the 
problem in very broad and sweeping terms: such a conceptualisation was well suited to the 
discipline of philosophy, but history was concerned above all with concrete problems, problems 
that could be addressed in the course of a specific and coherent narrative. Secondly, the 
enterprise of talking about Liberalism in such global terms seemed to me more and more 
problematic. There was not one liberalism in South Africa. but se~-e ral, and within these 
streams there were stiU more specific liberal discourses. Tempting as it was, one could not 
without mystification reduce to one tradition the Hegelian Liberalism of the philosopher Alfred 
Hoernle, the impetuous radicalism of a Patrick Duncan. the economic Liberalism of an O'Dowd 
and the plain-speaking moral judgements of an Alan Paton. If one tried to talk confidently 
about Liberalism as if it had some overwhelming anJ monolithic logic, some Zeitgeist of its own, 
one would only obscure the complex and problematic nature of the relationships, the similarities 
and dissimilarities, between specific Liberal discourses. 
Although J still related my research to the broad questions I asked when I set out, I therefore 
concentrated increasingly on the fortunes of what Tom Lodge has called "radical liberalism· . If 
the LiberaJ Party was a desperate attempt to inte rve ne politically in the Liberal cause, the 
radical liberals that formed such a vocal part of its younger membership seemed to be the 
persons who had confronted in its most extreme form the task of making LiberaJ principles 
mean something in the extra-parliamentary arena. And here, the story of the NCL/ARM 
interested me more and more. On one le\·el, I was drawn in simply by the drama of their story. 
And oo another, they seemed to be an essential part of the story of radical liberalism. Even then 
my attention was focused, not so much on their own story but oo the greater failure of which (I 
supposed) they were a symptom and example. Their story was important to me because the 
mere fact of their existence illustrated the e :-.1ent to which radical liberals had failed to resolve 
vi 
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their problems in the arena o£ above-ground political struggle. This failure could. I reasoned, be 
explained through the sort of account of social <.truggles and the material conditions underlying 
them that recent Marxist social history haJ made possible. I supposed that ( had spent enough 
time deciding what to write about. and that I could now go ahead. relatively unproblematically, 
with research. 
I was WTong. As my research progressed, doubts again started to plague me; doubts which 
became more insistent. Besides the questions o( focus sketched above, there wets a third problem 
I faced in my work. This problem was methodological. The perspective I had adopted seemed 
less and less suited to an understanding of the NCL/ ARM. In particular, its imperatives seemed 
always to lead me away from the NCL/ ARM. rather than towards it. At the root of the 
centrifugal tendency of my re search was Marxism's distinction between a correct understanding 
of the social forces at a given period, and the illusory ideas, the ' false consciousness', of social 
actors (in my case, NCL/ ARM members). In my own research. this distinction had led me to 
disregard tb.is 'false consciousn~s'; the task of und~rstanding their consciousness did not seem 
as important as the task of explaining how that consciousness had been "produced". But what 
was the use of a !itudy of the NCL/ARM which remained silent about the NCL/ARM. and 
which did not see them as interesting except a~ <tn "example", a !>ymptom of a gene ral problem? 
What about the possibilit~ of focusing on them in th~ir own right, and trying to explain their 
cour~e of action? Could one not, rather that explaining away their discourse, sed to 
understand it? 
Once the mountain had laboured and brought forth this simple question, many of my objections 
to post-structuralism started to disappeOjr. Indeed, the ~orts of questions asked by post· 
structuralists seemed precisely geared to this enterprise. In their problematising of the subject, 
in their investigation of the ways in which consciousness is inscribed in the network of a broader 
ten or system of difference, writers like Foucault and Derrida seemed to be looking at precisely 
the right sort of question. While I had originally turned to orthodox Marxism in an effort to 
close off or suspend the sorts of questions asked by authors like Derrida and Foucault, it now 
seemed that I could harnes.s these questions and lay open the project by which the NCL/ARM 
came to take the road it did. 
Thus it came about that by May 19&~. in addition to my research on the NCL/ARM, I was re -
reading and re-discovering many of the post-structuralist texts I had rejected earlier. 
Throughout the ensuing two years. this cross-polination continued. Thus, as my research 
progressed, I slowly gravitated towards Althusser's emphasis on the ideo logical subject. 
Althusser's conception of the subject seemed to provide a point of reference which made it 
possible to address a whole range of issues that seemed to me bound up with the NCl/ARM's rise 
and catastrophic faU. P&;heux's elaboration of that concept made possible a strategy for 
implementing these insights and fonnulating a method of discourse analysis that could be used to 
"uopeel" the central texts of the NCl/ARM. At the same time, this fr3mework made it possible to 
use the techniques of ethnographic interviewing borrowed by American qualitative sociologists 
from the discipline of ethnography.2 The results of such rudimentary analysis impelled me, in turn, . 
to take more and more seriously the Lacanian elements in Althusser's writings. 
During my stay in England, I was fortunate enougb to make contact with post-graduate students at 
the university of Essex who, together with Dr Emesto Laclau, had been working through tbe 
implications of a Lacanian re-interpretation of Althusser with far greater rigour. These students 
made available to me the writings of the Yugoslavian Lacanian Slavoj Zizek:. Initially, 1 could not 
see the specific relevance of his thought to a study of the NCLJARM. It was only in January this 
year, when my owo detailed analysis of NCl/ARM and liberal discourse was almost at an end, that 
I saw how a range of apparently divergent and problematic features of that disco~e could be 
understood io terms of Zizek's conception of the "ideological fantasy". 
In the end, therefore, this dissertation oa;upies an ambiguous position. like the social historians 
who have tried to make audible the voices of working-class people, who have tried to supplement 
the abstract theoretical categories of structuralist Marxism with a look at the experiences and the 
texture of working-class lives, I have tried to write an aa:ount that is alive to the oomplex nature of 
social consciousness . Like these social historians, one of my concerns has been to "rescue~ (to use 
again an oft-used phrase) the voiceless subjects of structuralisl, reducLionist analyses from the 
"enormous condescension of (XlSterity"; to allow these subjects to speak, and to show the ways in 
which they conceptualised the world. In other ways, however, my approach diverges from that of 
social history as it is presently oonceived. Though elsewhere social history has embraced discourse 
analysis and the insights il provides, this "rescue~peration" bas in South African social history 
always bad a curiously limited sweep. The narrative of the "experience" of working-class persons 
has tended to be a subsidiary voice, complementing and filling out ("adding nuance and Lexture", as 
Shula Mar1cs has put it3) to a master-narrative that still unfolded in teems of the overriding 
categories of class identity. 
2 
3 
James P. Spradley, Tkc Elhnographk lntuvk>w (New York, Holl Riaellan aad Wiostoa, 1979) 
Sh11la Maru, "1\c Hlstorlograpble of Soarll Africa: Receal OcveloplBcliSft, lo Bogumll JeWIIcwlclr.i aod David 




Reacting to this tendency to see consciousness simply as a reflection of a more or less tmnsparcnt 
"experie.nce" of the objet.tive conditions recognised by Marxist analysis, T. Dunhar Moodie has 
called, in a recent review of a collection of South African social history, for a return to Gram sci and 
a consciousness of hegemony; 
"These essays confirm my impression that the incredibly rich array of historical work 
which has heen inspired by the paradigm shift of the 1970s has outrun its theoretical 
()rigins and underpinnings ... [M]orc nuanced theories of polilics and ideology need to be 
elaborated to make sense of twentieth·cenlury South African History ... The best articles in 
this book point to political opportunities lost not least because of undialectical 
conceptualisation anti inadequate ideological initiatives ... "4 
As David Atwell has pointed out in a recent essay, this complexity means that historical writing 
shall have to "show what goes into the making of iliscourse, not only by attending to its conditions 
of possibility, bul by altenlling to discourse itself, to the way it negotiates a path for itself in those 
conditions."5 This approach has, I believe, much to offer social history. It emphasises the 
complexity of the task, not ji..L'lt of making hearll the voices of orilinary South Africans, but of 
listening lo and understanding (which means analysing!) these voices. H insists that these voices 
should be listenell to not only because they "express" people's "experience", but also because they 
are political acts; and that as political acts we should be alive to the ways in which they, too, deny 
cenain alternatives, close off undccideable questions, contain fault-lines, blind spots, instabilities. 
It shows us how persons construct political space and political identity in their most everyday 
discourse, how they represent to themselves and each other (and thus appropriate and hegemonise) 
the world in which they find themselves; and it also shows how these representations are in tum 
vulncrnblc to crisis. 
It is from precisely these concerns that my own work has sprung, from a eonv1ction that 
"consciousness", "Jiscoursen. "ideology" has its own weight and its own complexity. Outside South 
Africa, there are many social historians who have taken up these is.<;ues. Gareth Stedman Jones, for 
example, has addressed these questions some Lime ago, insisting that class could not be understood 
as an aspect of a social reality that existed outside and/or prior to its articulation in language. 6 
Another e"amplc is the work of Robert Darnton, also working under the banner of "History from 
below", and who has shown the immense power of post~structuralist approaches to 
4 
6 
T. Dunbar Moodie, Review of Shula Marh ~ud S~;~nley Trapido, The PoUtb:s of Race Cia~ and Nallonalism 
(l.nn<.lon & New York, Lons;man, 1987) in Jounuot of Southern Afrlun Studios, Vol. 15 No. J {April 1989), p. 
530. 
David Artwcll, "Polirkal ~Uf""rvision: the \"a~" o\ the 1990 Wit~ lii~IOI}' Worhhop", Prtlexl~. VoL Z No. I 
{Winter 199(1), p. 80. 
Gareth Sredman-J<Jnes, "lnl><Jdul"tion", Languag~s of Class: Stud lies In Engli~h Working Clan llfilol')', 1832-
11182 {Cambridge, Cambridge University Pr~ss, 1983). 
French cuhur;.~l history.~ In the CSA thi-. ..~ppr.• .. u:h j, ..~J,o ''.:11-l''I.Jhli-,h..:J. Ag;tin. I calln•'l 
pro\'idc .J 'uncy: c::xampks ol' thi~ :.~ppr .. a..:h .u..: Clillnn l r,,;,·, ''')r~ ~1n th..: Jiscur~in: lugic nf 
!\Clllcr iJc,llog,r'< aml the Cumarof'fs' wurk un th\.' c••tl,tituti•m ,,f African \\\lrking-cl;a~~ 
r..ubjccti1 ity.') 
Inside the country. h• •wc1 er. I here is com p.tral i1 ~· I\ littk· puhli~h..:J ''''r~ nn I hi~ terrain. and it 
ha' been in the lield5. of archel1logy. anthr~•pllll'g~ .tn<.l lit..:r;try ~tuuil· ' th~11 the in.,•ght'- ul 
di!ocoursc analy~i!> ha1e been Jt:plo)cd in •mal~:<.ing Snuth African pnlitic">. It r..ccms. ho\\L.:\l~r. 
that some ..:urrcnl n:search is starting w :.~JJn:'' th..:-...: lJU..: .. ti,ms in thl.' liL' Jd of -,,,uth r\l'ric;tn 
history. Anurew Mt:rriliclJ's analy~is of the Ji ... wuN: pf tht: ;o.;ati,·..:s R..:rprc;,.::nwtilc <.. tluncil ha;. 
already rccei1·eJ <.orne c~pu'\urc. 10 while Sh..~micl kppic h;,h Jcplmcd 'i•Hnc of the anal~tical 
tonls of an Ahhus~crian approJch to the ~tuJ~ ttl pnpular l'Uhurc in Di<.trid Si:-:. 11 Lou-M.:~ric 
Kruger·., current work nn ,·olk.!lmned~r Ji.,wur,c. 11hich IOllk<. in Jet;.il at the di.!>cursive 
con~titution of ~•H.:ial identity anJ g.cnJcr amnng Aftik,tncr \\Offil'n abn take!. lorward thi~ 
projecL 1! My o~n work on liberalism '\hl>uiJ b\.' \l' t.:n ao.;, n.:cupying the ... pace opencJ by thc~e 
project.!>, and a., an auempt to continut: anJ furt ht: r 1 hi~ work. 
Where due~ this lcale me In relatton to my nri~inal pwj..:c:t'.' On liOL.' kid. anu alrnO'\l lu my 
<,urpri.!lc. I saw many uf my original c11nn:rn~ ri~UH' in rn1- L.'\l·ntual ;tccnunt of tht.: :-.ICL/AR~h 
career, alheit in a changeJ form. fl..lr c\cntu;lll~. the: ~~~~r~ ~~!the 'iCL/ARM h the o,tor~ uf how 
liherali.!>m came to ~ct.: South Africa in (l·rm-. ,,[ ;m l'IL'r-inlTl'.J~ing Ji\iu..: b..:ol\ll'c:n the iJcal i..lr.u 
the :lctual, between the \\Orld of rc;,<.on anJ the 1iuk:nt rc<tlm 11f irratiun>.~lity. 
But on another levd. I wa~ al'lle Ill write thi~ acwunl nnl~ hccau"c I haJ left hchinJ mt: the wa~ 
in ~hich I had originally formubh:d m} qul.'">tinn. Firstl~. LIS my work progrc'>seJ. it ht..'camc 
ckar that many of thl' initial diffit"ultic~ l h:.~J l''ir~· ri~·nc~·J - th~.· trouhlc I haJ had to f,,rmul<tll' 
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incoherence at the heart of my origiaaJ project. Originally, I had been concerned about the 
problematic nalure of many South African mteUectual5' understanding of the relation between 
rational aiticism and po1iticaJ practice. I bad 'hoped that it would be possible to stan resolving 
this problem if one could place it in a globaJ way and show its historical nature, if one could, in 
otbu words, show from the •pri\li.Jeged• vi~wpoint of historicaJ ~aterialism the sociaJ processes 
that made such a misconception possible. The problem of such an enterprise wa.4i that it bad 
something of the character of pulling oneself up by one's bootstraps: there is something 
incoherent about a project in which one recognises that one's own underst·anding. of society is 
problematic- and then tries to explain that problem in terms that Jay claim to an (in prindple) 
unproblematic, privileged perspective on society! Thi5 is a problem 1 believe my fellow-students 
from the Department of Political Philosophy Honours class also found. A discourse which 
simultaneously asserted and denied its own radically problematic nature condemned one to 
shuttle futilely between these two poles: one was doomed to be continually aware of the 'flawed' 
or 'distorted' nature of sodaJ understanding, yet always straining to produce a global, 
transparent. all-encompassing explanation of that distortion; to be continually hovering on the 
edge of describing concrete problems, yet always postponing that description because one first 
has to understud the geoeraJ context in which th.is prob1em occurs. It is precisely iD the ability 
of post-stnJcturalism to sidestep such circularities that its attraction lies for me. It acknowledges 
the discursive nature of political understanding without exempting itself from the consequences 
of discursMty; and it rejects the project of prO\'iding global. totalisiog accounts in favour of a 
concept of enquiry as a provisional and open-ended activity. 
This awareness of the status of its own interpretations has prompted some South African 
scholars to take the post-structuralist viewpoint as implying a sort of relativism that prohibits the 
anaJyst from making any conclusioas.13 It is exactly this reading of post-structuralism we reacted 
agailut in 1986. ,Post-structuralist reading has often been interpreted in this way; as Nicolas 
Visser. pointed out recently in his keynote address to the University of the Witwatersrand 
History Workshop. the failure of post-structuralism to anract any serious atteotion from South 
African social historians is at least partly due to the way in which current theory •can indeed 
function as a sort of inteUectuaJ black hole, from which no light can escape". Visser observes 
that 
" ... many progressive historians would be likely to feel frustrated and even outraged by 
the work of Hayden White on narrativity in historic.aJ inquiry ... Unless read with due 
suspicion. and within a broad context of current theoretical work, White and others 
working in a similar vein can have the effect of aJtogether disabling historical and social 
See for eumplc Ed.wan1 Prench, "'The Reading World oC Black Worten• (Paper p.resented at the: Africa 
Seminar, Centre for African Studie6. Un~n>ity of C.pe TOWII, 1 August 1990). 
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inquiry, since there appears to be, in a particularly infamous (and to be fair, 
misunderstood) formulation by Derrida, nothing outside the text, no world of 
experience and connict available for examination."'"' 
If I have moved back towards an appreciation of post-structuralist analytical strategies, it is 
partly because this emphasis on the "relativist" implications of discourse analysis seems to me 
misplaced. Though the post-structuralist insistence on the provisional nature of every 
interpretation does make a return to the search for absolute. ultimate grounding impossible, that 
does not seem to me a serious or even a very interesting problem. ll means merdy that every 
position is also a position in struggle. Thus my work has not displayed the involved self-
reflexiveness that has come to be the trademark of much deconstructive criticism. I have 
attempted to provide a coherent account of the logic of a specific set of discourses. I am 
thoroughly aware that I am providing "just another interpretation· and that this interpretation is 
structured by a discourse which has its own blind spots. That observation is implicit in the post· 
structuralist methodology. But I have not seen it fit to make this comment explicit, to make my 
analysis, as it were, a commentary upon its own provisionality. If post-structuralist thought has 
no more to contribute to political struggle and theory than the dictum that every reading is also 
a misreading. or (as I shall argue in the pages that follow) every political identity is always-
already unfaxed, it is doomed to marginality. Very little is to be gained simply by disappearing 
into a pre-existing discourse of impenetrable technicality which simply mirror Derrida's moves 
without making them mean something to "outsiders". I believe that the de constructive sU'ategies 
of Derrida and others do have a crucial role to play in South African scholarship. But if that is to 
happen, the concrete implications of these positions should be set out. 
In this thesis, I have tried to do this: 1 have endeavoured to show how post-structuralism can say 
something definite about specific problems, and that it can do so in simple English. The 
condu.sions I draw in the pages that follow should the.refore not be seen as anempts to attain 
closure, attempts to "end the cono.:ersation", to put myself oulSide the critical text and to establish 
an authoritative reading which is itself impervious to critical analysis. Indeed, insofar as they arc 
condusions, they are invitations to criticism, points for re-opening debate. 
Andries du Toit 
Cape Town 
September, 1990 




This thesis has been the work of many hands and minds. Though I must take responsibility for 
its final form and content, I must also acknowledge the debts I have incurred in writing it. 
These debts are too numerous to mention: since its inception, this project has been the subject 
of countless discussions, formal and informal, with frie.nds and colleagues; their comments and 
criticisms have been i.nvaluable in shaping my own thoughts and influencing the course my 
research eventually took. If this dissertation succeeds in synthesising different disciplinary 
approaches, if has succeeded in showing how philosophy is relevant to h.istory, and how history 
can inform philosophy, this is because it was to a large degree born in dialogue and discussion 
with many people across disciplinary lines. 
Firstly, ~ wouJd like to thank my two supervisors, Professor Colin Bundy and Dr. Patrick 
Harries. In the first year·and·a·half of my research, Colin Bundy's guidance in helping me draw 
the conn.ections between the ph.ilosoph.ical questions I wished to address and the concrete 
h.istorical problems I wanted to study was immensely valuable. When my methodological 
bearings changed, Patrick Harries took over and provided much invaluable. comment and 
encouragement. Particularly useful was his work in helping me resolve the difficult question of 
the narrative structure of this work: It was his criticism, above al~ that helped me concretise 
many of the points I wished to make, and to weave philosophical and historical argument into a 
fabric that was, if not seamless, at least whole. 
Beyond these obvious debts, l must also acknowledge the influence of those whose teaching has 
shaped my own thinking in past years. Above all, I must thank Pro£essor Johann Degenaar: his 
philosophical rigour. his moral and intellectual integrity, and his critical commitment to truth 
and justice has been an example and inspiration to many students at the University of 
SteUeobosch. Also at this department were my father, Professor Andre du Toit, and Andrew 
Nash. who challenged us to bring the philosophical traditions of the Department to bear on the 
concrere realities of the political struggle in South Africa. During the first months of my 
research work, weekly discussions with Andrew Nash and my feUow students Lou·Marit Kruger 
and Jaco Malan were a source of intellectual stimulation and provided an important intellectual 
point of refereoce. At the University of Cape Town, Andrew Merrifteld was a valued colleague 
and, during the stand of the 23 conscientious objectors in August 1987, a close political comrade. 
During the time when I was returning to post·structuralist philosophy, he provided much 
encouragemt:nt and, ht!lh infonnally and as a memher of the Political Studies Department's 
reading group on ideology. he made counties~ valuablt: and creative suggestions. 
My trip hl England would not have been pos~ible v.itnout the assistance of many people. At the 
Department of Government at the University of Essex. I found discussions with Alettc Norval 
and other studcnls in Dr Erncsto Laclau's postgraduate course on discourse analy..,is hdpful and 
stimulating. I am aho indebted to the gcm:rosity of Bunty Biggs. Sue and Neil Rice, Bill 
Johnson, Anne Brown, Dylcsia Forhcs. William Ogkthorpe, Greg Dunn, Alix Hodson: at a time 
when I had very liule funds, they made it pos-'>inle for me to survi,·c and do research at the same 
time. 
Furthermore, I am indebted to friend~ and acquaintance!> ~·hose patience and generosity made 
the writing of thi-'> thcsil> possible. There arc too many tn mention hl·rc, but [ mu:,t single out 
David Waddilove and Johann Hamman, who made their per!'.onal computers available to me at 
all convenient and inconvenient hours. Fran Biggs provided much personal !>upport; during the 
final months of preparing this dissertation, her proofr~tading skills and comments were of great 
value . 
IDASA kindly provided me with an airline ticket to England. Money from thl· LICT Research 
Scholarship provided '>Upport for my research during 1988; this was supplemented by an 
additional grant from a UCT Research Associateship. On two .separate occasions, the Harry 
Oppenheimer Institute for African Studies provided funding for research trip~ to vil>it archives in 
Durban, Pictermaritzllurg, Johannesburg and Harare. The financial assistance of the Institute 
for research Development towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions express-ed in 
this work or conclusions arrived at arc those of the author and arc not to be attributed to the 
Institute for Research Devclopmenl. 
Lastly I must thank the ex-members of the NCL/ARM and their friends and l'amilics. The 
business of oral history, of turning people's private li\'es into material for an academic 
dissertation, ha~ at times an element of the vampirical about it. Though we, as historians, may 
be impressed with the broad political justifications for what we are doing, such justificatiom. 
must never allow us to forget that we arc not only li.'>tem:rs but aho invaders. The people we 
inten·iew may object to being put under a microsope, and may find our inquisitiveness, guided 
by the imperatives of research, alienating and far removed from heir own concerns. Throughout 
this project, [ have been impreso:.cd and moved by the generosity of the people I interviewed. 
Their readinc!'.s to help me, and their honesty and frankne~s in reliving: often painful events nave 
made working on this thesis a rewarding, involving and often unsenling project. I cannot repay 
my d~·bt to them. I hope I have not hurieJ them undcr a heap of (nnt n.mcs. and that lhi~ star) 
comey~ ~omet hing of 1 heir ..:om mit me nt and courage. 




Introduction: Sabotage and the Politics of 
Frustration 
1.1 'llte NCUARJ\tl in hi.o;tory 
At approximately 4.15 pm on Friday 24 July 1964, John Harris, an accountancy teacher at 
Johannesburg's Damelio College, placcll a large brown suitcase containing 8 sticks of dynamite, 2 
gallons of petrol and a timing device in the centre of the concourse at Johannesburg's main railway 
station. I At 4.20 he telephoned the South African Railway Police at their office in Johannesburg, 
anooundng that he was from the Africao Resistance Movement. and told them about the bomb. He 
asked them to clear the concourse at once. He also called the Rand Daily Mail and the 
'frnnsvaler.2 
There is no question that the phone calls were received: that fact was later admitted in court. For 
some reason, though, no action was taken. 3 Wheo the bomb went off at 4.33, therefore. the public 
had not been warned about it in any way. Twcnty·two people were injured in the blast; one of them, 
a n.year old woman called Ethel Rhys, died in hospital on August 19 of complications resulting 
from injuries sustained in the bt<JSL.4 Thus it came about, paradoxically, that the fi~t person to die 
as the victim of an anti-apartheid bomb attack: was killed by a white liberal member of an 
organisation unequivocally and explicitly opposed to tbe taking of human life. 
2 
3 
S v Fr.-d~rkk Jo;>hn lbrrl>i, Supreme Coun, Transvaal Provincial Division, Pretoria, Case no. 453/64, pp. 392, 
402, 415. 433. 
Op. dt., p. 421, 439-440. 
South Africa o ln~tilute for Race Rela lions Press Clipping:< Collection (William Cull en Ubrary, Un iversi 1y of !he 
Wil'-'·atcrsr~nd, AD 191Z),"Thr~t gol coils befor~ tirn~ bomb blew ~r", Rand DaUy Mall, 22 September 1964. (I 
u n u~fnrlunatdy not provid~ any more specific rdcrence to any newsp•p.er report in lh is cotlec lion: ~ince my 
peru !>a I, I he lnMil~lc's origin•! C3l3logu ing syslc m )los he en r..placcd wilb rbe tihra ry's own. I have lbercfore 
included story lilies for clarity of reference.) Gordon Winter alleges !hal lhe Railway police in I urn phoned lhe 
head of the Bureau of Slate Secu rl! y, Genera t H. J. van den Bergh, who im m cdiatdy in formed I he then minister of 
Juslic~. John Vof>1ler (IIl!oido Bo-.s: Soulh 1\frlu.'s Srcrrl PDUc~ (HMmondsworlh, Penguin, 1981) p. 96). No 
indepcndcn I corroboration of lh is allegation eKisL~. Win lcr also does nol uplain wb y a clio n was no I 1.a ken lo dear 
lhe concourse 
"l'nrs for girl victim <•f bomb", lllt A~us,10 September 1964. 
" 
Jnd~~d. I he "ii'TY ,,f th~ Afric<~n Rt:»i~wnc.: \I"' ..:rnc·nt .• 1~ the- grouping: th~t ralkd it~df 1 he 
National C ommilt.:t: fur Lih.:ration came to he knu11 n · j, m arkcJ by paradliX. It 11 a~ a ~mall 
organi~~lli<•n .:nmpu!-.t:d mainly t)f midJk-cbo.,~ S1>Uth .--\(ric;.tn 11hitt.,, 11ho".: aim 11a~ ILl fig:htlur 
a dt:mncratic, non- racial and ~m·i;![i.,t St>uth .-\1 riel . Their '>tr;at..:g~ fnr achie,·ing thi~ g•lal wa ... ntl\ 
th~ org;uli,atinn of the hlad South Afric<Jn wurkin~ d,t,..,, hut the ~ahotagc of power pylon~. 
railway ">ig.nal cab[t:, ;Jfld ~l<mdard~. Thc gn•up n~·h·r numhcreJ much rn<lTl' than fifty people. 
and it~ core of active memhcr' wa~ even -~rn;Jik·r_ lh Ctlnu:plinn tlf cont:r<.:lt' polilical gl1al, wa~ 
vagu~:, and tht: Tllle of <.abut age a~ a \tralcg; 11,1, n...:1cr thc•lri~cJ or explicitly ~IJ.t<O'd. Though 
~nmc of ils member<. ~ilw tht:ir t: \"\:nl ual mk .~~ th>Jt nf huildin!! a mas~ libcratiun army, <.~.nJ 
though many hoped that their action~ \\nuld o,park t•ll ,, ma:-<, upri'>lng. th~:y made no attempt at 
<'r~aniscJ contact with th~: African pt:\>pk the~ w;mh:J to lit>aatc: lht:ir conta~·ty. with the 
African ~atinn'-11 Ct1ngrc~.., (.-\NC) and Pan African (\mgre~~ (PAC) v.c:rc minimal. anJ ~Xl"c:pt 
f1)r a few mn~tly putative link.~ with black politic~ I hey ''PC rattd amo.,t enlirdy nutsidc th.: 
dominant stream of rna.,., politic.~ in S"uth A frit:cl, ThtlU!!h the nrg;mi.~ation pre~~ ntcJ a defiant 
facade to the South African gm-.:rnm~.:nl \\ht:n it \\:.t~ acti\~. it uff~:n:d .,urpri.singly lictle 
rc~i'>tance tn I he gnn;rnmcnt when unnwercu b:- the ;.ccurity police. Tn m<Jkc matter~ wor~e. a 
key memhcr of the ''rgani!>ati1m, AJri.m Ldt \1 kh. \\ ho ... l:L!ml'J to pcr~nnify the id~:uli ... m. 
Jctcrmin<-~til'n and integri1y of tht: NCL'~ ~-llUthful mL·mbcr'\ anJ \\hP had him~df cmphasi;;.cd 
the nee-d f1)r .,ecrecy in the organi~a1ion, ~:mkd up cunfc~.,ing to the pulicl' f::~r mort= than he wa" 
even supp(•sed to know, and hctr a yeLl his a ... t ,.,_hill' fricnJ~ ;,tn<l Cllmradcs hy tc.,tifying against 
tht:m in court. 
It h no .,urprio.,c. then, that c\·alualilm 11f ih .,hllrl carca. both in~iJL' .tnd out~idc th~.: democrati<.: 
movement. has been con~i~tentl~ negali\c. Critic~ ~~mp.lthctil' to thc l"nngre~~ Lraditiun ha\e 
generally critici~cd their failure to wurk cffccti\cl~ with the ANC and ~~1uth Afric<tn Communi~! 
Party ( SACP) anJ have traced thi~ failure tu the fact of their liberali~m: uthers have .lgain seen 
their <.:anlinal sin as lying precisely in th~:ir ~t: 1 rayal t•f lihcra!i~m. In cit her ca~c th~.:y ;trc usuJll~ 
re pn:~e n tt: d, a:-. Eddie W d1stc r has pt!int cd uu 1. ~ \ <.1 .. n ;~i1 c. arrogant anJ c gut i">t ica I grouping··. 5 
Gail Gerhart, fnr t:Xilmplt:, Jc~cribcs lhe NCLj.-\R;'\.1 a~ ·an ..tmateuri~h underground sabot:Jgc 
organi~alion of white uniwr,ity ~ruJ.:nt~ and mcmho.:r., of 1 hi.' Liberal Party"".'' a ... urn mary that 
has been echoed hy critics as ideolugic:~lly n:mL\1 cJ .1.<. \!art in Lega~sick ,.md Alan P<tton.7 
5 Ld<l•c Webster. Tlcg) for a Rc,,•lutlc•J\al\ "' C .I_ f1n1c1 L \11'1,'3 .Svu!h p,~pcli'MI.s . D:~,- IJ Plullp tf'JX-1-) ~ 
rc"cw·· .... rrka P~T\p<'(the _,n 25 (J'Jti-n p 7ro. 
G.l!l Gcrh.lrl. Black Po .. er in Soulh \frint: lh~ ..... tutiun or an idrolOii!J ( Lloll<lcm. l Oi\C~I\y cof (dli[oJnra 
Prc>:!i.. l <J 78 l- p 253. 
Fnr e~ampk~ nf the wa~ the "\U /.\R\111"~ l'ee11 rcu"!r<~lt<.J ,cc U. Can~r ,m<.J I "-amc hmu Prrllt'~l In 
Challe~: .I, Documenta11 Hi ... to.-,. of ~fri<'an Pnlllin in South Uric~. Vu1. 3 ( ..,tdnfnr<.J. Hoover Jn~!ltul!nn 
Pre~s- l<:l77). p. loSS; \laum·e llommd_ l"<~pri,·mo Uha~': tlw Slno~le rnr Human Righi\ in South .\lri•·a 
(I nwnto. l ultur<~ma. l<:l8l J. p. 15~: R v. Johll'""· Huu l.on11- "ill South \frka Suni•e·~ {! onJon. 
Such. a view of the NCL/ AR\1 is nul ~tltugdht: r inaccurat.:. But in tnt pages, tnat folluw ! ~hall 
~ugge:>t that it faib to come to grip~ with th.: wmpkx prohkm-. rai~d hy the hi:.tnry Clf thi" 
!>I range 3nd f :.hcina Ling organ i"o.~tion . ll i~ t n1..: t h:ll i 1 ~-. member.' we rc libl.' ra b, ~uspici11 u~ uf 1 he 
ASC and the SACP anJ unable 1<.1 link up their ~trugglc 1\ith that of the pcuplc they \Vishcd to 
liherate . It i~ a!~o true that -;omc 111' thl."m \\ t:rc in th~.: .: nd <.hown to he nut uf th~ir Jepth. unabk 
to live up to the high <.takes nf the grim anJ \'iuknt gam\.' they \\t:re playing. But it is ncce'>sary 
to go further tnan this. 
In the first place, it is intcrc~ting to nntc thai. unin~r~al though the dismissal of the NCL/AR:Vt 
is, remarkably lillie is kno\l;'n of th.c actual hi,ttuy of the organisation. The only book-kngth 
treatml.'nl of this organisation, Mile~ Brnkl.'nsha and Robert Knowlc~· Tbe Fourth of July 
Raids,8 i~ somewhat lading a:> a historical work. Not tmly i" thl.' author~' c:xplanati,1n of thl' 
organi!',ation's choice l'f ~trall:gy quite pruhkmatic.'> but their ... tory also '>Ufkrs lrnm factual 
defiCiencies. Tht: book's almust cxdusin:: rdbncc: on m;1t~rial from the Cape Town trial mean~ 
rhat <tlmo5t the entire hi'itory of the group before 1%.3 is ldt out. 10 These Jdiciencies have 
tended to he duplicated hy later accounts of the organi:;ation.l I 
In this thesis I ~hall thcrcforc attempt two ta!>h. In tht: fir;L pl'-ICC I ~hall try to ~ct <,lraight the 
historical record on the career of this paraJo:\i~:al grouping. But more than that is needed: I ;hall 
also, in the second plate, cxplorl! the political anJ Jiscursi\·c underpinning_~ of this organisation\ 
commitment [0 sa\lola!!e. A closer investi~at ion llf their hi.itory docs nlll only cnallcnge '>Orne of 
the accepted truism~ ahout the i'CL/ARM ~tpry. it wil! alsn tlmm up new quc~tions. It will 




:'v!ac:'v!LIIan. !9771, P· ~fl: R. Ull">:;on .. UL'il':ln Uh.-ration ''lllt!OIPnl" Conl<'mponlr) ''"'Slgl~\ aaain~t "hife 
minoritJ rule. l Lclndon. 0\ft>rd l n\\er>~l! Pres> fur th.: ln~tllut~ for Rare Relations. 1972) p. 5!i 
Cape Ttw•n. "itmon.:hum. t%5. 
The'e w1ll t>e dt~<ussed I~ 1er . see pp. I u . ~~ J 
While in some pla.:es tl1is lw, r~>UI!cd mcreh '" gup~. thac arc tll llcrs "'her~ the authors ~em to ha•·e 
n:~orh:d to outngh.t guess\\ or~ tu fill in th~ hlanl. 'ra~c) \\'c .ee . lor e\an1ple . Ldtv.Kh fmnHng the '\C!. 
~long ..,.; th RanJc•lph \ 1gne anll D~ nn" I to;;::;:. 1 dunn g. 1 he~ >pendale. dn n k111g w,s,,w; at the "Pt;; ~ tld 
Whistle" tn RonL!ellCl~t'h' (op. l'il .. p J7) ). '"111 the d~ei!ii0\1 10 go twer to 'abola~e l'>etng t~kcn after the 
formatton (ltK, dt .. ,..,.., Jlso p. ~0). Tl1c! ill'l'<'H'd R,,[,nt \\"atoon and V1gne <~11 e.\CC,sl\el] central and 
rummandmg ~latu> (op. t'il •. p. {J(J; ~c m~ CL'IlHnem' '''1 p. 13\ t>etow.). This clcv«loon ul personaiLtie~ " ·ho 
,.·ere nm at all rn ren1 ml coni rol neJ 1c~ real 1n.·on~o~1~ IKIC> 111 1 he1 r ;;n·ou nt; m an ellort 1 a n•at.c sen~c ul 
lhese they spcrula1c that Wat,on. Htt;t:" ~nd \ 'tgnc ma) ha1·~ hccn tncmhers of a greater. u~ YCI 
undiS('O\ ·cred Ct)n~p,ran top. t'il •. p. ~'!). 
\lore dt't'\orate Lli~n•~wm; ul the ,.( !.1.\R\I ~rt.: tu he (,,und 111 'o,l S.-\S. i);,.,._.n.,lon in the 
Rank.': "hile oppor,.ition to .\partheid (lid I ~utcd. l'!SJ ). pp 33 · W Tom Lodge corrc<.'tly emph~st.><!> the 
rot~ 111 the origm of the ' 'Cl./. \ R.\.1 of the gro.•" 1h nf" left nppo"uon It• the SA.CP in the Em~rgcncy. (Tom 
lodge. Blat·k Pol ilk~ in South .\frica .,;nco: I~=- 1 Joh~nnc.sl>urg. Ra' an Pre~~- l9tB ). pp. 2..10 - 2-4 I) . 
Paton\ anounr ol the :'\CLj,·\ R.'l.! rehe~ hea\Lh· on The Fourth of July Rolid~. prc~s repon~ nl the Cape 
To"' 'II tnal. and tnformation aho1n the Hari'IS ..:a~c made ;/\ ail~lll~ 10 him by [rnic Wcnllel and Ruth 
Ha~man . 1 'ec Journe~ Conlinu~d: \n .\ulohiol!raph~ 1 Cape \o\0. n. Da\ 1d Ph1hp. !<1881 p. 225: IU nd<Jiph 
\',gnc. "Journey's [nil" The South \f.-ican Re•il"l• of Book~. \ 'ol.2 \u I. ( J p. !~). 
~Latem~nl Jut::- nol hc.:lp u~ uoder~tanJ wh~ th~-.: lihl..'r<tl' (.JOh.' ,,, ,tel in th.: ~~ay th.:y uirJ. Til 
unrler~tand the meaning of their choice f11r ,,,b,,t,tg.c.... it' ... ignilicancc f,,r them a~ a political acl. 
we ... hJII ha\C lol look mnn: du!.dy ill tho: hi,h•ry ;1nJ ~~~~~~· ,,f ~~·uth African lihcr:.dism. Wr: ~h011l 
h;m: "' lr~ l<' unr:..\'d ~t1mC of it'> Ji-.cur,ih· l;tbric. JnJ im...:,tig.o..ttc the implication!. of it<. 
underlying. philiJ:mphicaJ pre~uppnsit iPn~ in 1 h..: mnlt:\t qf th~· ~uut h African P•llitical ~trugglc!- in 
Lhc l%0s. 
!\-i.y purpose i~ thu, ntlt to lJUC~li<lO the nq:<lli\1.! term" nf the popul~r judgem~nl on tht: 
NCL/ARM. In a <;Cn!-c. the o;trongc~t argum.:nt .tgain~t th.:ir "tr.tiL'g~ i~ the t.iCI of it~ failure. 
But tu ~imply di5mis.~ chcm because of th;tl lailur.: jr:, n<ll cmJUgh. Such a Jismi,~al J11e~ not 
amount tu a political undcr~l:-~nding. 
Th~: qut•stiun may ,,f ct•Ur~c b~: .~~ked whdher thi~ ta;k ,,f unrJcrslanJing the: failutc of the 
NCL/AR.!\-1. politically is til all wunh\O.ilc. Th~: :..tll~\Wr. it !>hnukl he ~tatcd at the nut~ct. doc~ nlll 
lie in their impact tln South African hi..,tury. It ''t•ulu ,)f cour~~ h~.: wrong to sa~ that the 
NCL/ ARM \·ani!>hcd from the arena of P•'lit ic.., \\ ith~)U\ ~~ ripplt:: 1 ht: cru!>hing. tll NC'L/ ARM 
dealt a painful blow ~pccifically to thc rclati\d~ <,mall and cohc!->ive nc\wt>rK llf South African 
llber:11..,. 1 ~ But the Liberal Purl~ fllllmkrcu 1111 th'-· much nwn.: ma.,,i~c and trc;,cherllUS rock~ of 
black radicali~ation and ,..,·hit~ rcuctinn. 11 l'l1mparcu fo l he \h'i!!hl of ~tat.: rcpre ... ~i•ln in g..:neral 
and the Prohibition of Improper lntcrfcrcnc..: Act in ro.Jtticul<~r. 1 ~ the NCL'!o role \\i1"> minor anrJ 
contributory, merely a ~uh~iJiary para~raph in In~· ''"r~ pf lihaa]i..,m·s tr.,ublcd fMtunc-. in 
Sl)Uth Africa. 
In the field of action it had cho~t:n l11r ihdf, nwrt:l)\er . its failure \\i:iS pitiful. N~.::-.1 to the 
ma~!>ive and oppressive weight l'f apartheid aou thc immense t~sk of ~llCiali!>t liberation the 
l'hc '\:Clj.\R.\f~ rullap\e prUI·,.Jed rhc gO\crnnl<'l\1 Willi 'Jhli•l'le anJI11U1Htinn "11h "'luch ll could 31liJCI. 
the Lthcral P.Jnl' cSee. for example .\0 1'112 ... ~~ ,,1() t'11g. L r>r'Cr'>l!clle al aangel.ccr" . Da~~:brrrk. ~,. 
Sond!lJ!nuu~ l5 '\twcnlhcr J')(>-1 . 111 "h"·h mudl pia~ ~~ llt.oJc ,,f tltc ho:;h pcr.:cntagc of lil,cral PdCI~ 
m~mt>cn an\l people ~~W\'IdiC<.I wllh I he ·.,r.,n' Lrl\1\ ~r~IIIC" 111 111c mcml't:r~lttp of rhc :'\Cl. See ..1bo Janet 
Ruben son. Liberalhm in Suulh .Uric:a, 1'1~11 • l'lf'-l 11 hf.,rJ. U.uc•"""'· 1'>71) p. 22-l. fhe rollap~c • •f I he 
~CL wa~ lhcrcforc aho ~tguiti•~•H m 11' 1'111.'\1 ,,,,either hhc1,,1, f'c>r man> ~Hncmhcr> ot the Pan~ . the 
-r-.ctra~.d- of hhcralhnl l•y nlCillhcr~ who h.Jd 1Hit1CU lh~ 'CL ,\R..\1 ill 3 1111\c \\hen rhe rarr\ Wd~ 
hclcagucrcJ h}· II!> cncnltc> 10 I he nght. ~nJ "hen "' c:arhcr lll>rc• ~c.:mcd doutucd IU l~1lurc. wa> a b•llcr 
and soml:llmC., ,Jcntorah~mg blo" . .-\Jan Pal•'"· l••r e'a•nplc. l1<h llc,cril>cd the dl>(nvcry of lit-erals· 
mcmher>htp •JIId lhC Sca11nn Bomt> <~>" 11,.,) ,.f the ·t\lclM pJutful' c'ent., 111 h.- life tnp.rit .. pp. !36. 2..1t)) 
.\c<nn.hng to Paton. the cr•~"Jr: ""a~ d ,tJ,.,·h.mg c,p~;nctu:c IC\r lhc :"'3liOOal Ch.iirman olllJ ll\c 'iltic>nal 
f'n: .. Jcnr. f,lr che 'aTton~li••~- and e~pcn>~lll fnr .. B J Y,>r,tcr. n rro' tuct.l chc .l"~ufil'iltion lor all lltc1r 
SC('Unty lcg.>latoon. fflr The power 10 dclatn \\llh~>lll lhargc nr tr1al . ior lhc power to l,an ano.J hant\h, and lor 
the taKill:!, ~wa~ oC \li:JI pn"·ers from llle IUdtr!Jt'\ .tnd llanJin~ lilclll 111cr 10 chc \.tinslcr. Jr JU~IIflcJ the 
'vhntsrcr·~ tamous remar~ thai the comnHHH~l.' ~oiled pcopc 11111 chal 11lc hl,erals led people inro amhu~h 'o 
thJt the,· n11ght he killed .' {op. rit. pp !~' · ~~S . l 
Jane• Rohc:rhi)A. np. cit •. p. !Jt1 
\nc.l'it. 
organis;~tion had emhark.::J nn, ih li~t o•f ~C\plnit~. though ~[K'aking ,fa n:rt:.~in bra\<:r~. are pun~ 
indeed. When mo.:asured again~! the ,other Mg:ani~atiun~ thilt han: taken up arms ag:aimt the 
South African <.I<!IO:, ih failuro: i~ .:1en more· lob1iPu~; P''l!''· ~hnrl·li1.:d a' it was, made more of a 
mark th;:m did the ~CL, mobili,ing th"u~and' .-\lric;tn<, lo f'P Olt:r \;l imurrcctinnary 1iuknce 
again~! the state: some year~ afta ih intdnal kaJ..:r,hip h.1d been destroyed, its legacy ,till 
in.<.pircd ~poradic outbreaks of r.c~istJ.ncc. L" .-\ nJ tho •ug:h U mkhllntn we Si,...l: has ncn:r bcc;1mc 
a m:~jor and independent l·,,rce in .l:.o.,uth Afric.m politics cnmparabk to the role of guerilla 
moq:ments elscwhcrc. it attained fur a tim,; a Soli,; and undispull'U centrality in th.c armed 
... uuggk against apartho.:id that. ro;tw,<,pecl i1 <:ly. make the NCL/ ARM seem ino,ignificant indeed, 
Why then pay attention w their story'? Their Je mise ha., some value as a cautionary tale, t11 t'oc 
sure, and the courage of mo:.t of its member., in >Jcti1ely nppusing apartheid and facing: the 
consequcnces of their actions must b.c .IC~nowkdg:o;!d. But is our .cncrgy not more u~dully .,pent 
in looking at the political mo\'ements that ha\e m>~uc ;.~ Jiffercncc - in chronicling, for cx<~mplc. 
th.:- ~trugglc of South Africa·~ \\orkt:r!> from 1 he ll'LI t11 CO~A TU, the growth of popular 
militancy in the tuwn~hip.,, the hi~t,,r~ l,f the ANC. the rise uf Black Con!>ciou~ncs~ in the 
sc1·emics, ;md the re~urgence uf the Cung:rc~~ t raditiun a;, a \·e hide for m;.~ss mobilisation in the 
eig.h.tic.,·? 
I can only begin tu re~pond ltl this qu.:~tion in thl' fin,,l pag.o.:s nf this dis~atatil>n. By then it will 
he dear that the prohlem.~ rai~cd hy the hi-,tnr~ of the NCL/.-\R M arc of a particularly npen-
<!nded kind, and do not admit uf a fin;d and cl~l~ed-llff an~wer. I can huwever make two 
introJucwry puints at this ~tagc. Fir<,\ ly. their ~wry prm iJcs u~ with a valuable chance tu look 
in detail at ~orne of the political anJ m<Jral t rauiti•>m that charach:riscd the di~coursc of 
libcrali~m at the time. Understanding the t'>~ilurc , ,[ th~o: NCL/ ARM will help us understand 
some aspects of the more general probh:m~ f.tc,·J b~ lihcrali.,m in Snuth Al"riea. Furthermore, 
as I ~hall explain in my final chaptcr. these traditions arc ~ignificant for an under~tanding, not 
only of South African liheralism, but also ,)f the white left more go;nerally. In that nmluding 
argumcnt I shall attem pi tp explain more fully 1\hy and how the i~:.ues raised by the failure tlf 
t ht: :'.J CL/ ARM arc of sum e import a nee to 1 us in 1 he changing p(llit ics of the 1 <J9Us. 
Secondly, this dissertatiun abo sen es a pur po~t: hcyund accounting for the hirth ;.md death ol 
the NCL/ ARM. Intertwined with the cnn~iJerati\)n of the political Jnd historical problematic of 
this ill-fated grouping there is also a ~d of thL'uretical pruhkms rt:garding the theory of 
15 See Tom LoJgc. "I he Poqo insurrecunn. l'lill · J%8". (Paper proent~t.l ~~ the Confcr~nc·c on 'Cia!.S. 
Communot} ilt1t.l Cunniu: Local per~pectl' es. at the I li~1on Worhh<'P· l nl\er!<ll} of I he Wirv.at~~ranu. 
Johanne;hu rg. 3 l hnua ry - ~ fehruaf\ I 'li\J J. 
~ubjcctivity and ideology. Although my primary intent h:1-. hl'..:n fl1cus.:d thr,,ug.hnul on the t •• .,k 
llf explaining the organi~ation·~ career. tht: path. nl m~ r..:-,~·;m:h has time OJnJ timL' a~pin hrought 
me up again.,t these thcoretil'al question~. Th,_:,._. rrohl.:m .... far l'rnm heing marginal or cxlernal 
to an umlcr'>landing of the NCL, will pn11iJ.: .1n impl•rt;mt 1\.:1 (<I comprch~:nJing their cour-.e of 
ac1inn. This dis,;enation thu'> abo functiuno.. as ,Jn ~xtcnJ,•J mcth\,Jt>ll'gical argument fur the 
deployment by hi:-torians of the tools or diSC\)Uf.'\c .wal~ -,j,, 
Thc:,c two concerns - the historical and thl: mL·th.odull'gical - are by no mean~ '>t:paratc and 
external to each other. Indeed, the force of thl' mcthm.lnlog.ie<JI argument for di:.course analysis 
hinges pr!.:!ciscly on the degree to whil·h the narratin:~ uf history anJ th.cory are here knoucd 
together: the centrality of the theoretical quest inn., to my -.wry. and 1hc ir power in providing a 
perspective from which one can under!'.land the ~CL/ ARM. My theoretical concerns grew out 
of my concrete research, and each ~haped and innucnct:d the other. In writing thi~ thc~is, I have 
tried to preserve something of thi!> pron:~~- I ha,·c thcrdore tried to limit the c"1en1 of the 
purely theoretical digre~~ions: instead of plunging. h.:aJ lir:-.t inhl the heady water~ of theoretical 
speculation, I have traced the theoretical qu.:~tions as they .::merge "organically" out Df the ~lory 
of the NCL/ ARM. 
l.2 llnderstanding the NCL/AR..\1: Ho~ did it rail? 
At first glance the story of rhe NCL/ ARM appears 1<1 wnf rnnt u~ with the ~a me sort of problem 
as that posed by the gro~N1h of midd!c-cla~~ radkalism in the L. nitcJ State..,, Britain and Europe. 
Jt seems. indeed. to prefigure in an uncanny man ncr the career!'. uf groups that wen: to cm~:rgc 
elsewhere at the end of the decade: the Re\·olutionary Y\)Ul h. ~foh·mcnt ( R YM) or "Weather 
underground" in lhe lJSA and the Angry Br'1gadc in England. The ,-.;cL·s lcfti.<.m - li~c rhat of 
the- Student.:. for a Democratic Society (SDS) from which the R YM gn:w - had its root~. not so 
much in the traditions of M ilrxi:.t and working. cla.~~ pnlitic.~ but in the moral outrage of middle-
cia~ radicalism. And like the.'>e group~. it!!> c.::ntral political and :,trategic problem lay in its dfort 
to identify itself with those whose uppre~sion it ~inm: to m·.:rthrnw. tr• 
Looking at the NCL/ ARM in thi.r, light, one mig.ht bl.' tl..'mptcd to consider their decisiou to go 
'-'\·er to violence as the crucial problem to be explained. Thj.., has been the approach adopted by 
many author~ a ddrcssi ng t ht: rad icalisal iun of )'<..lUI h in 1 h~.: Ia! c 1960s.. Consc rvative analy~ts of 
lb See Kirl;palrl<"k Sale. SDS ('...:ew Yur\.:. rtan.J<Hn I"""~ · JQ7J) t'or a <kl~1led ac~ount of tl1e polit1ral 
dn·elopmc: nt of the R Y \ol J nd a rnt ~e·al cun~J derallnn ,,, l h.: fJ 11 u rc l'f 1111hla 111 1111.l<ile-dass rad ica li~m 111 
the l 'ltiOs. 
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the NCUARM have taken a similar tack, a-;king themselves the question why the middle-class 
children of comparatively wealthy parents should tum on the society that had nurtured them in so 
radical a way.l7 I have deliberately chosen not to make this the central focus of my study: instead 
I have chosen to loot in more detail at the specific strategy Lhe NCUARM used. In consensual 
industrial democracies such as the USA, the very existence of a radical and massive challenge to the 
legitimacy of the state might in itself seem to need explanation; and in the absence of any larger 
and broader struggle, this fact rather than questions of spcdfic strategy might seem to dictate the 
focus of study. In South Africa however, where after the mid-l950s the very foundations of the 
state's legitimacy was a politically contested issue and where a broad tradition of popular struggle 
existc.d, we cannot stop at the mere existence of radicalisation. lhe course of action chosen by the 
NCLJARM must be analysed and its relationship to the rest of the democratic and socialist left 
should be examined. 
In other words, besides the existence of the NCL we also have to understand iL<> failure. We need to 
understand how they could embark on such a radical course of action and cut their lies so decisively 
with the world that created them. nut we also have to explain how they could act with apparently so 
lillie notion of what they were doing and why; how they alU!d entertain such sanguine and 
seemingly baseless hopes of victory. lhe story of the NCL is the story of people so radicalised by 
the events of the late 1950s and carl y 1960s that they had to act, even if it exposed them to danger -
but it is also the story of people who ended up acting so suicidally, so self-destructively, that their 
defeat ultimately overshadowed their saailice and courage. Today they are remembered, not as 
liberals who fomx>k the safe politics of the lellers page and the meeting hall for the risky life of the 
saboteur, but for their anlagonism to the Congress Alliance, the poinlless violence of the "Station 
Bomb", and the inexplicable betrayal of his comrades by Adrian Leftwich. 
To ask this question is to some extent to discount the simple answer- given by some NCL members 
- that they failed simply because they were Clught.IB ll is to imply that the NCLJARM was 
stillborn; that even if they had not been crushed, success would have eluded them, Lhat there was 
something fundamental!y problematic !!bout the strategy chosen by this grouping. lhis is of course 
nolhing new. It is a prevalent as sum plion in the popular negative evaluation of the N CU ARM. It is 
therefore probably not necessary to argue for it at great length. It is, however, essential that the basic 
reasons for this position arc made clear, and that the context of NCLIARM's acceptance of this 
strategy is understood. 
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Sec my di,cussion of Miles Bro\;cnsha ~nd Robert Knowles's allempl to do jusllhl~ on p. 16 below. 
lnte!'liew wilh Randolph Vigne, London, 28 February J 9B9, 
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I, 
Tbe problematic nature of their strategy can best be umJerstaoo through comparing them with 
Umkhonto we Sizwe.J9 In the first place, Umkhonto we Sizwe and lhe NCL failed in much the 
same way.20 And though this failure was partly due to the effectiveness of state repression and the 
material conoitions of guerilla struggle, 21 it was also due to another, more serious flaw. Thus Bill 
Johnson, for example, has argued that activists should rather have lah..llow and waited for political 
space to open up again: according to him, sabotage was " the politics of individualist, liberal 
machismo ... afler their 1905 the South African revolutionaries ... adopted the tactics of the pre·I905 
Russian narodniks and anarchists"22 
Turok's oomments are less sweeping: According to him, sabotage, while providing the government 
with every excuse for unlea'>hing a brutal wave of terror "failed to ignite the prairie fire as many had 
hoped." According to Turok the strategy "failed on the main count • it did not rnise the level of 






In spire of !be huge differences hetween the rwo groups there is some ground for fNilful con1parisnn between 
them. Both movements conceplualis~d sabol.:!ge in similar Wiys. Membe,; of rhe NCUARM tended to see 
sabol.:!ge primarily as a form of symholk prolesl. Dul at lhe same time there wa,. • growin!! conviction in tbe 
minds of so me cen lnl members th t it should he seen •s the first step towards prolncl<'d guerilla war. Similarly, 
Um~honto we Slzwe's camf"'ign was also aimed crucially at influencing while political opinion. Some ~cholars 
have pointed out lh•l sabotage seems initially to have keen seen nol so much as a stepping-stone to guerilla WH n 
a shategy for change in itself (Doug Tilton, From Non·Violence to Sat>otage: the Africu Nalional Congress of 
South Africa and the formation of Umkhunto we Sizwc (Unpuhlished MA thesis, Oxford Univcr.<lty 1985), p. 8.) 
h ~~eem~. in any ca!-<', th~t though the High Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe saw sabotage as an introductory 
L:lc:tic to other forms of ~trugs;lc. th i5 in tcnsific•tion was envisaged only if the fi r.ll wave of •IL:!ch did not succeed 
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"Sabotage remained the weapon of an elite oorps in the liberation movement. As a 
consequence, sabotage had the effect of isolating the organised movement from the mao;s 
who felt unable to join in the new phase or even to defend the actionists when they were:. 
seized"24 
Joe Matthews of the ANC was later to make essentially the same critique, arguing that " •.. the masses 
had no inkling of these events. Here we were, embarking on the most import ant of decisions, and the 
people knew nothing. We were going to war without the people with us."25 
Instead, Turolc suggests, sabotage and guerilla struggle might have been started with the ''simplest 
methods" that were available. lie points out the importance of simple methods of struggle in 
e:t.:p1aining the depth of the involvement of the Vietnamese peasantry, and argues that "if the 
assessment that the pwple were deeply disturbed by Sharpeville and subsequent events was correct, 
then the more effective methods were those that the masses could use, too." 26 
1be complex questions peruining to Umk.honto's own choice of strategy, the way in which that 
strategy was carried out, the relationship between it and the broader mass of Africans cannot be 
discussed here. What is relevant to my argument is the implicatiol16 of this criticism for the 
NCIJARM. If Turck's critique is applicable to Umkhonto, then it is all the more valid for the 
NCI)ARM, which emphasised the accomplishing of complex and technically sophisticated acts of 
sabotage. 
The second point of comparison lies in Umkhonto's resurgence during the 1970s. While the 
NCUARM and MK were alike in their initial failure, they were very different in their eventual fate: 
while the state's crackdown on the NCUARM nayCIJ it open to the core, MK wao> able to rise from 
defeat to beoome an important actor in the South African arena after 1976. While MK 
weathered the blow of Rivonia and Lhe later d.isasters of the Rhodesian campaign, the NCI)ARM 
was simply too weak and ideologically disunited to continue, let alone rebuild an organisation 
within the country. One crucial factor was the ANC's link to the SACP. As Stephen Davis pointed 
out, this association made it possible for the ANC to tap into the e:t.:perience of people who had 
organised underground for a number of years, and to build a structure some remnants of which 
survived the security dragnct.27 1'lle association with the SACP had further advantages. The 
dependability and continuity of Soviet aid enabled the ANC to survive as a strong organisation, 
and it managed, unlike the PAC, to steer clear of dependent relationships with African host 
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in which the ANC managed to maintain a degree of ideological cohesion and stability even in the 
fissiparous conteJCt of exile politics.29 Out far more important than this was MK's link to the ANC. a 
political organisation which, although it was hadly decimated, had left behind a history and a 
tradition of mass struggle around which people could be mobilised again in later years. 
This was of vital importance to the story of the young activists who had left South Africa after the 
Soweto uprisings in 1976, and who were to revitalise the ANC. The complex processes that 
underpinned the resurgence of Charterism since that year have still to be examined in detail, and the 
particular dynamics of the exodus to the ANC fall outside the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say 
that though Char1erism was at the time nowhere ncar as central a political tradition as it has become 
in the 198Qs30 the ideological heritage and memory of the Congress alliance cannot be discounted . 
As Edward Fcit put it. though Umlchonto's "roots among the masses ... may have been thin, they ran 
deep".Jl 
To state aU this is to set out in detail the simple point that the central problem with the NCUARM 
was its lack. of contact with the mao;s of oppressed South Africans. Though Umkhonlo we Sizwe 
shared with it a oonception of sabotage that undcremphasised political work, it was linked to a 
broader political movement and the popular traditions and consciousne..o;s that movement had built. 
Tnis point has serious implications for the NCL!ARM and our attempt to understand it. There have 
been groups - the "July Plot" against Hiller is one example - that have tried to overthrow 
governments or rulers in rol.itical isolation. Out the NCUARM was very unlike the "July plot"; if 
they resemble any anti-fascist organisation, it would probably be the "White Rose" group:32 many 
\cey members were committed to mass struggle, and all of them saw themselves as appealing to their 
fellow-South Africans to rise up against oppression. Though some members did see tht:ir actions in 
tenns of symbolic protest, its founders and most central members took: part in sabotage rognisant of 
its use by insurgents elsewhere in the world, and hoped that they would eventually be part of a mass 
movement for national liberation. Yet, in order to achieve this they consciously operated in a 
fao;hion that, as they seemed to be wdl aware, excluded the participation of all but a tiny technically 
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did have ~om~ form of mass support. \\'hat is more. they pt:r~islcd in this course of action l!Vcn 
when it was clearly fruitles s. Theirs wa~ :. cour., .. : of action apparently ~o irrational as to be 
almost i nc:xp!icable . 
The mystery deepens when we look at th..: a\ailahlc texts produced by members of the 
organisation itself. It appears that the! connection between the strakgy of sabotage and their 
understanding of the South African ~truggle rcmJined almo~t untheorised . Its \·aluc seems to 
have hecn assumed without qucstitm . As Hirsnn \\ould s<~y almost 25 years later. tht:re seems to 
have been an inexplicable rupture between the rigmous clas.\ analysis some of the socialists in 
the NCL/ AR\1 prided themselves on, and their eventual course of action.J3 
An example o[ this disjuncture is pro,·idcd by twn documents produced by members of the NCL 
octwcen September 1963 and April 196-J, later used as exhibits in the trial. One document was. 
produced by NCL members in london; the other was writt.:n mainly by Randolph Vigne in 
Cape Town.J..I What is noticeable iJbout them i~ the apparent discrepancy between the situation 
the NCL found itself in at the time, and the role thc:y project for their organisation. Aft.:r the 
passing of the Sab01age Act in 1962 and the Rivonia Raid in Junl.', l'.l63, the picture (we would 
think) must have looked bleak. As wc shall '>t:e in later chapters, the NCL had by that time 
failed 10 establish themselves as a mass based or C\·cn an effective organisation: they were 
isolated from what remained of Umkhunto we Sizv•c and Poqo. and the South African ~tate was 
cun~olidating its ~trcngth. \Vhat cuuiJ a tiny hand of saboteurs hope to achicH:? Yel. in both 
text~, to a gn:atc:r or lesser e.-..tent, ~~·c find them cone.: i\ing of thcmsch cs a!> having a surprisingly 
central role in the liberation of South Africa. Thus, in the Lundon document, th.:y ~peculate 
that the organisation could become the "sinew~ of the struggle" and a crucial clement in a "joint 
command" with other organisations.J-" The optimism of Vigne ·s text is even more striking.: not 
only doc~ it see the "NCL's business" a!'. recruiting. training. and leading a ··National Freedom 
Army" which will overthrow the National Pany regime;36 it also sees the members of the NCL as 
ultimately being "the controlling force in a ~trong, cl:!ntral Gon:rnmenr-_37 The central question 
- how a sabotage slratt:gy would lead to the building of a mass liberation movement - does not 
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In other words. a critique of the NCL's strategy should not merely point out that the NCL was 
mist<Jken in supposing it did not have to work directly with the masses, organising and politicising 
them - that would be facile. It would have to go further, and show the reasons for this f<~ilure. This is 
the task 1 will now address. 
1.3 Sharpeville and Sabotage (or, Che Guevara in Stuttafords) 
Part of the answer to the question of why the NCUARM chose sabotage as a strategy lies .in a 
consideration of the context in which its members found themselves. lhe initial decision to tum to 
sabotage was taken just after U1e Sharpcviilc crisis, a time when the legitimacy of the Verwocrd 
government had been chaUeoged as never before. 
The shooting at Sharpcville, coming as it did a mere six weelcs after Harold MacMillan's "winds of 
change" speech,38 seemed indeed to herald a coming storm. With the assasination attempt on Dr 
Verwoerd by David Pratt,39 and Acting prime minister Paul Sauer's subsequent announcement that 
with Sharpcville, "an old book of South African history was closed" 4o and, above aU, the 
catastrophic .slide of the stoclc exchange which plunged the counlry into its biggest financial crisis 
since 193241 those winds seemed to be mounting to a gale. Small wonder that it seemed, as the 
liberal lawyer Emie Wentzel was to put it later, that "Blacks had shak.en the cages in which 
apartheid imprisoned them", 42 and that opponents of the Nationalist government - from the Liberal 
Party members at the Congress immediately after the sh00ling43 to central individuals in the 
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Evt:n the brutal repression that folluwcd the J_,claration of the State of Emergency seemed 
amateurishly applied. It was -.:\·iJcnl that the J..:tentiom that accompanied the State of 
Emergency proceeded acwrJing to old anJ <Hit-uf-dato: lists: they mis~cJ many central activists, 
while picking up Communist P01rty mcmbL·rs \~Jm h<.~J JroppcJ out years beforc . ~ 5 Many people 
had to be released and redctaim:d a~ the Emergency rcgul:ttiom. had not been properly 
prum u lgatc d, and in J ohan ncsburg the slid c -~ eff, lr\" to o pposc their release by deferring I he 
court hearing in order to ny the properly-promulgated Emergency regulations up from Cape 
Town ended in a farce when Mealie Board contml rcgulatiun::. were 3ent up by mistake.~6 To 
many of those who were to join the NCL/ ARl\1. the state appeared lu be h,,Jding on !U pnwer 
with a desperate but fumbling grasp. 
At that stage the strategy of sabotage seemed abo w offer exaggerated promise. The 
NCL/ ARM was of course only one of a number (1f groupings that ad0ptcd this course of action 
in the Sourh African l960s. Besides the ob\·ious example nf Umkhonto we Si:.rn:e, the Yu Chi 
Chan Club aho embraced guerilla theory. and as we shall see, even scpcratists in Natal toyed 
with the idea. It is inJecd significant that the \·arious groups that came together in the NCL had 
all decided for sabotage rei at ivdy ind~ pendently f rum one an other. In the early l9b0s. it seems, 
5abotage was simply pan of the general ptllitical mcabulary, one of the choice~ open to 
l)pponents of the Nationalist government. This popularity in turn was only part of the wider 
resurgence of guerilla wars after the Second World War. Partisan fighter~ had been using 
guerilla strategies during tnat war in much of Nazi-occupird Europe. and.by the time of the 
founding of the national :"-iCL in 1%2. guerilla matcgics had :tlready been used in China, Viet 
N:.m, Cuba, Cypru~ and Algeria. to name but a few examples. 
In South Africa, as in the rest of the world, this was p:.rtly a function of the deep social cnanges 
that accompanied the War it~elf. The struggle in South Africa would not have been keyed to the 
pitch of armed confrontation were il not for the vaM increase in African urbanisation and the 
accompanying rise in pulitical consciousncs~ and militancy. Equally essential was the groYw1h 
and flowering. in tile worldwide context of heightened popular and anti-colonial s.truggle. of new 
and powerful theories of guerilla warfare. Tnough the mere tactic~ of guerilla warfare h<:~d been 
known for years,n it was fully developed and integrated with revolutionary theory only by Mao 
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accompanied by the consciousness of and the elaboration of the principles enunciated by him, 49 
with the writings of Giap an Che Guevara being notable examrlcs. 
Guevara's writings have, however, a problematic relationship towards Mao's text. Although the 
romanticisation of the guerilla was only to attain its full flowering in the writings of Rtgis Debray in 
the late 196Qs,50 Guevara's writings already oonstitllte an important modification of Mao's thought. 
This shift can indeed be found in the contribution of C...astro himself, who tended to foreground the 
guerilla's position, instead of the mass of the oppres.••;c.cl.SI This was taken even further in Guevara's 
well-known statement that "one does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation to 
arise; it can be created."52 While Guevara does not argue against the importance of building a mass 
struggle, his privileging of the technical aspe<:ts of guerilla warfare seems built on the ao;sumption 
that a few guerilla-revolutionaric...<i, given the existence of certain "grievances", would by their mere 
example "vitalize the pcllple";53 the book thus encourages the interpretation that direct political 
work with the peasantry is not really necessary. As Kenneth Grundy has pointed out, it is in essena:: 
"a manual of military t C<:hn iqucs and tactics" with I it tk altention to strategic problems. 54 
The NCL/ARM was doubtless deeply influena::d by these developments. Some members of the 
organisation had served in World War II and had been impressed by the example set by partisan 
resistance movements like the Maquis. Others had studicl.l the Greek, Chinese, Vietnamese and 
Cuban experiences, and had analysed these in their discussion groups. Guevara's treatise on guerilla 
war was panicuJarly important: it w<Js freely available in Cape Town and could, for example, be 
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widely read in the white left at the timc.-56 Indeed, one of the documems unoovered by the state in 
its swoop on the NCUARM was a typewritten summary of Guerilla Warfare, compiled by Baruch 
Hirson and circulated in the organisation.57 Other documents wrillen by members of the NCUARM 
seem to reflect an acute consciousness of the strategies and problems of guerilla warfare. The 
NCUARM's choice of sabotage could therefore be at least partly explained with reference to the 
impact on them of this body of thought. In the context of the Sharpcville crisis, where the state 
appeared to be floundering and inefficient, the Cuban revolution must have seemed a seductive 
validation of Guevara's theories. 
But though satisfying in the short term, this answer suffers crucial defects. All it docs is to defer the 
problem, to displace it across the Atlantic Ocean. Guevara's own modification of Mao is itself a 
development in need of careful political analysis! How did Guevara, once such an able strategist 
and guerilla fighter, come in the end to embark on the futile and suicidal Colombian campaign that 
was to lead to his death? lhis question needs careful analysis to be answered; and we might even 
find that an undersi.'Jnding of the NCL!ARM sheds valuable comparnlive light here. And such an 
understanding would have to deal with the question of why his thought resonated so powerfully with 
that of NCUARM members. N. Kenneth Grundy has pointed out, it would be dangerous to posit 
too dircrt a relationship between the flowering of insurgency theory and the development of 
sabotage and guerilla strategies in an African context - even when we know that the group 
concerned was aware of 'classic<!!' texts on the subject.58 Insurgency theory arose out of very 
specific local conditions, and an understanding of the NCUARM would therefore have to proceed 
at the same level. That is not to say that knowledge of the 'classical' texts of revolutionary guerilla 
warfare are irrelevant. But it would be wrong to suppose that NCL/ARM members simply rushed 
into action, unreflcctively "applying" Guevara's doctrine. Thus Baruch Ilirson had, for some years 
prior to his joining the NCL)ARM, mounted a critique of Congress strmegy which emphasised the 
need for mass organbation. Though he and his allies had studied the Cuban revolution, they did not 
oonsider it as a model that could be unproblematically applied to the South African context.59 In 
other words, important as the availability of notions of guerilla warfare was, the crucial problem 
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beliefs. I will now gn on to consider the atkmpls mad.: to resolve this problem. and to ~how 
what we can learn from their failure. 
lA Some instructin mi.o.undef'standings: ''[ru~tralion" and the question of political 
discourse 
In con!tidering the queslion of the appeal of sabotage for members of the NCL. the solution 
most readily to hand is an appeal to romantici!'.m and frustration as motivating factors. This is 
indeed a seductive answer when considering lhc prevalence and appeal of Guevara's thought 
worldwide Juring the 1960s. Thus scholars like .J. B. Bell ha ... ·e analysed the prevalence of 
theories of guerilla warfare in terms of a "revolutionary m~lh". often "twi<>ted into fantasy by the 
desperate and nai\·e" .w The reasons for the persistc nee uf this m)'th, h.c says. is "largely an 
unanswerable question". He can only attribute it to factors like "[low) uf glory. hope of power. 
an excess of pride, unexploited talent, ambition, some deep psychological drive, fate, or 
friendship ... each may play a part."61 In black. Afrka. he argues, "the [gueril!aj campaign soothe~ 
the ... anxiety of Black Africa, maintains- th.e cause of liberation as a fact, and ... gives meaning and 
justification to men on the edge of despair··_r,2 
This kind of explanation suffers. however. from a ~cri0us defect: by psychologising the issues in 
this way, it obscures a political understanding of the "gucrillaism" he sees as such. a dangerous 
m~th. I will develop this criticism more con ere tcly by looking at t h.: case of the NCL/ ARM 
itself. I will thus proceed by analysing the weakness of an appeal to notions of "blindness", 
"frustration··. or "romanticism" in understanding their strategy. 
It is indeed in terms of these very notions that the NCL/ ARM has been approached by most 
writers. Two cas,;:s in point are Broken~ha and Knl>wlcs' account of the Cape town trial. The 
Fourth of Joly Raids, and the NUSAS publication. Dissension in the Ranks. It is notable th.at 
these two work::., probably the major analyses of the NCL/ ARM to date, are rcmarkallly similar 
in their view of the organisation. I wi!l demonstrate how the terms of these analyses produce in 
both texts a similar political incoherence . 
Especially important to my critique is the fact that both tc:.1.s constitute themselves as political 
interventions. In the introduction to The Fourth of July Raids, its authors explaiD the purpose 




1. B. Be: H. op.cit •. p. -11 . 
Op. dt~ p . .!5 ! . 
Op. tit .. p. 2b l: see alsop ~67, 
"Sitting in South Afric.1n g.wb tfn.l<.~~ <.1r1.' ;1 numhlT of young m~n anJ \I.-omen. Mmt of 
them are in their ~:arl~ (\\Tntir~. a fc\1 m tht:ir c;~rly thirti.::>. The pro~pect th~y f<.~ct: i~ 
up to 15 year:, l:JehinJ tho~c pri..,on \\<JlJ, hdor~: they arc again free men and W11men. 
They :..rc paying the price for thcir !-.lUpidit~ . 
This hook is neither an i.!Ucmpt tu c:-;cu~c their ::~ction~ nor tu comlemn them. H is an 
attempt only to try to set out f<.~llu;d!~ th~.· lircumstam:e~ that leJ to the ri~c of the 
Afric;.~n Resi~tancc MllWmt:nt. to renm.J it~ ~<.~bot;..~gr raids and ~)(plain how the polkc 
were finally able tn smash tht: organit.ttiun. 
It also makes no aucmpt to •maly~c the pnlicics of ,my polit1cal party nor to justify or 
deny the policy of apartheid. apart hcid is a h.ct anJ it is a fact t h:..t apar1hcid led 
largely to the ris~ of ARM.,. 
The African Resistance Mm·emcnt i~ !\hauercd. If this <.~ccuunt nf it~ short lite should 
dissuade anyone from planning to create a similar organi7ation it will haw achieved its 
purpnse.''63 
Note how Brok.cn~ha anJ Knowlt:s concei,·e of 1h~ NCL/ARM'~ actions in term"> of "stupidity". 
Throughout the book, ml!moer.~· actions art: cllncciH:d of in 1erm~ of irrt~.tionalit~. frustration. 
ohses,;ion, romantici~m and guilt.6-i 
The author~ of Di~llt'nsion in the Rank~. in cun\Tal>t. are amwed opponcnls of apartheid. It i:. 
important to rcmc mber that this text cmt:rgd out of a ,·cry Jiffcn:nt context tn the one quoted 
above. While Broken.~ha and Knov.les wrutc in Jl/6:\, in the contc:<t of the decimation of the 
liberation mO\emcnl by the slate. and proYidl· an argument for Pl'litical quieti~m. the NUSAS 
tc\1 was produced Juring tht: ct~rly ltJKOs. at a time when NLTSAS a~ an llrganisation was 
drawing closer to Charterism. It should therefore he seen as a political intervention aimed at 
inserting NUSAS into the Congre~~ movement. This texl. like th~ Fourlh or July Raids, is a 
political imervention and states its intl·ntions as clearly: 
''This booklet i:. MC a hi.story of white opposition in South Africa. Although it relies 
primarily on this history, it is not an atkmptlo analyse or describe the progre~sion and 
dynamics of thb opposition. It rather focuses on the \·ariou-. nrgani1 at ion a 1 re!.ponses 
that wh.itel> have adopted in opp,,sing th.~ n<ltun: of South African Society. By 
examining historical e"<ampl~~ of th~.:~e re~p11nses. it attcmptl> to explain the lessons to 
be learned from these past ~ictories anJ error~ · in a sen,.c. the "do's and don'ts" · for 
the operation o[ white democrats in fnrmal nrganiLational structures toclay."<J5 
But all hough the purpose of their intcf\ention in the struggle is diamctrically opposed to that of 
Brok.ensha anJ Knowles, they articulate thl: reasons for the formation nr the NC'L/ARM m 
remarkably similar term~: 
.\tiles Dro~en~ha and Rot1e n Knowtc,. op. di .. p 1 
S..c tor c.~amplc op. cit .. pp. 7 I 0 lh. 1 Jl!. 
:\LSAS. op. cit •. p . .:! . 
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·· ... a sense of rru~tration. togclht:r with .l k.:ling: llf guilt .... underlay the formation \}[ 
ARM and the adoption of it>. ~~r~L~gy nf ~abnt.1~c. The f:Jilure of this group ol white 
intellectuals to relate to the onw.nitational gwunJ!>\\Cll of rc!>i!'.tance which formed the 
C11ng:re~s Movement. .. cau~cd ih..:m tu initiate ... a futill! ad uf dt:~pcration."' 66 
Such an oplanation Joes indeed look pl::~miblc - what bcsiJes fru~tratinn C\)Uld h;,.\"e driven 
lihcral~ to abandon the non-violent fnrms of ~truggk Lh~!y had hitherto adopted? Ami did not 
NCL/ARM members themselves later admit that in their adoption uf sabotage they wcre Jri\en 
hy frustration? 
It may \Jf course be that NCL/ARM members wnc inJe..:J lrustrated and that their fru>.tration 
lay at the bottom of their actions. But this explanation line~ not answer our own quc~tion, docs 
nm help us understand 1hc politics of the- NCL/ ARM. Altributing their course of action to 
frustralion immediately leaus to the que~tion: how did it come about that in this case, fru~lration 
Jed specifically to sabmage; sabotage, what is more, in conscious isolation from any of the mass 
organisations in South African politics? 
The coosequcnccs of resorting to thi~ explanatory category can be illustrated hy a closer look at 
these texK In the final paragraph of The Fourlh of Jul~ Raids, for example. it looks as if the 
authors arc suddenly anJ inexplicably pessimistic of their cautionary talc·s chanc.-:s of ~ver 
achieving its end. 
"The African Re~istance Movement is dead - but onlv a blind man will see in its Jembe 
the cnJ of resistance. There will be others like Ldtwich, Schneider and Harris .... For 
that is the tragedy or South Africa. There can be no reconciliation between 
diametrically oppo~ed forces without ,·iolcnce ."1' 1 
From the stern opening lines we have arriveu <1l a conclusion that is oddly resigned: actions that 
were initially describcJ as Jue to s!Upiuity are no\.,. Jescribed in terms of inevitability. The 
Fourth or July Raids vacillates between being, on the one hand. an active inlen·ention in the 
name of sanity and good sense, anJ on the other, the impotent and futile chronicle of tragic and 
unswppable events _6!1 
ln Dissension we do nm find quite as ~uddcn and ahjcct a statement of defeat, perhaps because 




Op. cit •. p.39. 
'A:1!es Brokcnsh.a and Rot-c r! Knowles, up. rit •. p. 151. 
Th1s .I.CillwphrenJC" ~liC<.' IIa lion hetv.·cen ra!iona h~r opunmm and impotent pessmusm ~~.·a-. 1n fac1. a~ I shall 
show. a major charac!cnslic of South ,\frican l1hcr~hsm a1 the time and 1> e~pec1ally nlarked m the dismurse 
of liberal~ in 1 he :>:Cl (sec p. 159 ff ). 
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NCUARM's "frustrated" response it poses a different possibility -that of action rooted in a correct 
understanding: 
"The flaw in the ARM response lay largely in the inadequacy of their analysis of connict in 
South African society and the process of change aimed at eradicating that conflict . 
Although ARM members evidently did not see South African conflict in simple 
Black/White tenns, they failed to recognize the extent to which it is, in the final analysis, a 
contest between democratic and anti-democratic forces. Although the vast bulk of whites 
are likely to defend their privilege, this does not exclude ccr1ain white groupings from 
joining the opponents of this system of privilege. The basis of this alliance, however, must 
not be a feeling of guilt or frustration. It must be a carefully considered decision which 
takes into account the nature of the movement for change and allows white democnts to 
utilize their skills and privilege, to their greatest capacity within 1 nat movement ." 69 
Though initially appealing, this explanation suffers from two crucial defects, both of which malce it 
deeply ambiguous as an intervention in the South African struggle. In the first place, when it come.c; 
to the "do's and don'ts" promised in the introduction, its message is perhaps surprising. To put it 
rather crudely, it rome.c; perilously close to telling us that the NCL's members failed to recognise 
that it was unnecessary for whiles to endanger their skills and their (admittedly unjust but no doubt 
strategically U">eful) privilege ... Whatever one's understanding of the historic role of whites in the 
anned struggle, this approach docs not much help us to formulate a critique of the NCL's specific 
trnjcctory. 
And it is when we look at how the text addresses this question that we encounter its fundamentally 
ambiguous character. As in the case of the Fourth or July Raids the relation of the category of 
"correct understanding" to the misapprehensions it is supposed to counter is ambiguous and indeed 
undecidenble.70 Their frustration is described as being caused by their "failure ... to relate to the 
organizational groundswell of resistance which formed the foundation of the Congress movement 
during the 1950s and early 1960s". That failure, in tum, is caused by a failure of analysis, a failure 
to understand the role of whites in the struggle. What did they fail to understand? Thai the basis of 
that aUiance could not be "a feeling of guill or frustration". The analysis is in the end circular. The 
notion of frustration plays a double role: on the one hand it is the resull, on the other the definition, 
of an incorrect analysis which precluded them from relating to the Congress movement. As in 
Brolcensha and Knowles' account, the text functions as a voice of reason (or a "correct" analysis) 
which i.c; so systematically opposed to categories lik:e "guilt", etc that it both has to and cannot 
function as their antidote. 
69 
70 
NUSAS, (Jp. ell., p. 39. The ~mpllasis is mine. 
I am using the concep1 of u ndecideabilily in rhe full deconsll'llcnve seu~ of a strudurally lrruolvablt 
amblgult;r, lin ambiguity in wnich 1he discu~iv~ [ramework. "bolb bfg.:.S choice ~nd preven~· lba1 choice [rom 
bdng made" (Jonalball CQUer, On DrconstrucUon: Throry and Critldsm aht'T Slrucharalhm, (London, 
Routledge 1\eg~n Paul. 191!5). 
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It i'> the logic t1f these psychok)gistic t:xplanalllry c.ltl.!gliTil..'s -guilt. frust ratiun, romanticism - and 
the pn:<.uppositions that underlie thi.!ir <:~lmo~t 'Pllntancous appt:al that I will ~xplorc now. For 
the ~c makl..' pO~!.ibk both poles of the Ct•ntraJictnry mon:ml..'nt we haY.: .seen. It i~ this nl)tinn 
that permits hoth optimism and pcs.simism in Tht Fourth nf Jufy Raids. This is true al!>u of 
Oissensiun. In buth li.!Xb these categoric!> h<t\1.! ;m apon:til.: ll1gic that cannot he mastered b~ tbt: 
text. Fanaticism, frustration , guilt arc prcci'>dy outsid~ th~: llcld of reason, are not susceptible to 
it at <ill, constitute a surface so slippery th.H th..: lan~uage llf rational analy<.i<. cannot get a hold 
on them. The)' arc categories conceived of as bt:ing essentially undetermint'd, amorphous. 
unstructured, having no political logic nf tht·ir own: in ~ ~th~:r words. they ar-e sten as belonging 
to a fi~ld beyund politics. 
The cour~e of my argument "0 far has he~n to a~scrt two points. Firstly, I have tried to "how 
that the story of the NCL/ A R\1 present~ u.~ with t bt: ta~k l'f under~tanding their stratcgi~ choice 
for sabotage in isolation from any ma:>s political organisation. Secondly, I have dtgut:d that 
existing accounts of the NC'L/ AR~f fail to pnwide this explanation. Interestingly enough, the 
failure of these ~xplanations i~ not due to ~ lack in the factual data about the material conteKt of 
the South African political struggle in th~ llJ51k II can be traced. in!>tead, to the logic of the 
c::{planatory categoric~ that arc appt:alcd to. Thcsc categoric~ appear to havt: bct:n resorted to 
simply bcc<:~usc: our knowledge of that social context !)till leaves somc of our question~ 
unanswered. In a context where that matnial context hy it~clf dot:s not i.!Xpbin their choice, an 
appeal to e<ttegories like "guilt" and "fru~tration" may hu\c some pcrsua~iq~ force . Thl! problem 
is however that such notions, hecause they can explain almost an~thing, cm.l up explaining 
nothing. Th~ assumptions that und.:rlie thi.! ~ppe;jl to "frustration ·· - the notion of an a!oopt:ct of 
human suhjcctivity that lies beyond political det..:rmination - ultimately scuttle the argument. 
Although such notions can he summoned up with case to lill the gaps in our explanation, they 
se~m in tht: end to have a contradictory lngic. o.~nJ fail to hdp us to comt: to a pulitical 
understanding of the choice for !>ahot;jgc. 
This i~ a crucial poinL U we wish to understand the NCL/ARM politically, we cannot appeal to 
fundamentally apolitical explanaiOry categories. In otner words, we haw to look at them from <t 
perspective that, while.: giving weight to the importance of their fru~tration and conceding their 
romanticism, allows us to understand the logic of that romantici~m. the politics of that 
frustration. In the next chapter I will argue that the task of undcr:>tanding the NCL/ARM i!) 
therefore: fundamentally a que~tion nf discou~t . Coming to grips with thi~ qu~:!'>tion will 
necessitate a short excursion into theory. l ..,h<~ll \ hcrdllrt.: hrieOy sketch the outlines of the 
underlying theory or tht: human subject. This th~.:or~ '"ill llpcn a new pen;pcctivc on the human 
)I 
t.,ul->j~:ct that 'ol.i!l make pos .. ihk a ... .;t of difkr~nl di<;coUr'>~:·;,~.no..~l~lical strat~gi~'>- With the aid lJf 
thc~c luolt., I shall ht.: at'lk to "unpt:d' the ;>.;('L/r\R\1" ... pt•litic-.Ja:-.:r hy layer anJ ~huw how they 
came w act a~ th~y did. 
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A Theoretical Interlude: The Ideological Subject 
and the Politics of the Signifier 
• .. [J.,nllly I~ whal \~ na\Utali', gtven and 1'> theref<>t~ n>nW.kreJ a f'<'>~CSSillfl \CI II IS d[,O thai "'1\t<'fl P'"~e.'>S<:S th~ 
tnd"1dual. If. on th~ one hand. tdcnlol~ t> con~l ttulcu h) a rcrwnal c\per•en~e a•ld an md"·ouuJt hl,tOI). 11 1' al>o ~nd 
lflCVl!ablr a rrodu<:t <'f the Olhcrncs; Of CU It ural. SO.: tal and lntg_u>l>lh <.ktettl11flo Ill> . ..\~the lOUt\ t.Jua[ tCC't)IJ~Ir!KIS and 
reflc.:1~ upon 40 •magmarv identlly, h" i she ruhi\·atc~ an illuston <•f <'On>nous rontrol that unl) ~r.cs to Ol'dutle the 
alc~tory ndl ure of til!; llll~gona r. Cl>~Cnl'C . · 
2.1 Why discour~l' analy!lb? Some g~ner~l rr-marks 
In I his cha pt~:r I wi II hrie Oy cxp 1 ore the the\ •r(·l ita I u ndc rpinnings uf discnur;,c ana lysis and 
delineate its mcthodologic;.~l ~tarting poin\s. In 1hc pre\'ioul'> chapter I have set nut the arguments 
that confront u~ with the need for a kind of analy!.i~ that .:;m go beyond previous atu:mpts Ill 
make ~ense of the t\CL/AR/1.-fs strategy. I did n~ll dll mu.:h mlHC than indicate vaguely that a 
different sort of re~carch wa~ needed, Bt:yond thi:-. atl~.:m pt 10 indicate the existence::. in the 
jungle, of a hitherto clusi\·e ;Jnimal, I did not g\l: m~' argument wa~ a· lisl of hlind alleys. a 
concatenation of ;J!1sences. In thi>. chapter I shall try to go into more detail and try to describe 
wbat this beast looh like. how its paw-prints can he rcn1gniscd. and how it can 11<.· caught. 
Such a move may require som.; ju'>tification. Ah hl1ugh hi~tory is an analytically sdf-aware 
discipline. it tries to fu'>.: theory with narrati\ ~.: in a st.: am!.:~~ \\ ay, and 1u cml1ark suddenly on a 
detailed thwrctieal discussion is to di~rupt and jar thi~ n;..rratin: llow. In addition. such a 
discussion is perforce rather techmcal: it is difficult tn dc~crih.: the p<1S\-structurali<ot theory of 
subjectivity which underlies discour">c analy~i.~ without refcn::m:e to som~: of the rather 
outlandish terminology that characteri~e'> the \Hiting'> of 1hinkers like Althu~~er and Pecheux. In 
the rest of !hi!> dis..,crlation I have tried to a\o.liJ the use Llf suc;h terminology: the language in 
which the theory of the ~ubjcct ha~ hecn wu<.:ht:d has h~cn partly rt:sponsihlc for its 
Kdrhs Race~'l>~!s. "foucaull. Rameau·~ ncphe" .:~nd 1 he Ou~~ttun of hknt111 ". on Th\' Fl1111t foucautl .cd ,,,. 
l<>me~ BernJucr Jnd Daqd Rasmu~scn ( ('amllrn:lgc. \Ia~~ . rhc \tiT Pre~s. !'i!,:!; 1. p 21 
inaccessibility to non-~pccialisb. r>.!y uwn ane~l~~i~ hu~ therefore proceeded as Lu a~ po~~ible in 
wh:u passes, in the academic world, lor plain Engli~h. V..'h~. then, i~ a dctaikd theoretical 
chapw r ncct!s.s.:t ry? 
~' -' 
My main con~ideration has been that Ji;;.cour~e theory ha-. not receiwJ exlensive attention 
within the field of historiography. Without an cxpbnation of the underlying considerations that 
direct my analysis, my analytical mm~·s migt\t thcn:fnrc not make sense: my sudden departure, 
in Chapters 6 and 7, from the chain of the narrative could seem inexplicable and the bc<Jring or 
my detailed examination of NCL/ ARM. te:-.1~ and inten·iews on the rest of the story might seem 
obscure. And though the theoretical conCI.:pts I will explore in thi:; chapter will gain meaning 
and content only hy being related to the star~ of the NCL/ ARM as it unfolds, such a weaving 
back and forth between theory and narrati\-e cannot on its uwn convey the full meaning tlf these 
central thcorCiical conc~..:pts. For that, an e.'\plicit account of their logic and their relation to each 
other is necessary. 
This is particularly so because discourse analysis does not merely add on another array of 
analytic tools to our common-~ense way:. of think mg. lndcl.'d, it i::. su:.picious of ··common sense"', 
and is concerned with questioning notions n:ry deeply routed in Western culture. These idc .. s 
arc so much part and parcel of \lUr Jay-to-Jay thinking that they ~cern not to bear talking about; 
so '"obvious" that we arc usually not c\'e n ctm;;ci,Ju:. of them and so natural that altcrnati~c 
approache:. seem paradoxical and counterintuitive. \\'h:11 could be more obvious, for example, 
than our experience of the link between w.uds and their meaning, more spontaneous than our 
sense that we know '-"ho we are? Y ct these arc precisely the certainties that discourse analysis 
::.eeks to undermine. 
In the first place, discou rsc analysis is con cc rned to focus on I he apparently u ncom plic at ed fact 
of subje-cth,.ity, on our spontaneous assumptions about who we are and why we do what we do. 
It questions the spont::~neous notion that our own experience~ and articulations about our social 
identities are simply rellections of an authentic private e.xperience or of an objective fact. It 
emphasbes that the spontaneous experience of sdf-ide;ntity masks the socially constructed 
nature of our identities. It insi;;ls that while we. like Popeye. may feel secure in the 
comfortable, tautologous knowledge that ·1 am what I am··, we are what ideology has made us. 
This is not to ~ay that discourse analysi~ takes the ruute of a reductionist Marxism, and dismisses 
~uch articulati\ms and experiences as ··false consciousnes:-.··. In its terms, there i~ nothing to gain 
by making a distinction bdween who people think they are and who they "really" are. Socia[ 
identity and discursive self-representation arc not separate. e:<traneous matters; they arc 
intimately hound up with ca..:h •Hhcr: the quc~tit~n or whtl WI.! art: (anJ. th~rcfnrc. what wt art: 
going w do ;,hout il) is indi!>!>oluhly hound up \\ith the tjUc,tion dwho we take LIUr,clws to ht: . 
And in th..: wwnd pl"-CC. dbcoursc anal.,.~i' ~Uhlcrt!- th..: '>ccmingly tran~parent link hetwcen 
language . ..md the Wllrld that languiigc ~a~s it i~ mcrdy Jc~crihing. We arc accustomed to 
thinking that the woriJ i~ one thing and language i, anntha. separate thing. On one lc:,·ct. that i!'. 
trut:. But suc.:h a view often shades into a h:m.kncy Ill -...:..: wont~ a~ lablc~ that hang around th~ 
necks of prcviuu:-.ly-cxisting meanings. .-\ di~cour~c-anal~1ical approach argues that this \'ic.,.. 
mis~cs the way in which language ir;t:lf hdp-. Ji,·idc up and calt:iWrise the hoom ing and huzzing 
confusion for us. 
Through concentrating on this, Jiscoursc anal~sis i::. enncc.:rnc::d 10 make: us alive to the many 
different ways in which the world can he di,·ided up. Thi~ docs not mc:1n th;at we descend into 
rdati\i~m. Rather, it unveils to our g.a1e the- uhiquit\~U:- and dt."ccptivcl~ innocent world of 
ta.xonomie'>. Whal can he more tri\·ial than the arr.jng.:m~nt of wares on a supermarket shc:lf'? 
Yet what speaks more cloqut:ntl~ of the ~ocial con~truction uf gendt:r than our own acceptance 
of the division hetwccn the hardware: section and the cooking utensils? Discourse analysis. 
through looking at the way the world is di\ ·id~::d up in language. pninl!> out hov. ideology 
dichutomi,e., political <ipace and install~ U'o (ln thi~ or that ~ide of a hierarchical tlppositil•n . 
Through a pruhlcmat isation of the order ~~r th~· ,ignillcr. and through an insistence on the 
inrcrdcpcndenct.: nf the ~uhjcct and that si~nificr. disc1lUrse .mal~si~ thus reveals a different level 
of the political: a politics which cxi~ts, nut primarily at the level oll'xplicit political demands or 
programmes. hut in the cwryday distinctitms anJ assumptiuns \\hich make up tho.: uns.p()ken ..tnd 
in\·isiole hcdrock uf o:veryd<ty life. 
This approach has a diverse genealogy and there arc many different ways to implement i1s 
insights. To use its insights i~ to work in the shad(lW (lf Gram~ci. whose concept of hegemony 
v.ent heyond the Leninist concept of da~~ alliances. in v.hich participating sectors retained their 
separate identity, and upcncd up 1 he 4uestion of the way in which suhjcct po~ition~ can traver!>e 
a numher of class scctors.1 This pruhlcmatic h.)-. ~uh~~qu~:ntly heen developed in many ways. I 
have chosen the course of investigation op..:m:d hy post-~tructur::Ji~t thCllrics ,lf language: J.nd 1hr= 
social. Initially demarcated in the writings llr (among others) Barthcs, Kriste\a, Or:orrida and 
Michel Fuuc:1ult, it h:..~s gruwn to a m:..~ny-~idcd and t:lahoratc 1 h~:uretieal tick!. It would be 
impossible to explore all its ram ificati(ms in thi~ disscrtat ion. or to consider the c0mplex 
challenge~ the~c theoretical developments t hru\\ up for South African Marx.ist historiography. 
Erncsro U('tau and Chantal .\1outfc. Hettrmon) and S«iali~t Stnll~to= to.-ard~ a Radical Dfmocralk 
Politir'> trao~. h~ Wmst<ort \1•>0rt: ilnd Paul Cammad. (\ .ondoi\. \ 'cr.;o. tQI\SJ. pp f>5 • 7!. 
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Instead, I shall narrow my vision down to the oonccpLS developed by a particular set of thinkers -
Louis Althusser, Michel P&heux, Emesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Slavoj Zizek. All of the.<;e 
writers owe a common philosophical debt to the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. In their 
writings the Lacanian oonccpt of the subject is given a political edge, and its implications for the 
study of ideology are clearly shown. The relationship between this constellation of writers is 
complicated: Louis Althusser and Michel P&heux in particular do not fit neatly into the post-
structuraust pigeonho\e.3 Nevertheless the concepts they develop rnn function as a springboard, and 
can be used to explain many of the features of the post -structuralist subject. 
2.2 Lacan, Althu.~er and the concept or interpellation. 
Lacan's thought is far too elaborate and multi-faceted to be discussed in this dissertation. Lacan's 
works are notoriously difficull: His deliberately unsystematic treatment, the shifting meaning of his. 
key terms and his dense, allusive style mean that any brief sum mary such as this must perforce be a 
crude oversimplification of oomplex issues.4 In this chapter, rnn only state 
3 Thus, as Erucsto Lac! au 1 nd Chntal Mou fre point our, Althusser's wriri ng is toru he tween the a nil-reductionism 
implicit in his concept of "uverdeterminatiou'', and the tem/eocy to a reiUltl to essenliallsm in his iosislence on 
delermination by the economy "in the last inslance" (op. dl., p. 97- 100}. In addilion, his conception of the subject 
never expllcirly addresses !be problem of the uoconsdou~; bis concept of interpcHalioo seems lo presuppose a 
lunsparency of the subject lo ilsdf which Lacan would deny (Colin McCabe, "On DiKOUDe", in Colin McCabe 
(ed.), The Talking C11n: Euays In P~ychoanalysb and l.anguge (J.<,udoo, MacMillan, 1981), p. 212}. 
Furthermore, both Pecbeu~ and Al!busser see their own dis.eou""" as the d iscou r.<e of scien~, wbicb does not bave 
(or at least strives not 10 bavd) a subject-posilion (see AllhuMer, op. ell., p. 4S; Ncheux, op. dl., p. 142); ~ 
cooceplioo which Andrew Merrifield has criticised in b \5 paper ("The an of l osu rnc1ion - a discur.;ive a oalysis of 
Lenin's writing5 September - Oclober 1917", (working duft of paper prepared for delivery at the l 986 Annual 
meeting of !be Ameriun l'olitin 1 Sdence Assodalioo The Wnh ingtoo H ilion, August 23-31, 1986) pp. l - 2; 15 -
16). My interpretation of All husser's eonrepl' should therefore he- seen as an attempt at a post-stn~crurallsl re-
reading In which hi~ deb! to Lacan has been bo01e in min<!. 
Good introductory SUIVeys !lf Lacan's main worb ue provided by Bice Iknvenuto and Roben Kennedy's The 
Works or Jaques ucan; An lntroduc!lon (London, Fre~ Assoei~!ion Rooks, 1\186) and Anih Lemaire in her 
Jacque-~ ucan (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). Anthony Wilden provides, in Thr unguagt of lhc 
Sdr (B. hi rnme, Joh us Hopkins Unl~er~i ty PreM, 197 ~ ), illuminating notes and comrne nlary on Lac an's famous 
"Rome dixour.<c". Turk!e~ book Psychoanalylk Politln: Fn:11d'~ f'rrnch Revolution (Cambridge, MaM., Tb.e 
MIT Press, 1981) help~ situate th~ development of Lacanian psychoanalysis 111ithin the context of French radi..-al 
Jl<llilics, though Stuart Schneiderman's elegant Lacan: Thr Dtalh or an lnltlledual hero (C.mbridge, Mass., 
HaiVard Univcr.;ity Press, !983) oflen gives a more profound insight in to many of the themes she addresse~. 
In the genera I field of the lheoty of I he ideological subject, 1 heordinl introductions abound: Colin 
M._.c:Jloe, o p. ell. and Mark Cousins' "Jokes and rhdr rei a lion to lhe means of production" (Economy and Soc le ry 
Vol 14 (1985). pp. 94 - 112) provide suiVeys oflhe Field chaned by Althusser and Pechux. Iksides !besc 3rticles, 
there is Oia oe McDonnel, Theorlo:s or Db.c:oun.e: an tntrnduc!lon (O~ford, B~sil Blackwell, 1986 ); Rosalind 
C(lward and John Ell\5, Language and Materialism: Dtvrlopmtnl.s In Scrnlology and lht Thtorr or the 
S ubjrcl (London, Rou fledge & Kega n Paul, 1986); and K~ya Silverman's I ucid The Subjrcl or Srmlotks (New 
York, Oxford University PreM, 19!13). EroeMo L•cbu and C~~ntal Mouff~ (op. dl.) anempt a susl.:lined argument 
to dcvelo pe I he problem of political subjectivity witbi n !he fra meworl of Mauist t~oug~ t om hegemony; I heir 
discussion seems informed by a reading of Lacan ahh<>ugh !he connection with the Laeanlan subject is nevu 
explicitly made. This has bt.•en left 10 Slavoj Zizek. who ha~ <l~:~wn dose lin);s between l.11clau and Mouffc's view 
of social anugonisrn and !he implications of a l.ocanlan re-reading of AlthusSO"r's theory of ideology. 2'.ize~'s boo~ 
Tht Sublime Objul or ldrolo~ will to my knowledge, he publi~bcd later tbis year. Meanwhile, bis unpublished 
my theoretical bearings, and point out why I consider Lacan to be central to this field. Broadly 
speaking, his thought is crucial in two main ways. 
In the first place, the basic point of departure of discourse analysis must be I...acan's concept of lack. 
This concept is central to an understanding of the Lacanian subjea. In fact, for Lacan, the subject is 
crucially the subject of a lack.s This is a complex concept, but crudely speaking we should sec 
La can as questioning the idea of a central human essence fonning the core of subjectivity. Such an 
essence, for example, is presupposed by the met<~phor of 'socialisation'. This metaphor implies an 
irreducible kernel around which layers of sociali.••ation accrcte, like a pearl forming round a grain of 
sand. Lacan denies that there is any such irreducible and com .. Tcte human essence at the "centre" of 
the subject.. That is not to say that there is nothing universal about subjectivity. What is universal 
is the struclun- of subjectivity. subjectivity as a process: the subject, for Lacan, exists. precisely in 
its ceaseless endeavour to overcome the experience of lack. The ucanian subject is not a positive 
given that springs, full-blown, into the world at birth. For the newly bom infant the possibility of 
differentiation between its own undefined self and its surroundings first arises when it experiences a 
concrete lack, through the absence of the mother's body. But this is only the beginning: From this 
initial experience onwards, the subject i.s formed through a series of identifications with what is 
external to it; each of these, though making possible some degree of positive identity and 
consistency. are also the occasions for fun her self-loss and a progressive alienation. In a manner of 
speaking Lacan puts, in place of identity, the process of identiliCBtion. He focuses on the 
movement by which the subject, striving to overcome its experience of self-loss and alienation 
objectifies and extema\iscs itself, in an external image. 6 
This movement of identification has its own complex logic. We can look at il here in terns of the 
interplay between the interlinked orders of the Imaginary and the Symbolic ( Lacan recognises a 
third order. one he calls the Real: J shall consider its role in the final pages of this dissertation). 
Again, f have to emphasise that none of these terms can be given a reductive, sclf-rom.ained 
meaning. They are terms for different yet interdependent orders of being, and it is their interplay 
that constitutes the passibitity ofsubjedivity.7 
s 
6 
anicl~~. "IJcyond discouBe analysls"(unpublisbcd typescript) and "ldcnllly, Jdcnlific.lioo and lkyond" 
(unpublished rype~ripl) aod "Approaches lo lhc L..canian Real (unpublished lypescripf) are engaging, maslerfut 
aod innovalivc discussions of !he L..canian subjecl. 
Kaya SilvennaP, op. dt ., p. 151. 
The lack in 1bc: suhjecl can ll>erefore be seen in two complemeRtary way!.. On !he one hand the subj~ct never 
wlwlly lranscends this lack. and it every identity is lherdore always-•lready in il•elf blocked, marked by an 
impossibility. On rite other hand the subjt'cl is possible b~cauu of this lock if is the desire lo lranscend the lack 
th•l is the motive: force for its identification~ with wllal is l•ulside it. Lack i!> the cnlral condilion of ('Ossibilily of 
subjectivity; it simullaneousty precludes the ~ubjecl's full ~•lis•lioll and fonns the condition o! possibility of what 
f""'itive consistency it alia ins (S. Ziztli, "Deyond discourse-analysis", pp. 6 · 9). 
Bice Benvc:n uto •nd Rot>e11 Kennedy, op. ell., p.82. 
'!.7 
sdf-contain~d meaning. They are terms fur Jifkrent yet interJepcnJent orders of being, and it 
~~ their interplay that Ct..\nstit Utes the pu~~ihility of ~uhjcct l\ ity.7 
The Imaginary order includes the field t1f fanta~~ and images." and is that order of the subject's 
experience which i~ dominateJ b\ the c<periL·nce of identilicalion.'J Some essential 
characteristics o[ this order can he c'\plaino.:d with rdcn:ncc to the paradigmatic case of 
identification - what Lacan calls the "Mirror stagl···. This is, for Lacan, a crucial and constitutive 
moment in the formation of the human ego. It occur~ when the infant, as yet an inchoate bundle 
of perceptions, with no conception of itself and control over its own limb~, recognises its image 
in the mirror a:c. its own, lO Because the infant has, until then, had no conccptilm of itself as a 
coherent entity, ~table and delimited from the wurlJ. this moment of recognition-identiltcation is 
also a marne nt of transrormation, 11 A useful way to put it is that the movement of "recognition·· 
is one whereby the infant assumes its own image. This is a crucial moment in the development 
of the subject. It is important not only for the formation of the child's conception of itself as a 
unified, coherent v.·hole, but is also the basis for ih ahility to relate itself to its surroundings: nnly 
on the basi:-. of this identification v."it h an image of itsdf as coherent can the infant postulate 
objects of permanence and idemity in the world. 11 
Two features of the mirror stage merit special emphasis. Fir~tly, the fact that the infant"~ 
recognition of it sci f lies in identification with a virtual, e:dernal unity that cannot actually he 
touched. The moment of identification is thcrefmc abo one of alienation: the subject's 
realisation lies in an a sphere outside itself. it depends on an imaginary "other". 13 Even more 
crucial is a second feature of thc mirror ~tag.e - that it is "a drama whose internal thrust is 
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation " 1 ~. With this phrase Lacan points out the fact 
that the identification of the infant is with an image that has a unity and coherence that the 
infant, with its unformed sense of selr and unco-ordinated motor functions, in actuality lacks. 
The notion of a unified, coherent self is not something that pre-exists that instant of recognition; 
in fact it is the other way round. H is on the shaky foundations of this glimpsed image of 
coherence that the bastion of the cohl·rcnt ego is huih. The formation of the subject through 
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fragmentation and insufficiency Ill the suborJinatinn to an illusory image of unity. an image uf 
unity that the infant dnt"s not yet havc.l5 
Tnough the mirror ~tage it~df is a limited, 5.pt:cific momcnf in the cnmtitutiun of the numan 
~ubjcct, its real importance lies in its paraJig.m:.llic ,-aluc: tnesc twn features will henceforth 
characterise all suhsequent identifications. The initial iJentification with an image seen as 
stable. self-contained and autonomous, as Lacan ~a~"· "\ituatcs the agency of the ego ... in a 
fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the indi\idua! alone". 16 The :,uh,ject's 
knowledge of itself and the world is charactaised by what Lacan call:. meconnaisance. or 
"misrecognition"Y it is consti!Uted by its identification "'·ith that whicn is external to it, and by 
the "f orgen i ng" of rh e conditions of its <)Wn co n.c, tit ut inn .1 ~ 
For Lacan, though, the decisive moment in the constitution of the subject is its entry into the 
world of meaning through its identilication with some signifying trait in the S)mbolic order. 
Though the mirror stage and imaginary identification leads to the C)iperience of some illusory 
unity, it is only in the universe of language that the ~ubject·~ thoughts, feelings and desires can 
be represented. 19 Indeed, for Lacan the Symbolic order dominau:s the subject. II is not merely 
the vehicle for expression of the suhject's self. hut prior to and constitutive of the :,ubjccL!O As 
he bas put it in a famous passage. 
"Symbols ... envelope the life of man in a ncl\\·ork so totaltnat they join together before 
he come.<. imo the wnrld, tho~e who are going to engender him by ·nesh and hlood' ... so 
total tnat they hring to his hirt h. along with t h~ gift~ of the ~tar.<. ... the shape of his 
destiny, so total that they give th.e words that will mi!kc him faithful or rcn.:gadc, the law 
of the acts tb.at will follow him right to the v.:ry place where hi.' is not and yet and even 
beyond his death, and so rmal that through th.em his end finds its meaning in the last 
judgement, where the Word ahsolves hi~ being or t·ondemns it.''11 
Lacan thu.r. emphasises th~ anteriority of the Symbolic Order to the subject and the dependence 
of the subject on the ~ignifier. The subject has identity insofar as that identity is represented and 
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This ~:mphasis has been tako.::n up in Ahhu-,-;cr 's critiquL t•f the idealis( notion of ideology as a 
·\~t t•f ideas" .~" Althus.~cr ha..-. gi,en Lacan·, thought an explicitly political point hy ~hnwing the 
primacy <lf the signifier a' the surlacc of idcnlngical id~:ntific.llion . In other wonh, Ahhu.<..<.cr 
empha!'>i,cs the moment at which the .~uhj.:ct rewgnisl.'s itself in or assents to the ideological 
sign . To Jcscrihc this moment Althusscr has ur.ed the c<mcept of "hailing" or "interpellation". 
According to him, ideology operate.<. by interpellating or hailing indh·iduals as subjects.23 He 
illuslratt:s the momcnll>f interpellation in a Kafkac~quc "theoretical theatre", an imagined scene 
in which a policeman haib .an individual with th~ ~hoUL "hey you!" The individual turns and 
"(bJy this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion. he hecomcs a 
subject. Why? Because he has recognised that the 'hail' was really addressed to him, 
and that it was 'really him who was ha i!ed'. (and not som cone else) "!~ 
Through the very act of recognising that rhc call "as addressed to him. the hailed individuul 
a~~~:nts. to the full meaning of the policeman ' ~ call. Th~: Kafkaesque dimension of the drama lies 
of course in the fact that (as in The Trial} the existence of an actual crime, an original sin, is 
irrelevant: what maUers is that the individual rc nda<:> him or herself a 'iUspect through the very 
act of wrning around. In this way Althussa 4ue~tions the notion that a prior essence must 
underlie the moment at which the subject recognises itsdf in a particular identity: it is the 
momc nt of ide01ification itself that constitutes the indi\·idual as a subject. 
This point must be understood in rdatiun to the intluencc on Lacan and A!thusscr of 
Saus,urcan linguistic.'>. Sau<,surc\ points nf departure - his distinction between the signifier and 
significd.~s hi.r, insistence on the non-natural and " arhitr;.~ry " nature of the link ~ctween th~: two,26 
and his argument that linguists should fncu~ on the ~~!>le m underlying concrete speech acts and 
not only the speech acts in themselves, ~ 7 ha\·c all functioned to sever the apparently natural link 
between word and meaning that exists in our common-o;ense \·iew of language:. In its place there 
has grown up a view of the identity and value of signs as relational. In terms of Saussurc·s view, 
meaning docs not lie in the relationship betwcl'n a woru and what it "refers" tu. Meaning i~ 
constructed and created in language: it .'-Ub~ists in the rd<Jtions of synonymy and ~ubsticutahility 
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Classtcs. i98ll) p. 117 
Op. fit •. p. 7J, 
Up. dl •. p. 18. 
Peu:r fiud!.On. "Causality and lhc •ubJ<C'I 1n a ·(.liscuu!'-e-lhcon:llcal' ;~pproach Ia \-lar.\ISOl", .Studie~ in 
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essentially pri,·ate psychic act of compn:hcnsilm nr in the appn:h~:nsion or indiviuual signs, but 
in the pnss ibility of relating them to each nth~r. By .: .xt~:ns ion - anu here is the rub - identity. 
too, i~ CJught up in this rdational network. \\'hen the ... ubj~:ct rccngni~c~ him or hcr~clf in a given 
~ignifier. whether "worker", "white", "African" llT ·\;JbLltcur'·. the full meaning of that idcntity lies. 
oot in wme inner es~ence, the private intcntiLlns llf the suhject, nor in the objectivity of a 
transparent "experience", but in the external. publici~ aYailable network of relatiLinships and 
practi~:es which give I hose sign iric rs their val uc . 
This point give:. us the key to the interpretation of Althus~er's statement that ideology in,.talls us 
"in an imaginary relation to real relatiom".2'l By this he should not he taken to mean that our 
experience of conditions. of existence is illusory or fanciful. One Wa}' of thinking ahour it i:; 
rather that these cxpaicnccs arc produced lln a diffcn:nt k,·d from that at which they are 
experienced: our own experience of being ~ubj~;;ch. the ~t:lf-eviut:nt obviousness in which the 
worlu presents itself to us, the sense: we ha,·c ourseh·es of being spontaneou~ centre~ of action 
anu initiative - this is nothing bul the ''elementary" dfecl - of ideology.~ In terms of thi~ 
reading of ideology. a juxtaposition of the "illusory" nature: of ideology with the concrete 
experience of "reality" is meaningless - ~;:xpt:rience is ideological~ iJcology is our way of being-in-
the-world . As Althusser puts it. rephrasing St Paul, "it i), in the Logos, meaning ideology, that 
we 'live, move and have our being:"'3 l Ideology gi\'cS us ~1ur "spomaneous." experience of the 
sociat,32 while concealing from us the signifying nct\\Urk that shapes that experience. This is 
what Pecheux mean.-. when he says that ideology "supplies-imposes · re:tlity ' for the subject in the 
general form of miscognition",33 and that its operation is nne o[ imposition-concealment. 
We should however not take Althusser 's statement that the subject is insEalled in an imaginary 
relation to real relations as meaning that we are doomed to lh·c: trapped in the illusory world ol 
a "political imaginary". This would be to miss the importance of Lacan"s emphasis on the 
constitutive role of the symbolic order. Thi~ cmpha~is opt:n~ up the possibility of "unwrapping" 
political identify by analy~ing the weh of relations in which it is caught up and which give it its 
meaning anJ value. Lacan and Althu!>se r focus our attention on this underlying web and so give 
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" .. .lhc drama of interpeUation is presented from behind the scenes, from the place where 
one can grasp the fact that the subject is spoken of, is spoken to, before the subject can 
say,'I speak'."J4 
31 
Though their approach does deprive us of the apport unity to appeal to a viewpoint claiming lo be 
grounded in a privileged access to reality, it does not rob us of a critical perspective on the 
disrourses we are confronted with: as I shall show in my analysis, post-structuralist discourse 
analysis is an analytic strategy aimed precisely at detecting the hidden points of crisis, the "fault-
lines" in the ideological edifice. In this chapter, though, I wish to emphasise mainly the extent to 
which Sat.L<;sure can be seen as laying the foundations of a materialist theory of meaning. The 
sign, says Volosinov, is "a phenomenon of the eX\emal world" and so are the relationships 
between them. He has explicitly stated the consequences of a view according to which 
"understanding is a response to a sign with signs.": 
" .• .this chain of ideological crealivity and understanding, moving from sign to sign and 
then to a new sign, is perfectly consistent and continuous: from one link: of a semeiotic 
nature ... we proceed uninterruptedly to another link of exactly the same nature. And 
nowhere is there a break in the chain, nowhere does the chain plunge into inner being, 
non-material in nature and unembodied in signs. "35 
In other words, though we are concerned with .the 'interior' of the subject, that interior can only 
be grasped through the exteriority of the symbolic order.36 Here it is helpful to remind ourselves 
of the parallels between discourse analysis and Lacanian psychoanalysis. As Benvenuto and 
Kennedy point out, 
"According to Lacan psychoanalysis does not deal with feelings as such, but with a 
questioning of emotional states; that is, it is concerned with their meaning ... "37 
A funher valuable aspect of the Althusserian approach to ideology lies in the way in which it has 
built on this point and gi11en it an explicitly historical and political twist. In his essay, Althusser 
problematises the subject in the context of a broader discussion of the apparatuses through which 
society reproduces itself. This has on ocx:.asion been interpreted as a narrow functionalism, in 
terms of which Althusser is understood to explain "ideological state apparatuses" simply in tenns 
of their functionality to a ruling class. Another interpretation is however also possible, which 
focuses upon Althusser's comment that these institutions are in themselves both the site 






V, N. Volosinov, "The study of ideologies nd rbe p~ilw.ophy of language", in Cullun, ld~Oioi:J' •M Soc .. ! 
Pru~e,.,.: A R .. adu cd. by T. Henner, G. Martin, C. Mercer, J. Woollacorr (lnndon, Bl.r..ford Aradcmi<: and 
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fllr th~: way in which th~ functioning of it.kolt•~y it~df ;, unda~tOl•J : m~aning~ i:lnd id~: ntiti~~ can 
them!'chc~ bt> '\ccn as b~:inp. !>haped in pnlitic;.l 'truggh.: . 
Thu~ \lichd Pech~ux, taking Althus~er\ project further, has argued that Saussurc's focus on 
the general lingui~tic system of langut' a~ dc.:tc.:rmining the \'alue of any given clement !.hould he 
shifted Instead to co nee ntrak on the im pl)rtancc.: of historically specific plllitical discourses . 
Besides the general tdational ~ystem or the Engli~h langU<i~l.:. in othl!r W\ltd~. there i!> the way in 
which English is used in sch110is. armies, pri<.ons. htl~pitals. uni,·cr~ities. l!tC. Discursive 
formatiL•ns exist on a Jiffcrcntlcvcl frnm either langue or the concrete speech acts of Saussurc's 
parolt': Th~:y have a historical and politic<~.l sp~:ciiicity that the lHlhod{lx nptinn nf langue lacks.311 
Pccheux's remarks ,,n the historically specific nalllrc of discur~iYc formations help us further 
understand the: meaning of Althusscr's thc,•rdic'-ll t heatn.:. r\ltbus!>cr"s u~e of the polic~:man­
figure (in • .Jn1lthcr c:xam pic:, he u~es Glld) j, a metaphor through which h~: Jn:.ws our attc:nti,m :<' 
the way in which ideological ~uhjeclion i~ always !-.uhjccti'")" to what LKan calls an Other - or in 
Althusscr"s terminology. a ··suhjecr· with a capltdl S . ~r1 But this does nlll mean interpellation 
is a literal hailing by a conuetc empirical indi\·idual. The cr:ntrality of the "'Subject" is the r~:~ult 
1lf its place in a wiJer ~ystem, and Althusscr\ policeman is a ~tand-in for the Ideological Stale 
Apparatus. the entire range ,,r riruals, practices and institutions that mak~ up the discursive 
formation . 
Two important points !low from thi, unde;:r-,tanJing. ttl di~cuurse . Firstly. it implies the material 
nature (If every discursive structure. In the words ,,r laclau and Mouffc, discursive practice~ 
"cannot cun..,ist purely 1"\f linguistic phenomena. but must in~teaJ pierce the entir~: 
material density (If the muhifarious institutions. trituals and practices through which a 
discur~ive furmation i~ structurcd ..... w 
In other words, though I shall approach the discour~c uf the NCL/ AR\1 through th~ texts that it 
left behind. its disc,,urse d<IC!. not cnnsist only in thc~c ttXI!>. The m1wem~:nt of identification. 
the constructi\.'" \.lf a subject position and the dichutomi~atinn nf ptllitical space that I shall trace 
in my analysis of NCL/ AR\1 discourse - all th~.:sc pro ct.: sse~ uccur~J only thwugh th~ diverse 
practices that mad~ up the NCL/AR~rs acti,iric-.. The \~:ry act of sahotage itself. in ulhcr 
words. was as much part of the: discour!.l! of the r-;cL I ARM a5- the docum~nts I shall look at 
l<Jtcr; it. tm•. was a "statement". a m et;Jphur. implying i.l certain subjccl-ptlsition. 
38 
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Secondly, discourses, because they invoJo.·e institutions, practices and hence relations of power, 
also involve political struggle. Precisely because ideologies do not exist primarily as abstract 
ideas, they cannot be seen as independent world \·iews that pre-e:<ist their coming together in 
idcologicaJ struggle. They do not have a unitary, monolithic, homogeneous logic: Instead, they 
are deeply heterogenous, taking shape in relation to each other, marked by what they oppose . ..ll 
Hence, no identity, no signifier, is ever free from the marks of an ideological struggle, the stakes 
of which are precisely the way in which crucial signifiers will be articulated.42 As laclau and 
Mouffe put it, every discourse takes shape against the deforming influence of a discurive 
exterior, an exterior that is contitute by other discourses, and is therefore aJways vulnerable, 
open to destabilisation . ..l3 
2.3 Analysing historical texts 
These points of departure have a number of clear implications for the analysis of concrete 
historical discourses. Perhaps the most ob\ious consequence is the implication that we can no 
longer take the words people use to describe their experiences or their decisions as self-evident. 
The very question of their meaning is thrown open. The notion of a social context to which 
statements must be related now expands to include Ideological context, and the specific political 
weight and value of any statement has now to be determined with reference to its position in a 
particular discursive formation. 
Through problematising meaning. therefore, Althusser's theory of ideology opens up a whole 
new level of the political. The really important level of operation of ideology is not that of 
systematic political theory nor is it to be found only in the explicit content of manifestos and 
programmes. Rather, it lies in the interstices of everyday thought: its most imponant influence 
lies in the way in whicb it shapes the most spontaneous and basic assumptions of historical 
subjects and conditions their most everyday eKperience of the politicaJ. When we want to 
understand how subjects act politically we should investigate, in other words, the ideologicaJ 
resources that were at tbeir disposal. which rendered their world intelligible and presented them 
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In looking at the discourse of the NCIJARM, therefore, we should not pay attention only to the 
explicit content of their documents, and we should go beyond asking ourselves whether the 
perceptions enunciated in them wer.:: <:~ccurate or not. Discourse analysis depends on a move that 
Ziz.ek has com pared to the Brechtian alienation-effect: a deliberate "freezing", as it were, of the text 
itself, in which we bracket the question of whether the statements we are reading arc true or not, and 
suspend our own "obvious" experience of its meaning. In terms of this aprroach, texts should not 
only be seen as windows on a world of facts; we should also look at their own internal structure. 
We should ask ourselves how their central concepts and the relations that gave these their meaning 
shaped the t:xperiena.:: of the subjects in question and gave them a perspective on the world. 
A perspective that enables these imperatives to be translated into concrete and practical analysis has 
been worked out in some concrete detail by Michel P&heux in his hook:, Language Semantics and 
Ideology. I am not going to dwell on the details of Ptcheux's complex and subtle argument, much 
of which is concerned with the analysis of the problem of the distinction between explicative and 
determinative relative clauses since Port-Royal's Grammar. Suffice it to say that he shows that these 
fail for the reason that such relatives cannot be understood only in tenns of their grammatical 
function, that it is their discursive functioning that is cruciaJ.44 In the process he isolates the two 
central discursive mechanisms whereby ideology intcrpellates and sustains the subject in discourse: 
preconstruclion and articulation.45 
Precon.o;lrudion is the operntion whereby language constructs ohjeas in the world for us by 
referring to them "as if [they] ... were already there". 46 As an example of the way preconstruct ion 
operates, P&:heux cites a joke recounted by Freud: "Is this the place where the Duke of Wellington 
spoke those words? - Yes, but he never spoke those words." The point of the joke is that it is 
irrelevant whether or not the Duke actually spoke "those words": the fat.""! that we can refer to them 
as if they existed i.o; enough to enable us to identify the place. Whether they existed or not, language 
constructs them as iF they did indeed exist, before and outside it. Pecheux's point is that this 
modality is the way language makes all objects available to us; and that this is how discourse can 
have material effects of its own. In assenting to such preconstructions, them, by seeing them as 
referring to existing objects and not as objects constructed in discourse, we are interpellatt:d as 
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And h should be added that once tbcy are real for us, they start developing a life of their own. This is where many 
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Pl!!cheux to mean when he says that the preconstructed " ... corresponds to the 'always-already there' 
of the ideological interpellation that supplies-imposes 'reality' and iL'> 'meaning' in the form of 
universality "48 
But these preconstructcds do not contain their full meaning in themselves; their meanings are 
contained in their relations to one another. To interpellate us as subjects, ideology has to construct 
the relations between them. For Pc'!cheux, ideology docs this by "reminding" us of these relations. 
But the word "reminder" is deceptive: the main point Ptcheux seems to make by using the concept 
of ''reminding" is that ideology does n01 expliclly relate its crucial signifiers, but operates simply by 
presupposing them, orcrating as if they already existed. rn other words, it invokes relationships as if 
it is only reminding us of something we already know- but it is through this very operation that the 
relationships are constructed,49 This "retum of the known in thought" 50 is what Pt!cheux calls 
articulation. 
Coll'iit.ler, for example, the following phrase, taken from the discourse of an imaginary biologist: 
"men and women, being rational animals ... ". On one level, the words "rational animals" mean 
precisely the same as the words "men and women": they are mere rcdescriptions, focusing on an 
already-known feature of humanity. But on another level we can see that the scoond phrase acts in 
part to (re)define the words "men and women", Think of the very different definition of humanity 
implicit in the phrase if a fundamentalist Christian substitutes the word "fallen angels"... The 
operation of articulation, in other words, actually gives the preconstructeds it aniculates their 
meanin~ and gives the subJect its relation to these objects. Articulation thus "constitutes the 
subject in his relationship to meaning" 51 
A few last remarks are in order before concluding this chapter. As the previous pages show, the 
analysis of NCL)ARM discourse entails a careful and meticulous parsing of their texts for 
preconstructions and a systematic reconstruction of the way in which they interrelate. It thus has a 
very "mechanical" aspect, and it is no coincidence that Pecheuxian discourse analysis has at times 
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Sec Michel P~cheux, "Are the Masses an !nan i mate Object?" in Llngul!>llc VariAtion: Model5 and Method!., ed. 
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influenced by its roots in the Jisciplinc nf ~~ runur;disl an;.d~ '>l.~. It i~ also routcJ in a prufounJ 
~uspici<)n nf <tn "intuiti\~:" understanding ,,f il gi,~·n t.:\1 ;.~nJ a (on<.ciousne"" ,1f the way in which 
the analyst can be blind tn the "obviousnco;.,~~ he 11r o.,h~ j.., trying tn unct)\L'r. The methodical 
and careful "unpceling· of the text into ito; wn~titu\.'nl parh ~~ pi.irtly a 5tratc!,.':\' geared to avoiding 
t,)o great a trust in our own cxperi~::m:c nf ih mc,tnin~. 
At the same time discourse analysis is not at all reJw:ibk to ~uch mechaniul tactics, a mere 
description of those rdation~hip~. In a se n~e. ~w.:h a dc~cri ption \vould be a task both 
unmanageably huge (given the di\'er~ity of ··on~truct ion~ in a te>..t and their interrelation~) and 
ul!imatcly poin1bs (since it would la~k a f~._Ku~ and organising logic), Bc~ide!> this mechanical 
aspect, it is therefore <.~lso necessary rn cmpha,isc the status of disctlUr~e an.tly~is as an 
intcrprcth·e strategy. ln the cour~e of an analysi~. '-pecific constructions arc focused on, others 
arc ignored and certain relati,)nships 0:1rc singled uut for ~:mphll~is. Any analysi~ .,-ill always be 
an interpretation from a specific point of \'icw. Th.:reforc the analy!>t"s uwn position. his or her 
nalure as an intcrpe llatcd ~uhjcct i~ a crut"iill Jderm inilnl .1f the analytical proce~~. During the 
conclusion of this di!>~ertati1m. I ~hall take up sum~ ,lf t hes-: point~. But before we come to the 
business of analysing the ~CL/ ARM tc\15 <)f consiJcring their implicatiDm., we need tn lool-: 
llr\1 a1 the NCL/ARM itself. anJ the hi~tory frum \\hich it <.~rose. 
3 
The Development of Radical Liberalism in South 
Africa 
How can one change I be world if one idenlifies wilh everybody? 
How else can one cban gc it? 
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Arthur Koestler: Darknt'S! al Noon 
3.1 Uberalism and Radical Politics in South Arl"ica 
The NCUARM occupies an unusual, indeed uniq\lc place in the history of the armed struggle 
against apartheid. While it was only one of a whole range of groups to abandon peaceful protest in 
favour of sabotage, it was the only liberal group to do so. This is the fact which at firnt glance has 
appeared to be their most paradoxical characteristic, for South African liberalism, especially in the 
1950s, was marked centrally by its commitment to non-violent protest. The story of the NCLJARM 
must therefore be set in a broader context: it must be shown how liberals could reach the point 
where they could even consider sabotage as a strategy against apartheid. We have to understand the 
NCU ARM, in other words, against I he broader ideological background oft he development of a new 
kind of liberalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s - a political tendency that Tom LOOge has 
described as "radical liberalism".' The NCUARM should be seen as merely one of its 
manifestations: it was the most radical and desperate readion to the increasing oontradictions and 
tensions facing liberals during this time. 
Liberal and revisionist historians' bitterest disagreement has perhaps centred round the historical 
role of liberalism in South Africa, Ube.ral accounts have ponrayed it as a moral force in South 
African politics, a repository of civilised and rational principles South Africa ignores at ils peril -
and a tradition which, though it never became politically central, still had a meliorating influence on 
state 
2 
repression. 2 Rev isionis!S have been harsher in their judgements, 
Tom Lodge, "Patrick Duncan and Radical Uberalism" (Univcr5ily of Dpe. Town, Centre for African Studies, 
!977, Paper 2). 
R. F. A. Hocml~, S11uth Afrlnn NaUve P11Ucy and the Llbrral Spirit {Johannesburg, Witwalc.,.nnd Unive.,.ily 
Pres~. 1945); C. W. de Kicwiet The Anatomy or S<~ulh Arrkan Mhery, (London, Oxford University Press 
1956); Leo Marquard, Libnallsm In Snuth Africa, (Jobanne.o;burg, South African Institute or ~ace RelAtions, 
1965), Mathew Midlane, "Aspects of the South African Libent Tndition" in South Afrku Research in Progre..,.: 
Papcn given at a conference for Southern African Studies, UniVt'r5ily of York. December 1974. 
seeing it as the (albeit unwitting) handmdidcn of capit ;1lism\ opprcssmn. In a clas~ical 
statement of this position, Martin Lcgassick ha~ ~umm~:d up lil'>cralism's role in South Africa Js 
one of "social control') In a saie::, of articles h~· ha~ wntinuall~ emphasised its dimension as 
"a km:e trying to minim he or di~guisc the connictual or coercive aspects of the social 
~rructurc and ... to con-.incc sdcctcJ Africans that the l!rh:vances thcv fcl! could he 
ameliorated through rc.;forms which liberals CIIUIJ promul~atc.·-l -
This social role is, for him, deeply rooted in liberalism's complicity with cap1talist interests, in 
particular ~ith those of "secondary indu~try uf a particular kind".~ In another study. Paul Rich 
has argued that the political liberal intellectuals "pbyeJ an important part in the evolving 
poli(~il.:s of segregation up to the ~ ationalist's triumph in l9-l8''(1. In his judgemenl, t nus 
li neralism sh arcs some of the rcsp onsib ilit y for 1 he doc! rl nes of apartheid they de nounccd so 
p<~~sionatcly after lQ~. Other scholars h<!\ 'c: warned agaimt too global a condemnation of 
liner-a! policy. arguing that liberalism cannot without qualification he seen to he a force striving 
for social controiJ 
A study of the politics vf the :"JCL/ ARM will thw~ light on some of the issu<::~ Involved in this 
dchate. It wa'!. nut one example of a phenumL"non that was growing more and mnre widespread 
in the late 1')50's and early l%0's: the cm~:rgcnce of lihcrab who broke wilh tradition <1nd 
~tartcd to enunciate an increa~ingly radical, somctim-:~ t:n:n revolutionary perspective on South 
African S(lCiety. In this chaplcr I shall considt:r the de\·clopment and discur5h·c logic of this 
radicalism. l shall also explore some aspects uf its relationship to more conservative traditions of 
South African liberalism: ho"' it tried to tran~c.:end thi~ consen·atism, and in what respt:c\5 thi" 
anempt f<1iled. Before I analy5c the phcnumcnon uf radicalism in an; great detail. however, it 
mig.ht he usduliU gain some idea of its pusitivc hi.,torical manifestation. 
For the sake of clarity, It may help to distinguish hdween different senses in which we can look 
at the liberal community in South Africa. fn the limited sense. there was the tightly knit 
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~ee. (or e~ample . Ph~lh~ (...ey,-;en. "Cape LJt>erah>m on ot!; Tcrmonal Phase ". tn Workin11 Pa)Mr~ in Southern 
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Race Relatiom. the church~::~. amlth.: uni\ersiti~:s: <~ cummunily that Michelm.-..n has dcscribl·d 
as 
a kind of interlocking dirccturCitc of organi,.alions and indh·idual~ who serve the 
liberal cau'!le. They co-operate with (Int.: anuthcr in organi!'.ing protests. They swell l•ne 
anuther~' membership lists. -,cr\·c t1n each other"s committees, and underwrite each 
nther's cxpenscs.''8 
But we shlluld also look at a broader community. a community that includes a larger part of the 
South African left. Of course. th~.: word "community" is used ad\·isedly here. Its borders cannot 
be ~harply defin.:d. It wa~ on the whole com posed of English-speaking South Africans whose 
antagonism to apanheid had sharpened into an oppositil•n - sometimes \·ague and unformed, 
>,ometimes programmatic and thcorised - tu whitt.' supn:macy and inequality; but an account ~~r 
thi~ community would alw have to include figures like the coloured LP member Eddie Daniels, 
Africans like Jordan Nguhane and Selby .\him<m_!!, and Afrikaans speakers like Breyten 
Bre~1cnbach. Furthermore. as much di\·ided this ' community" as united them. Though 
sometimes its tics stretched across political di\"iucs and bounJ together Liberal Party and COD 
members (for example in the defence of Tr~ason Trialists) it was at other times characterised by 
an internecine distrust and bitterness that almO!il cxcecued their antagonism to the Nationalist 
em:my. But for all this. what they shared was important. When Ronald Segal, for cxampk, 
decided not to nail the nag of his journal tn the mast of any particular political movement, he did 
so in the hope that the magazin.: could serve as a platform ·· ... on which sp{1kesmen of the 
Liberal and Labour parties might sit with those ur the non-white political movement<. and free-
lance rebels like myself."9 
That hope was bas.cd on the recognition of the degree to whieh different streams within the 
South African left shared a common ideological heritage. Driver, in a thumbnail sk~:tch of the 
broader community of the white left, has pointed out how much "free-lanl:e rebels" such as Segal 
held in common with liberals and communists: 
8 
" ... in South Africa, white liberals, white socialists and white communists tended to live 
rather similar kinds of li\'es. though tht:ir backgrounds were often very different. They 
tended to be intellectuals - that is. they c:m.:d about ideas, books and the arts. Bccaust: 
they were in opposition to the gO\ernment and bl'cause tht:~ were in a small minority 
within their 0\\-U class <~.nd race. they were generally non-conformist and tended to be 
anti-authoritarian; even those who accepted the authority of a creed or ideology tended 
to be critical within that creed or ideology. They tt:nded to look out'r'ards from South 
Africa, to have links abroad, and many were able to choose to leave South Africa 
temporarily or permanently. IL is worth noting that one is discussing no more than a 
Cherry :>firhelman. The Blark Sa\11 of South .\fdra: .\ <'ll<.t <,fud} in libo.fali~m (Lono..lon. O'ifon:l 
Lniversil) Pre~s for the lnslo!Ule of Rare Retauons, t975) p Q 
Ronald Segal. Into Exile. p. II'). 
few thou:.and people ... That is.. lor all !heir ideolul.!ical differences. !hey h'-d sociologicfll 
linkli ... and in that sociological sense tlwr'-' was a c~rtain ·tihnality' linking them:·lfl 
Of couro;e. this is nnl to say that all while South African!> nppo<,..:d tn apartheid should suddenly 
be '\een a~ radical liberals. But it dues mean th,tt 1h~ di:grcc lo v. hich liberal ideology has left 
its mark on radical thought in South Africa \huuld not be undcn:stimated. I have in mind hen.: 
the liberali~m that marked much nf the politic~ nf mon:mcnts further to the left, ~uch as the 
Congress of Democrats, the traditinn Lcgassick was rcfaring to when he pointed out !he 
existence in South Africa of a liberalism that is not rooted in ·· the timidity t1f English Bourgeois 
thought" but in "the diffuse populist radicali~m which is tmc major theme of E.P. Thompson's 
!\laking or the E:nglish Working Class" . This tradition, according In him, was not so much 
expressed in the institmions of liberalism itself. but mainly "throu~h a popular front Marxism, 
and anti-Fa~cism, or in terms of African Nationali:,m or even 'African socialism'." li 
By the mid-1950's however, a different specie!> of Jibe ralism arose, one that was set a par! from 
both these communities. There was an aspect of liberal politics that was not completely 
conmined witltin the hounds of mainstream South African liberalism, but which was not 
accomodated within the Congress alliance either. Here again we cannot point to the cx.i~tencc 
of a cohesive "radical liberal" community or ddinca!t: the outlines of radical liberal politics with 
any finality. Though it was to some extent sclf-conseiou~ it never had it~ own manifesto, is own 
progTammc, its own newsletter or organisation. 1 ~ It existed merely as a tendency, a submerged 
current in the broader stream of South African liberalism. For all its elusiveness, however, it did 
have a real presence: throughout the 1950~ and early 1960s, it is po~sible to detect the 
emergence of a liberal discourse well to the left l•f the main 'tream. 
This. is illustrated most powerfully by the history of the Liberal Party. 13 At its founding the party 
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~() September 1987): Douglas ln.ine, "The ltberat Pari\ . I<J53-J<J(,S·· in J. Flutlcr, R. Elphtck. D Welsh 
( cds. J, Democrat it Li~rali~m in South .. Uric a: if~ hi\IOij and prO.,p<!d (Cape Town. Davtd Philip. 1987 J, 
pp. J 16- \33; Janet Robertson. Uberali~m in SQuth \frica: 1~8- 196..' . pp. 106- l-16. 161 - 231. 
See for e\ample the ad\-ertisement placed tn the liberal .iournal Forum. in October 195.!. l'ry mcmh.:r.; of the 
Cape To"11-hased South Afnran Libeml Assor!al!on . and wh•ch mdi!l'c!ly led 10 tht founding of the party. 
Its sign3torics· t'oncern With the necll. to wtn O\'CI' the dtsenfrancbtScd elite. the1r "dtsmay· at social unrest. 
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lcadcr~ were the sam~· lihcral.., wilt) h:.u..l d,,min<~tcd the: lih~r.:.l imtituti''"' with th.:ir 
accomm01..lationi~t :.tnd meliorist st;mn: lnr thL.: pa~t 30 yc;,rs.t:" Its. pulicv wa~ mnscrvat ivc. 
C<llling only ror the qualifted franchisl.'. anti thou~h the party wa!> \·agudy concerned with pnn:rty 
;.~nd economic hardship, it rem aincd tid 10 free: ·mar~~·t principles: talk abnut the pu~~ibility of._. 
planned ewnomy or t!quitablt: Jistributilm 11f l,ind was not c\cn enlcrtaincdY' Furthermore. 
1.!\·cn after the Defiance Campaign's d1Jll.:nge tQ p:trliamL'nlary struggk. the party profcso;cd its 
commitment to con~litutional mcthud~. 17 In Ronald Segars acid ... ummary. the whole 
mllvcmcnt :u the time appcan:d "as a sallln culture to which S<>fas were more the in ... trum::nts of 
change than barricat.le!>.''lll 
Yet such a judgement W<!S an over~implificatioo. Segal him5elf conceded that the Liberal Party's 
younger member~ wert: reaching for a "new anJ dtal policy··: 
"They \loOuld grow in numhcrs <.~nd innucncc: a~ white ~upremacy ~truck out ever more 
~avagcly at all 1twse who nppo.~cJ it, and at l~st they would transform the programme of 
the party to an acknowledgement of economic realitks."'19 
For the LP leaJnship diu not rcpn:c;ent the opiniom of the gt:neral mcmhership .1r' lndceJ. the 
early years of the LP Wl're chaTacteriscd b)" a l.trugg.lc between a consenative lcadcr~hip centred 
in the Cape, and a far more radical memhership. reprcsemcd hy member~ or..uch a~ Violaine 
Junod aml Hans Mciuncr in ~atal anJ t>y Jock [sacowitz in the Trans\·aal;~ 1 a struggle which 
::.oon threatcncJ to t.:ar th~.: party apart .~!. 
Thw:., in 1954. the ~:ommitmcnt to a qualificJ franchise was ~ucces~fully challenged and the 
universal rraochise was accepted in principk.1l In 1')56, controversy over the exclusive 
commitment to constitutional means JhrcJ anew a~ .a result of the arrest of several LP 
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.'\n acroull( of ~orne of the!>e carl\ 51rugglc~ ran t•e fmllld in Daqd be rat\. "'frank!} l'ro~:htcn=d: the Loberal 
Parry and the Congress nf the Pe,)p!c". p . . Hf 
Op.rir., p. 7. 
As a ~op 10 the CJpc leadcr>htp the po>~thllol\ of 1he um,·er~al franchose onh heulg tnrroo.luced 10 sta:;es was 
retained. Part\· unot' wa' tn am o:a"" senousl\ thrcatcnc<l. an<l \>ias mo.~u\laoncd onh n\· the JC•'lSlOn 10 
transfer the tc~Jer..hlp of rhe t';;rr~ to "\a1al. The uno,eral frandll>~ -.alo only full> acc~pt;d at ns \b} 196il 
.:\aoonal Congress {Janet Rol"lcrt~on . np. cit .. r-!'1~: D"uglas 1 f\ me. op. cit .. p . I I 7). 
Patnck Duncan had i'oeen arrested for ~tteo\Jmg an .\ \.(' C<,.>nfcrcn'" m <JuecllMO\\"n without " perm<l: 
Violaonc JunoJ of !he "\luonal ("ommutec a"J' others were ~rrcsteJ for ta~mg part on 3 women·s march 
to the policy that extra-parliamentary activUy should be seen as ·purely ancillary 
and secondary~ to conventional electoral activity was foiled, and a compromise resolution 
was adopted according to which extra-parliamentary activity was seen as having a "complementary" 
role. 25 
In subsequent years, the extent of extra-parliamentary activity grew, and despite resistance by the 
Cape Town leadership the LP soon had for all intents and purposes relinquished the parliamentary 
arena and ceased operating as a political party.26 Freed from the need to win white votes, its tactics 
changed: instead of making appeals to the institutions of authority it started organising opposition 
against them_27 From 1955 onwards the leftists in the party became increasingly involved in the 
organisation of grao;sroots resistance.28 Partly due to this work, and partly due to the banning of the 
ANC and PAC, the Liberal Party's membership changed to include more and more Africans so that 
by 1961, though whites dominated on its National Commillec, the majority of the delegates to the 
Party's National Congress w~re African.29 
The Liberal Party also drew clrner to other extra-parliamentary organisations. Some liberals were, 
for example, sympathetic to the Pan Afri~nist Congress when il broke with the ANC in 1959.30 
This was of crucial importance to the Liberal Party during the State of Emergency that followed the 
Sharpeville shooting. In fact liberals would demonstrate their radicalism perhaps most 







Peter Brown, op.dt., p. 21. 
See for u~mp!e P~ton's argument iu the wake of l~e 1958 election that nlhe Nationalist Government will, by aU 
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arguing that wbite supremHy would never yield to ''mere verbal pcrsuasion".(lbkl., p. 125; Janet Robenson, op. 
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Dovglas IIVine, op. ell., p. 124; Peter Brown, op. dt., p. 29. For a participant's view of tbe imporunce of extra· 
parlia menl3ry aC'llvity s.ee Vio!aine Junod, ~White libetllls and the Treason Trial Anest.s", A rnea Soulb, 
Aprii/Ju ne 1957, pp. 23 - 24. 
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in its suspicion of lite aetivitks of white Communist"' (C. J. Driver, op.r;IC., J'· 163. I 65). It is, of course, easy to 
exaggerate LP sympothy with the PAC. Many liberals remained suspicious of the PAC's racial ideology, au<l 
Patrick Duncan, f01 all his PAC sympathies, remained intermillenrly supportive of lbe ANC as well, gran ling huge 
prominence to the young Nelson Mandel~ i" !he pages or C:oniad a f!er 1960 .. 
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followed Sharpeville that tht: newlt)UnJ C\1ra·parliamenl;try fcrmur nf the Parly wa.s tc~ted. and 
on the whok it stood the te<,L Instead uf n:tn;ating. tht: Party's pu~ilion hccamc more defiant. 
c~pccially in C'apt: Town, where liberab ~upported the PAC stayaway after the Emergcncy.31 
Dunl·an\ journal Contact which had t.ccn rir~t to pul'lli<.h an cyewitn~s~ account of the 
Sharpt:\ille ~hooting, ht:camc almost the only ~ourcc of new~ about the Em~:rgcncy in the 
countr~·. in ddiancc of the Emergency·~ rl!strictillfi!> on printin~ news.32 Throughout the 
country, liherals showed that they were pre pan:d lu work illcg-dlly in opposition to apartheid}3 
The party's radicalisation did not end ht:re . The Party hau been o::uging in th~ direction of 
calling for fundamental economic change since April 1959, when it!> National Congress had 
accepted a minimum living wag~: as a cardinal clcmt:nl of party policy.l-l In tht: t:arly 1%0's, 
with a memhership vastly Jifft:rent from the conservative liberals of its c:=arly daysY• this lrcnd 
continu~:d. At the National Congr~ss in Cape Town in Jul~ 1963 tht: party J~hatcd whctbt:r a 
socialist bias should t-te given to Party pC1licy. and a rt:solution was adopted committing tho:: LP to 
secure "economic, social and political equality and justice for all people in a dcmocrJtic South 
Africa".36 A resolution put forward hy Ernk Wt:ntzd proposed that a commis~ion !>hould report 







Sec Peter Dreyer . .\fan~r\ and Fanalk': South Mrica and Human Dt>,lin} (\e,.. York. 'limon and 
Schuster. ]'!80). p. 1 'IS for an de~mpllon of ht>eraK cnthu~lil'IIC ~olidanty w11h the PAC.. The role of 
ht>crals 1n :tu~ lime. espeCially the quc~t•on of Duncan ·~ hcha\IOUr r.:garoing the langa march . ha~ been 
~omcthinl! uf a >Dntro,·er1ioal 1ssuc .. -\r,-on.lonl! w one account Duncan pe,.,;ua<lc() Kgosana to call off rhc 
march an lavour of the prllmt><: of a meeting ""h the ;\1ull~u:r. mtsu~tng the "en<)rmou~· tru~t .-~o~ana 
placed an htm 10 dessepate the me leta nee or the marchen ( :0.. L S.-\S. Dh~en~ion in the R.nk~. p. II 1: 
a~.-.ordrng to another Duncan him~elf railed on the man·heJ> to do~pe~e ( R. W. Johnson. HO\~ Lon~ "ill 
Soulll 1\(rira Suni•·e:". p. 19 Set: alk:> '\larton Le:;a~~id, . "Lib.:r.~hsm. Social Control and change m South 
Afnca. p. 15.) .\ dofferent ,·er~ton of whitt happened ~~ howe\tr a<.lvanccd in C. 1 Drover. op. cit •. pp. t79 • 
180 and Tom Lodge. "Patnck Dun,·an and Radical l.•l'erahsm". p. 9: accordong to the!oe arC'nunt~ Dunc3n 
could nC\'cr have "betrayed" the Lang~ ).!l!rrh. not hadng hecn pre~ent at all This , .eJ>ton of e,·enrs es 
corrot>orarcd n1· Kgosana himself "ho pre~enr~ the protni~e of an mtcn·t.:w a~ a wnccssion "1:>" by himself 
and tile marrhen \loltrtuut Dunc-an • uJtef".entiun (see Phelep A. 1\gosaoa. I.Ar~t '~ Foll:'ll: An Autobio~raplly 
(Johannest>urg. Sl..ota\'lllc . 1988). pp .:..! . 351 Lu<lge argue~ that hhcrals indeed rla)·ed an •mport.lnl 
supportin~ role. both on gening the polocc to accept the authorHJ ui the P;\C leadcr!i in the confrontation 
that occurred on .!S .\{arrh. as well a) rn hnngtng food int<) he~ieged Langa after the State of Emergencv. 
:\.,cording ro l'um . liberal~ worl.ed 11.1\h 1hc .:um and ~<tlh the ::Ktual effe,· t of C<1ntrtbullng to the power l)f the 
P:\C tn the area. t T\Jm I odgc. op. cit .. p . ll, 
"" .~ was not l:>eeng producetl • 11 was l:>anned •>n 8 .\pro I ~nd mn~l of ••~ staff " 'ere tn detenuon ( C J 
Dnver. op. rit •. p. 183. i8CJ). 
Tom Lodge . op, ril •. p. II. 
Janet Rot>cml•n. op. ~it •. rP· 19" · l'lS. 
Sit1Ce tile pan~ had on pranctple accepted 1 he unl\eJ>altranrhrse . 11 had t>e.-nme .l haven fnr left·WJng whotcs 
who were opposed 10 the C.ommuntM Pdrt}' a promcnent e.~amplc ·~ the c~-Communt~l Eddie Rou~. whu 
JOined tn (Q57 (Sec f:ddre Roux and Wtn Ruux. R~bfl Pity: Th~ Lift> o! [ddt. Rou~~: {London . Rex Collin~. 
1970). pp. !03 · .:!13) and e"ent11al1y pla~e<.l .; matnt role "' che Pa:-~y s I'Ommtltee on 1hc lan<l QueMio:-~ (AD 
1931 Aa r· 118). AI the same nmc man1 of the more conr.en.a11'c mcml'c"' of 1he LP were leav1ng: Bcl\>'ecn 
1959 and 1'160 more than 50 people left the Parcy. among them Gerald Gordon and the tP founder. OJ.Car 
Wollheim both of 11.·hom wen• O\'Cr ru the PFP (Janet R.oben~on. op.dl .. p. l'lll) . 
Peter Br<lwn. op. rit •. p. 5.:!. 
Democratic Party, whik two other member~ argued that the commi~sion should consider a 
change of name to the Socialist PartyY 
It is not only the Liberal Party that broke <.harply from mainstn:am liberalism. Indeed, from 
1960 onwards, radical liberalism of one kind or another was making itself heard in other 
contexts. The Black Sa'ih, for example, originally founded to protect the constitution against the 
procedural manipulations of the Nationalists, had S\)On gone ~eyond a commitment to formal 
constitutionality, and had confronted the inequalities that constitution it~elf embodied. By 1956 
many of its members had already begun to argu..: that the South African political order had in 
any case already been unjust. 38 For a few year.~. in the intcre<,h of preserving cohesion and 
preserving its credibility and appeal to the white electorate. the organisation avoido:!d confronting 
this issue.39 In 1959, following the 1958 elections, Sash leaders came to feel that they could no 
longer soh-pedal their own criticism of South African racial policies. They turned their back on 
the electorate. strongly criticising the United Party for its opportunism and conservatism:10 The 
Black Sash's concern with black, not white, rights. Jed to an exodus of its own more conservative 
members. but left the Sash freer to endorse the cause of constitutional rights for non-whites.--1 1 
Further manifestations of th.e prevalence of a more radical liberal position can be found in the 
general leftward drift of white campus politics. C.J. Drivers "Botha's Hill" ~eminar was 
probably to become tbe most well-known aniculation of a more radical student opinion, but it 
was only one of a number of phenomena. NUSAS itself had moved leftward since 1957, and 
under the guidance of presidents like John Shingler. Adrian Leftwich, Driver and Maeder Osler, 
became an outspoken organ of legal opposition to the government.~:! One of the most 
interesting of these is the rather self-consciously named Radical Students Society. founded in 
1960 by Alao Brookes, who was later to join the NCL/ARM:n lt took a strong non-racialist 
stance, hoping to break down the gap between white and non-white on campus. hs politics, as 
reflected in its publication The Radical, was characterised by the anti-communism that marked 
most liberal publications of the period but at least some of its members ~eem to hav.;:: been 








lb ict •. p. ~ 6. 
See Janet Robenson. op. cit •. p. 1~1 
Cherry \tichelman. op. dt •. pp. 63-68 . 
Ibid •. pp. so. 
Janet Roberuon. op. dt .. p. 1·0. 
:'ota nrn Legaii.!Oick. "'The "\ational L" nion of South , \f rican Students: ethnic dea~-age and ethnic integration in 
the unive rsaies". ( L. nive r.;1ty of California ( l .os Angeles'· Af n~an Studies Cc nt re. Orca~ional Paper no. -1. 
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[n 1962. for e .~ample. the society came under ftre from the \ar,il} editor for presenung a di.ICusston ol 
":Iliad ern :-.iarxism· (Var,ity. 2~ .-\ugust t%: 1. 
a Student Fellowship Society was. founded (som~ m~mben. nf which wen: also to end up in the 
;o..;CL), ~o~,hich, in its radicallibenarian aspect set:ms to ha\·e been \CTY similar to the RSS:'5 
3.l The NCL/ ARM, social control and the reception of \landsm in South Africa. 
In I he previous pages I have trkd to give an imprcs~ion of the range of activities in which radical 
liberals were inmlved. To describ(! these acti\itic~ as being. part of the ideoiOf,'Y of ··:;ocial 
cuntrol" is clearly tendentious. lnstead. his10rians like Tom Lodge have argued that the Liberal 
Parry should be seen as an "essentially radical force" - that is. "a party which aimed at sueial and 
political change rather than con..,crvation".-+6 Instead of being agents of social comrol, radical 
liberals tried to identify with the social transformation that wnuld result from majority rule.-47 
Unlike traditional liberals, they did not shrink from identifying the ending uf white supremacy 
as their political ta,r,k. They bdievcd in a unitary, democratic and non-racial South Africa. Many 
of them saw economic inequality as an injustice as great as that of apartheid. Increasingly, they 
rejected piecemeal reforms and opted for a radical transformation of that ,r,ociety. And in :-nmc 
quarters, this transformation wa~ described in terms uf .J. transition to ~ocialism. Their only 
dear and explicit similarity with the liberalism of the original Cape leadership W<~s in their anti· 
communism, and their insistence, despite their acceptance 1)f the need for radical 
transformation, on non-violence. Radical liberalism was, in other words, a new creature in the 
South African political bestiary. 
But thi~ bn:<~k was never mmpletc. Though radicallibcrali~m had changed its spots it stilt bore 
many deep structural resemblances to its parent creature - and according to some accounts, had 
not even cut its umbilical chord. Thus in hi~ essay. "Liberalism, social control and lincration in 
South Africa", Martin Legassick argues that though radical liberals rejected the overtly 
conservative policies of their more staid fdlnw-LP members, that rejection was simply a negative 
reaction and did not ammount to a. transcending. of liberalism. They failed in ,r,hort, to e~cape 
from liberalism's conceptual hegemony and therefore remained unable to elaborate "a.n 
alternative theory and practicc."~8 Here Lcga,r,sick refers in particular to their lack of an 
understanding of the class nature. of South African society. The NCL/ ARM's radicalism was 
tho~ simply a clutching at "straw 5upcrficialities". Although Legassick docs not go so far as to 
characterise 1hem as agents of industrial capital. he does seem to see them as the children uf the 
lntei'VJew with Rarmond Er~en~rern . London J(, .·\pril J<li!'J . 
Tnm Lodge. op. dt .. p. 1. 
Op. cit~ p. ! I . 
\{artrn U:gasstck. "Lrberahsm. '>Otra! control and liherauon in South ,\frica". p. !5. 
English middle cl<Jss, struggling to break free but ultimately trapped in the web of bourgeois 
ideology. For him, their failure is directly linked to this conceptual imprisonment. 
In focusing on the ideological context of the NCUARM, Lcgassick has embarked on an avenue of 
research that seems more fruitful than the other attempts we have seen so far. His analysis is 
however ultimately untenable and incoherent: although he seems to be asking the important 
questions, his answers seem deeply suspect and, as I shall show, do not stand up to a sustained 
critical scrutiny. It is, however, an interesting failure, and therefore wonh exploring. I wish 
therefore to make two points, ooe building on and elaborating Lcgassick's JXlint, and the other 
criticising it. 
Firstly, Lcgassick's analysis reminds us of an impor1ant fact: the members of the NCI)ARM were 
part or a historically specific, indeed unique, intellectual and political generation. Here we have a 
section of the middle class that had been radical.ised to the point where they saw a need for 
fundamental social change in South Africa. But if they were, in a sense, revolutionaries. they were 
revolutionaries without Marx. 1bis fact should be understood historically. That the liberals in the 
NCJ)ARM did n01 embrace a Marxist analysis of South Africa was not a simple failure, a mere 
error of omission. Il relates to the complex historical and philosophical question of the reception of 
Marxism as an intellectual and ideological tradition in South Africa. 
As Andrew Nash has argued in a seminal paper,49 Marxism has developed in a specific fashion in 
South Africa because of the unique character of South Mrica's development as an industrial 
society. 50 Nash emrhasises the extent to which Marxism, as it developed in Europe, was marked by 
the fundamentally contradictory nature -the simultaneously traditionalist and modern aspects- of 
the Hegelian notion of history on which it drew. lbis was an unstable ambiguity, and Marxism, as 
it developed, had to opt for one or another of these moments. The <lifferent strains or Marxist 
thought in Europe were thus sundered from each other (among other things) precisely by the 
question or which or these two strands they embrac.ed.st When the dichotomy between Stalinism 
and Trotskyism, both wedded to the metaphysics of progress and the notion of scientific soc1alism. 
threatened to stullify the development of Marxist thought, an alternative Marxist tradition more 
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School. This tradition, along with the thought of Gramsci, lived to shape the rejuvenation of Marxist 
theoretical creativity in the post~Stalin period. 
In South Africa, Nash argues, this could not happen. According to him the rndically different context in 
which Marxism devc!o[led locally made it im[lOSSible for South African Marxists to come to tenns with 
this ambiguous relationship between traditionalism and modernity in Marx's Hegelian roots.52 South 
African society was characterised by a contradiction between development and backwardness of a 
panicular kind, and this meant that the deep suspicion of the discourse of progress and science 
embodied in the Frankfurt school could not find purchase here.53 No alternative Marxist tradition 
existed, therefore, beyond the opposition between a theoreticaUy vacuous Stalinism and a pedagogic 
and barren Trotskyism.54 
This is a bold argument, serving more to raise! a historical problem and to outline the course of future 
enquiry than to present a host of historical detail. The implications for the NCI JARM, however, seem 
fairly obvious. Its members were of a generation for whom there could be no alternative Marxist 
tradition. no Marxism that would enable th.em to formulate an independent critique and understanding 
of the events that were to plunge the socialist world in crisis after 1956.55 Instead, their perceptions had 
been shaped by the Cold War. In the context of the revelations about StalinL<>t totalitarianism and the 
invasion of Hungary, it is not surprising that radical liberal<; should be deeply suspicious of a Marxism 
that seemed to them inextricably associated with the heritage of the Kremlin.56 But in the long run 
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failure to leave libernlism behind to their 
Indeed, the memben of the NCLIARM en ironicolly be seen JS ahnosr the last such generation. AI tbe very time of 
th NCIJ ARM's exi~tcnc~ ~~me the fir.; I signs of a rcjyve n~tiun ~~ socialist thought in tema tionally: the recru.Jesce nee 
of a criticaltra.Jitinn of Western Marxism in Jounul~ like The Ne.,.. Rnsontr and The llnlnnitlt~ and iAn Rn!t.,.., 
the formub 1 ion of a a independent M.;m;ist critique horh of posl·war ca pi 11lism nd Soviet Ru:osia, and the general rise 
in tbe 1960s of a new L:fl in Eur(lpe and America. 
Thh rejuvenation was in tum t(l make i!5 impact no Soulh African MuJ<ism through per.;ons who were very 
much contemporaries (lf the NCUARM: academics Hke Sbula Mark.s. Slao!ey Trapido, Charle5 van Onseten, Colin 
Dun dy, Ric bard Tu mer and legassirk himself were a lm o~t a 1 tha 1 ~me moment coming under the inn uence of the!.e 
new do:velopmeoL•. 'Nltile !.Orne of the NCI./ARM memlll'n~ were still in prison, lhe first !.!lvos hd been fired io a 
deb• !e in South Afric~ n b i5roriography lba 1 was ~ventually I<;> play an im pc>rtant role in Mux i5m 's .begem(lR ic position 
in the so•:lal sciences at South Africa's ceniQI univen~ltios (s~e J. Butler and D. Schreuder, HU~ral Histe~riograpby 
since 1945". in J. Butler, R. Elphid and D. Welsh (eds.) DrmOC'ratlc l.lbnalhm In South Arrlca: it.o; History and 
Pruspnt, p. 158; Christopher Saunden;, Ttw Making or lhe Soutb A(rlcan Past: M'\]or fllslorlam on Rau and 
Cln~ (Cape 'Cown, David Philip, \988) pp. 167 · 176. 
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historical defeat. When he allempts this his argument gnc' -,cr·,,lU,Jy 1~n\ng . ~pt:a~ing ahout the 
1·ariou~ n,1n-\Jarxist challenge'> tO th\. ffi<'l"t: nm-,o:r\<tlih: "'fl~CtS ,,f JibcraJi~m. h..: p~)int!"> nut 
their failure tu transcenJ the mt)t a ..... umplit•n~ nf lihcr,iJi,m .mJ ..:'cape fwm ih wnccplual 
hegemony: 
"'In thi~ ... lay thdr mi!>takes - th..- ••lcr-ha~ty anti-pa\S camraign which hrought on 
Sharpevillc, the rcalliance with lihcral.:, anJ !he hdra\al of Kgosana hy Duncan. the 
blundrm;, bck of security and ,lr.Jte~:v \\hich c;-haractcri!)cd Puqo. the auempt lt1 
undertake ~ahotage without 1·iol~ncc hy tht: A.R.M .. the rapidity of the breakdown ol 
Leftwich (a lack of faith, thnlugh nothing ro~iti\"1.' Ill hal.:! faith in), the mindii!~SnCS!"> ul 
John Harris. All this.. erratic, without appar~:nl moral purpo:.c. scn.ed lmly to intensify 
repression ra!hcr than hasten fn:cJum. Is it only coinciJental that ir was with these 
kinds of activities that there was circum-,tantially ... as:-.l•Ciatcd the C.I.A. and thr: United 
State~ foreign policy machine? For -:vcn if ·:-.ucccssfur in overcoming their aprarent 
enemy, such organi)lations, on I~ rejecting hut nut 1 ram.ccnJing. lihcralism. could 
reassume the mantic of social cnnt rol. .. :\" 
Bc~idcs the factual crrors5S this is il tt:nJcntinu!> argument. Firstl~. his contention that 
Leftwich's hreakdown occurreJ hccausc he haJ nothing p1.}'1ilivc tu have faith in is Jceply 
suspect. In term~ of Lcga:.sicl.:"s argument thr{log.hout hi:- artid~. the NCL/ AR!\-r~ conr~ptual 
failure lay in their inahility tn transcenJ lihcrali-.m in fa\1.}\JT {'I \{,tr-xi-.m, anJ Ill cmbrace a cia~~ 
analy~is of South African soci<:ty. I do not thin~ I .tm twi!>ting hi-, 1\mJ~ if I tak~: him tn imrl) 
that if Leftwich had the correct materiali:-.l under~tanding of Sour h African soci~.·ty he would not 
have collapsed! It is diflicuh to take 1 hi.-, <trgumcnl :-.criou:-.ly · unlcs~ we wuuld turn every true 
~ocialist into a person of steel and C\cr~ Communi~t Pdrt~ 11r .-\ "C mt:mbcr that broke Jown 
under p<~licc interrogation into a closet liheral~ L.:ga,c;ick t hadnre doc~ nut succeed in linking 
the NCL/ARI"vr5 failure convincingly to their lih..:rali-.m.~9 
But is this nt){ rather unfair? Can Lega~sid:-. ha-.ic arg.umc.:nl he discreJitcd !limply hy rcfutin!? 
this particular illustration? It seem~. indeeJ, thill his ,wcrarching hvpothesis sun·i\·cs thi~ 
criticism. In the above pa~~agc: Lega~~ick is m;tking <lfl us~umption about the nature t)i" 1hc 
NCL/ ARM's failure which is quite incorrect. Without this assumption hif> ar~umcnt's more 
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I ha\C already ~·>mmcntcd un the faet rloat ()unc..on cannllt he "l1J h• ha\e "J,eoravcJ " ~o~ana (;ee p. 6"' 
at>ove). Funhennore. ohe 'Clj.--\R.\1 "''e' "''' •ccOltll h.t,e rcce"eJ !!!> mone~ from tl1e C"L-\ (seeP- 7~) 
It os nl'l dc:ar how rht P,\\s ·-,,, ·er-h.:bllne~;.·· led til ~harpeqJic : !I• fru1t >eem~ raohcr to ha\e h~en the lo" 
tumour~ thai <'haracrcrosed rhe .:a111pargn :_!;cneralh, and to "hrc-!1 Sha,,c,,llc JnJ Llnga were eu·ep11ons 
It should of cour..e also be p01n1ed <•UI th~t lu~ g'a.:ral rontentletn that the '\CL/AR'.h ideologu:al failure 
led to Inc mwnsift.:~!lon of rcpress.on (Jnd that il lo~ 1111phrat 1on I hen fore al~o ,c"cd .1S an agent of ".I.OC•al 
rorurol'") IS Jlso vee;. su,pcct . Though u ma~ he wrrccr to .1rguc somclin~<;~ that ondi\lduals somctomcs 
unintcnnon~lly fadlllatc ••x•al controL LcgJS\JC~ · , argumcnl here lhrc"'"n~ to 1na~e the term mcanmgh:ss. 
R} the ~arne token. hrs Jcfon1110n ••f 1hc :'\( L/. \R.\1 a' un\\lftrng agc111S <>f ~llCoal control would seem It• 
1ndudc Lmkhonro we 'itNC . Pn4o. and e'Cl"\ rc"lhJ!l(>t1an "'"'emcnt. oncluding lite Pan~ Cnmmunc itself. 
1h,11 fatlcd and thu~ put the rule" vn 1hc•r g••~Hi ~ufll.-,cnth 1u prc,e•\1. for lh<! trmc hc:ing. greater 
cortflilgrauons rn I he future: . 
-N 
problematic featur~~ di~app.:ar. Th.: r~·al rr,,hkm ~~ith hi'> ;1nich.: i~ not nnly that h~.: faib to 
expbin what he <.ays he can C'Spb in. hut t n;it (a\ '-hl•Ukl ht: ckar frum my <Jrgumcnt in Chapt~:r 
1).'''' h~ is tr~ing [I) t:xplain the \\rtmg pruhk·m! The \CL/AR~1\ real failure (.hies ntlt lie in 
th~:ir wllap~c in the face <Jf -~ecurity pnlic~· inkrrt>~;.tttun . hut in the initial hopeb,!-.nC!>!'. of their 
entire strat~~- lt might he that L:g.,~,,]ck\ argument ~tanJs a chanc~ nf hcing more c11g.ent if 
their 1,"-k of M arx.i!-.t theory coultl h.: rl· bred l• 1 their ,iratcg.y. L~g.a~:-.ick Jm:' nnt do thb in hi' 
article, hut his analysi~ might ~till han: \<lm,· r..:al l.'halkngc if thus rc-intt.:rprctctl. Anti at fiN 
sight, it doe.~ indeetl look <~s if thi~ rcint.:rprdJti<.ln -~tanJ~ more chance of s.urviving: the 
NCL/ARM'" main crmr lay in their dist~.mc.: l'r<}ffi rna'~ ~rruggk. If they hall po"ses,ed the 
conceptual tools of Marx.i!>m, might the~ not h;.ne an1iJeJ this mistakt:') 
But on furl her investigation even t hi~ n.:-int<;:rprctatilm is still probkmat ic. For underlying the 
various prohlems. I have pointed out. thac is an C\t.:n mure fundamental prohlcm. This in its 
great le\'el of ahstraction. Leg.as.~ick's analysi~ uf the ~l'L/ ARM's strategy ~ees it as woted 
simply in an absence, in a negalht> rcacti11n to lih~.:r.lli~m: thac was a \-oid (says L~;gassick) in 
their understanding: if that \'uid hall nut t:.\i~tcJ (if it had bt:<'n fi!lctl with a Marxist 
understanding). they would not ha\e m;1d~· the mi.,tak.:s tht:y did. Lq~as~ick's characteri!'.ation of 
the limits of the ;-.;cLjARM's lihcrali,m cllm.:s Ju''" 111 tht: ohs.:natilln that it did not make 
possible a matt:riali~t analysis of s,,uth African ~ot'it:t\ · v. hich is to ~ay that its liben•lism wao;; 
limited because it was not Marxist. 
That may h~ true. It b als11 tautnlngic;1l. In Lq!:..~~ick\ argum.: nt, the notion of a matcriali~t 
understanding plays. the r,1tc of ;t pure anJ unJiff~.:rcnti<ttcJ pult-ntiality: where<:~~ lib.:r<:~lism 
obscured social reality (and is thus autom<.~tically cuunh.:rrc\'Olutil•nary) .. \tarx.ism unveils ir (anti 
thll-<i is automatically liberat ... ,ry). If such an argument i!.. not to be. in the end, mere circular 
assertion. il "hould dE-mon~trare this poinl. That means that we ~houltl not only look at what 
was mbsing from the NCL/ ARM's thcm~o:tical h<~cl.:grounJ. hut al~n at what v.as there. Thi~ is 
what Lcga.-.sick\. argument Joes not do. He u{•~s nnt ~h''"" whi.;;h t:kmcnt~ or liberal itlt.:ology 
lay behind their decision to go over to ~abotagc. and h1w.- their liberalism made it impossihlc lor 
Lhem to g.o beyontl sabotage. He avoitl~ preci~d~ the main prohlcm: what was the pnsitivc 
content of th~ir liheralism·? What were the prohlcmatic <:~spec!!> that Marxism woult.l have 
transccm.kd'? 
Connected to this problem, thcrc is another - a re<1l urc that may cxpJ;,in just why Lcg.af>!>ick's 
arguments seem so misdirected here. It seems that Legassick. now that he has advanced a thesis 
Sec J.ho,e. pp h - t2 
that seems to explain a large pan of liberal politics. seems to believe that if it is valid, it must be so for 
all liberal politics, without differentiation. It seems inconceivable to him that his thesis could still be 
correct as far as moot South African liberalism is concemed, and that there could still be imponant 
exceptions, His is in other words, an aU-or-nothing position. This is linked to an aspect of his analysis 
which is at first glance its most attractive feature; its broad and sweeping terms. The broad, wide-
ranging nature of Legassick's argument is well illustrated in his seminal article on the development of 
mcx:lem liberalism, where he asks, rhetorically, whether there is any form of liberalism in South Africa 
which is not merely a form or benevolent patemalism:61 from the terms of his argument the answer is 
clear] y "no", In the 1970s, this thesis pia yed a politically very im ponant role. helping the nascent 
radicalism of the white left to articulate its suspicions about, and define itself against, the ideology of 
liberalism. Much of the power of this thesis lies in its apparent ability to make sense, at one blow, of a 
number of contradictory aspects of liberal ism. 
Ilut this generality has its price - as is evident in the work of some of the scholars who followed in 
Legass ick's footsteps. Stephen WaiSOn, in a searching critique of the failure of the liberal novel in South 
Africa, quotes Legassick's rhetorica I question approvingly and makes that implicit denial quite 
explicit62 He then sums up the dilemma ofliberal politics in South Africa as follows: 
"In a situation so polarised, and therefore commanding a specific choice in one direction or 
another ... the liberal is prevented from responding to this demand by the very nature of the 
principles in which he places his faith. 
In short, if he is to act effectively on a political level in South Africa, he has to cease 
being a libera I. "63 
Watson is absolutely correct to point out that liberals' discourse has rendered political choice a 
prcblematic matter. The problem with his statement, however, is that it is too neat and abstract. The 
NCIJARM's history shows that liberals in faa can and have tried to make "a specific choice" in one 
direction: they opted without qualification for radical change. Its failure raises precisely the question of 
how their liberalism enabled and constrained that choice, how it made specific moves possible .and 
others impossible. Watsons argument obsUires the concrete ways in which these limits work. In the 
absence of such .a concrete explanation his point that liberals can by definition not act effectively begs 




M~ nin Legas~id., ''The rise of modern Soijl h Arrica n liberttli~m: i~<~ nsurnpjions and soda I ttase", p. 3. 
Steven Watson, "The Fate of Liber~lism in Soulh A(rka" in D. Riemenschneider (ed.) Th~ 1Hslo'1' 11nd 
H lslorlogn pby ol Commnn1nalth Ltttr11lun (Tdbiogen, Gun!cr Narr, 19tB), p. 120. 
Ibid., p. 126 
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At the root of this sweeping analysis lies not the class reductionism for which Legassid:; and other early 
radical historians have been criticised, but rather the opposite. We have here, an idealist move, a 
reductionism on the level of ideological meanings. Legassick:'s mistake does not so much lie in arguing 
that the NCUARM is directly link:ed to liberalism's social base in manufacturing capital but rather in an 
assumption identified by Tom Lodge: that the "conceptual hegemony" of liberalism in which they were 
trnpped had a single homogeneous and reductive logic. IJeyond the wide diversity of concrete contexts 
in which South African liberalism has been articulated, beyond the divergent range of historical projects 
it has been part of, Le:gassick: seems to see a unified, monolithic aspect: an ideological essence which 
is everywhere basically the same. Liberalism is characterised for Le:gassick: by a certain essemial core 
of assumptions, concepts, presuppositions: any given instance of politics is liberal insofar as these 
concepts manifest themselves in its discourse. 
As Lodge has pointed out, this presupposition is one Legassick shares, ironically, with apologists for 
liberalism in South Africa. 64 Liberal historians and intellectuals, face,d with the fragmented nature of 
the South African liberal tradition. tend to postulate in the abstraCI a Jist of liberal principles, and then 
judge panics, individuals, etc . .as liberal insofar as these elements can be found in their thinking. An 
e:tample of this trend is Janet Robertson, who tends to talk, uncritically, of "liberals" in the ANC 
without trying to relate the elements of liberal ideology in their discourse to the other strands that can be 
found there .65 Legassick does exactly the same, but in reverse. 
The problem with this assumption seems Jo be not only that, as historians like Trapido and Lewsen have 
argued, liberalism in South Africa has been a fragmented trndition, that one cannot simply abstract a 
broad list of principles from the concrete practices of which it was pan. 615 It is also that this assumption 
does not a Uow us to come to terms with the sped ficity of each such set of practices. 6 7 It obscures the. 





Tom Lodge, op. dt., p. I. 
Janet Robcnson, op. ell., pp. 28 · 39. 
Se~, for exam pie, St.a nley Tra pi do, '"fhe friends of the Na lives': merch ats, pusan !5 and the political and ideo(ogica I 
st"'clure of liberalism in the Cal"', IS54 · 1910", in Shu(a M3rks and Anthony Atmore (ed~.), l<A:o110my and Soddy 
In Prt·indll.';lrlal South Arrka (Hong Kong, Longman Group, l'l80), pp. 247, 251-2, 25'l, 267 • 8; Pbyl!i~ Lew.s.en, 
op. dt.; "The C'.apc Ubera1 T"dition ·myth or reality?" (Institute for the study of Mao lo Africa, Papcr 26 (November 
1969). 
Thus Mkbcl Foucault argues that any •Uempr to define the identity of a giveu di5cursive field witb rereferen~ to an 
u nder1ying essence is t>ou nd to be me !.I physical ~nd logka lly circular (TI~ A rdu•ology or Kno..,.ltdgt, Ira ns. by A.M. 
Sheridan Smith (New York. Pantheon, t972), pp. 31-39). Foucault's point relates to the discourses of the social 
science~, but is equally appicable to ideology. The pmition be is 1efr wilh a! the end (seep. 38) seems to be dose to 
that of the lat~r Willgenstein. Instead of looking for .an underlying unifying essence, one ~bou1d tool; at the concrete 
"family resemb\Jnce~" between d ifferenttlll dirions, projecl5, i nstirutions, etc. thaT have In facl lo comt bt known Js 
!iber> I. Thus we circu mven1 the question of whether they are "really" liberal or not aud whether they share n romrnon 
core. (For an introduclory discussion of !he Willgensteinian concept of "family resemblances", see O.cat Hanning, 
Philosophy of Laguagt 1: Munlng and list In W1Ugu~teln's Blue and Brown Boob, (Bierchley, The Open 
Un ivernily l'r~ss, 1973), pp. 49 • 62.) 
in liberalism to the horizon of theory, an invisible ideological phlogiston that pe.nneates liberal polili~ 
and whose presence can only be detected, teleologically, afterwards. 6fj 
It seems necessary to assert, against this, that South Afri~n liberalism is a frogmented trodition. To use 
Pecheux's metaphor, ideologies are not fortresses, they are parodoxical spaces, they are texts. We 
should thus be alive to the extent to which the meanings of the ideologi~l text arc not fixed, but arc 
open to rearticulation, are themselves the objects of ceaseless struggle and are thus articulated and 
rearticulated in every new oontext. South African liberalism, in other words, was a tradition continually 
constructed. contested, and reconstructed. 
It might look as if I am exploding the body of liberalism in order to save it from the deep cuts of 
Lcgassick's analytic scalrel- I am not arguing that liberalism is without limitations. Indeed, this thesis 
has grown precisely from the conviction that liberalism in South Africa is deeply problematic. We need 
to understand how liberalism enables the subject to take up a political position in the struggle for the 
transfonnation of South African society - and the limiLS of this enablement. By looking at what the 
NCU ARM's liberal ism led its members to do, the drawbacks of their course of act ion, and the ways in 
which they sought - and failed - to go beyond those drawbacks, I hope to contribute to this 
understanding. 
In the rest of this chapler, I will explore the complex issue of the relationship of radical liberolism to 
"classical", conservative liberoli<im. To do that, 1 will trace the development of Jiberoll<im since the 
Scoond World War.69 The .seeds of radical liberalism of which the NCUARM was the most desperote 
expression had been sown during the war, and its development and the dilemmas that constrained that 




The theorem thr the pre~enee of phlogi~ton was the cau~ of fires w~s sim pte and appealing. If something burned, it 
contained phlogiston. H not, it ohvlously did not The problem with this thesis was rhallhe only way to ascenain rhe 
exisre nee of phlogiston w~s to see whether it would I> urn! Tbe grutesl weakoe::ss of 1 he ph logi~ton 1 he~ is was thus iL~ 
very irrefutal>ility. Irs explautory power was of a poSI-hoc, after-the-fact kind, and it failed to relate the fact of 
comhustion to the co~rttt, materlatrropenies of ohjecrs thl hutncd. 
The arty stages of this development, and the first man ifestuion of ~ democratic ~ hal!enge to the limits of coHervativc 
\ihnal politics is traced in Paul Rieh's analysis of the political fortunes of Leo Marquard, Solly Sachs ~nd l-lymie 
Basou (Sec P. Ricb, Whilf Pow~ r and I he I Jbrn I Com~t..~r, pp. 77 • 97. In a senii.oi: the lim its of ils developmen 1 
and ils essen tia I dilem nus were alrudy to some ex ten I prel"igu reo.! io their ~ reers_ But Rich Is more coneerud to 
discuss the role of more conserv~tive in•titution~ like the lusli tu te for Race Relations, and b is focus on the periooJ 
hdore 1953 means that his ana lysis of radical liberalism's final and failed a llem pt to intervene decisively in South 
African politics is confined to his CU(SO!)' concluding pages (see pp. I 23 · 126). My dis.eussion of the war yu.-. as 
we II as the period from 1953 onwards is boweva still indebted 10 Rich's W<lrk. 
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3.3 Liheralism and lhe Second World War: Democracy, anti-fascism and world opinion. 
The story of the transfonnation wrought locally by the Second World War is well known. The period 
between 1939 and 1945 represented the concluding period of an economic boom which began with 
South Africa's depanure from the gold standard in 1932.7° This had been a time of unparalleled growth 
in the manufacturing sector. From 1936, the industrial workforce grew at an annual rate of 6.2%, 
doubling its numbers by 1951.7 l A large percentage of this workforce was African: between 1936 and 
1946, according to official statistics, the African population doubled in Johannesburg, while in Cape 
Town it quadrupled from 15 000 to 60 C00.72 The war accelerated and deepened these trnnsfonnations: 
South African industry had to make a substantial contribution to the allied war-effort in tenns of ship 
repair work. and added to this was the fact that 10Q11 consumer demand was now cut off from its 
overseas supply.73 The effect of the resultant growth in the manufacturing seaor on the industrial 
workforce was particularly concentrate(] on Africans, p.1nly because of the absorption of 186 000 
whites into military occupations: while white employment in industry still rose by 20% during the war, 
African employment increased by 74%.74 
This resulted in a dramatic i ncrcase in the political militance and economic muscle of black workers, as 
is indicated by the rising incidence of strikes, the Alexandra bus boycotts and the initial success of the 
anti-pass campaign initiated in 1944.75 At the same lime, a new, more militant political leadership 
emerged in the African intelligentsia. This radicalisation had serious consequences for liberals: even 
relatively moderate /\NC leaders like Xuma were starting by 1943 to challenge the accommodationism 
of the Institute of Race Relations, asking it to clarify its position on issues such a<> the pass laws, the 
registration and recognition of Trade Unions and the Union's native policy, 76 while Luthuli, himself no 










Tom Lodge, "Cia.-..~ Coonicl, Commu nily slruggle and Patriotic Uni ly: lhe Communis I Pany of Sou lh Africa during I he 
Second Wold War'' (Paper presen1ed a 1 !he African Siudics s~ minM, Univer.;ity of !he Witwa ter.;ra nd, Johannesburg, 
Ocmber 1985). p. l. 
Jill l'llalras..•, Tht South African Economy: lt.. Gr111dh and C!wrtg'l' (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, J988), pp. 
t6S, 167. 
Tom Lodge, op. ell., p. 2. 
D. Hobar1 Houghton, Tht South African Eco110my, (Cape ToWlt, Oxford University Pr!$, 1967), p. ll9. 
l..oc.dt. 
See Jack and Ray Simons. r.lass and Colour In South Africa 1850-1950, (Humondswor1h, Penguin, 1969), p. 547_ 
See also Tom L£~dgc, op. ell., pp. 8, 10 for an analysis of C.ommunisl Par1y and ANC'~ failure to La:p inl<l lhis rhing 
mililan~. 
Rich, op. ell .. p. 73. 
A. Llnh uli, Lei my ptoplt go (Londonm Fonl•n a, IQ82), p. 94. 
But besides the ecooomic oontcx:t, the ideological oontext should also be unders\0Cld. 78 As Lodge 
points out, the war's full meaning cannot be found by only focusing on the socia-economic changes it 
implicd.19 It did play a mle in sharpening the oontrndictions th<Jt were alreal.iy taking shape in the 
structure of the South African economy, but it did more than that. Its specific imponance lay in the 
way in which it altered the ideological oontext of liberal politics, in its implications for government 
policies and the wider political environment. The Second World War differed from the First in one 
crucial way: the manner of its legitimation. In South Africa, as in the rest of the Allied world, it was 
construed, not so much as a war against Germany, Italy or Japan, llut a war against fascism. This had 
fundamental consequences for other aspects of official disoourse at the time: the war against fascism 
was simultaneously a war for freedom, for democracy, for human rights. 
lhe equation of the war against Hitler with a war for political freedom was articulated in a number of 




The dishoclion be !Ween e~onom ic and ideologic~ 1 conte~t m~de ~bl>ve desc rves some comment. Though I ~ m 
~on scious of I be gene~ logy of t~is term and irs strong suggesliou of the base-superstruclure model, I sb ou ld uot be 
L>.~en to tw: ~cceptlng, Implicitly, the tkesis of the ultimate delerminalioQ of the ideological by the economic frequenlly 
as~ocia ted With that meu pho r. 
Firstly, such a reduclion ism has lim iled use for undersu nding I iheral politics. Efforts to provide a 
materialist account for oppositional white politics bave had some e1tplanatory power, but only wbere the link be!W~en 
the in lercsrs of monopoly capital ~nd libeul Jl<l!itlcs is fairly straightforward. An exam pie of su cb an analysis is llria n 
Hackland's treatment of !he social base of the Progressive Party, (See "The Economic nd Political Context of the 
Growth 0 r the Progressive Federal Party IT Journal or So uthtrn Afrka D Stud Its, Vol. 7 No. l {October 1980), p. I). 
Though he can explain tbe growth of the pany in the mid -,;cventies in terms of the growing organic crisi~ of ca pill~ !ism 
after 1973, the binh of the p3ny and its continued uistence during !he economic boom of the I %0s is simply glossed 
over. If litw:ralism's "root~" in manufac!Uring and monopoly capital cannot e~plain Helen Suzman's gadfly presence in 
Parliament for the dur~tion of the t96l}s, bow then shall it nplain tbc Libenl Party and the NCUARM's act~ or 
sabotage lo the c.a usc of a radically democratic South Afric-a? Even In lh e most jaundiced perspective they cannot l>e 
seen to hzve been the agents of monopoly ca pi1.1l or ""condary industry of wbarever kind. 
Th~ same goes for Oelinda Bozzoli's discussion of ideological changes in rhe 1960's ("English-sp~aking 
hleology and advanc'd capitalism in post-Shatpevilte South Africa" {Piper prepared for the Worl.:.sbop on rhc Social 
and Economic J!iMory of Sourb Africa, Oxford, September 1974)). This paper de"-Crihes lhe developmenl of !he 
ideology of Industrial ca pi L!.lism itself. and Jooh a! the way !he ua nsirion in lo diversified mon oroly <:>pllal was 
cooceptua lised J nd legirimised. Though in such a case, t~e ideology of management does seem ro l>e close! y related 1<> 
lrJ.nsformalions in the natur~ of Soutk African capitalism, ex lrapolating from Ibis discourse to tba t of Iibera !ism seem~ 
a dubiou~ enlerprise. 
As should be clear from my ugument in Ch~pler 2, my analysis a:;.ozrts the independent logic of the 
ideologic11. This does not meao that! advocue an idealist ldeoiogkal determinism. The challenge of the Lacaniao 
theory of the subject lie5 preci~ely in irs powtr to transcend undialectical oppositions such as these. Some of lbe 
~om plexities of rhe relation between I be orders of the Rea I and the Symbolic ue explored on pp. 204 . 206 below. [ 
~m he~ simply distinguishing berween two levels of conle~t, and am not making any assenioo as to one'~ b-eing more 
cenlral to the olher. 
Tom lodge, op. ell., p. 2. 
I o England, it wa5 an importan I element of the radical populism of I be period (legassick, op. cU., p. 30; see EP. 
Thom~on, "Mr Arllee nd the Gada~ne Swine" in E. P. Tbo..,pson, Tbe llravy Danrtrs, (London, Merlin, 1985) pp. 
240 • 242 for a di~ussion (or I he sh ifllo the lefl that c hancterised Rrllish polil ics for the si~ ye• rs after 194 5). 
In S•lUth Afri~a rhe"" themes were ~rtkulaJed tly Smuls 3S well a~ tly the Communist Party, by Leo 
Marquard as we!! as the Springhok Legion. It formed an ideological accompaniment to 1he lib<:ra lisal!on of 
govemmen 1 policy at the lime; though Ltgassick i~ doubtless correct thaI the libeulis• rion of governmen l policy 
Iowa rd'i Africans was due to the need lo preserve Na lion al unity aod prevent black harassment of the war effon 
(Legassick, In<. dl.) i1 is significanl 111 noTe lhl the govemmenl's argumenls for national unity were also couched in 
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can be ~een. for example, in the wartim..: p~1lic~ <ll th.: l"atiuna! l'nion of s.._luth African StuJ..:nt'> 
(:-\LISA~), which reacted tn the incr..:asing con~.:n·atism of the Afrikaans campuse~ by 
id.:ntifying more clmdy with a dtmucr Jtic. ilnli· f;t-.ci\t pmition: it <ldmitted the Uni\cr~ity of 
Furt Hare ::anJ Hewat Training Cn!k~..: anJ Jm..:nJ..:J its cun~litutiun tn include the c.kfcnce uf 
dl.'mocracy and the promotion (lf oppnrt uniti..:~ fur the 'unJcrprivilcgt:J" in it'> lis! of aim~.81 
The wartime career of Lt:o MarquarJ ~en e~ as ~~ further example. In hi~ lecture;., at the South 
African Military Collt:gt: there is clearly reOecteJ the notion that the war\ anti-fascist nature 
aho meant that it was a fight for dcmoeracyS" 
This rcarticulation of liberalism wa~ of crucial importance in two ways. Firstly, it meant th::at 
liberJlism itself wa<, increasingly npcn tn ch,,lkng:..: and criticism, As I have pointed out in 
Chapter 2, ideologie.~ arc '>haped in rclati.._1n tn other ideologies that form parl nf their broader 
discursi\'e context. Though liberab were to a certain e.\t~.:nt frl!c 10 <trticulate their iJeolngy in 
ni!W ways, that articulation coulJ n~n happ~:n \\holly on their own term<.. A crucial source of 
lcnsinn, for ~::xampl~:. was the w<~.y thest: ch<~ngc~ maclt: libcrali~m increasingly nJlncrahh: to 
idcologicaJ challeng.: from the left.~-~ Bt:twecn the wars liberalhm 3od Communism bad been 
Sl 
In ~outh .-\Inca th~"' tlreme~ """" Ht~e·uiat~<i he- 'imut> "'~ well a~ h} lhe Cornmumst Pan~. hy 
Leo ~larqu~rd a~ w·dt a' rlw "rnrrgb,,~ l.q:run. \! f•'rll1~J .311 rdcologiral a,·,ompanrrn~nl to th~ 
libera!"a110 n of go' ern men t pnh,·~ a 1 r he t rme. tl•' rugh I ep~~~.:~ '' douhtte~s corrcd rhat 1 he lil>c ra I ;,a Iron 
of go~·~rnmem polu:y hJw·Jrd> ,\fn.:an~ ""'' Juc t" the nc~d w prc>cn e '\a!lon~l u>111} and prevent hlat·>. 
haras~mem Llf the w~r ei'fon 1 I cga"~e-1.. tm. ril.) r1 ~~ 'rgn•fr.:ant w note thai the gowrnment"~ .3rgumenT> 
for national un•l)- "ere al~e> (OUched 111 terms ol a f•ght for freed om. rt1u~ Smu l> Jc>crihcd I he ~wa\ti >.a a~ 
"'the symbol of paM 1~ ro n1ts and i11e ~n>l<i'- eme nt , >! tire human sp1n1.. {"Druadl"dSt t>~ J. C. Smuts. 
Commander m Ch1ef of the Sourh ,\fri<"i!n Forrc,. on h1s return from a vr~1t to h•s Buys up '\"onh. 
,-~wemher l '!.tO"' J while I he war was '"a nc" Crusade. J nell frgh1 tr• the dcalh for man·$ llhen•c~ ... '" !"'The 
Offcns•vc Pho~ec Speech de ti' c red l" G erne ul Srmr h I<> \!e mhc r. of the T ""' llou>es of Pa rl iamc 111. on 
WedncsJJ}. O(tol>er 21st, I 'J.t2 ·. l..rnd<>n. "I. Clen,cnt l'l42l. 
Bcnjdmm Kline. 'The '\al•onal L n••'n ,,f Srarlh ·\fnro1n 'il<•denl>. a .-~~c 'tud:> of tire plight L>\ l<hcrall.,m 
l9J-1-l977". r n Th~ Journal of ~ lodern \fl'ican Studi~'· 2 .l I 1 \ b n-h. I 'II(~) pp 13'l-l.t0. '>ce al!;o \Ia rnn 
Legass1c~. "t he '\auona! l n 1011 ol ..,, •ut h .-\1 rr<.'a n '>t "Jell!.<. c 1 h n lc de a\ age J nd ct hnK 1megra1 Tun 1n 1 he 
uni\.oel"'>iiTes"'. p If,_ 
Dun ng the ••ar. VlarT.JuarJ ~>.a~ an 111st ru,tor Jt 1 he .-\ rm; LJ\<<."3Uon Services. "·h1dr he had helped in~t tl utc. 
lecturing soldrc!"'> c>n the <deohJgTCal imp!i<'atrons of lhc "'1r agam't 'a7ism (Am han' Egan. !.co \1i!n.juard; 
A Biographical C<~~c ~tudy 1n <he ul\>"1h of So~lth. ,\fn<"an Li"erali>m until 195.'- (Honnun. dis.,eT!alian. 
L·n,~·cmty of Cape Town1. pp. 15. lh) Tlrc'c lertures mrt~ded a crilTT.JUe c>f Sourh Afncan r~ctsm and the 
1dca nf raCial m fc n\ 1r11 y. and <"<we red 1<:1pin sudl ~> · J>nnn pic' of De moe rJC} ·· ;,nd ., Democracy and the \cl" 
Order"' f Sec Leo \larguard papen. 1 J.1ggcr I ill 1M] rJCS8~) D~ 2 p. J .. DJ.'I. D3.JR. Anne1ure D.) Th1> may 
in fact t>e a worrh.whtk avenue for ILl rille r rc,c..r~h. JM!... and R~.l S1mon~. for "'ample. refer ( rla" and 
Colour in South .. \frka., p. 5401 w 1 he "d)- on "·111ch the .·\rm;. Edu<"awm ~enKcs "opened the nunds of 
front tine troops to progrcs>i' c JL.Ica\·· 
Rich cmpha''~"' the inl[>Vrtana role of cnmi>ll1 ,,( ITI>eral~ f•un1 the puht•ral left 111 shaprng "ariTnlC lrherat 
rdeolog;J (see. e.g .. Whit~ Ponn ~nd the Liherat Cun,cit'nce. p. ~'!). l11s C\plananon hm•;c,er d<•es not 
focus on the eS>Cnll~ll! d~n~n1ic 11a1u rc nf till~ pr<KC>.!.. lie d•>e' nm address the que~non of "·h} l'bcrahsnl 
wa~ open to such l nt tCTSTll dun ng the 11 ~ r. 'or doc> he look J 1 1 h~ rc~ rt t< ul~ 1 ion of c, 'm mun 15! Party 
rdeolog:j m 1 he ) e~rs '•f ! he popular hun 1 - a ,h, ft a> , m ponan l as 1 hat of htTe ral •deoJo:;y. Dunng 1 he war. 
the C~>mmunist Party and ~"me of 11> c'-memher" like ll~m<c Basner tTe,ame pr<.Jmment m ,.hile pnltttc; 111 
a ""'Y 1n wh"h thq had e'er"""~ hef\we ,,. ~mcc. B~ 1hc cnJ of the v•ar. "llhTn a space of si~ year'>. il had 
gf(lwn from ~small grvupmg of le:.s than 10!1 men1hc~. dtHlr<·~d from the mass pol•t•Cat mo•·ements to ~n 
•Jrgamsatl<ln whme memher.;h1p muiJ he wuntcd <o the l!~rll~ ancl wh>t'h was caP"hle of ""'nmng ""·hue 
~undered by a va!'.t gulf When lib.::rab ,,:~.:rt r~:.trtitul,,ting tht:ir idt:lllll~:-- . linking up in their 
discourse the traditional liberal concern \\llh W..:..,tern ct\ili,,Jiinn "''ith nntit1ns nf dcmt1Cr~r;y ;snd 
:.tnti-fas~.:i~m. tht:y were far rnl1rt: open tl1 being chalkngt:J n:v Cnmm unh.t<. ;JOd other leftist 
critks. During the Sl·cond World War <J grouping of raJic.:~l acci,·ists 3ml \Hitcrs incn:asingl:< 
questioned its right to speak with tht' voic~: uf Europ~:.tn ci\'ilisatilln anJ challenged it to render 
concrete and meaningful its talk of equ:~l rights anJ ju~t l(' l" ." 4 :-..:ot l1nlv ";t~ liberalism now being 
critici~cd from the left : it was bc:ing critici-.t:J in its uwn trrm~. Thi-. pr<..lduc:ed scriou~ problem'i 
for liberal Jisc<1ur<.e and forced m:.ny libcr<ll~ to C•'n'iJl:r tnc rh:JIIcngc of e.\1ra-parliamt:ntary 
action.85 
The~e proces!lcs JiJ nnt, however, immediately result in tht' birlh of a more radical strain of 
liberalism. The Liberal Party, from who!>e r.111J..., \\OUIJ rise lhc fir'>! gcncrauon of clcarlv 
idcmifi.jble raJicalliberals. was only ioundcd ;tlmosl a dcc:ttle .:.~ftcr the w;.~r anJ its lefrward drih 
would begin still further int~1 the future. But t:\'l.:n th~·n . the discouN.: 11f r<ldical liberalism wa.,_ 
still inllucnccd h~ the le:gac~ uf tbe S~cond Wl1rld War. For though the.: pwccsscs I have 
sketched here were crucial in contributi11g to the fragmentation and cri~i~ of liberalism. they also 
shaped raJicallibt:r<~lism in a ,cwnd way: the\ lay dnwn the crucial terms of refe renee of libt:rill 
85 
\n\'ill government clc<ll <'•n~ ()om loJ:,:c . 11p. ril.j .\nu lh<~ul:(h 11 t11J n<ll 'i.l(l'ccLl 10 1app1ng dfcctl\cl< into 
~~~~· J.. m1litanc~ .11 the t1m, . tTom l ,,Jg,c . up. de. p . ll\11 JtJ man~g' t.; 'PI';lt, for the l.hscolt·Jncluscd 
ma~~c; 10 term' mu.-h nh ;rc r.tvK-'Ithan th• ' '" <>I hl'~:r.,t.,m 
One 'Ui:h rad"'31 .:nll<- "I the l•l,eml~ "'" lhc ~\ · •••tllllllltlt-' I hnuc Ra>ncr fie \\.1\ nut a mcmhcr uf the 
Cornmunt~ l Part\", l•ul hi> p<lll\o('a\ pl~:fuflll (Ut\t.:llncd nlilfl\ ul the anlo f>l'C"L do.I'T'hiCr;IIIC a~pCCllo 'r 
ropular front tLlc••lt'~ - ll•'> ch:ct iun tel lhC ~cn.ll~ '" '\all\c Rcpr-=!oentdli\C ""' " 'hl•..-~ lh31 pm•erfull~ 
.-un('<;nlratcd lhC m;nth , ,f n1an\ hhc rat-. I [1, •ll' l• ~~~ t•nol..c ehe odc<'k•g•cal homt1geneu~ uf '\acove 
Rcprc..cnt<m<..•n 10 :;:m·cn•meat and ch .. tlcng"d the hegemt'lt~ of the (n _,l\lutc ui Race Rclaltun~ there 
'tpcnf,call\ . he .tttaci...:J ille ln~ e illllc\ rdt"dl 11• ral.c p•>htt<JI 'tt.lc> 1•11 llle · '\;ui\(! l)uc~lltln · 111 South 
• \frtc<t ( Pa11l Ric-h . op. cit .. p !l t ). I Its rad1CJh~m mcanl chal he had i..1r greater apr~ a I l•l chc murc m•ht~r l 
~cctn.r.; ot Afncan poltuo:al nptnt<.>ll. am! the,. Jecpll· thrc ;ucncJ I he pc.souon of I he lohcraL<;_ 
Antllher cn11que twm 1he left wa~ <olCC<l h~ the trade uneomst Soli) S.l.;h~ . .-ht> pocnlcd out chal 
lihcralt~m had proJgrc,~cd 111 :'menc-a and fnglal1ll •lnl\ lltrot•~h an under\t ~mding t•t wurl..c~ · need~ and coJ-
opcrauon ~>1th lhctr nt~~~ Llrgane)all<on. lie "Tille on TrO!k thal "l1bcra "'11111 'iouth .-\frka 1" duumcll unte~s 
or lc;~m~ to undc.r..tand the .,.-url..cr\ · pr<'l,lcm' ~nd ftnd' a , .,,,~rre1e ha~c "f Cll~pcratuJn v.,th tho.: mas~t~ 
and "orl\et$ ... " {So!h "iacl1\. quoted en Paul Red\. op. cil, _ p. 'Ill). It'' on<~dentall~- dotiin.tc c,; unJcrstand 
Rich·, cla~'lircallon d Sach~ a~ a r:Jdtr~l lthcr.•l tihid •. p ~''' - ""'h' hall hecn <J memller of the C:ommuOJ~t 
Pan~ unttl he wa~ purgeo.l on '>cpc-.:n>l'Cl J'I:; J ti .•Jll•" Ro"' and \\'on ft<'U\ . ll.tlwl Pity. p . 1111} fhPu~h hts 
0011-f3Ciah~m Sha~<J ~011\C theme:; With lthCrd\Jde<l(O~ - Itt\ rro:nCCUf'Jlll) l\ \Hih \Hirk.in(t-d3~' Ulltl\ aCCI\IS' 
the colour ltne' renders dass,ti<:atJon of h1nt a, ,1 loh~;r~l C\lrCmcl~ prol,lcmall< rur an accoun t uf -.ath'; 
non-111cral rradc un10n1~m . ~c L esloc Woll '-;cf\.<:11 ,,, the Wort..cr. : s.,n; 'iach~ and lhC loarmenl Wor~crr: 
L111on. 19:21!-L95.:! t\L\ Dis>cna11on. LlH'Cr..lt~ or the W'""ucrsrlnd . 1'18-'1. anll E. 'i. Sarh~. Rdwl'~ 
Dau~~:hten tlondun. \f;G,hhon .'t: Kcc I'J'i7!. espcctall• pp II · 15. 128- 1-H lh8 - .:!29. 
! n:ly hetc on RJ,·h·s ac<'ounc ol (ht re.ohgnmcnl~ "tthlll chc ttdd l•f hhcrll p<>littr' dunng chc WJr \'cars. 
Ounng lhc War. for c\amplc. \farq<,ll'd-, P•'"'"'t' he,·amc ch:.rac·.cn..cll h, a >lurp av.·arcn1''" of the 
hmtl~llt) O~ of ltt1~raltsm his r)cUI.lun~OIUU\ Th~ 81afk \lan'• Burden COI\I.llll~ a dc<lr C\l'l .. r:JIKtll or 
hherah~m ·~ narrow focu' •'ll pdrli~ment anti tl' ll.I(Jic dfort> lll tJttlucn>e gmcrnmcnt poltc,· thrnugh CO· 
ope r:JtJ<1n and tltalo~ue . ln 11. he argued that lohcral"m \lll.I[J do no more chan fight a "gallanl rear-guard 
anion aga•n'\t the l<1r,·c~ of n:ac11on on Svuth .-l.(n,·a" .\t·,ordong co htm tt "a!. 'apparent lhat iht llllto" oi 
reformt~m han: hccn reached and that an~ rurthcr tnlpr.:-,cntcut will -,ave to!><: achoe,·cd along the hne' of 
tndu"rial a('llon ratho:r than h~ lthcral mOue nee on f"' ·llloC'>. · 1 I c<1 \13f4uJrd ( P•~ud . John Burger) . The 
Black :\tan'!> Burdtn (London. Vtctor Goll<~nCI . l'l-l.h p !-l-1 . ) 
Ji!>cuursl! .mll gan: It> radical lih~r..d-. th~· it.kul.~g_l(<.~l fr<Jmcl\urk m which they wuuJJ act uut 
their oppo~ition to aparth~.:iJ. 
Thu,. tht~U!.!.h \larq uarll'~ uwn 1 tell\, lor (\,unpk. 11n~· n1 11 m udt to the left llf 1 ri.lu.•tinnJ.I 
lihcr o.~lism.~~> .mJ though he wuld ,till u nJcr~tanJ twt i~>n~ like · J~mocracy· in con~ern11i1 c 
Wily~. the ideological rcarticubtinn Lll libn<.~li,m n:tl.:u~.:d in his. discourse opcncJ up the 
pn.~~ibility of further radicalisation b~ later gc:nt:r<Jtinns ('If libcr._.l.... Indeed, l he equation pf th~ 
'trugglc against rasdsm with the ,truggk fnr democracy was to pro\'idc the main matrix within 
which ap•mheid f>4.1licics were sc ... ·n . Thi~ thl-'m~ i" :1 \cry no1·ious one in the libl!ralism <lf l he 
I ~5Q_, and 1">60~. It i"> clearly cxprcs, ... ·J in the raison d'etre of 1 he T•xch Commando, summed 
up in the word~ uf 'Sailor' Malan. their :-.:(ltionill Prr:~id(nl, when he said that "nur aim i-, tu 
defeat the Government. which i~ fa.~..:i'>t in spirit"_;.;~ But. a~ many historian~ have pointed out. 
thi.., furmula united a wider range ol rh..:m..:<;. Lcga~~ick ha:-. for example observed trow 
" ... lib~rals ramc- to rcprcSL'nt th~ id~·t,ll'gic.ll antith~.;,i~ It~ milit<Jnl Afrikaner nationali~m 
... the theme!> were indi,·iJu,•li~m a~.1in~t <'L'Ilcctivi ... m, Wc~tc:rn civilisation <1gainst 
Teutonic race culture. the fre-: m;nk..:L again~! the involvement of tht: State ... "~ 
fh i~ as~ociat ion •~ hard!~ s u rpri"i ng. Th~· rc w~ n.: man~ concrct c hi~toricJI I inks he tween 
1\'alional Socialio;m and J'atinn,llist idco\tlg~. Lihcr:.l~ nL'<:tkJ liulc reminding of Herzug\ rdu~al 
to agree to South Africa's im·oh~.:mcnt in th..: war. of the o..,scwa Brandwag·~ campaign of 
~al:lotagc, and of Vcrwoerd"s anti- .. ...:m iti~m and L>pcn ~up[llHl, as cJitor of the Trans\o·alrr. ol' the 
Gt:rman cause - anll thc~c wnc tmly 'ume uf the fact<, 1 hat seemed tn indicate :1 do~c 
connection between the pnlicic') ol the \.'Cit illO;Jii~ts and thns~.: nf Hitlcr.89 
But more crucial th<.~n these fact~ i-.. th~· m~;ming with which libtral;, in,-~stcd them. This 
'>ignificance was deeply connected Ill th~.: ~~~uc uf Suuth Africa\ rclat ionship lO the W~,.,lcrn 
po11 er~. This issue, and the problem '1f Suuth Africa's growing isolation (rom tnc international 
community from 1946 onw(lrds, was a perennial concan l'ur liberal~ after the War. For the 
H1s poliltcal position was m ~ome rc~rcn~ ditlercnl fl'llm 111u":: of other hllcrals. duti11g his ~ruJ•~~ at 
0.\(ord he had pirketi up a fa•th m 1hc .nn ,, ,,h,iltl ,,f '""'~l"m '-hll'h dll<'> not >cern to have hc~n shar~d hy 
many of his fcllo\1.-hocr;il~ (..\nth""~ l'g,•n . len \l,nquMJ. ~ Lliograph"·al Ca~e Study m 1hc GrD\1-lh of 
Sotuh .-\fri(·an l1hcral1>m 11nl!l 1'153. p. 31 - btll 1h1s '~ems to hal c •ndicatcll more of a t>clief in a l . .lbour 
Pany Wdfarc-stansm than a cnmtl1•tl11~111 TCI \lar""'' 1 ibid .. pp ~I. 2h. ~~1 - In 01hcr n1at1cn.(ior c\ample 
in h1~ fanl1 111 the supenont\ of l:tll'<lp<!~ll culture !ihid •. p. ~111. he fell ~quarclj 1n 1hc patcrnaltsi!C ~nd 
ron~crvat1ve mould. lndcc:d. lite G ut:'li• '" , 1f gaugt ng 1 he e' 1c n 1 of \liir£:111<1 rd 's rad1rah~m (or the lack uf 1!) 
needs cnucal attention. anoJ th<.: u11dcrl;. •ng .1~ nam•r~ for Ill> aflpM~ntll' conlrad~t'IMy and , ·acnl~llng 
po>ll!on dcsc"'c funhcr an.th ~" · 
Sec also Eddie Rou.x. np. ril •. p. ~05 . 
\!anin lcgass•cl. . op. cil.. p. 1?: hn~1 R,>l'crl\•111. I iberali\AI in Soulh .-\trira. p. ~~~. 
For a ,·ontcmporarJ lrhcral arn•ullt uf \ ~ • "-•JCnh aniHcmili~m and ')mpalh) \\llh 1he :\:a1ional Sorialt'l 
rause. see Sranlcy l'y; . "HcnJnk Fren•cll \ crwocr<J . Prune '-l•n•s•.:r of Snuth ,-\fnca". Mrira Soul h. \'ol 3. 
\o.! . (Jan-'Aan·h ! 95'J) . pp 1-S 
South African imelligentsia, as with that of any colonial outpost, their links with the metropolitan 
countries had of course been very imponant in any case. If they were an outpost of Western 
Civilisation, and if Europe and Britain were the sources of that civilisation, then South Africa's links to 
the metropolis were an umbilical cord it would be disaster to sever. 
In South Africa, however, the pain of increasing isolation from the Western world was made all the 
more hitter by the special place South Africa was conceived to have in that "civilisation". Here, an 
importanl part was played by probably the most prominent South African to concern himself with his 
country's relationship with Europe: J. C. Smuts. Not only were his local and foreign policies 
powerfully shaped by a concern with these links, but he also transformed their significance, the whole 
idea of what it was they linked South Africa to. 1ltroughout his career in international politia; 90 Smuts 
was centrally concerned with the concept of the peaceful co-operation of a f~1mily of mature nations 
bound together by civilised values- a concern symbolised, above all, by his involvement in the drafting 
of the Prcamhle to the United Nations' Declamtion of Human Rights.91 In terms of his thought the 
Commonwealth, the League of Nations, and the United Nations were more than forums for power-
politia;: they embodied <Jrtd safeguarded the highest human values -which were, for him, synonymous 
with the supreme values of Western civilisation. For Smuts, remarks his biographer Hancock., 
"the British Commonwealth of nations seemed a secure toehold humanity had already won 
upon the cliff of world unity and freedom. The League of Nations was a second toe-hold + if 
only it cnutd be made more secure- higher up the same cliff."9Z 
If South Africa was a peripheral society, its ties to the outside world represented its hope of one day 
being admitted to the circle of truly mature nations that existed as equals, guarding the values of 
civilisation for future generations. And after the Second World War, it seemed to many South African 
liberals that precisely because of the stature of Smuts, "a world-per.oonality in the very widest sense of 
the word"93 that this possibility had rome closer to fulfilment. Through Smuts, South Africa had (even 






See W, K. Hancock, Smuts: 1ll<' Sanguine Ytan, 1870·19111 (l<!ndon, Cambridge Univel'!lily Pra., 1962), p. 377, p. 
423 • 432 for his member.;hip of Ike War Cabinet during lhe First World War; and pp. 429 • 432 on bis role In !he 
form~l ion of I be Commoowc•llh. His role in I he follllation of the League of Nations is recounted on pp. 438, 454,460, 
463, 491, 500 · 504, and in W. K. Hancock Smuls: The Fields ol Force, 19111-1950 (l<!ndon, Cambridge Univer.;lly 
Press, 1968), pp. 7, 17, 36. 39, 229. 231. F01 his role in !he Second World War, see op. ell., pp. 267-268,308. 
325,409,427. 43 .•. 
Ibid., p. 432. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
The words of the Rl lion, Vis.:oun 1 Cra nbome in his in1roduction to Smuts'~ address. ''Though 1.'1 on the New World" 
(l<!ndon, Empire Par/ia men !.I ry A:;.sociation, 1943), P- 3. 
Thus Hofmeyr saw as one of !l1e bene/liS of the war the enh•nced ''prestige and houour" of South Africa among.;! lhe 
nalioH of lhe world {Jamc~ llnber, Suulb Africa'§ Foreign PoUcy, 19~5-1970 (Lindon. Oxford Univer.;ily Preu. 
1973), p. 7). As 13art>er h~s p<'iuled out, t>efore lhe war lhe Union b1d seen itself as a peripheral stale with no 
in!enutional rol~; in Smuts sh~ bow~ver seemed 1o produce "a scate$mU of Wfll!d rtpu!e" (lbid., p. i 1)- A colleague 
would Ia ler alm051 wistfu l!y reca II how "Reputedly he, !he Prime Minister of a small country, remote from 1 he ceo Ire 
58 
,I 
This. then, was the context within \l.hich South Africa's !'all from international grace must be 
understood. Tn hear South African racial policies critici~cJ in a forum which a ~outh African 
~tatc-.man had hdpcd create. to hear its r,llicics r~·j.:ctcu in terms of the very dec!aratinn of 
human rights of which Smut<. h;~d written the pn:ambk. m.JdC that fall uoubly humiliating. 
Many South Africans, Smuts includ~·J. reacted \~it h the t ruculcnt defensivcnes<o that ha-; 
characterised South African relations with th~ Lnitcll l':;,tinns Organisation ever since.'~5 Other 
liberals echoed the u...:o·s critici~m. and held up \\hat the~ now saw as the world's rejection nf 
apartheid to illustrate the depth tu which the Natiundlish had dragged the country. Thus Edgar 
Brookes, fur example. argued that "I am sure our pn:~<: nt policies mu~t he q:ry drastically 
revised if we arc to find any sort uf ;,afe ur harmoniuus place in the family of nations to which we 
inescapably bclong.''96 
This concern was cc ntral!y lin ked to 1 he a~sociation in liberal discourse of apart h~id policy with 
Nazi.,m. Smuts's identir,cation of the aim~ of the Commonw~:tlth anu the United l'-;ations as 
guardians o[ civilisation in\'csted the conllict again.,! Na1i~m with a very specific meaning. In the 
minds of South African liberals, the Allied \·ictory was a victory for civilisation as such; the 
Charter of the United Nation!> <>tood for rati,mality itself .. mrJ cmbl1dicd the highest values uf 
humanity. And over and against these l'alues. lib<!ral~ saw in Nazism their opposite: a romantic 
irrationalism, a backward, archaic and emotional id.:ntification with blood and race. Ami these 
categoric~. by extension, bt:camt the framework in which they understood Nationalism. 
The effects of thi.<. identilicatk,n can be clear!~· seen. fl,r example, in the political writings of 
Patrick Duncan: it formed a basic thread in hi!. laith in Satyagraha-!ike non-\iolcnt action. 
Writing in Africa South in W5ti, he announced that 
95 
"lt is becoming clear that uur countr~· has only one future - a non-racial future. Once 
the social and economic forces begin to act strongly in any situation, then he who de lies 
them does 50 at his peril. I wa~ moved to read the summing-up of Hith:r by ... his 
interpreter, Paul Schmidt.. .. SchmirJt\ juJgcmcnt is that thcrt: are at work in the world 
irresi5tible moral and economic.: forces. and although dictators. can construct falst:: 
moralities and phoney ecom.lmics which h::w.: da77ling short-ll:rm s.uccess. yet in the cnJ 
such people are crushed iind their .~ystems with them. Nnw th~:~c ~ocial and economic 
force!> are at work with great ~tr.:ngth in South Africa, working. for change in the 
direction of greater equality and dcmncracy. However grc<tt the will-power may be that 
repute" (Ibid .. p. ll ). A colleague , ·auld late-r alnw~ot "1st full) recall how "Repeatedly he. the Pnmc 
:-.!.inoMer of a ~mall cmontry. rcmme from tile centre of .,,·cnrs. too~ 1he world sragc 10 drive home his o<;lea~ • 
.,.·hen the PresJdc:nrs or Prime .\1inislc~ of the most important ~ounrrics lo>r IMir drive or sense of 
doret'lton ." (Ben Codi.ram. "Geoleral Smut' and ~llttlh .\fncan Jliplomac;:" , p <J . } 
JJck Spence. "South Afri('a and the \tooern \Vortd ". In Th' o,rord Hi\! Of) of Soulh "frira, Vol II: South 
.. Urica, 1870- 1966 ed. hv :'1-ton•ca Wibon .m<;J t.eonard l'hontp~on (O,fof\1 . Clan:ndlln. l'J75). pp. 5Ul-5~0 . 
Cdgar Brooke~. ·suuth Africa· ~ rare rro\"llems: the ~~oorld \"l~cl..ground"'. Contatt. Oc1uber 19~. 
II 
attempts to dam them, it will not 'uccecJ ... The doctrine of White Supn:macy is 
doomc:d.""97 
Note the: 1c:ry ~pc:cific meaning the t:qui\aknc..: hctw<:cn !'ationdlism anJ :--lazi.!>m had fnr 
Duncan. The: struggle against t:ach were: alikl· in prcci,t.:J~ une dimcno;ion - that they were the 
da!)h nf "irrc<.istible moral and economic fnrcn ·· against "falJ>c moraliti~s" and "phoney 
economics". This is the signi!icance ulthc way in which libc:ral~ at the tim..:, as Legassid has 
remarked, saw tht: work!> of nationali~m in t~·rms ul thl' curiuus category. "inv<Siid".')fl The: 
Nationali~to; wc:re out of touch. in contradiction to the ideal~ of humani<.m ami freedom and fur 
that very reasoo, they wc:rc doomed. More than the empirical dc:tails'JQ of the narrow margin of 
Nationalist victory in 1948, it was the notion that 1\'ationalist idcolng.y wa!> an attempt to resist 
the onru~hing stream llf world history ibelf that underpinned libt:ral faith in their e1·entual 
triumph. E1·en after th~ Nationalists gained a m<.~_jority ol '\t'at~ in the JQ5J election, fur example, 
the Lihcral Pany mouthpiece SoU.ei'Umlilo could still Mite. 
"Anyone who has trouhled to glance in t:\t:n the mo~l ca:-.ual manner at world trends 
since 1945 knows how hopcle~~~~ outm01kd nati0nali:-.t and UP thinking is. Anyone who 
bothers to look at t:vcnt~ in the last 1i1e vcars in Africa can come to onlv one 
conclusion: white domination in any form whatsoever i!. nn the run ... lfXl • 
A~ this passage indicates, the: defeat of Hitler was ~ct:n as only the t.eginning of a much larger 
process - the long, slow victory of humanist. l·nlightcncd \'alue~ lllicr de!>potism and tyranny. 
Nowhere was that victory more clearl~ cmh,,dit:d for them than in the cstahlishmenl of the 
L:nitcd Nation:. Organb~tiun and the v.avc of dccolonisation and independence sweeping the 
hi[hcrto subjugated peoples or Africa and A!.ia. The signs, for them. were C\'erywhcrc: with 
Ghanaian independence in 1957. the ftrst All-African P~o:oplc'!> conference in 1958. the tensions 
in the Central African Federation, the intt:rnatiunal s;,nctillO gi1·cn to this hy the United Nation's 




Patnc Duncan. •Pas~1~-e Resistance" . -\rrka South . Vol I. '\o. l. I On-Dc:c-1 ?56). p. 7R. 
.\fantn Lcgass1ck. "leJ;~slatio)n. ldcolo~ and t~o)nOn1) on Post · 11)48 South A£nca" . .Journal of Soulbtrn 
African Shldit~. Vol I .'l:o 1 (Oc10ber 1?7~1 r '\ 
The :'\.!.IIOrtah~t etecroral ~1ctory v.as for a long lime sun ~een h~ liherals ;u something ot an aherra11on -
whil'h tronically delayed lht formaiiOil uf a L•t>eral Pam for 'ome ~ea~ . The hope could ~11!1 for the lime 
bemg be cheri~hed that the l nued Pam \\L•uld rega•n po.,..c:r tn the: ne'l cle(IIOn. and that hhera ls could 
play a valuable l'llle 1n the L:nued Pan\. !.See f•lr e~ample the eJullnal e.,horlallon l<l lol'leral L P memt>crs 
not 10 "[o)S(: heart" In riM Forum. Vol 1. . no I. 1\pnl JQ'i1 . p. 2. 1 This ... a!> partt~ l•crause I here IA·ere ar the 
wnc: cmpiriral reason~ for seeing the ~atoonalist Pari\ s rule as 1nserure (J Rohew.nn, op. ril •. p . ·U J 
!llc>t 11C10l) had heen a dose thtng. a sram O'J \cats 111orc: than l P/l.at>our Pany alliance . • llld. what is more. 
seemed an ahcn-ation of the electoral S)'~tenl '"th the L'f> ai•Jne sllll v.1nnmg l.!ti t!!b VL•tc~ more than the 
:'\P and Afnkaner Part~· ~omllm~d. (Sec thn<"tl<"~. op. rit .. p. SO'i. l But thcs<: figun:~ only gained I hat 
meanmg m the contc:xlof the t'ITo)ader • ..tcoiDgJcal fr.lmC\\I)rk 1n terms.,( whi<"h hl>erals mtcrprctc:d them. 
"I he l:':le('tion". Sokli~ITmlilo. Fet>ruar. l'JSI! 
Janet Rot>crtson , op. cit .. p 115. 181. 1'>5 -;ce .~t~o t Bruol..c~ . Sourh \rr~a in a I..' hanging World. ( Oxfor•l 
L'nl'crs,ty Press. l95.31 . 
11 
Ill 
Two consequences nowcd from thi-. \icw. In the tir~t plac~·. lil:'oera\s did not only sec this 
sweeping change a~ incvitaole. Th..:y also wdwm.:J it. It is po:.~il:'olc Ill detect in the liberal 
discour<,e of the later 1950\, a trcnJ that could perhaps he Jc~crihcd as an "afric:miseJ" 
Jibe r<~lism, a growing i ntcrcst in and iJe nt i fie at ion with 1 he coot inc nt of Africa itself. It is 
rcnectcd, for instance, in the very title~ of new journals like Africa South and The New African, 
I he latter of which appeared with a :-.crawled ln~n 1lf linked human figures rhat suggested hoth 
the humanist freedom of modern Wcst~rn at! aflcr Pica~n and Miro as well and the repetitive 
shapes of ethnic African paintings. It is rcOcctl'd. too. in the enthusiastic n:ception in Conaact of 
the All-Africa Conference in Ghana to which the Liberal Party had aho '>ent a 
reprcsentative, 102 and in the growing interesl. in the columns of Nt-w African, in the "African 
Socialism" enunciated by Nkrumah and Senghor. 111 ' 
Secondly, the identification of dccoloni~ation and dcmocrati.~ation with the nl)W of history itself 
powerfully sustained radical libcr~ls in their stance. Though they represented a pitifully small 
grouping in parliamentary terms, thou~h they stood no chance of winning elections and gaining 
power, they helicved that they represented the deeper stream of unil'ersal history. This made it 
possible for liberals to oppose the white ekctnrate on the grounds of abstract principle. and to 
cast aside the considerations of realpolitik - 11nll even lO redefine realpolitik: in a surpri!>lng 
inversion, liberals appear at times to have seen the Nationali~t proposals as impractical, as 
at"lstract fantasizing hlucprints, while their own non-\·iolcnt politics of abstract principle was seen 
as concrete re<~lism! l n the Duncan article already quoted, he concludes his article for 
satyagraha in South Africa by exhorting on his readers: "Let us realise, a~ all the rest of the 




Peter Brown. op. cit .. pp. 17-28 For liberal pa11Klf'illlon '" 1he Ali-Arrican People·s •·onfcrence tn I'IW. see 
Patrie!\ Van Rensburg. op. dt .. p. ~I. :'\ote lm refere11ce to htm~elf a~ a "whit~ ,\friran·· a self·r<'nrepuon 
unthinl\able to the more conse!'atl\e hhcrals v. ho hatl dominated the tns!llutlon!i. of libcrah~m before the 
Second World War. The gap heroo.een leflist liberalism hefore the war and after it 1s neatly encapsulated in 
the difference herween this notion of a "wh1te ,.>,fncan" ~nd the name of William Ballinger"s ''Friends of 
Africa". 
For an m1erest1ng ron!emporary debate on Afnran soc,altsnl. ,ee Cl!<.., Wake. 'Senghnr antl St>Ciahsm". ;-.;,... 
>\friQn. Vol. I :\'o. !I (\'o•·emh~r l%2). pp. :: . 3. J . .\fuldi. "Approach to African Soc,;~! ism". op. cit .. Yo!. 
I no. IZ (Derember l\lfl:!). pp ~- ); :O..Iargarer Rtlhen5. "What lmd of SO<.·talism for South Africa·!". op. cit •. 
Vol 3. :\o . .:! !Februar\ 1'1(,.1), p.!- .1. Ronald \'i. \lam~. 'Africa 's Fa•·ourite Fallacy". op dt. pp. -lll- ~8. 
R. Leather. "The v.·ord \onalism' has lo~t its meanmg". op. rit .. \'ol. 3 :"\o. 3 (:'-tilrrh l'JM). p. 55; Reginald 
H. Green "The Condillons for :"ational [conom1e~ '" .~fnca". op. ~il .. pp. 63- (>$; \1. Legas~ick. "Sc>Ctall~t 
Algeria and Autocriltl~ \to rocco". ibid •. pp. o'l- -:"0: B. D. G. Folson. "\1arxtsm through Afrkan Eyes". op. 
tit .. \'o! 3 -..·o. ~-(:'-lay 1965). pp. 7~ . 7(J: \1. legas~t.:l\. "Afn~a and :O..hnism- 1". op. t'it •. Vol. -1 :\'o. l 
(~larch 196-ll. pp. 8-9: :\f. Lcgas>tr~. ",\fn<"a antl \lar~'~m- :!.". op. cit,. \'ol..l .. '\o. 2 (April [lJ6S). pp .. 1.~- 6. 
Accordmg to Vigne n wa> ·""' .\frican s dcn~1un to pla~e thts senes of arurles that led to thetr funds tnoing 
<"Ut off by the CCI (intero.iew. london.~ \Ia) 1'181)). 
Patrie Duncan. "Pass1ve Res1Mance" \frinl ~uth. \'oU. :\'o.l.. p. !H. 
'I 
Thi!. self-cunfiJence i<> penw,,ve, and many namplc,. couiJ he qu•lt~d. In an article in Contact 
wbich commemeJ on the wa~ in which huth th~ Lih.:ral Party anJ th~: !hen Prime Minis.ter had 
uccu~..:J t:.Kh nthcr of a Ji~rcspect for lh..: Ia-.... l'onl<ll'l r:~th.:r smugly ohscrYe~ that "Mr 
Strijuom and the Liheral Party share much the ,am~· •)pinit '"~ of one amnhc;-r. .. But the Liheral 
Party has one g.reat ad,·antage : the n:sl uf thl' world agn.:t:~ with it. ·!tiS 
Underlying. thi!> faith in the power of "world hn~tility· · W;JS thi~ td..:ulngical vision. this tendency It> 
equate the struggle with apartheid wilh prugr.:~~ ibdL and to ... ce thi~ prugn:~~ as un:.toppable. 
Note how, in the: follt1Wing passage, the focus mon!s from the par\jcular (Nationalist educational 
policy) to the: general witlwut any sen!>e of di~juncturt.!: 
"Until the N.nilmali!'>h evolve <.omc new br<~in-wa~hin~ technique tu which they can 
~uhject all teacher~ in this country they will he unahle to dc;-stroy the liheral tradition 
which permeat~ ~o much of South AJriea·, ~chnol 'iy~tem. Long heforc: then they will 
have gone the way of all who han~ !!ought to thwart man'!> quest al'tt-r truth.'' 10b 
Here we <;ee clearly how ideology works through articulating crucial terms in chains or 
equivalence. From the per~pective of the di~cour~c analyst we can see that the Nationalists are 
uuomed nut ~o much by definition a!. by rtJdinitinn. Hat.!. in lact the Nationalist\ attempt~ ll1 
demoy the "\ihcral traoition" arc de~cribcu in term~ of (anu thu~ ddined as equi\'alcnt W) the 
thwarting of "'man's quest al'tu truth". This link i~ not arg.ucd for. it is simply a~sumed. and tht> 
implicit equi\'alencc: that underlies this ~lide from <lne term 10 another make, it that much ca!.ie: 
to see them as doomed from tht.: slart .10., 
This sc:t of equivalence~ - this \'i~ion of th..: tight again~t Nationalism and white supn:macy as 
essentially a fight for the triumph of ci,·ilisation as such and the human values it embodied -




"'Cnmm~l Tenden<'le~ in <;c.ulh Afr1,a " Cont~CI. \l.or\11 l'>.~t •. 
··subm11 and Teafh". Co11tart. \.Ia~ 195::.. 
Tht~ faoah in inc>11abtc vicrory could of cour;c nol c.\t>t un..-hangcJ and wtthout stram a~ the l9SfJ~ wore tln 
and gave wa~ 10 the 19605. Wuh ume. of cour.<c . us mcantng chanbrcd. ,.\s the .'\arronaltsl gnp l•n Sourh 
Afn,·an politiC~ gn:.,.·. as ah.::y pcrsisled m S\uYccdutg u1 ~;hal ht->eral~ had pn:dicled the) would fail. as 11 
t>e~amc more and more oh>1ous rh .. l rhe~ "ere not gnang to t>c sy;cpl lil..e matrh~flc),s t>eforc the tide of 
·man·s quesr afler Jruth ". ltt>erals .:ould nol prcJ"·r ':l!l<>tlilh\1 Jele~r wnh the ~ame t>lnhe conftdenre. Yet 
1ha1 fauh m the ultimate defear ,.,f 'dttonahst th,t<•:,!hl dnd I h.: ftnal , .. hdtr~ of ,.·orld optntOI1 shll r~n1a1ne<J 
a powerful thread tn trl'ler~t though!. Though uo longer Jh( :,:uar;lnl.:e of c:•entual ,;cao~ ~nd no longer 
permintng an cdS) scorn of the ~u,·ce~~ CJf the g .. ,·ernment 11 hetame an undcrl}lng thread tn 'onlsnued 
defiam·c ~;hen all ocher cerlatntoc~ had ned II ~~ po~s,hlc: 10 dcret·c in much of the radtcali~rn and hl'lcralssm 
of I he 1%0· ~ a ~I rong cxlstenllalisc uoderrone on" htdl I he liist e<h<1cS of rhas fauh 111 the ttlc>uat>le lriump, 
CJf human freedom over I) rann)· \'lin be hearJ. When Duncan wrote 111 Contact thai "We llo not believe ah~t 
thc~e re~tn,·uons "111 ~top tho.~e who suffer 1hcrn "\ten and .,.·omert tn the agele" snug;lc for freedom ha~ 
endured worl)e and still lolon trl the cnd" (T.,asi••n h) 13annmg·. eduori<~l '" Conla<:l Vol.h. no.5 j7 :-tan:n 
IW:!JJ . p. : .). n wa~ 1he equt•·alence ht:l\\cell the i•l•tllcJoaJc 'otruggle .. gaonsr 'auonalism and ahe "ageless 
struj!gle for freedom" ahaa pro•oded some of aile unJct•ptlltllngs lot ht~ rdus~llo admn ddcdl 
far more radically than had pre\·iou~l~ bt:l·n th..: e<N:. But thi~ intdlectual tradition impl1scd 
deep limitation~ on radic.::~.l liberals and c\ o.:n a-. the\ wcr..: Jrh·cn to idt'"ntil) with the cause of the 
African u pprc ~~cd, n: ndc red their rcl at ion -.hi r \.\it h .-\ lr i c;m politics dec pi y am bigu ou~. 
Th.;sc limitation-, become apparent thrnug:h a "crut iny of the meaning of key terms in liberal 
discour~c - term~ like '"world opinion·, ··man·, quc.~t after truth", etc. When the signifying 
relation~hips in which these terms arc l!mbcdJcd <1nd which gi\c them their meaning an: 
uncO\·ercd, it wun becomes dear th<lt the~ are umkr<>tood in a \·ery limited sense: 
"There arc two great political mo\cm>.'n!s in the world today. One is a demand b) men 
throughout the world for a full ~ay in the wa~ in which they arc governed: the other is a 
universal rejection of discrimination b;lstd on '>Uch artifidal criteria a~ race. nr C('''lur, 
or creed. The ideas behind the-.c gre:ll mnvcmcnts arc nut Cl•mmunistic: they arc 
~imply the acceptance by Non-We~tcrn pe•'ple of the lessons which West an 
mio;sionarics and teachers hi:l\C be..:n teaching ova many year~_--tos 
On the one hand, identification nf anti-coloni::~l strug___c:k~ with ""the lc~~ons [or) \\/estern 
mis~ionaries"' made pos~ib!c liberal identification with African liberation. But on ihl· other, this 
passage illu min at cs the powcrf ul I im il;tt ions on that ide nt i fie at ion. It scc ms that it was 
i m possihl e for some liber a Is to iJe ntih· \~it h African decollm is..tt ion unless it could be 
··Jaunder<!d", unless its entire mcanin~ coulJ be contained within the lalues of Western, 
"civilised"" thought. \1/c have here nothing lc~~ than 1 he return. through the back Jour, of" the 
Eurocenlrism implicit in !he more traJitional liberal formula of ··equal righls for all civiliseJ 
men"'. The umvcrsal culture, the world npi ni,,n. the human frecd11m liberal"' fought for were 
co nee ivcd quite explicitly in terms of the ""ci\iliwd"" Y.orld. 1 '~'l European culture. Western opinion. 
and the institutions of Western-style parliaml·ntar~ demliCri:lcy. ReJcting against Strijdoms 
L: nion Da~ exhortation to South African'> 111 ··re~pect l' ach other'~ cult urcs"' Contact remark~ that 
·· .. .it ~eems to us that it i~ the < .io\"ernmcnt who will decide what that cultural hcritJgc 
willlx-. certainly in the case of African culture. In any C\ent, whatever cultural heritage 
we may possess, there is a technological 'culture' whil:h is modern mdn's Wily 11f living 
on the earth. II doc.s not bdom!. to ;mv r<Jct: or n::~!ion, but to man, ami the A.frican 
people ha\"e as much right to it a~ an yon~ d~e _-·IIO 
As this pas~age shows. the process tlf Afncan liber;ttion i~ -,cen. not ~impl~ il~ the ccs~atiun of 
domination of the We~t. but in terms ol African ~tntr_y intn a cultural order which already exists. 
Here we st:e n:vt:aled mosl clcarl~- South African libcr<Jii'>m in it-, dimeo-,ion a!> a colnnial 
discourse. Its commitment was to l·aluc~ it saY. a~ cn,IHin,J in Western ci\·ili'>::Jti11n and it\ 
""Withn the l ntltd Part\~-- Contad. 'iertemh~ r 1'15~ 
See. for example. J. K. 'guhanc. ·1 he tv.o moralt!tc~.-- \~• ~fri<:an. Vol.2. '-o.J.(J4nU~r\ l%3). p : 
"'The Pnm' \-ltn"ICT Jnd ln.on 0,"-- Cunlafi.J"ne l'/'i(,_ \ll cmrhasJ~. 
opposilion to coloniali>.m grew chid1y frum it~ c' mvictiun that these value~ hJd been successfully 
imported to Africa. and that political colnni<.~li~m anJ W.:~h:rn connivance with apartheid and 
coloniali.~m would r,erve only to drive African~ into th.: :~,rm~ of S<l\iL't l\1mmunism - ~hich was 
cenainly nnt seen as an emlloui..:mnt ot the values oi We ~lcrn cullure! liberal support for 
African politicisatilln thus often tended to be quctlified ;mJ ambiguous. 
P~rhaps the most important consequence of this\\ Ll~ the Lll· ~·ply amoi' alent rdation of litl~rals to 
the arena of black polirics. Liberalism W<~" 'om dime., , )JJ!y incapablt: tlf seeing Africans as 
rational political acrors in their own right. This wa.-, a marked theme in the discourse of the 
Lillc:ral Party. Paul Rich has remarked on th~ prt'\alt:ncc. in the liberal discourse of th~: I'J5U"s, 
of the assumption thar liberal insti£utions (th~· IRR. the Curcht:;;, etc.) were the only reposiwry 
of political rationaliry: African poti1ical militance. unle!;S it was curhcJ and informed hy these 
inOuenccs, was seen a~ an anarchic an u pot c:nrially destructin! forcl! .1 1 1 
The:\e assumptions diJ not characterise only !he liberal P;.~rty of the t:arly liJ50s, hul also marked 
ils more radical phase . An example is the di~course of Sl'mconc who was to become a 
prominent member of the NCL, Randolph Vigne. Writing: in tht• ~e"· African after the Bashce 
Bridge killings.hc said that 
''The Bashee Bridge confirms the appearance on the scene of a new force, of ml!n who 
will kill in defiance of tradition and teaching ... 
In 1927 the prophetic Lord Olivier warnL·J 'the w~~t..:rn ci\·iliscd man ... whether he be 
white, coloured 0r black' of the t hrcatcncd Jcstruction of his forces by "an 
irrccondlable Jacqucrie: of oppn:s~.:d ... nali\es .. .''112 
Note Vigne"s approving quotation oi the idea nr black p.:rSI.)nS being included in the category of 
'western civilised man". Here we sec ckarly how radical liberalism, though oppo;;ed to white 
domination. :.till saw civilisation in explicitly Euroccntric term<>. and cou!J accept hlack politics 
only if it conformed to these terms. Later in the piece Vignc ~peaks of ''western ci\·ilisation" as 
synonymous with "world culture". And opp~.1sed w this rational .... wid culture embodied in 
Western values, there is a notion of a blind Jc:structin· forcc. the anger of disgruntled peasants 
thai would kill "women and children <~nu c\·co the strango..:r in our midsl. " 11 ~ Radical and 
conservative strands were thus inex1ricably mixed in the lihcrali~m of the late 1950's. A Caith in 




Paul R.orh . 'White PO\H~r and lh~ Li~rat Comt'it'nce •. p. 118· 11'>. 
~toO- African ]edHorial) . ...-ol.~. no.] (Fel'>. t%3. p. l.) 
Thr~ rcr~mio!l of Eurucenrnc clemenh 111 c1cn '"rl.cill_l rildi,~llll>eral di><:our,.e. where even e.\horrar•onl 
to idenlify with .\friranist nationalism an.! 111~ mll1tanc~ of the P .• \.C 1S hound ''P "'ilh a htdden yet redl 
suspiCJon of that militance 1S 1'1:1) clear m Patnc'- 1a11 Rcn~l"lurg. op. dt. (see c~p . pp. J37 - liiBl . ~r>·hirh will 
l'>e the subjO:CI of a fuwre paper. 
identification with radical politics. But that faith WJ~ ~till premised upnn a Euroccntrism which 
could only accept African political militance if it could comfortahly fit within the parameter~ of 
European liberalism. 
This amhiguity was to have a crucial effect on the lihcral politics of the 1950s: Any articulation 
of African demands in terms different to tho~e wncci,·cd in liheral discourse, any articulation 
that ~eemed to exceed these limits would bl:! regi..trtkd with deep ~uspicion. If A(rican militance 
tended either in the direction of African natinnalism or Soviet-style communism, liherals could 
not support it. Liberalism 's relationship to ma"s political mm·emems like the ANC and the PAC 
was thcrdore fraught with difficulty. In the words of an anonymous member of the Congre~s 
alliance, "the Liberal Party was one or twu steps behind the Congress MoYement. The liberals 
always moved with hi~tory. But they were alw<.~ys a step or two behind. They changed, but they 
never radicalized. They could never get into tht: action.·•ll-l 
This problem, that of nen:r hcing able to g:.ct "into the action", i~ indeed a perennial feature of 
the organisation's histl"~ry. For although many liberals in the LP did mm·t closer to the ANC and 
mass opposition politic~ than any liberals haJ hdore, the LP's official relationship with the 
organisation had been ~trained from th~ beginning. This is nowhere better encapsulated than in 
the Party's failure to participate in th~ Congress uf 1 he People in !955. Though they had h~en 
invited to the C.O.P. at an early stage. ~orne p:my members feared that they would be unable tn 
control the C.O.P:s outCllme, and that the c\cntual demands of tht Congress would he too 
radical tiS Fearing that this would cause a pnlari~ation in the Party thty resisted more radical 
members' insistenct: that they should ta~c part. ANC-LP relations never fully recovered fmm 
this event. 116 Instead, the rift remained, and. throughout the late 1950s, the liberal suspicion 




Quored m :'\LSAS. Dh;en;ion in the Rank~. p. 13. 
See Dave Ever~ll. " Franl.l~ frighrened: rhe Lrheral ParryaooJ rhe Congress of the People". The concem 
over lack of libe!<ll conlro! •~ e".:lenced on d terre~ tu \1argarel Elalhnge~ t>y Waller Sranfurd quoled ll) 
Eve r<l.tl {p . .:!3): "I t htn l ir f nghr ful!~ dangerous to come on at .t late s1age >uch as th1s when '''e hac·e not. and 
as I see it ,.,;11 not get. any real control mer this urgamsat1on." 
Here an important rotc 10:as plaYed. 1ron1call~. h) three prominent ex-A'C members who did joon the liberal 
Pany Selby \>lsom<~ng. Jordan :"'gubane. and Joe '\~aile. Together. the three became the core of ·•a >mall 
tnt1uenllal group" on the I.P ,._·no ...-ere hlghll· t•ntlcal of the Cornmumsl Parcv·s rotc 111 the 1\:\T (Tom lodge. 
"Palrick Duncan and Rlldocal \.ohcral!sm·' p flJ and who fanned rhc fires <Jf man)' lollcrals' anti -;:ommunlsm. 
\himang. m-foundcr or the ,\:'\C hy the standanls of the 50s and 6Qs deeplc- conscrvati,·e. had 
lefr the :\:\'( bc,· au~c _,r 1 he inl1 ue nee of the Com mu n 1~1 ra rr; . v•h rch he ~a~~o· as an o rgani5il! ion of c~r rcnmt 
"rabt>le-rouscrs" 1 Tom Lodge. op. (jf,. p. 6: for :\l~1maog · s clo~c er.av•hilc ties ~>.ith •·ooser.ari,·e lit>eral 
polnrrs on !he Gamma Sigma duh on Durt>an. ~ce R1d1. op. cit. p. 13 - 1-H Joe .'-'k<nle·s opposttion to the 
SACP stemmed from divergenr reasons. he saw 1he111 as a hrake on .-\frican radicalisation . Xgubane. a co-
founder of rhe X\CYI. and ao omp,manr editor ol lnkundla ya Bantu tn '\atal. was deeply opposed !0 
Commumst mllucnce. argumg that 11 ~~horagcd ,\fn~an :\at10nalosm (S"·mer and s ... ·irzer. Tl" Black Pre~~ 
in South Africa and Le~othn: a cl~\criptin biblio~raphit KUide to .Urican., Colour~d and Indian 






By the late t<,l.'iO's therefore, raJicalliher<.~lism was suhj<.."ctcd to a series uf stresse~ and dilemma~ 
that onl~ grew sharper <~s time won: on. Though mJny of the younger liberals pa~ionatel)' 
idcntilied with the goal of a non-racial and d.:mocrt~tic ~~)cicty, their party had never quite 
managed un.::quivocally to align itsdf with African political movement~> fighting for that goal 
Though they tried to iden1ify with militant African nationalism, they could do so only in an 
<~mbiguous and qualified way. Although this may not be true of all radical liberals, and though 
some liberals seem to haye had far fewer reservations ahout mass politics, these theme!> were 
prevalent enough to render the LP a!> a whole incapable of forming any close alliance with 
Congre~ politics. Though the Party had soon gone beyond the parliamentary pah: of white 
politics, and though they had in principle accepted the desirability of essentially revolutionary 
change in South Africa, they had not worked out what 5>ort of restructuring would have to take 
place. 117 On the ooe hand, the liberal Party for.r,ook all chances of gaining any power -..ia the 
parliamentary route. On the other it never succeeded in allying it~clf with any other political 
force of transformation. 118 
Radical liberals were thus caught between an ever-more repressive stale and the incre<~sing 
militance of African mass politics. Ernie Wentzc:!. sensing that the Party's younger members 
were becoming increasingly unhappy with its vacillation, grew alarmed. In l?63 he tried to keep 
the loyalty of 5.omc of the more di!>conteoted radicals by involving them in devising a economical 
l17 
1!8 
Belte~ing that communist~ had sought· sul'cessfully · to don1rnare ~mJ control the Youth league, thar they 
had rna nipulate(J the Congress of the People in I 955 and 1 hat the Freedom Charter was the result of 
Communist Pany policy deci~rons. he resigned in 1156 1 For :\guhane ·s own 'iews on Communism and the 
communtsr domination of the A:\"CYL. see J.K :\guhane . .-\n .-\fri~an e"plain~ ·\ptn1heid. (london. Pall 
\faiL 1963) esp. pp. 99, [(>2-t 11!6}. 
Anmher 1mpon.ant pan. was played by the und1plontai1C and •mpctuous beha,iour of prominent 
LP mernbel1i like Patrick Dun1·an. (for a sensti•·i\e discuss1on of the nature and roots of Duncan's ~nli­
mmmumsm. see C.J. Driver. Patrirk Dunca": South .Urican and Pan-Arritan •. pp. 122 - 12~ . ) Thoush 
Duncan htmself wrshed for closer t1es wtth the . .>..:--C- he hoped at one stage lhal the A~C could become a 
non-racial ma!>!i m011ement 1 hat would ultimate!} ma~e the Lit>e ral Part) itself redundant - this d1d not lead 
him to contain his militant antt·communtsm or to meliorate h1s crill~ism of the SACP in his neWJ>paper. 
Contact. Contact was not a Liberal Party organ . I'H.It the association was l'lose enough for 11is attacks to 
wur the relation hetweel\ Congre3s and the Ll'. H1s "open letter ro Luthul(. in 1••hkh he accused the Chief 
of being blind to Communis! Influence 111 hrs organiS.illion. ~as a case 1n point. wming as It d1d dunng the 
Treason Trial. in wh1ch man~ Congre~s Leaden;. were accused of furthering the aims of Communism. 
Though many liberals ~a~ere en tical of th1s leller. {see op. cit., pp. 160 • [61.) 1h1s did not endear him or the 
lrberal Pany with the .-\ :'\ C leadef">htp. 
Tom lodge, "Parnr~ Duncan and Radical L•heralrsm". p. 5. 
It was not only the ltberal Pany·~ relarion~lllp to t>!ack mas~ politics that was ambiguous. If on the one 
hand it never fully entered the a rena <.lf h lack politics. it also never quite left 1 hat of white politic~. Even 
tho1.1gh memben;. of the Sa~h and 1 he Liberal Party had ntade a pohticalehorce that had alienated them from 
most of the white electorate. and even tho1.1gh their 5!ance .... as anathema to the interests of moM white 
vote1"5. they never quire cea~d IOCiking over rlleir shoulder at 1 hat ele\'torale anCJ ronmwed m p1n 1 rs hopes 
on the po!>!itbility of a whtte "(hange of heart- Simtlarl> the Black Sash. though deeply conscious of the fact 
that constitutional means were usele~s or (for blach) simply not available. remaine<l commnte\l w 




political programme f1x the Liberal Parry. If they could become intcr~"tcd in helping .;,tcer the 
Party toward:-. a policy which ack nowlcdge d t h..: nco.: d lnr a radical di::.trih ut inn of wealth in Snut h 
Africa, their disillusionment might fade .11'' He was mi~take n. ""In truth,", Ernie Wentzel writes. 
"the radicals had abandoned u~ in .;,pirit... ·t2'l Th~y had decided to turn to a more forceful 
m.::thod of articulating their protest: ~ahotage. 
li9 
l~O 
AD J93l _\a pp '18- lllO 
Ibid. 
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The Founding of the National Committee for 
Liberation ( 1960-1962) 
4.1 The State or Emergency and the formation of I he early NCL 
The NCL was born where, four years later. it was to end: in prison. It was founded by Monty 
Berman, who was one of 29 detainees thrown together in the Johannesburg Fort and later in 
Pretoria Local after tbe detentions that followed the imposition of the State of Emergency on 30 
March 1%0. John Lang, a liberal co-detainee, also formed a group which was, along with a 
Trotskyist organisation called the African Freedom Movement, to merge with the NCL two 
years later.! 
That, at least, is the officia.l version of the facts, as set out by the prosecution in rhe trial of 
NCL/ARM members four years later. The full story. as we shall see. is much murkier, much 
more tangled: it is a 5-tory in which organisational boundaries arc vague, where the intentions of 
central actors are often unformed and ambiguous; a swry where the initiative belonged to 
everybody and nobody, where actors who conceived themselves lO be at the centre of events 
:o.uddenly found themselves overtaken by the margin. 
The complete and unabridged version of this story will probably never be told. The 
organisation left few records and, with some fatal exceptions, successfu!ly limited the !low of 
information between its own cells. The main body of evidence about its activities lOday is the 
trial record of the court cases; the testimony given here is thus subject to all the doubts and 
problems such sources entaiJ.2 Many of its erstwhile members are today reluctant to talk about 
often painful memories; those who arc willing can speak only of their own limited experience. 
What follows can therefore only be a patchwork story, a jigsaw puzzle constructed from a sparse 
scattering of facts, hints, and contradictory rumours. 
A general arcount of the formation of the group 1s given in an anonymou~ memorandum in tl"!e Pa10n 
Paper-; (Jagger Library. Lni~·en;tty of Cape Town. BCZ.-\ C-l(u)h . p . .:!). Circ11m•ranl!al evidenre suggests 
that rhi• memorandum was comptled by II ugh Le1qn : tl i$ one of a sene~ of memoro~nda (wnllen ,.·nh the 
same typcwnter. and all mar~ed with the letter ·· t·· at the top) at least one of which was defmitely compiled 
by Lc:Wln tthere are clear references to his fat!ed marnage and his friend~hip "-ith Ldr-..ichl h is tllerefore 
ltkdy that the ""L" refers m fact to rhe tmtial Jetter of b1s surname. and that the other memoranda were also 
compiled by him. The others. Lt seems. may ha\·e been <."omp1!ed tly Eisenstein. 
Edward feit. t·rban Revolt in South . \£rica, l'MO- ~. pp. \ · xi 
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This problem is intensified by the fact that many members' experience of the NCl)ARM was 
limited to their knowledge of their own cell and should not automatically be taken to be valid for the 
whole organisation. The NCUARM was no monolithic, unified entity. Organisationally, it was not 
a coherent and centralised body, but rather an umbrella under which group5 that had originated 
separately and independently in different parts of the country could work together. The history of 
the NCl)ARM is therefore that of the alignment in one organisation of a handful of even more 
shadowy groups. These were more often than not loose associations of individuals with divergent 
views who had been shaken together by the nux of left-wing polilics after 1956: people who had 
split off from -or were fairly dissident in- political organisations such as the Communist Party, the 
Non European Unity Movement (NEUM) and the Liberal Party For reasons not explicilly 
documented at the time, and who had kept in contact with each other for a host of different reasons 
and for no explicitly formulated political purpose. 
The NO)ARM, in other words was ideologically heterogenoous: besides liberals it included 
Trotskyists, ex-members of the Communist Party and COD, and some disillusioned members of the 
ANC Youth League. Their experiences were shaped by their own ideological subject-JX1Silions, 
their insertion into the discour,es of the organisations to which they be.\onged. Though all these 
groupings shared, for instance, a commitment to soc:ialism and an opposition to the Communist 
Party, and though aU of them were committed to the strategy of sabotage, even these areas of 
agreement were interpreted in widely differing ways. I! is therefore doubtful whether one can speak 
of any common purpose prevailing throughout the NCUARM. Some of the most basic points of 
departure were in fact contested terms from the beginning. Even when these ideological differences 
were not expHcitly addressed, they still had effects: one view of the political point and aim of 
sabotage could prevail in the NCUARM only by marginalising other views. When using trial 
evidence and oral interviews as material, we sh<Jlltherefore have to be on our guard against reducing 
the complex nature of the NCLJ ARM to that of one of iLS component ideologies. 
It is probably best to start such an account with the smaller grouping from which the broader 
alliance took its name- the circle of leftist dissidents who decided to form an underground sabotage 
organisation called the National Committee for Liberation during their detention. in Aprll 1960. A 
glimpse into those days in prison, and of the circumstances of the founding of the early NCL is 
provided in the memoir, of the Johannesburg lawyer and Liberal Party member Ernie WentzeJ,3 
According to him the 35 white detainees lumped together in the Fort and in Pretoria were 
composed of three main groups. Firstly, there was a sizeable group of about 18 ~ 
J Emie Wen1lel, Unpublish~d Meml'lir.l, (Erne$1 Wentzel plpe.r.~, William Cullen Library, Univel'$ily or 1he 
Wi twuenm nd, AD I 931 Aa ~nd Ab) 
20 Communists led by Cecil Williams; other prominent figures were Joe Slovo, Rusty Bernstein, 
and Harold Wo!pe. Then there was a group of liberals such as John Lang and Ernie Wentzel. Lastly, 
there was a group of dissident lef\ists which included Monty Berman, Hymie Basner, Michael 
Muller and Archie Levitan. 4 
Not all of these dissidents were to become pan of the NCL, and the NCL included membe~ who 
had not been pan of this group. It is, however, out of their reactions to the State of Emergency, and 
the interactions between them and the other two groups of detainees , that the organisation was to 
grO\\I. They were people who, though they seem to have been involved with the SACP in earlier 
times, were at the time of their detention no longer in its ranks.s Berman, for example, had lifelong 
close links with the SACP; his father, Leon Beeman, had been an early member of the Communist 
Pany in Johanne.sburg.6 ncrman and his wife had for some time adopted a critical position within 
the SACP7 and Herman had apparently been expelled from the C'..ommunist party at some date after 
1956, possibly because he was suspected of Africanist sym pathics. 8 
The State of Emergency had been an attempt to regain control afler the crisis that had shaken South 
Africa after lhe Sharpeville shootings. 'The detentions had, however, some unintended effects. 
Firstly, the throwing together of member.i of the left in the close confines of Pretoria Jail provided 
them with an opportunity to reassess the situation after the turbulent days that had just passed. This 
was especially so in the case of the Communist and ex-a>mmunist detainees. Ernie Wentzel was 
later to comment wryly on the Communists' propensity to see whatever happened to them in the 






"There was an air of great events-about-to-be about the Communists. To me the reality of 
arrest very quick.ly asserted itself as a demonstrntion of the power of the State, The 
Communists, on the other hand, were elated. They saw their arrest as the logical (outcome J 
of an historical process. They fell that this was the beginning of the end of white rule and 
!.hey were exhilarated to be participants Their sense of great 
AD 1931 Aa, p. 50; Ab, p. 15. 
In Cerview with lssy fuyman , Jabannesburg, II September 19B9. 
ibid. 
Hirso n also says tbey bad refused to join the COD because of tbeir objections to beiog pan of .a colou r·brr 
orgau isatiou {Da{llch 1-lir:soG, "The Socia list Lugue" (unpublished typeM:ripl, 1989), p. 3). 
Interview witb Issy Hayman, Joe. dt Oral tescimony con nil" Is an this point. Monty Dennu (interview, London, 5 
~h y 1989) down pia ys his difTeren<.'es with the SACP a ftd has it thaI be !e[l them after lhe !nv3sion of Hunga I'}' in 
1956. Hir:son consradicts this, and concurs more with Hayman's ver.;ion, s.ayiog that the Bermans remained ioside 
and were l~ter expelled. He appears lo think chat this expulsion was 31 least panty due to the fact th3t they were 
being associ~ ted witb hlm~~Jf. (See Jl~ruch Hi~n. op.dl., p. 3.) What bad estranged the others from lhe SACP 
I~ not clear: Hayman characterises all of them merely as dissidnls who did not fll into Cbe SACP or the COD. 
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[excitement} at historic events - and my growing amazement at their romantic 
detachment from any sense uf reality - nercr (cea~cd I to intcre~t mc ."9 
This propensity was shared by Monty Berman anti other dissident leftists. To them and the 
mainstream Communists it really was the bc~t and worst of times: the situation seems to have 
appeared simuhaneously grim and un!:!:otpectedly hopeful. On the one hand, legal mas» 
organisation appeared to have been crushed. The banning of the ANC seemed imminent, and 
the state had demonstrated its determination to counter even n.:m-vio!enl protest with brutal 
repression. All non-violent ~trategies, it seemed to Berman, had failed; the legal ~pace fur mass 
struggle was. dosing. At the same time South A[rica also seemed to contain une-xpected 
revolutionary possibilities. lO 
Until then, Berman hall agreed with the SACP that it was too early to move to armed struggle in 
South Africa. Though the question of armed struggle had often come up before, it was always 
rejected as a strategy 
" ... because at that stage there were :;till means, lcgaJly, to challenge politically without 
violence . .. . [T]he people would nor be able to take [up] violence, becau:;e they were 
neither organised nor ready for such action."11 
But aher Sharpeville they felt that conditions had changed . firstly, the level of repref>Sion for 
which the state was prepared seemed to show that freedom was going !0 be unattainatlle without 
a "real fundamental struggle". To Berman the pass burning campaign !>eemed to show thal the 
African working class was "much more vociferou!> about their needs ... and gelling angry·. 
furthermore, the massacre "was such a gross miscarriage of justice, such an appallingly violent 
thing, that what was going to flow from that was the total and absolute antagonism of the blacks 
for whites.''11 Berman and his co-detainees seem to ha\e fdt that this anger, if it was not to lead 
to mere destruction. would have to be channeled in some way. In this context, their previous 
arguments against violence seemed to be outdated. 
71 
But how to take up the challenge of going beyond the politics of non-violent protest? Some of 
the members of the group had been in the armed forces during the Second World War, and had 
been very impressed by the example of underground resistance movements like the French 





AD 19J I Aa. pp . 2~ - 5. The words an squan: t>ract.:et.s h;we t>een omiTted from the typewritten 'c~ion of 
the memoirs due to tl1e il!egibilirr of rhe manus.cript : an ;mempt 10 ueripher ttle manus~ript itself has made 
it possible 10 insen them here. 




legal work for th:u of undc.:rground acriviry . ll was time 10 do "something more active .. , and Ill gn 
ovc.:r to a strategy of sabotage. They decidt:d to ':;et up a National Cnmmittcc fnr Libcratitm", a 
~mall group \)f activists who would rorm the nucleus anlUnd which a hroadcr sabotage 
movement could grow. Through their acts thcy hoped also ro create a general in!>urrc.:ctionary 
atmosphere: individual acts of sabotage would. they hoped, ..:ncourage others to carry on in the 
same way. 
This decision, although it was the product of a perind of reass-;:ssmcnt and discussion in pris\m, 
was not in itself very deeply theorised. In the context of the gO\ernmcnt's repression of mas~ 
politics, sabotage seemed so obvious a nex1 step that it was almost a fMcgonc conclusion. As 
Berman puts it, .. ... because all of us ... were already committed ... there was no need for political 
discussion.... It was a question of... moving out of passive legal action into active military action. 
The detentions were to have another long-range com.equence for the NCL/ARM besidc.:s the 
bare fact of their providing the opportunity for reassessment :md discussion. This Oowed out of 
their wide-ranging political spread. Liberals, Communists. and dissident leftists· long-time foes 
outside prison - were forced into close contact with each other. and had no option but to dose 
ranks to some degree against a common enemy. This was especially true of the Communists. 
who took the line that in spite of political differences a cnmmon front had to ~e formed 15 and 
went out of their way to draw in the liberal~.l6 
II wa~ an uncomforlable solidarily, partly because it necessitated the lowe ring of political 
defences. In addition, the! liberals. ~ecm to have been suspicious about tht: Communist 
enthusiasm for solidarity: Wenlzel, for one. felt that it was merely a public-relations excercise 
on the part of the Communists. The Communists knew, Wentzt:l reasoned, that public sympathy 
for the liberals would be much greater than for themsel\'c~. While lil'lerals rcmaint:d in jaiJ there 
wa.s every possibility that the Emergency would come to a more rapid end. He suspected that the 
Communists' wdden non-sectarianism was due to their concern to prevent a rift forming which 
could result in the Communist!> being rekased later than thi.! libnals.17 Though the liberals did 
not go so far as to make a separate peace '>"-ith the authorities, they spurned the Communist 
advances: they refused to participate in collective action like hunger strikt:s 18 and started early 
14 Ibid. 
1.$ AD \9Jt Ab p. ~0. 
It> Op.l' ic .. p. t 6. 
17 Op. cit .. p. t 7. 
18 Op. ~it .. p. 19. 
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on to involve Communist Party membl!rs in long ideological arguments. Tensions quickly rose. 
and relations became strained. 
A three-cornered <:onfrontation cnsucrJ, with the liberals anJ the Communi~b as the main 
sparring partnc rs. The dissident leftists appear to han; sided first with the one side. then with the 
other and in the accompanying jockeying for posilion some of them drew closer to the liberal 
position. As Wen1zel wa:, to remark, 
"One of the factors which I think disturbeJ the Communists was the facl that these ex-
Communists who in a sense hl'IJ the balance of power. were clearly more attracted by 
the Liberal point of view than bv the Communist. And there were several of them who 
were very eager to get to know the Liberals and discuss matters with us." 19 
Thi:, was especially true of Monty Berman, who from the beginning seemed to enjoy the liberal 
lampooning of Communist Party arguments. During the course of their detention, he became 
"very very close" to John Lang, and "seemed to be establishing some common ideologicaJ 
ground with him".2° Although John Lang did not join the new organisation he agreed with 
Berman and hi~ culleagues about the need for sabotage. Their friendship was to become the 
basis of a close but informal working relation~hip between him and the NCL. Lang had access 
to prodigious funds, and in the ensuing months he was to provide the NCL with valuable 
rcsources.21 
Once out of prison, Berman and his comrade~ tried to put their plans into effect. This proved 
difficult. firstly the group was small, involving only "four or five" people.2~ Secondly, any aHempt 
to expand the group had to take place secretly. Thirdly Berman seems to have stood in a fairly 
ambiguous position vis a vis the SACP and ANC. Although he had left the SACP and therefore 
found himself, for the time being, outside the organised Congress alliance. it is ob,·ious that the 
estrangement, as far as he wa5 concerned, was far from total. He s1ill believed that some co-
operation between them was desirable and possible. This added to the problem~ of expansion, 





Op.dt~ p 20. 
lbKL. 
For a discus~ion of John Lang·~ ill'tivi11es. :.u pp. 88- 9S. 
lnter.ie"' "'lth \font}· Berman. toe. cil. )l is diffi~:ult m say who these member.; were. II ~ccms that \tike 
.\tuller of SACrt.: may hd\'C been a member (ibid., supported 1n mtemew with Raymond Eisenstein. 
london. !6 April 1989) Alex Cox. a liberal husincssm~n who owned a shoe fa~:m<) in Johannesburg. W'dS 
l~ter recroited becau>e of his s~ill as ~11 acroplaoe p1lot (Barul'h Hin;on "The state of Emcrgenc)''. P· ~). 
\fie hac! Sdme1dcr may also h~vc hccn a member of this early group ( intc:l'\iew with Raymond Eisenstein, 
loc. tit .. mtc:I'\1CW with R.-lndolph Vigne. 16 :-.larch t'lS'l) . Harry Harrv.cll. a di.'i.Sidcnl member o£ the COD. 
seems ;l[~o to have been peripheral!) invol\'ed (Baruch Hirson. op. cit .. p ~: 1n1cniew "-ilh h•>) Hayman. 
lot>. tit.). 
lnlcl'\-1cw Wlth \fonry Berman. toe. ~it. 
Although they knew in g~:neral th<Jt the ANC wa:;, "mo\ ing in the samt: direction··. they wt!re 
excluded from discus5ion~ in5ide the SACP and ANC and did not su~pect that the formation ol 
Umkhonto we Sizwt: wa<; alrt!ady being planned. According to Hirson. Berman approached 
SACP members and in~ited them to join wirh the NCL in a programme of action, but thest! 
overtures wert: rejected.2~ Bt!rman himself savs that he met members of the ANC ('"Walrcr and 
Nelson '" ) to discuss pos.sible co-operation. The ANC. probably un\villing to disclose their own 
plam regarding the possible formation of Umkhonto at so early a stage, apparently decided to 
play along for the time being. It was therefore agreed that the NCL "' would ... do a very 
important jon, and that was to take people out of the country who needed to go.' '25 The NCL 
thus became involved in securing the ~afcty of many people whme liberty and lives were in 
danger now that the state had cracked down on the liberation movement, and while that 
movement was planning to continue it~ operations underground. ~ot very much is known of this 
aspect of the NCL's a~:tivitie!'.. The extent of the co-operation between the ~CL and the 
SACP / ANC has been the ~u~ject of conOicting claims..~1' A careful piecing together of clues 
afford~ us a glimpse, however, of the extent of its role in the immediate aftermath of the lifting 
of the Emergency. In this ptctur\.0, the figure of John Lang occupies a central place. 
According to the Bcrmans, Lang had ontaincd funds fwm Ghana through Kwamc Nkrumah's 
legal advisor and Attorney-General of Ghana. the Labour Party MP Gcoffry Henry Cecil 
Bing.:P Some record of their association exists in Bing's autobiographical account of Kwane 
Nkrumah's Ghana, Reap tht Whirlwind. According to Bing, Lang held a posl as Professor of 
Law at the University College of Ghana and as head of the Law School~8 after leaving South 
Africa. Bing indicates. that he knew Lang even before this. Signirteantly, he also mentions thai 
Lang'!"> ~eeond-io-command at the Law School was the ex-senator Leslie Rubin, Neville Rubin's 
father. 29 How Lang had cominced Bing and the Ghanaian government that they should grant 
28 
Baruch Hi non op. cit.. p. 3. 
In tesview WJih .\tonty Derman. loc. dt. 
Thus L" m1J10nto we Sizwe wa:; later 10 deny that ot bad an~1hing to do v.it h the :\Cl (5ee footnote -42 
be: low), while at the other extreme \1 u riel Horrel alleges thai L" m khonto "'operated under the gutdance of 
the '>:;nional Commntee for LJberauon· {.-\ction, Counln-artion and Re-action: ~ to rid rfl i~ of non-whitl' 
poliiKiill movements in South .Urira i.Johi!no\e~t>urg . South .-\fnran lnstltute of Race Relauons. JQ7J ). p 
53). 
lnter.iel'l with ~ynle Berman. london. 3 June !990. That the money c-ame from Ghana has al~o heen 
dlleged in inte["l.le"'-s "'ith Baruch H tr'lan !London. 15 \Ia) l'J89). and E i~ns1e1n ( loc. cit. ). Hm;on ·l> 
unp11hlish~d autobiography i,'lVes ex-senator Leslie Rubon a~ lang'~ conta't {se~ op. cit •. p. ~. ). Ruhtn was a 
fnend of Lang's. and as I poont out here he did ha,·e ltnks Y.ith Bong as well. Thos may account for Hirson"s 
1·en.ion. 
For a summa,. of Btn•>s career see D. '.f. \lrfarland . . -\ Hi\toriclll Dictionaf)' or Ghani! . .. 0 - . 
(london. "The Scarecrow Press. 1985), p. 50. 
G. H. C. Bing. Rtap the Whirlwind: ..\n Account of K"a"'e 'ikrumah'~ Ghana Jrom 1950 tu 1966 {london . 
. \tacgibbon .Jnd Kec. 19681 p. 313. 
Ibid •. p. 32-1. 
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him the money is not clear, but in 1960 he was granted a substantial sum of money + apparently 
3bout £25 000.3o 
Lang retained control of the pur.>e·springs, but seems to have made some of his funds available to 
the NCL for its projects. Thus he organised transport for twenty African nurses whose services 
were needed in Tanzania, but who could not get pa~ports. The NCL, which had investigaterl 
po~ible "escape routes" across the border, covertly took them out of the country.31 The NCL also 
had the use of a singJe.engined aircrn.ft Lang had bought with the Ghanaian funds. After the end of 
the Treason Trial, the NCL took Raben Resha out of the country in this aircraft. 32 The NCL also 
hcl ped "kidnap" persons banished 1 o remote areas and take I hem out of the country. 33 According to 
some claims they "rescued" 16 people in this fashion. 34 
Further clues to the extent of this "rescue operation" is provided by two widely disparate sources. 
The first is an article in a Quaker joumaJ35 by Ronald Watts, who had been a Tribal Agricultural 
Officer in Serowe, a town in Bechuanaland as it then was. According to Watts, he was involved in a 
plan for the evacuation of South African politlcal exiles he claims had been devised with the help of 
Oliver Tambo and George Clay of the Observer, Exiles coming from South Africa, usually via 
Swaziland, landed at Scrowe. were taken to Frandstown, and were from thence flown to Ghana. 
Among these refugees were Robert Resha and, he claims, Adelaide Tambo.36 
A further piece to the jigsaw puzzle is provided by Bing's book. According to this account, Bing's 
own wife was invoJved in activities that look as if they more than touched on those of the NO... 
After Sharpeville, she was to "pioneer" an "organized rescue attempt by which refugees of all 
colours were collected in Aechuanaland and airlifted over the Federation of Rhodesia ... landing in 
the Congo and from there on to Ghana.'o37 According to Bing, the "rescue operation", which 
involved the synchronisation of illegal flights across South Africa and clandestine border cro~ings, 
involved a total of about 24 peoptc.38 
IndividuaUy, each of these pieces of information appears of doubtful value. Aut taken together they 
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Bing and Watts refer to ~c~m to have bet:n th..: n:ry OnL· ,,r which Lang and the ~CL organisc.:d 
the South ,.\l"rican end. If thi~ i~ so, the NCL ~ccm tl) h3\t: been part of quite '-~n <ambitious and 
well-organised rt>scue ope ration. 
Be!;idc~ the~t' rescue operations, the NCL al~o ..:miJarkt:J on a campaign of ~abotage. On 211 
September 1% t it launched an arson attack nn the nfficc~ or the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development in Johannt>sburg.'N On 8 Octl>bt:r, it toppled a power pylon in 
Lombardy East, apparently by dint of sawing through its lt:gs.~0 This last altack, according to 
the Bermans, was done in cooperation with member~ of the Communist Party who blew up· or 
attempted to blow up- a telephone line in Pretoria. According to Myrtle Berman "We did a jninl 
programme. We knocked out a pylon and they were supposed to knock out telephone lines and 
none of their stuff came off. They were as badly organised as wc ... "-11 
This tentative working relationship would not last. In the first place, the resources nf the NCL 
would become kss. valuable to the Al'iC once their own underground movemt!nl was 
established.J2 Secondly, although Berman saw the NCL's distanc<! from tht! formal Congress 
AUiancc: as a £emporary affair, this. was not to be the case. In lhe following pages we shall sec 
how the social and discursive context after Sharpcville m.:ant that 1hi~ separation would grow 
and solidi(y. Factors beyond the control of the NCL'~ foundt:rs would work to widen the gap 
between them and the Congress Alliance. and choices and wmking arrangements made in the 
Ouid early stages of the NCL's development would acquire their uwn logic, a logic that was to 




Anording to SQrne d~ims these altach "''ere llue w take place in \iay "but "'ere P<>Mponed at the request of 
.\1r .\tandela" (Ke AAS H3, p. 156). If this 15 true tt confirm~ the Be.rmans· statement~ that there was wme 
at tern pt to co-operate v.irh or at least stay out of 1 he way of the A\·c. 
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announce its Jislance from it Sli)1ng that 11 "·as "nor connected in any Wil) "'ith 1 he so-called \'arional 
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starcmem released by the high command of Lmkhonto we Sitwc. This document ts contained 1n rhe 
Hoo,·er lnMiWte on War, Re~utution and Pea<·e·s mtrrohlm collection entttlcd "X>uth Afr•ca. a coflectton of 
mtscellaneous documents. 1902-l%.'1'', (Dot ume n tatwn Centfl! for t\f ncan St udic~. L m,·e ~ity of South 
Africa librar:o·. AA.S lSJ) Reel 7 r Fl L<,IJ)) 
-1.2 The Socialist League of Africa 
Berman·s was but one of several groups outside the Congress Alliance who were now, after 
Sharpe\ille. contemplating sabotage . One such group was the Johannesburg-based ~ocialist 
League o[ Africa {SLA), a Trotskyite group leu by the pnysicist Baruch Hirson. Though. the 
SLA was by no means a large group, and though its acti\·itie5 were fairly limited. it was to play 
an important role in the creation of the nationwide network that eventually drew together the 
groups that merged to form the NCL/ ARM. 
77 
Writing about this role presents the historian with some diflicuhies. ln one sense, as som~ of its 
members point out, even to talk of the Soci11Ji5t League is to participate in a fiction:n It appears 
to have been little more than a s!Udy group, with no formally constituted structure. lts career 
lacked continuity and it had Ji!tlc cohesiveness. Its membership was not only loose and 
undemarcated, but had changed almost completely between its formation in 1957 and the 
moment when it joined forces with Bt:rman's NCL and other organisations five years later. In 
fact, the only connecting link between the earlier and later Socialist League seems to have been 
the person of Baruch Hirson himself and his own political project. Rather than being an 
organisation in the full sense of the word, the SLA seem.<. rather to have been an informal 
grouping of people with whom Hir.son y,·as in contact and wh.o he saw a.<. being potential 
members of 11n organisation which could form an alternative to the SACP or the ANC in 
huildi.ng a working-cla.<.s movement in South Africa. This means th<1t it is rath.er difficult (to say 
the least) to gauge the exact size of the Socialist League. Hirson. for example, say~ that about 20 
persons were involved in the later League, while another SLA member puts the numbr.:r at "[our 
or five ".+< Hirson's figure seems to refer, not to a dearly-demarcated core group, but rather to 
all the people he was in contact with and saw as crucial political allies. These, it appears, were 
included by Hirson in his conception of th.e Socialist League even if they had never explicitly 
commiHed th.emselves to his own political programme. This seems to characterise much of the 
style of Hirson's polities: he was a lone operator, isolated even by the standards of the left 
opposition to the SACP. While he would on occasion be p.s.n of a collective political enterprise, 
he seems to have operated according to his own agenda, and to nave interpreted these 
enterprises always in the light of h.is own eventual intentions. As Bernice Kaplan, a member of 
the later Socialist League, would later put it, looking back at th.e discussions that characterised 
her experience of the organisation, 
lntervieu.· u.-ith !Qymond Eisenstcm. loc. d!. 
lnte"'1ew with RB)mond [isensrein. toe. fil . 
"I think we were actually preparing. Baruch wa~ preparing himself. That v.as what th~: 
activity was i.tll about. Laying the ground .... making as many contact!\ as he could; 
learning things, discu~~ing the direction we were going in:·~5 
And as Hirson himself observes. 
"'I am not certain whether what I Jescrihe as Socialist League acti\·ities were my 
activitie~ or group activitics."-l6 
Hirson, a physicist by training, had had become involved in Trotskyist politics before World War 
II. In the 1930s and 1940s, he wa~ a member of the Workers· International league (Wil). but 
left upon their fragmentation after the Second World War.n After a period of inactivity he 
joined the Progressive Forum, a NEUM affiliate. His ~upport docs n01 seem ever to have been 
unqualified and his di:o;illusionm e nt gradually grew. In 1 tJ 57 he lc ft it, partly because of it" 
refusal to join the protest against the Universities Apartheid kgislation, and partly because of its 
support for the Soviet im·asion of Hungary. He also disagreed fundamentally with Tabata's 
account of the All African Convcntion.-l8 
Hirson met with others who had also left the Progre~~ive Forum and together they decided to 
launch the SLA.-t'l They were united in their opposition to the SACP, their belief that the ANC 
could not provide viable political leadership, and also agreed that the Unity Mo\'cment did not 
provide a \·iable alternativc-.50 Hirson hoped to build a working class party on the basis of this 
common agreement. But on another level. this group had little in common. The other SiP. 
members did not even ~cern to share Hirson's reasons for leaving the NEUM: the principal 
reason for their linking up with him was the fact that they had left at more or less the same time. 
According to Hirson, "It was a most peculiar situation in whic-h thc5e people, having broken 
[with Lhc NEUM], did not quite know where they were and they linked up with mc:·Sl 
Hir5on found discussion in the SLA barren: the other members were theoretically 
unsophisticated, and their time in the NEUM had !eft them closeted inside its ranks, isolated 
from the broader black community and thus unable to intervene in trade: union or township 
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which Hirson saw as his prime target- F~.:cling politically isolated. he decided to change tactics 
and en1er the South African Congress of Democrat~ (COD) as a strategy. In this way, he hQpcd. 
he would find the contacts through which he could build up a socialist movement: his objective 
1vas tn find people "who agreed on the need for a working-class mo\·ement"5~ and who could 
form the nucleus for an alternative group. He was particularly interested in making contact with 
people who had innuence within the ANC and Sr\CTU . 
Initially. ht" only succeeded in increasing his isolation. His decision to enter Cnngrcss alienated 
his ex-Unily Movement contacts. Moreover. he was far from welcome in COD. Hirson"s critical 
po:c:.ilion towards thl! SACP meant that he h:~d accumulated some mcasurl! of notoriety in its 
ranks and among it!> sympathiscrs. The name Baruch Hinon. as an ex-member of the 
Communist Party was later to recall, was a ""swear-word'' even among Cape Town SACP 
member:c:..53 In COD, he was "always under suspicion, always an outsider, always the wrecker 
who had to ne watched" . 5~ Member!> o[ COD who did nul share his political concerns found 
him "pernickety" and difficult to undcr5tand,s5 and his insistence that contact bad !0 be made 
with African workers merely succeeded in alienating members instead o{ winning them over.56 
But in the long run, the strategy bore fruit. COD ga\·e Hirson access to mhers who, like him, 
were di~illusioned with SACP policies. He made contact with Mike Muller who, though 
banned, was sti!l acting as an ad\'isor to che South African Congress of Trade L1nions 
(SACTU)57 and with Phyllis Altman. abo involn:d in the SACfU.ss Hirson saw them as 
valuable contacts. He also met Vic and Marcelle Goldberg. They did not agree with him on the 
need for an independent working-class party, but like him they took exception to the notion that 
as white activists they should work only in the white arcas.59 They became important political 
allies, and Hirson supported Vic Goldberg when, in l958, he called for "one congress" in which 
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"In defence of the Congress". and the d1scusston 'Fusing the Congre~s?" in l.iberatiom A Journal of 
~moc:nuic Di~Cu\~ion :\o )7. July !959. All these are contamed in collection by the lloo•·er Institute for 
War Revolutton and Peace. "Sourh :\fnca: a collection of miscellanous document:.. 1902 - 1'163". 
(Documentat ion Centre fur African Siud>es. L'nr,·ersuy of South Africa A.-\S :!5~ ) Reel 6 (fl 640)). Ronald 
Segal. (see lnlo E"'ilo-. p. ~II) also offers an acwunt a/ the "One Congres.~· issue. Why he mcnuons only his 
own cant rib1.1rion 1 a 1 lie deba re 1S nm enhrely cltar. 
But far more important to Hirson was the access which the Goldbergs, through their refusal to limit 
their involvement to the "white community", gave him to ANC activists and township politics. AI 
their home and later, when he joined them in their trips to the townships, he succeeded in making 
contact with dissident members of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) who were unhappy with the 
ANC and its relationship to the SACP.61 These included Stephen Segale, who wa.;; at the time the 
presidenl of the Trnnsvaal Youth League,62 "a great agitational peasant kind of leader, a sail-of-the-
earth kind of guy," as a SLA member later described him.63 Segale was accompanied by Milton 
Setlhape\o, his Provincial Secretary.64 Their political conviction seems to have been a mixture of 
Africanist and socialist sentiment. 1bey were dissatisfied with the ANCYL, and seem to have 
shared the PAC's distrust of the SACP. But they did not agree with the PAC in its opposition to the 
Freedom Chaner, and according to llirson they were unhappy with its leadership, especially afier 
rumours that figures like Lebal\o had connections with the CIA. 
Of their own political position they had as yet no clear appraisal. They had come into contact wilh 
Marxist pamphlets, and were interested in reading more about socialism, but their own 
understanding was still vague. Though Stephen Segale "had socialist slogans", llirson's impression 
was that this reflected very little detailed comprehension: 
"1bey expressed an interest in wanting a better socidy which would be socialist.... [T]he 
word 'socialist' nourished all the way from Sukamo in Indonesia to Mao Zedong in China ... 
So there was something called 'socialism' which was better than this thing called capitalism 
which controlled South Africa ... I don't think there was any way in which they could have 
formulated it very preciscly."65 
All the same, Ilirson maintained contact with them: "I was not going to probe about what their 
discontent was. r was trying to spread socialism. And if they want to come talk socialism to me: 
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Segale, Setlhapelo and an ANCYL member called Thco Musi started meeting him in his office at 
the Physics Department at Wits University, discussing socialism and the need for a socialist 
movement.ti7 
Hirson was also regularly meeting other socialists who were not affiliated to the Congress 
movement. These included Raymond Eisenstein, a young Jewish immigrant who had survived the 
Warsaw ghetto as a child6B and who had studied in France, where he had been involved in 
Trotskyist politics. Eisenstein was studying at Wits, ~nd through him Hirson made contact with 
members of the Studems Fellowship Society (Srs).69 In 1960, this group was joined by Bernice 
Kaplan, a UCT graduate who had been suspended and then expelled from the SACP because of her 
associations with Unity Movement members in Cape Town,7° and also because of her continuing 
leftist critique of Congress campaigns such as 1 he 1958 potato boyoott. 7 I Other members were Fred 
Prager, a Jewish Austrian who had come to South Africa in 1936, and his South-African born wife, 
Rhoda Prager. TI1ey were both from the Liberal Party but had socialist leanings: Fred Prager had 
been a social democrat in Austria. Though, as I have pointed out, Hirson seems to describe the 
Socialist League as comprising the entire "loose alliance" of about 20 people he had met through 
joining COD, it looks as if this grouping was iLs core. 
Other people were in infonnal oontact with this grouping. Dennis Higgs, who was later to be a 
prominent member of the NCUARM, was also known to the core group of the Sl.A, although he 
does not seem to have joined them. 72 In formal links also existed between this group and a grouping 
in Cape Town- Neil Talbot, Anthony Eastwood, Edmund Trosser and Hillil Ticktin, who had earlier 
been adive in the Congress-oriented Modem World Society but who had since berome leftist 
dissideoLs.73 
Though this oore group was ideologically diverse, there were strong oommon threads that brought 
them together. Dcsides their oommon oommitment to socialism and opposition to the Communist 
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characterises thi.s group as broadly Trotskyist, it was thus Trntskyi.st with a difference. According 
to at le<t!>l some of its members. it tri~d. 10 transcc:nd ~orne of the feature~ that had hitherto 
characterised the divide between Stalinism and Trot~kyism in South Africa. Bc:rnicc Laschingcr 
remembc:r~ a strong feeling that the dc\Tiopmcnt of \ft~rxi;.t idea~ had stulliried in past year~ . 
that "" there was nothing new, there was nmhing creative. thae were no devdopmcnrs in Marxist 
thought at a11'". 7...1 The discussions in the St•cialist League were lhus directed towards re-
evaluating some of those ideas and providing a ·· fresh. ind\'pendent Marxist perspective'" : '" If you 
did not agree with every word ~tarx wrote" she recalls, it was not the ... end of the world. Neither 
did Trotsky have to be treated as Jesus Christ.''75 
Although the SLA's roots were deep in Trotskyism , its formation should th.us also be seen in the 
light o[ the development of ~larx.isrn in the aftermath of Kruschcv's secret speech and the 
invasion of Hungary. To an extent its own formation was a result of the fluidity that 
characterised - even in Sourh Africa! Marxist politics in this time of crisis. it was also 
influenced by the international intellectual rejuvenation in Marxism at the time . John Saville's 
journal the, New Reasoner, was read avidly by some of its members, and the SLA seems to have 
taken a lively interest in any revolutionary developments such as the Chinese or Cuban 
Revolutions that seemed to explore alternative paths to socialism. The Socialist League lOok a 
great interest in the guerilla strategies used there. and according to Kaplan, Guevar<~'s Guerilla 
Warfare was studied by the group and summarised in a 26-page typescript by Hirson.76 
The Socialist League was also engaged in formulating a position on the South African '>truggle, 
and here Hirson used it as a sounding board for his own ideas on the subject Over the years 
between 1957 and 1960, he was to \\/Tile a series of text5 under me auspices of the Socialist 
League which amounted to a detailed critique of a whole range of aspects of Congress 
strategy.17 
Hirson's plans to use Congress as a hunting ground for political allies were however changed 
completely by the Sharpeville shooting and the event!'> that followed. There had been shootings 
before; Sharpeville was distinguished, however. not only by the number of people slain but also 
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Johnson lOok e\'cn organisations like the PAC and ANC by surprise _78 This indirectly Jed lo a 
sequence of events that finally alienated Hirson from Congress politics. On March 10, when it 
was hroadcast on the radio news that thousands ol Africans were marching on Capt: Town, 
Hir~on was electrified: he was convinced that an insurrectionary moment had arrived, and that it 
was time to intervene decisively. At this crucial juncture, the Congress Alliance seemed to fail. 
SACTl) did not act decisively enough ror him: a call for a Johannesburg stayaway wa.c. delayed. 
mo.c.tly, it seemed. for bureaucratic reasons, and a pamphlet calling for a stayaway which had 
already been printed by Phylli.c. Altman of SACTU was not distributed .79 Whether the stayaway 
would have been any more successful if the pamphlet had been distributtd is an open question, 
but for Hirson, frustrated at the difficulties of organising in Congress, this was the last straw, and 
he decided to abandon the strategy of organising. inside it~ rank.~.30 
The wave of detentions that followed the Sharpevil!e crisis mi~~ed the core of the Sl)ciali~t 
League, and as the emergecy wore on, they continued to meet. At this time, a number of policy 
issues solidified. Firstly. the other members of the SlA agreed with Hirson that it was time to 
!eave the Congress Alliance.SI Secondly Hirson started producing a clandestine sheet called 
Spark, which was distributed in the tov.'Tlships. Thirdly, they felt a need for new strategies and 
considered a move to sabotage that most of them had previously rejened. 
According to Bernice Kaplan, they were influenced in this decision by the Cuban revolution .8~ 
Hirson points out that the decision to go over to :sabotage was not a simple decision to "apply" 
Castro or Guevara·~ ideas to the South African situation.83 Though the grouping had at some 
time or 01her discussed events in Cyprus, Palestine, Cuba. Viet Nam and China, and had also 
compared recent events in South Africa with the activities of partisans during the Second 
World War, this was what he calls "ordinary run-of-the-mill political discussion", and the group 
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stay-at-home . .See for example the amcle 'The stay-at-home call: why did it fa1l'.'" (Congre\s Voi(t' . Vol . .!. 
:Xo.2 (\-fay 1960) AAS Z.H Reel 8 1 Fl 692) ). Ttus a rude stares that "On the rccommenda tion of some 
excited and ovc rcnthusia~llr activists who u rgcd for a strike on the 31.~.60 and who ~ore that the people 
were ready and just walling for the word . a call was made for that date .' That ver:.- everting another group of 
aniv1sts had decided on other dates 'A& 11 result. the ronfuston was ronfounded .... (E)vcntually order was 
reswred and once th1s was done all concerned worked enthustastically for the ~ray-<ll·home" (Ibid .. P-~- l 
E~·en !hough it conve~ a d1ffer~nt judgement. thiS bear5 out 1-lirson·s vc~ion or the facts. 
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with the banning of the PAC and ANC it became clear that in the context of renewed repression, 
above-ground mass politics would be impossible, Like Derman and his co-detainees who were in 
prison at this very time, llirson's group now felt that the "old methods" of legal and non-violent 
protest could no longer be used any more. 
The fact that other groupings had come to the same conclusion strengthened this conviction. 
Members of the ANC and CYL who had not been arrested were thinking, Hirson knew, along the 
same lines,B4 Funhermore, a message from Mike Muller had been slipped out to them from prison. 
MuUer was at that stage apparenlly one of the people involved in the formation of I3erman's 
grouping, and he, too, urged them to consider moving to sabotage.BS A new stage in the struggle, it 
seemed, had arrived. 
New stages take a while to manifest themselves and the SLA's oommitment to sabotage did not 
immediately lead to action, For most of 1960 and 1961, discussion continued as before. Dut 
throughout this time, as a political underground grew apace, new contacts were slowly being made, 
and it was only a matter of time before the Sl.A stretched out feelers to the NCL. I !any I {an well, 
an ex-SACP member peripherally involved in Derman's group, told Hirson about it and its activities. 
Hirson did not know much about the group - only that it had been formed in prison, and that the 
Bennans were involved. This last fact stood in the way of a merger between the groups, because 
Jlirson and Monty Berman did not see eye to eye politically. Berman, with his attachment to the 
Congress tradition, had little patience for what he saw as Hirson's divisive and sectarian politics, and 
there was little chance of a political alli:mce between them. It was to be some time before the two 
organisations could merge; by that time, ironicaUy, Dennan and lfirson's differences would be 
rendered more or less irn:lcvant by the presence or another ideological tendency: liberalism. 
4.3 Radical Lihemls In Du.-han: John La.-edo and D11vid Ev11ns 
In spite or the differences between Ilirson and Berman, it should be remembered that they were 
ideologically bound together in an imponant sense. Ironically, this bond can best be described by 
referring to their common link with the Congress aUiance. This is an imponant point to bear in 
mind when discussing any deeply fissive politics such as that constituted by the relation between 
Stalinist and Trotskyist groupings generally: for aU the fact that they disagreed strongly, even 
bitterly, with each other and with the Communist Party, they shared many of the fundamental 
concems of socialist politics, Though there was no central or essential element which they 
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all held in common, there were what Wittgenstein would call certain "family resemblences" between 
the groupings. The debates which occurred between different positions, and the differences of 
opinion which divided them from each other, only made sense within a larger and more or less. 
shared world of discourse, and the different positions could to some degree be situated on a matrix 
defined by the theoretical and strategic issues raised by mass politics and the struggle for socialism 
inside the Congress tradition itself. 
The political tradition of liberalism that now started to impinge on the politlcs of the NCL and the 
SLA had a very diiTerent set of concerns. In the previous chapter I have shown how a new 
generation of liberals had come to the fore in the late 1950s ~ persons who had in some measure 
broken with traditional South African liberalism and were seeking to identify with the political 
struggle of the disenfranchised. Their political course was now to intersect with that of Berman and 
Hirson, and r~dically change it. Liberalism had, so far, existed at quite a distance from the traditons 
represented by Marxism and African Nationalism, and therefore, did not have much of a chance of 
innuencing the direction of their politics. Ironically, it was precisely because this radical liberalism 
came closer to the revolutionary impulse represented by the former two tendencies that it was able, 
eventually, to change the nature of the NCL fundamentally. 
The liberal strand in the NCUARM did not come from one, clearly defined source. As we have 
seen, both Hirson and Berman had made contact with liberals who supported the strategy of 
sabotage: llirson with the Pragers and Bennan with Cox and Lang. These liberals came from a 
variety of backgrounds and followed different paths before they reached that decision. It might 
however be useful, by way of example, to narrnte the politic.>! journey of one such libernl as a more 
or less representative exam pic. In this section, I shall t hcrcfore discuss the political development of 
John Laredo, a liberal who along with David Evans, made contact with Hirson at this time. 
Laredo had grown up in Pretoria in a household sympathetic to Afrikaner Nationalism. While 
studying at Stellenbosch he became increasingly alienated fmm the militant Nationalism and 
xenorhobia of his fellow-studcn!s. By the time he continued his studies at Cambridge he had 
completely rejected apartheid. During a year of teaching at the University of Cape Town he had met 
Jack Simons, who had exrosed for the first time to Marxist analysis. Though he did not go over to a 
Marxist position himself, he started shifting away from a reformist persrx;ctive: 
"There is this moment of crystallisation. You can talk about things and say 'things will 
change' and then you suddenly realise, looking back. that if you are going to change you 
are looking at something that is so radical .. . that it isn't just reforming the system, that 
one is talking about a completely new system."So 
He was not alone in this. In Durban, this positil1n was shared by wnat was according to Laredo a 
fairly well-denoted tendency in the Liberal Part~·. especially among the younger members. 
There was a growing feeling. among them "that the powers-that-be ar..: beyond reforming: that 
there had to be some sort of a radical solution ." This therefore meant a commilmenl to extra-
parliamentary action: 
..... at that time I think people were talking about thi!> kind of thing fairly often, you 
know... Tbe question would be po!>ed to you: what are you doing politically. Partly it 
was a question of what organisation you belong[edJ to and partly it was a question of, if 
you belong(ed} to an organisation, wnat were you doing about the organisation. II i!> 
obv1ous that what lay behind the question was that ... we did not even 1hink about the 
official parliamentary opposition. This was the great army outside Parliament that was 
waiting to batter down the doors. II was your place in tnis army.'·87 
This also meant that friendly relations existed between these more radical liberal!> and other 
extra-parliamentary organisation!'.. The an1iparhy between the Liberal Party and the COD that 
was so marked in Cape Town was not nearly as inten!>c in Durban. In 3 paradoxical way, the 
absence of a well-defined tradition of socialist thought as. existed in Johannesburg and C1pe 
Tov.n meant that the ideological noundarics were policed less conscicnrously; though the COD 
and rhe Liberal Party kept their distance from each other organisationally, Liberal Party 
members. and COD members often co-operated on an individual level. Laredo's circle of 
friends in Durban was thus composed not only of white LP members. but contained some 
Africans and COD members as wcll.ss 
"At the level of co-operating, as far as :--sara! was concerned. we knew and got on very 
well with people who, though you could not call yourself a Communist at that stage, 
would, all things being equal, call themselves Communist:·8'~ 
But Laredo':> nascenr socialism did not lead to a break with the Liberal Party. This was partly 
because COD and the A:"-IC were widely believed by liberals to be under Communist control. In 
the context of the Cold War, particularly after the events of 1'~56, liberals regarded Communists 
with some suspicion. "You did not have to be very reactionary", remembers Laredo, "to have all 











Gnder tbe circumstances it i_~ not surpri:>ing that Laredo and Evans would m(!ct Hirson. As we 
have seen, Hirson's very political i!'.olation was to kad him 10 make political contact with 
groupings acro!'>s a very wide polirical .~pectrum. While on holiday in Amanzimtoti be met a 
group of people with whom he discussed the possibility of co-operation.':JI They were not 
interested - possibly because they were morc sympath.:tic to the SACP: Liond Gay, a memher 
of this group, wa!'> later to join MK.91 Through this group he was introduced to two y1mng men: 
John Laredo and David Evans. They were liberals, but they had enough in common politically 
for Hirson to want to keep up the comact.Q~ Hir:>on did not, however, make any overt 
reference:> to a specific political organisation: "Nothing: was said that wasn't a sort of general 
political discussion about the situation in the country ... there was nothing which was not a 
general discussion about what people could do."9-' 
Hirson did indicate, though, that he would be interested in remaining in touch. and that there 
was a group of people in Johannesburg who were involved as well. He indicated that this co-
operation would not supersede Laredo's Liberal Party activities, and that it would indeed be 
essential for Laredo to remain in tbc liberal Party. They parted on this incondu.~ivc note, hut 
laredo was interested enough to talk to Evans who, "in a desultory way", indicated that he would 
also like to maintain contact with Hirson.95 
After Sharpevil!c. however, this meeting attained a new importance for Laredo and Evans. 
Now, they and other radical liberals faced a whole new set of questions regarding their political 
commitments. Like Berman and Hirson, it seemed to them that after the Emergency 
crackdowns and the banning of the ANC and PAC, the scope for legal cxtra-par!iamentary 
mass-politics had decreased decisively. 
"Almost unthinkingly we said: right, you ban the two major mass organisations: other 
organisations can continue hut thc:y only continue on sufferance . Therefore the time 
had come that we actually consider altcrnati\'c means."96 
But what could take tbe place of mass, above-ground elCtra-par!iamcntary politics'? The 
problems tbis posed for radical liberals bad a special sharpness. They were very conscious of 
the advantages they had in this new context of hea\)" state repression. The relative leeway they 
9\ Bai'\Jch Hi rson. op. cit,. p. 5. There is some 'onf us•on here: llir.;on gives the date of his ttltroductton to 
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bad as whites seemed to them to place on them an e\cn greater re~pon~ibility to act: the 
question "what are you doing politically?" wa~ now hcing posed with increasing insistence by 
those of their post-graduate African friends at the Llnin:r..;ity of :-.lata! who had escaped 
detention. .-\s Laredo puts it, "One fe It u political imperati\·e. per hap:. even a moral imperative 
that given what was happening in the country, that we had to do som~thing.''97 
And almost as unthinkingly, it seemed clear that this ''something" was sabotage . Laredo and 
Evans were conscious of the WTitings of Guevara, and the collapse of the Cuban regime seemed 
to have particular relevance for the eKplosive situation that followed the Sharpeville massacre. In 
these conditions it seemed that even a small group of guerillas, given the correct political 
conditions, could spark a major uprising. The notion of an underground sabotage organisation 
bad become increasingly auractive and seemed all of a sudden realistic. This was especially so 
because of the extent of the crisis the state had apparently bt:en plunged into after Sharpevillc: 
"There was definitely a feeling in the aftermath of Sharpe\'illc. in the financial crisis that 
occurred because of all the money that was withdrawn from the country; in the shooting 
of Verwoerd, that the government did not quite know what it was going to do, that 
things were never going to be the same again."98 
It was only in 1962, however. that the po~~ibility of sabotage was lO become real. 
4.4 John Langts group 
Laredo and Evans were not the only · and definitl'l~ not the main - grouping of radicalised 
liberals that inOuenced the development of the NCL/ ARM. There was another person wh11 was 
involved, like Hitson, in making contact with different underground groupings at the time: John 
Lang. Lang is pe rb aps the most enigmatic single figure in the story of the NCL/ ARM, and the 
lack of information about h.is activities certainly constiiUtes a serious gap in our story. If the 
h.istory of the NCL/ARM as a who!<: has to pieced together from incomplete sources, this goes 
doubly for Lang. 
Lang was in some ways the political opposite of Hirson. Though he was a member of the 
Liberal Party, be had a range of political friends and contacts which stretched across a wide 
spec1rum. including people with backgrounds a!'> diver!'>e as the Torch Commando and the 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Communi:.! Party.99 Lang, as M:yrtle Berman remembers, was "a man with a good network". 11 H1 
Closely linked to his aptitude for making and main!aining such contacts was his nair - of whil:h 
he was quite proud - for fund-raising. 1111 An im·estigation of the way in which he handled 1he 
money he acquired from the Ghanaian go\'ernment reveals something of hi~ e\entual political 
intentions. 
Lang's own political agenda seems to h;:n·e e:<tended beyond merely aiding and abetting the NCL 
in their activities. The larger part of this money Lang spent a on boat, named Torquit, which was 
capable of carrying a load of up tQ 16 tons, and which he kept at Southampton docks in 
England.102 Wbile Hirson and Berman were preparing for 5abotage, he was evolving an 
underground network of his own. By the end of 196l he was in contact w:ith a wide range of 
groupings. firstly, he had made contact with a group of Liberal Party members, based mainly in 
Cape Town, who were contemplating a !'hift toward sabotage. Among these were Randolph 
Vigne, the vice-chair of the Liberal Party and later editor of the liberal journal The New African 
and Eddie Daniels, "coloured" member of the Cape provincial executive of the Liberal Party and 
brother of the Cape Town city coundllor N.J. Daniels. Also among his Cape Town contacts was 
the ex-National president of NUSAS Ne\·ilte Rubin. 
Lang had also made political contacts in the Transvaal. Once again, only indirect evidence is 
available, in the form of a confidential memorandum, dated 15 August 1961, from the Rand 
Daily Mail journalist Benjamin Pogrund to his news cditm.103 According to this memorandum, 
Pogrund had been informed by an African friend, (a "former ANC ufficial") that he had been 
~mployed by John Lang at a salary of R70 a month to do "organisational work". This work 
consisted in the formation of "committees" of up to fi\'e Africans each, with the purpose of 
destroying grain bins and dams on white-owned farms in the Transvaal. Lang had been vague on 
the precise method5 of destruction, bUI had said that these would be made clear larer. 
Pogrund's informant was under the impression that explosives would be brought in from 
overseas. Lang had abo told him that negotiations were under way for Israeli instructors to be 
brought in ro train them. The plan was for the Israeli trainers to be based on farm5 in 
Swaziland and Bechuanaland, where they would train "committee members" who would visil 
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1961 he had already organised [(5 such structures. working with former ANC members known to 
him. It'-! Pn!!rund adds. interestingly. that his informJnt had 111ld him th.11 this activity had nothing 
to do with \landela lind hi!> crowd·', thl1ugh he had hearJ that 1\bndda was doing !>Omething 
"along similar lin.:s··. W 
Lang also had some connection with a ~hadowy s~cessioni!.t grouping based in Natal variously 
(alled the "Horticulturalists"' and the "Cricketer~;·.tOfl Not much information is available! on this 
grouping. 107 but some clues as to their activitie~ and political agenda are provided by reports 
surrounding the arrest and trial of some of their members in a police crackdown on 22 May 
1961, just days before the Republic cclebrations.108 Four pcoplc, 109 some oft hem members of 
the United Engli5.h-Spcaking South Africans ( UNESSA) were arrested, and at the Durban 
home of one, police found explosives and home-made bombs. Evidence seems to indicate tbat 
these were probably mem hers of the "Horriculturalist" /"Cricketer" group. 110 
According to a memorandum submiHed during their trial as eYidcncc by the !>tat~:, the purpose 
of the group was to bring Natal "into a sratc of spiritual and moral insurrection" so that "at the 
appropriate moment", the organisation's leadership could ~h:p in and ··proclaim Natal's physical 
independence".111 The memorandum statt:d that "the arbitrary u~e of force:. while not 
contemplated at the present time, cannot bt: ignored'' but warned that "lthe] Natal stand cannot 
succeed if it is to depend on armed action, at least not under present circumstances". The 
sought-after "state of spiritual and moral insurrection" would instead be built up by a campaign 
of affirmative and dc:fiant actlo by citi7em.. Exampks of such ··acts" were the periodical 
boycotting of government transport and postal sl!n·ices. prderential purchase of Natal produce. 











H1n;on. 'The State of Emergen()·" p 3. 
Sec P. S. Thompson. :'\atalian~ Fint: Separ.tli'm in South Arrk:a, t?09 . 1?61 tJohannest>urg. Sou1hern. 
lQ90t. pp 163 • IN• for an account of sowe of thetr a<:lt\lliCS. 
"l.atc·n•gtlt 511.·oop on '\a tal honte~". Capt Time•. 2-l \la1 J%1 
.-\,·cordmg 10 The Cape Tirn~s of H Stptcml>cr J%1 l"lketho\en .and V-Sign at Durban tnal") they were 
\fochael \1alhmck (Johannesburg). A.P. [lannon 1 Durhan). P Graham ( Durhan Janda woman. G. Lee. 
A<'<'M<l1ng to Thompson (op. cit •. p. 165) 1he llortoc:ultural•~t~ a~~ group opposed !><illOtage. and rejected the 
wggesuon of some member.. of C'I.E.SSA that the .\;auonalist~ should be ""driven into the sea'. ,-\ 
ronncctton he~"~>·een the aCTested groupmg and the Hortt~·ullurahsts ~hould therefore not be made 
automatirally. There IS, hOWC\"er. some Clr<'um~tantra! evidcnre that does u1dio:atc su,·h a linlo:. f irstly. 
Thompson obser.·es that some of thc1r more hot-headed members drd voo:ally ~uppon the 1dca of" anmng 
ag;~inst the "i.ltJonalist~ (p. 166). Furthermore. he lonks the Hortku\tur.dists to the very freedom Radio 
31'11\1!1~ of wh"'h the four aCTtJited penon~ ,.,·ere ;u·cuscd (sec foornnte 112 below) . \ton: !!Vidence as to 
the~r hnlo:Ji ,.,,h lang os doscussed in footnote 115 below 
Op. dt .. Capr Timn. I~ Septcmher I %1 
'1(1 
91 
also charged with running an illegal radio station. which had hroadcasl in the: J1,150s and after 
the Emergency under lhe name of .. Freedom Radio '. L\2 
Hnw Lang saw his relation to these groupings is not clear. There are few indications of h1s own 
political \iews and eventual agenda. An interesting due to his possible inlcntiom. is provided in 
a document reproduced in The New African, lD an anonymous and undated MA lhcsis in the 
possession of UNISA's Documentation Centre for African Studies."~ This dl)cument, 
according to the author of the lhesis, is an unsigned report written by John Lang in late Pi6l. It 
is an applicalion for funds from an anonymous donor who seems to be sponsoring underground 
resistance activity in South Africa. The applicalion provides a gn:at deal of factual information, 
but this is not what makes il important for our purposes. Irs most interesting fearure -and one 
that gives us some insight into Lang's purpose - lies in the way in which the different assertions 
are linked together. 
rt details a wide list of underground ac1ivit1es, many of which can be confirmed, either through 
documen1ary evidence or by the affirmation of erstwhile NCL/ ARM members. Th~! ac1ivitics of 





Ibid. S.:e P.S Thumpsorfs descripuon rop.l'it •. p. Jrw) of the: Horriculturafisl's "Freedom Ro.Jdio" acriviries . 
Ahhough Thompson 's dcscnption relates to rhc: carlr ]!)60's. some ne~paper rc:pons rndrt•ate that there 
had been earlier broad.-asrs . whi•h had \eased after June 15. 1958. Broadcasts took place again on JO 
October 1960 and~ and 9 April 1%1 (.'icc ,\D t'JI:! "Freedom Radio on arr agam·. Th• Rond Dail :\-tail .11 
Onober 1?60 and '" Freedom· Rroad•ast". The lUnd Daily :\-lail. and 10 April 1961}. '-'o more broadcasts 
look place after l he police raid . 
I thank Doug Tilton for drawing my allention to lhrs document . 
AAS l·B. Thrs document pro"idcs a wealth of supristng c•idcnre abour Lang·~ actr,rtics. Its claims should 
however not automa~tcally be atcepted as beyond douot. Some: dJscu~ron of irs credibrlity seen1s th~reforc 
to be in order. The lhesrs. wh ich appears to have hce11 11mtren rn the late 197(/'s. seems to be the iame te\1 
as a researC'h work of the same tule referred to ll} Gordon Winrer rn hts bool.. Jnsidt Bo''- Winter 
mentions a book t'allcd The '1:~ Mril'an written O) Piet S"anepocl. the then head of 1he ""hne suspects 
division in BOSS (see Inside Bos,. p. 57:!). ,\!though 11 tS generally not clear how rrust..-orth~ Wrnrcr's 
rnfonnation is. his account of the cementS of thr~ ""·or!.; seems 10 <'Orrespond with the contents of the 
mys1e rio us 1 hesis. 
In the rhesis. the writer auempts !0 prove rhe e.\lstenre of linlos • •f not a conspiracy· betwe«:n the 
ClA and intemauonal ~Ol·tahsr movements. The l~nchpm of his argumc.nr rs his conjtt:lurc that the 
:'\CL/AR.\t was itself funded oy the ClA. The main evidenre for 1h1s argument is I he fac1 that Randolph 
Vigne art ~Cl/AR.\t member. seems to na"e rece;aved CIA funding for his JOUrnal The \- ... friral> 
through the Congress for Cultural Freedom (AAS l·H p. 3). I! should he slated rhat although this 
allegation seems 10 be rorrcct · the \,.. African did unknowmgly !l'ceive CIA funds (inte.rvrew w1th 
R.tndolph Vigne. London. 2 May 1989: see also ed1torral. :\ew Arriun, December 1966) • that docs not by 
an)• means prove thai !he .'\CL/AR.\f was rhus funded . As I ~how. !here i~ far more Circumstantial evi<lence 
that the money came from Ghana . The CL ... rhes.rs. for example. does not account for the funding drffrcult ies 
the :\'CL/AR.\t encoumered once Lang had ldt (see my diS('I.l.SSron on p. IIJ below). 
The doc:umentary e\'rdence quoted by the unnamed author rn !>upport of hr~ clatms seems.. 
ho,.·ever. to be authentrc. and tendi tn rts concrete detarls robe confirmed by olher independent accouors. 
Though the thesis itself shoul<l thaefore not be seen as an rnroni!'O"nlible soun·e of informallon. I have 
made JUdicious use of the fact5 quoted tn e•1dence. ( have drscussed the weight and reliability of mdr\idual 
allegauons where 1 have made use of •hem. 
The documem refen. ro a group m :'\atal. more than forty m number. who brtladca~l on Sunday evemngs 
under the name of Freedom Radro . and who had acces" 1o explos.ves. Lang refers to the facl that 
in Johannesburg.ll6 The discussions of the Socialist Lc~gue are mentioned 117 ~n<.l the document 
nlso refers to Lang's own effons, dccribed in the Pogrund memorandum, to build underground cello; 
in the tow nships.ll B other allegations are more diffirnlt to verify and inlleed surprising - for 
example, that there were large groups operating in Pretoria and C..ape Town, t19 that headquDrter5 
had been established in Swaziland adjacent to an airfieldl 20; that £500 had been donate<.~ towards the 
organisation of the ANC's stay away on Republic Day in 1961 and that money had been given to the 
PAC.Jll All this information seems to indicate that Lang had a surprisingly wide range of contacts 
in South African underground life. 
But what is interesting is that Lang creates the impression that all the activities mentionell ha'Je been 
organised by a single en!ity - which he calls "The Group". 122 To this "Group" he allributes an 
agency of its own, an agency that supersedes and includes the actiiJities of the IJarious smaller 
groupings. H suggests that there were close links between "The Group" and the ANC regarding the 
establishing of Umkhonto. It claims, for example, that ancr the failure of the April 1961 stay-at-
home "when Mr Mandela announced that his foUowers were considering direct action," a meeting 
took place at which Duma Nokwe of the ANC anll a representative of the "Group" were present. 
Nokwe had told the reprcsentatiiJe that the ANC were contemplating a tum to sabotage, anll the 
"Group" representati"e had reponedly responded that there should be close links between the two 
organisations, promising to supply explosi..,e.."> and detonators as soon as it was in a position to do 
so.J23 
Upon dose scrutiny, though, il is clear that these claims need to be treated with caution. Lang 
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every town and villago:", bo l who have m~de very little progress (up. rll., p. 154 ). This was almost cen..ia ly the 
Sl.A- see my discussion of ~ng's relation with this organisation 011 p. 100 below. 
Ibid. Lang's rdert nee to the hct !bat he is ~m ployi ng three pl'r.;<>OS, nAe of wbom wu an ex-member of tbc 
African National COD8f"SS, seems to be 1 dear reference to the I"'I""Mln mentioned by Pogruod (see p. 1!9 above). 
Op. dl., p. 155. 
Op. dl., pp. 14!! - 149, 156. According to the Bemuns, ung's reference to a base ill Swulland may have been a 
rderence to bis friend Robin &on Smith, who could ny and who was in Swaziland at the time. N I point out 
later (see p. 93 below). Lang'~ document is marked by a distinct tendency lo exaggeration. 
Op. ell., p. !50. 
Doug Tilton su gges~ in his thesis, From noo.vlolence to s.Jb01age, lha 1 this "Group" refers to !he NCL (p. 88 
footnote 79). As I show in these pages, this is highly Improbable, since many of the activities attributed In tbe 
"Group" had nothing In do with the NCL. 




!;Ompletc a thorough reconnaissance of the areas uf t1perations, and to select limited objectives 
for training purposes: 
"It is therefore proposed to attempt at an early stage to achieve the disruption of the 
telephone senices by the whole~alt: destruction of telephone lines on a night in August. 
Then::after s.clected targets. for burning such as the pass oHict:s, police stations, 
granaries should be tackled sv~tematical\v". 1 ~"' . . 
It also decided that its most urgent need was explosives and training in the usc of ~:xplosives. To 
this end it decided that it ought to seck a "suitable instructor from Europe" who would be taken 
to Swaziland to run ''weekly courses for groups and cdls from all uver the country".t25 
NCL members - even those who knew and co-operated with LJ.ng - strenuously deny that 
anything of the kind could have happened. Lang, according to Monty Berman. had no say in the 
direction of the early NCL, and no-onc ever discussed policy with him. His role was only to 
provide resources. But there does seem to have bet:n at kast a grain of truth in the story. As I 
have shown, the NCL was involved in the destruction of at least one telephone line, and this 
operation may have been discussed in its ranks.l26 Furtht:rnlore, as I have indicated, there is 
independent evidence in Pogrund's memo that Lmg bad contemplated bringing instructors to 
Swaziland .127 But these devclu pme nts occur rc d in dependently from each other. Any allegation 
that these two decisions are linked through the agency of a national "Group" is, at lea.st 
according to those who were involvt:d, purt: fiction. It is of course not impossible that the NCL 
member.s, without knowing it, were simply cell members of an even larger group. But this is 
unlikely, ru say the least, seeing that no independent evidt:nce can be found of any such 
"National Meeting" taking place. If "The Group" existed, it left no rrace of its existence other 
than the daims made in this document- and, furthermore. ir mysteriously evaporarcd afrer 1%1. 
What is far more likely is that the "Group" as portrayed in the fund application was an entity that 
existed only in the imagination of John Lang himself. This is .supported by Monty Berman, who 
argues that '"I tbink John really thought he was in charge of everything ... I think that (we had] 
done some things and John knew about it, and all he was doing was expanding it in a way that 






Op. dt .. p. 5h. 
Ibid. 
See p. 71:> ato011e. 
Seep. 89 above. 
lnteMew v.ith :\tonty Berman. Lvnuon. 3 June !989. 
"So far as I know there was a lot of discussion going on ... but we never took it seriously .... 
This is where John is infinitely creative. Ir he is going to do a broad plan, he will take 
something that was once discussed ... casually and put it into a ... sequence".l 29 
What, in the end, can we learn from the claims made by this document? Was Lang merely 
fantasising? What is the meaning of the curious web of truth, half-truth and exaggeration we find in 
the fund application? One hypothesis alone seems to account for all the facts: that Lang was indeed 
in contact with a wide range of groupings, and that he hoped to bring them together in a single 
organistion, It seems that he hoped uHim at ely to contra 1 and coordinate the activities of the smaller 
groupings through his access to funds and resources. The exaggerated nature or his claims may help 
explain why Lang had been at all succes.o;ful in gelling funds from Ghana; as Monty Derman 
remarks, the document gives the reader the impression of dealing with "half the liberation 
movement" instead of a few small and scattered groupings 130 
John Lang's hopes were not to bear fruit in the way he had intended. He did, however, play an 
important role in bringing together the different groupings that were eventually to form the 
NCUARM. Through his own and Hirson's activity, a network of sorts already existed, connecting 
the NCL. the Socialist League, John Laredo and Evans in Durban, Yigne, Daniels, and Rubin in 
Cape Town, ex-ANCYL members in the Transvaal, as well as the "Freedom Radio" group in Natal. 
Towards the end of 1961, these groupings now started moving closer to each other. Some time 
before August 1961, Rhoda Prager introduced Hirson to John Lang. Lang suggested the possibility 
of fusion between the NCL and Hirson's group, but Hirson rejected this, apparently because of 
Berman's SACP connectionsY~l He agreed to maintain contact, however, a fact that Lang seems to 
have found encouraging.J32 As a result of this. Hirson attended a meeting of some of Lang's 
contacts. Besides Hirson and Lang the meeting was attended by Cox (from the NCL), Vigne and 
Daniels from Cape Town, and what Hirson eal\ed "Unessa types"- the remaining members, it seems 






totervi~w with Mynle Berman, loe. cit. 
Interview wilb Mon1y Ben~~an, lot. cit .. 
See BCZA 77(1.5 C4(ii)h, p. I. 
Lang c!Jims, in the New African docu men I, that a merger did ui;e plare. In his reference to his contact with tbf 
"group of socialists" in Joh~n11esburg (sec footnote 117 above}, he says tbat "rbis group b~s united witb tbe main 
gro~p and its leader is a member of the planning lind executive command of the whole organisation" (AAS 143, 
p.154). This is another exam pie of the diffkulties this document pre:;~n l'l to the pe~o wish io g to get a r the truth 
of politics of the underground movcmenl'l of the 1960s. There is oo evidence that the SLA amalg~mated witb 
Lang'!> group Jl the time. Neither i5 it likely that Lang is referring to a ootber organ is~tion; the meeting between 
Ling ud Hirwo did occur more or less a I the time (late 1961) referred tr.o in the documen r. Laog's allegation 
therefore seems to be due to bis already men rioned tendency to stretch I he trutb: Hir!.O n's will iognc..s to remain !n 
contlct with him could conceivably (at a pinch!} have been inlerpreled as a "merger". 
Ba t"'lch Hi~ on, "The Su te of Emergency'', p. 4. 
94 
At this meeting, many of the hitherto loose threads of this network seemed to be slowly drawing 
together. Reports on the variou.~ groups1 activities were given, notably on the airplane and 
discussions on mapping illegal routes across the country's borders.IJ4 Neither Hinoon nor Vigne 
were however very impressed. According to llirson, "most of the meeting was devoted to madcap 
ideas about putting bent nails on the Durban-Johannesburg Road ... " Vigne was just as 
uncomplimentary. In his opinion, many of the members, particularly the NataHans, were "still 
fighting the Boer war",135 Hirson reported his disillusionment to the other members of the SLA, 
but he was told to keep in touch. 
95 
At the end of 1961, a series of events occurred that were to remove the last remaining obstacles to 
union. Firstly, Berman was tipped off by a friendly source in the Security Police that he was in 
danger of being arrested. Derman does not think that this was due to his membership of the NCL; it 
is far more lik:ely, according to him, that although he was no longer listed as a member of the 
Communist Party, the security police still suspected him of membership. This had been a difficulty 
already discussed in the organisation: Berman's prominence might attract attention to the 
organisation. Not wishing to expose the NCL to such risk, he and his wife decided to leave the 
country. 136 Shortly after this, Lang also had to leave South Africa in a hurry. Accounts of the 
reason for his decision to leave vary: according to one version his second fund application to Ghana 
had been inten:epted by the police at Jan SmuLS Airport as it was being taken out of the country by 
Ambrose Zwane, a Swa?.i politician.B7 Other sources have it that he had been accused of 
embezzling trust fund monies)38 
l11ese developmcnLS left Ilirson in a crucial {XlSition. He had remained in touch with Yignc and 
Daniels and was now probably the only person linking together all the groups in the loose network:. 
The slow process that had started with the Sharpeville crisis was now quickening, and soon 






Interview with R.ondolpb Vignc, lo~. dt. 
lnLerview with Monry Bmnan, 5 May 1989. 
This Is alleged by Hirs.on op. cit., p. 4. If Ibis version ts correct, 11 wou !d reno to corrobon te rbe 3 urhcnuciry o( rhe 
doCII menr quo red in rhc New Afrka n rhesis, 3 nd rna h Gorden Win ler's cia im rh~ I I be lbcsis origillaled from 
BOSS more credible, since i I would explain how I be reporl fell in 10 tbe hands of the authorities. 
Interview wilh Hugh Lo:win, lhrare, 4 February 1990; AD 1931 AI p. 138- 139. 
4.5 The African Freedom Movement 
Th.; next aucial step in I he unificalinn of the Jifkrl!nt groupings I.)Ccurrcd when the pcr~on who 
introduced Hir~on to the Durban group told him of ~till another organi~ation which had 
independently decided to go ov~.:r co sabotage. 
ll wa~ called I he African Freedom ~o,~·ment (AFM ). and it had been formed simultaneou~ly 
with rhe NCL but in the black section of Pretoria LocaJ.I39 When this grouping contacted 
Hirson, they found lO their mutual surprise !hat they knew each other. The Af~ included th~ 
ANCYL dissenters he had met rhrl.)ugh the Goldbcrgs.uo Hirson's AF~ contacts wen: ~ilton 
Setlhapclo, Johannes Dhladhla and Willie Tibane, \vho apparently led the group.W Another 
member, Samuel Olifant was also an ex-ANC mcmher. !hough he had joined th~ Liheral Party 
and now worked attbe South African Institute of Race Rclarioos. 
The African Freedom ~ovcmcnt was organis..:d according to a cell sy~tcm, and Hirson m:vcr 
made contact with any but a small part of it. lls full membership is thcrefote unknown. h i~ 
worth pointing out, though, that ahhougb Stephen Scgalc. rhc dissid~nl ANCYL member Hirson 
had mel before, is never mentioned as a memher of the AF~. he was also among those 
incarcerated at Pretoria Jail when tbe grouping was formcd. 14 ~ Also among the same gmup of 
detainees were Thco ~usi. who had al~o bc~:n present at some of the discussion.!> with Hir~on, 
and Jerry Mbuli, who would later be invoked in the NCL/ARM's s.ahotage activirics.1·0 
The AF~ is no less shado"')' than the other group!. described. According to later testimony for 
the State by Willie Tibanc, their aim~ were socialisl. 1 ~ and although then~ was no clarity on the 
exact course of action w be taken to realise this goaJ.l~5 there was at that timt already a 







Baruch Hi~on. op. cit •. p . .5 . 
Ibid •. also mccMew. lof, cit. 
BCZ.'\ 77/15 C~1 I I )h. p. 1. 
!lis n.1mc is one of the S<l mcn11oncd tn a leuer from hlad; e~·cmergenq dera.nee~ ;u PrctonJ Jatl co rhc: 
\1im,.rcr of JuM~ee. BJ. Vorster. dated 6 _.>.,ugusi 11J60. complamtng ahoul mtdico~l and other condirions 
during their derenteon [ AAS :!5~ . Reel 7 [ Fl 691) ). 
Ibid. 
S ~ Hirwn. tesumony nf Willie ftbane. p. J~. llerause the ller..on wal wa~ nc•·er I he subJeCt of an appeal to 
a htgher coun. no finally ~onee! and oumhell'd court rcconi ts avaJiahle tO the arch i, ·es of the Pretoria 
S11prcme Coun. The task of soncng rhe often mt~numhered. chronologtrally JUmbled and tncorrcct!~ 
~llnhuted trial record is therdon: l<:ft to the rcctdcr. ro ascertain ('iilncy ol reference I ha...-e nuenhcred rhe 
C\ldence Clf each wuness separately and ha,-c tned 10 end kate the few mstancc~ where evidence was givc:n h) 
a rcc.1lled W1tncss. For hrc~11 y·$ sake. I have used a s~·srem of not.tlton woth the name of the matn defendant 
tn hold to tdenllf)· the trial in que~llon. followed hy a ~lash f/) and ohe name of ohc: witness. The atoove 
reference would thu~ be rendered "Hinnn/leban<:. p. l-1 ''. Because numt>enng ,., c~plicit in chc other court 
rewrd~ quare<!. I have not had to resort to that system there. and H tS uSI'd on!) 10 ~fer to the Hirson tnal. 
Op. <:it •. p. l.S. 
Op.rit .. p. H 
would later also turn State witnes~ .• tnd ~nuld tcst'1fy that thl' AFM had a membl!rship which 
numbered "an a\t:rage of between L500" {~ic). Thi~ ligurt! !>cern~ inllatcd, hoWe\·er: ".when we 
formed the ~ational Corrtmillee for Lihc:ration anJ I ,.,a~ ~i\'t:n to maintain cnntact with the 
groups from a !i~t that Mih0n had gi,·en to 1 Ei~c:n~lt:inl ~nd I went around Ill tht:sc people and 
tried to find out whether they wert: mcmhcr~ of tht: organisation. I continually rt'portc:d that 
membership wa~ tkcrea~ing". 1 ~ 7 Raymond Eisenstein remembers that at the time of fusion with 
the NCL, AFM strength wa~ counted at about l-W members, and even this figure sec:ms to have 
referred to "paper" members. 1-18 According to Dhladhla, wh~1 al~o testilied for the State. the 
black mcmh.er5hip of the Transvaal NCL in 1%J included the c:lllirc: AFM, • in other word~. a 
figure of about 5 or l• people. t-19 
l)7 
The extent of the co-operation between the AFM and the Sociali~t League i!' just as unclear. 
According to AF:\ol members who testified in later trials. Tibane and Setlhapelo from the AFM 
and Hir!'.on, Rhoda Prager and Rilymond Eisc.:nstein from the Socialist League met ill Hir~on's 
house in :\-larch 1961 and discussed the aims and objects of their nrganisations in order to ~et: 
whether there was any basis for the two organisations merging. ISO There was conscnsu~ nn the 
need for a transition to violence as well a!> a commitmt:nt tt> socialism.t5 l Abuut twll weeks 
later they met again. thi5 time with SLA member Philip Green and Olifant prescnt as well. At 
this meeting the two organisations merged. keeping the name of the African Fre~dom 
Movemen1. 151 The new enlarged AFM appointed Willie Tibane as their full-time organiscr, a 
position for which he was to be paid Rl~ a wcek.1'i3 After the mcr~er the AFM had regular 
fortnightly meetings at Hir5.on'5. house attended, apparently. by Olifant. Sctlhapclo. Hirson, and 
Grecn. 15.t 
Aside from these meetings, the merger doc!> not seem to ha\'e meant any major change~ for the 
Socialist League. The AFM had a membership oath pr<)mi5ing loyalty to the AFM under pain 
<Jf de.ath, 155 but according to trial evidence efforts to make SLA memllcr.s take it mc.:t with 
resistance; even Hirson and Eisenstein refu5.ed to take it. 1S6 In fact the accounts of SLA 











Hir\On/Oiifanr. p. -16 . 
lnter.1e,. v.1th Raymond [t5cnstcm. loc. cit. 
Hirson/Dhladhla. p. 18. 
Hirson{Tibane. pp. 2 • 3. 
Hirson/Oitfant. p. l.t . 
Hirson/Tibane. pp. 3--1 . 
Ibid. He occupied thts po~r for t....,o month~. und then wcnr ··on lea,·e·• (!iCe p -IJ .-\l'rordrng 10 Olif;m!'s 
re~rimony. lltrson wa~ ar th1s ~rage the lcauing ftgure 111 the organtsation 1 Hir~on,-Oh(ant. p. II}. 
Ibid. 
Hirson/Ohfant. JIP· II - 12; tllr~on/Dhla\Jhla . p. 13. 
Hir~on/Ohf<~nr. pp.ll. l.t. 
even mention any such merger. Kaplan !Ollk four African~ for a study group nn the Chinese 
revolution, but she JiJ not even know who they were or \\hcthcr the~ bdongeu to the AFM. 1"7 
Hirson and the AFM mcmbrrs' Ji!>cussillfiS remained abstract, revoking arounu the logistics of 
sabotage · '" the grading of compasses and the reading 1Jf map,". 1.58 Eventually lhe AFM decided 
to go over to action, and the group embarked on wh:.Jt thl!~ called "Operation D". Milton 
Sctlhapelo wa~ to be sent to Morocco to be trained in sabntag.c.159 The AFM would pay for hi~ 
trip there anJ for the maintenance of his wife whik he WaS ~one 11•0 
"Operation D" misfired from the beginning: Setlhapelu ne\'er C<1me back . 161 Later it transpired 
that he had lost touch with his contact in Tanganyika and had to stay in England. According to 
Samuel Olifant. he later went to Cuba, from which he u;as "wdJenly pu shed out" 161 ~ allegedly 
because Tennyson Makiwane of the ANC had spread a rumour that he wa~ a spy.1h3 Ht: 
returned to EnglanJ, and though he W:JS in contact with tht.: Bt:rmans. he was never again to be 
involved in the NCL/ ARM. He later became a member of the ANC. 16-I 
4.6 The rormation or the NCL ali a nalionlll grouping 
[n April 1'162 there wa~ o1 renewed auc:mpt at fusion between the SL/AFM ;.md the other 
groups.t65 On the weekend of 1'1-20 May 19h2- scarcely two mt)nths after the SLA\ merger 
with the AFM and on the C'\'C of Sctlhapelo's departure to be trained as a guerilla - there was a 
long meeting in the house of Ak.x Co:v.. the liberal <~sso~:iated with John Lang and who haJ on 
occasion acted a~ a pilot for Monty Berman. The meeting lasted from early that afternoon till 
late in lhe night. lt was attended by Hirson, EisensTein and Green of the Socialist League; 
Olifanl and Tibane of the AFM; Laredo and Evans from Durban. as well as persons who had 
!>Umt: as.sociation with John Lan~c Cox, Vign~:, Daniels ami a per~on c<~llcu Yusuf Omar, who 











I nte!Vlew with Bem icc l..as~ltinger. lot. ell. 
Hinoll/Olifan!.p-109. 
Op. dt .. pp. 16. [9- Hirwn(Tibanc P- -t 
Hin.on/ Oiofant. p 19. 
BCZA n I '2j C-l{i, lh p. 3. 
Hinon/ Ollfanl. p. 13. 
lnce,..,ew \lllth Ra\'ITIOnd Eisenstem. 1~. cit.: \1onty Berman)()(. rit. 
Ironically. he and \1akcwane ,.·ere lattr to t'c part o f che "Gang of Eight" c~-pcllcd from the ;\\C '" 1976 
lnteMew with Raymond Eisenstein. loc. cit. . For a detaolcd dJ~cussion of their expulsoon. ~c the 
Com m1.1n ost Party puhli<:ation "The enemy hodden under the ~a me colour: statement by the central 
rommittee L>n the Gang of bght." South :\fritan Communhl' s...,ak: Document~ from tht Hislol'}· of the 
South .-\f..Xan Communi'! Party, 1915- 19M cd . Bnan Buntmg (London. Inl..ultddu. I!J81) P- -401. See abo 
Tl)m lodge. Black Politic~ in South ,\frifa. p . . ~H-
BCZA 77/1.3 C-4(ulh p. 3. 
Op. cit .. p. 2. See also Hir.on/Oiifant pp. 17. 18: it ts v.-orch nonng that Olifant om1ts tile names of Tibane. 
l..aredo and Evans. The Iauer n-·o omi~soons may t>e due to the fact that Ol ifam did not knav,- them. This 
•i•J 
Atso at thi:; meeting, to Hir.son·~ amat~m.:nt. wa~ Mont~ Berman. Rhoda Prager had informed 
him of developmcnts'r'7 and he had flown hack to South Africa on a false passport supplied to 
him. al.,.lng '4-ith funding for an airline ticket. hy Jnhn LangY•:S Berman ~bared Hir;.un·.~ surpri~e: 
he was in fact privately horrilied and mystified h;. the ideological turn the organisation ~ccmcd 
to he taking: 
"I went hack to South Africi:l - and <~l this meeting was Randolph Vignc and Baruch 
Hirson! That Wi:ls a combination I could not bdicvc. Baruch and I had actually come to 
[bej totally opposed to e<tch other politically. I found his Trotskyism and rigidity quite 
awful. And suddenly all these liberab were part of the organisation, which had me 
floored! That reallv had me !loored! I did not know where thev had come from. I did 
not know them. I d.id not know who they wcre:· 1ll 9 • 
Berman seems however to have swallowed his d\lUhts on th:tt occasion, and Hirson and Vigne 
were able to go ahead with the process of fusing the two organisations. In the conversation that 
followed, it became dear that there were ::.orne area~ of agreement: lirstly, there was consensus 
that the different group~ did indeed ~hare similar .,ncia!ist aims. Secondly, they agreed on the 
correctness 11f sabotage as a strategy. There wa.<. nu in-depth discu~sion here. The ad\·antages of 
~abotage seemed to have been simply assumed. and the discussion that followed seems to have 
skirted the ideological difference~ between the difft:rent people present hy avoiding excessive 
concentration on questions of political principle and eventual goals. Most of the debate focused 
on practical and logistical arrangements: 
"They v.ere nut talking about uhjccti\·cs. There was an assumption that what we were 
doing ... the activities of whatever political organisations we were in, [were continuing[. 
II was clearly anti-apartheid ... it was dearly part of the liberation struggle. But a great 
deal of time was spent at the meeting talking about when something was undenaken, 
how we were going to publicise this. Mure time was spent talking ahout how you 
distributed leaflets ___ " 
It wa~ decided that the organisations would pnnl their resources and form a coordinating hody 
called the NCL. 170 The organisation was to operate under this name until 1%4, when it changed 
to the "African Resistance Movement'. Hirson was elected secretary of the organisation, while 






would help to C\-plam the confu~ton on the !esumony ahout men.hcrshop of rhe :SCL/AR.\1'~ s~hcommruee~. 
where Oltfant regular!~ omits !heir name~ from suncommince~. 
Baruch Hirson. op. fit .. p. 5. 
lnter.1ew v.•th \1oruy Berm~n. loc, cit. See ~~~<l HinonjOiifanL pp. !7- 21: BCZ.", 71!2'5 C~(ii) h P- 2. 
lnteiVICW with \font} Fierman. ibid. Emphaso~ h) ln!ef'.'lev.ee. 
Hirwn/Oiifant. pp 21 33: Hi non/ I'oha ne. p 5. 
Hirwm/Tibane. AD 1912. "l K. wm m itlee men 1 ooned in ""holage mdictment" Rand Daily :\1 ~il S 
:\ovember 19(14. 
This c;~ught at least some of those pre~cnt a littk unaware~ : li.tn.>do and Evans IHtd come to 
Johannesburg expecting more l)f the diet of tentative di~cu~~ion~ they had become u.;,cd to. Now, 
"what we came back v.ith was the notion that thi~ thing c:ostcd, thai it was up and running.'' In 




Sabotage in the NCL: 1962-1964 
lien I) Jame~ 
S.l The new NCl; its !itructure and political programme 
The NCl wa~ now an organi~ation with som~thing resembling a national structure. In the first 
plact' there were the two main brancht:~ in Johannesburg and Capt= Town. Then thcrt' wao; a 
small branch in Durban, composed of Lan:do and Evans. In addition, branches later s~cm to 
have existed in Grahamstov-11 or Port Elizabeth. 1 Another commiUt't' was in London, consisting 
of the Berrnans. assisted at !';!a~t for a while by John Lang and Neville Rubin. This branch had 
no real power to make decision~; all decisions had to be approved by South Africa.~ Its main 
purpose was to raise funds. 
At the merger meeting Baruch Hirson read out a manifesto or political programme for this new 
group. This document. which apparmtly reflected Hirson s perspective on the thinking in th<= 
SLA and tbe AFM, was accepted as rdlecting the NCL ·s policy as welP They also adopted a 
constitution which spclt out the structure of the nt'\1.> organisation . ..! A National Central 
3 
.\o Grahamsto"" cell of the 'CI ~<a> "' er unro•:ered ~nd rone of the ro--con~pirato"' mentio!'led rn the 
State 's a('(' uJ.alion~ "ere member.; "fa cell there. There seem~ to he >omc e'1dencc that >uch a cell e.\istcd . 
These !"!:late to !he mrstcnous g,'lings-on at that Cllmpus dunng the time of the state nad..dovm on the 
:'-CL/AR.VI. t\ccordtng to (Untemporaneo~~ rcpons . four Rhcxlcs students (Anthon) Carter. :vtalcolm 
Snbey. lillian C'rane and Gavin Trnelyan) Llrsappearcd [rom the r;ampus on 7 .-'.ugust l%4 ("Rho<ks 
LniVer.;uy Sruderors: Secunty !'ind on Garden". Th~ \rgu,, 12 August l<Jt>l). 5hortly after that scrunty 
police were reponed l;.r observed to d rg up dn ··obJed' 'ariously desml•ed as a radro and a tin trunk from the 
gan.len of a house occupicl1 by two t)f 1 hem The four "'ere later grontcd pohttcal asylum in S"'•niland 
I ibid.) Pol\l'e later denied knowledge of the "obJect" ur dny S<.an;h of th~ grounds of the house in 4uesuon 
("Police deny finds tn garden", Thrt .\rgu' 13 .\ugusr J'lo.l ). 
!'urrha h tn ts regarding r he e \tstence or .1 G raha m!.to~< n hranrh ran he found 1n the roun 
record~. Rose mal) Wentzel resttfied 111 court 1 hat she and another memher. \oltrhael Wade. hall trao;eled to 
Grahamsro"'11 "to mal<e Grahamsto"11 feel thdt the~ were nottsol~ted and onrhetr mo,n" . ( Hirs.on/Wentzel. 
p. 17) fi:sensteon also apparently accompanted her on th os trip. Eddie Daniel;. also seems to have made 
'\CL-rtlated trips to Port Eltlabcth (bldic Danrc:ts . Spent IS year'> on Rob~n hlarnd. (unpublished 
typc:~npl. n.d .) p HI) It may ['lc. of course. that the I"<' branches were one and the same: th~ Lnrver5rty of 
Rhodes rncorporatcd hotn ca"'pusc:s. 'o 1 hat a bl'anch 1 n en her centre could \'Ortcei\'ahl}· have had ~ome 
p~.'oe'I'ICC in I he Other. 
Hincln/OlifanL p . ..!~. 
(fl!e rview w11 h Baruch Hi ~on. l,,,ndon 15 :vtav J \189. The text of this document is reprodured tn Appendix 1 
Document 1. 
5 ' Hinon... bh '\fS( 1 ). 
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Committee ( ;.<CC) wa~ to be: the central authority in the NCL It wa~ w function a~ its "activt 
political centre" and would "'direct the actinn and m~anisation of the membership"'. 5 
M.:mbership was drawn from every centre in the muntry.r' Between full meetings, its work wa.-; 
tu b<! carrio::J out by a Working Committee comisting of thuse of its member~ whn resided on 
the Witwatersrand, together with members from other centre~ whu could attcnd.7 It was decided 
that a National meeting would be held once every three months.8 Each region was to have it~ 
o.,.il Regional Committ<!e which was to be completely autnnomou~ as far as was compatible with 
the centrality of the NCC.'l It wa~ supposed to meet once a fortnight and beside-. having to take 
aJI decisions affecting the region in mailers of political activity. was responsible for all 
recruitment in the area. 10 The actual work in each region wa~ to be carried out by 
subcommittees drawn from the cells. 
That both these documents - Hirson's ··manifesto" and the constitution - were accepted i~ quite 
dear. What is problematic is the question of their !>latus as texts inside the organisation. At first 
g)ance. it seems ~urprising that groupings so id<!ologically dissimilar could have fallen in so ea!>ily 
v.ith Hirson's description of their purposes. Hirson's manifesto (which described the SlA as ""the 
independenl movement of the workers of Africa··) 11 could hardly have bc<!n taken by all present 
as an accurate reflection uf the NCL"s nature. Yet fall in they did - almosl without discu~sion. 
Instead, talk was devote-d almost entirely to the practicalitic~ of sabotage. while the manifesto 
itself appears to have been ignored hencefor ... .:ard. Indeed, accounts of the accc pta nee of that 
manifesto are absent from all hm a few members' later description of the merger meeting. 
People who joined the NCL/ ARM later '-CCm to haw been ignorant of such a document heing: 
accepted at al1. 1 ~ This sec ms to indicate that the lack of amument about the manifesto reOected 
not so much a total agreement with Hirson's views by the politically di\·crgent members present 
but rather a disinterest in ideological issues and an overriding desire to go ahead with concrete 
action. 
This inlcrprctation is supported by a close investigation of the constitution. H.:re. too, it ~eems 
as if there is a connie!: while members describe the purpose uf the NCL as nothing but a "co-
ordinating committee", the conslitution with its talk of political centres gives an imprcs~ion of a 
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relation of the variou;, Regional Committee;, to each other. did not affect the working of the 
diffe rc nt groupings to any grc at degree. The text of the constitution itself contains ~om c elm:~. 
The ~.:uional Central Committee is dr.:-;cribcd as the ··supreme authority", re~ponsiblc for 
din:cting the action of the membership. '"hilc at the same time the Regional Comminee is 
made responsible for taking "all deci~ions in the reg.ion in matters of political activity, leat1eting, 
action. etc." The dfeet of this is that the issue of the relation between the Regional Commit!ces 
and the NCC is left crucially vague. 
This is most obv1ous in the statement that the Regional Committee wa!i to be "completely 
autonomous" as far as was compatihle with tbc final authority of the NCC. This seems to have 
meant that in practice, each branch was left more or less to its own devices. As unc member 
was to poim out during the trial, the National Committee, without any sanctions \l.oith which to 
enforce its authority. simply had to rrust the Regional Comminccs, which were in return "free 
to disobey" the high com rna nd. 13 In othc r words, it looh as if the Nat ion a! C c ntral C omm iuee 
was not w much a "political centre" a~ a co-ordinating body at which matters like the allocation 
of resources and the national co-ordination and timing of attacks could be sorted out. 1 ~ 
This should help clarify ~orne of the factors that bound the NCL together in spite of the 
differences between the groupings and made co-operation worthwhile. UnHication did not 
mean that any group had to make much of a compromise vis a vi~ its own programme. Groups 
were left free to pursue their own ends as before. The consent to Hirson':. programme shows, 
not that he had won them over, but that what he was saying simply did not matter much to them. 
For some members. ideology was genuinely irrelevant: there was an enemy tu be fought and 
what mattered was the willingness to join the Gg.ht. Some of them·. like Laredo and Lewin, 
seem to have ended up in the NCL, not through any principled refusal to be involved with 
Congress-affiliated organi~ations. but becau~e of their political roots and the \'agarics of the 
process of their recruitmenL 15 
But although there were no overt divisions, differences still existed. The fact that battle was not 
joined at the ideological level indicates simply that some of the members pursued their aims on 
another level. It is quite clear that more than one person saw the formation of the new 
organisation as an opponunity for their own group to extend its intluenec. Monty Berman still 
had "a certain attachment to Congress"l6 and in spite uf his doubts regarding Hirson and the 
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"becau~e I believed that we ought to be working together in paralle1:·17 According to him "our 
hope was that we would form a sufficitnlly strong - 'military wing· if you like - that would 
support the ANC to take over power ... Js 
Other NCL member~ !ike Baruch Hirson and Bernice Kaplan were far more antagonistic to 
Congress. For them the aim was still to build an al!ernati\'e workers· movement. Sabotage was 
desirable because it would hopefully inspire the most militant workers to unite around the NCL. 
It seems that they hoped thus to fuHill, in the long term, Hirson"s hope of building a working-
class party. Unitication brought the SLA the advantages of the resources which the: NCL 
seemed to have at its command. In addition. Hirson had hopes of influencing the direction of 
other groups in accordance with hi~ plan~ for the Socialist League. This was the reaM>n behind 
his apparently mystifying description of the NCL as the independent workers of Africa. Once 
again (as with Hirson's descriptions of the Socialist League) this description seems to renect his 
intentions for the group rather than any illusions as tu its actual nature. Though he was 
conscious that this organisation was far from the grouping he had in mind. and had no illusions 
that the constitution really reflected their point of view, he propo.sed the conslitution because 
that is what he hoped the NCL would become. 19 Later he was to state that, while he was 
conscious of the NCL's nature as an umbrella organisation, he also saw it potentially as an 
"extension of the Socialist League·• 20. 
A third position was occupied by Vigne and other liberal members. Though they shared Hirson's 
!>uspicion of the Communist Party to some extent. their hope was to win the ANC away from the 
Communist Party. They were concerned about the deep divisions between the ANC and PAC, 
which they saw as irrelevant w the struggle that lay ahead. If the mass support of the ANC could 
be won away from an ideologically preoccupied leadership which included the SACP, they felt, 
the main obstacle to unity between the ANC and PAC would be removed.21 Meanwhile Lang, 
as we have seen, tried to use his funds to bring 10gether a group in which he could have some 
influence. 
Th.is situation, though promising advantages to each of the different organisations taking part in 
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po5ition wa~ almost parado:cical: herr.; wa~ an organisation, ~:ngaged in th~C gnm and S~Cnous 
business of underground armed struggle against aparth~id, with no clear long-term programme 
about which its members were genuine!~ in accord. Indeed. the NCL was disunited about 
c\·er:-r-1hing except the ultimate goal of a sociali.<.t South Africa. various shades of antagonism to 
the Communist Party, and a certain consensus about the immediate political value of 
demolishing power pylom. This conscmu~ was nen:r seriously discussed, and no serious attempt 
was ever made to theorise sabotage as a strategy. 
This lack of unity was to be a crucial wcakn.:ss in th.: organisation. In the lir~t place, ~orne 
informal ''sabotage" of the NCL's own activities was committed. One of the AFM members, it 
later transpired, was in fact working for L:mlhonto we Sizwe. NCL members w.:re mystified: 
"His explosives. never seemed to go off', writes Hirson, " ... we learned later that he took the 
ClCJllosives straighl to his. contact in L"mkhonto we Sizwe and handed them over."2 ~ Furthermore, 
though the lack of a genuine political programme could to some e:aent be disregarded in the 
immediacy and excitement of disrupting ESCOM's '>ervices to the South African public, it would 
cause serious difficulties once the initial enthusiasm wore off and members. had to confront the 
political problems facing them.. Given the lack of clarity about ultimate goals and suitable 
strategies to reach them, the NCL was unable to act in a unif1.:d and co-ordinated way on any 
basis other than that of simple pylon demolition. It was. to take many months before even a 
beginning could be made to remedy these deficiencies. 
5.2 Going over to action: sabotage after 1962 
In the short term the NCL thus. did not spend any more time in political discussion hut set about 
becoming an efficient sabotage squad. First thl:!' new organisation obtained access to 
explosives:23 7 boxes (350 lbs.) of ammon dynamite '>~-'ere stolen at Witbank by Dhladhla, 
Eisemtein24 Higgs and Green.25 These were distributed at the first national meeting in 
September. Two were sent to Cape Tovm and one to Pietermaritzburg.26 Then there was 
recruitment. Although there never was an~1hing resembling a recruiting drive, the NCL did 
increa:.e in size dramatically after the merger meeting in 1962, as a number of new recruits 
joined the organisation, drawn mostly from the ranks of the Liberal Party. In Johanncshurg, 
new recruits included Harry Cohen, Ros.emary Wentzel, Hugh Lewin (the features editor of 
23 
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Post. an African weekly)27, John Lloyd (anotht=r journalist),.;~ John Harri!i, and Dennis Higg~. a 
mathematics lecturer from Wit!>. 
Here, Higgs was an especially valuable new member: to blow up pylons required much more 
than just dynamite and detonators. Skills were needed: members had to learn how to 
manufacture timing circuits, how to shape charges and how structures could mo.st efficiently be 
brought down. Initially Philip Green was in charge of the explosives and the "technical side of 
things",29 but it was Higgs who really made the NCL a technically viable operation. Higg.o. took 
care of the dynamite30 and perfected a rudimentary timing circuit that could be sent to the 
various centres and re-assembled by members before they embarked on a job.31 Later, Wentzel 
was to describe him a!> the "driving force" behind the Johanne!>burg group. 12 But by far the 
biggest influx of new liberals came from Cape Town, where new recruits included Alan Brooks, 
Tony Trew, Millie McConkey, Lynnete van der Riet, Stephanie Kemp. Spike De Keller, Robert 
Watson and a young man named Adrian Ldtwich . 
Watson was an especially important recruit. [f the Johannesburg branch was lucky in recruitin,!! 
Higgs's technical skill, Cape Town seemed doubly fortunate in acquiring Watson. Watson is 
another of the enigmatic ftgures that populate the history of the NCL/ ARM. Born in South 
Africa, he had ~tudied engineering for a while before working for the Chamber of Mines. 
Turning down the offer of an oppurtunity to study ar the University of the Witwatersrand, he 
had enlisted in the Royal Engineers in 1956. He served ar. an officer in its paratroop brigade 
until October 19M, gaining experience of counter-insurgency work in Malaysia. In October 1961 
be re~igned and returned to South Africa. After serving as a minor official in the Department of 
Education he became disillusioned with the policies of apartheid.33 How he came eventually to 
join the NCL is not clear; his checquered past meant, however, that he was the single NCL 
member with the most pra.:tical experience in working with explosives. His expertise was thus a 
vitaJ complement to Higgs's technical knowledge . 
Watson travelled to Johannesburg either at the end of 1962 or the beginning of 1%3, and met 
Eisenstein, Rhoda Prager, Green and possibly Olifanr. in order to discuss training. In 1963, he 
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as well as (at least) Dhladhla and Gn:c::n from Johanne:.burg3i' in th~ handling and u~e of 
explosives. He also worked our much of the mathematics and t'nginecring of bringing down 
pylons, drawing up detailed diagrams and documentsY These were unaccountably saved, and 
would later be part of the Stale'!> overwhelming case against the organisation. 
Besides this group of full members, there were othas who were drawn only into the fringe of 
the organisation for limited tas.ks. Thus contact was made in Cape Town with a doctor38 who 
would be willing to deal wirh injuries on a no-questions-asked basis,39 while Higgs in 
Johannesburg stored dynamite in the Oat of a student in the science faculty where he worked, 
Denis Capatos:~0 Later, he stored a suitcase of papers and explosives in the study of Helmstedt, 
a colleague at the Univer.sity:H 
The storage of explosives and other in.:riminating material was a serious problem. In 
Johannesburg, a steel trunk containing maps, docks. gloves etc. was stored at Barnens, a local 
firm,-':! while in Cape Town members tended to take the risk or looking after the explosives 
themselves, which meant that the aging Witbank dyamite, grov.ing progressively more unstable 
~ the months went by, was passed on from member to member: it was stored for a time in 
Schneider's Oat, after which it was in Watson's care. LalCr, it was stored in a room rented by the 
organisation in Claremont. It was moved to a new nat Schneider had taken, but when Schneider 
"took ill" it was finally moved, in what proved to be a fateful decision, to the nat of a very junior 
member of the OT[!anisation, Lynette van der Riet .-43 
Security was also an important consideration. Letters were written in a "concealed" language; 
inside the country leuers were disguised as business lcHers, while overseas correspondence 
paraded as family letters.+~ The NCL inherited from the AFM its cellular structurc.-45 Each cell 
was to consist of two to r1ve ml!mbers-'6 and were known to each other only through code names. 
These arrangements were far from perfect, and quite soon after the merger meeting, events 
occurred that nearly spell disaster for the NCL before it had even got properly into its stride. 
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kept in a suilcasc at Cox's factory and was charged with ill~gal possession of explosives. He was 
convicted, and imprisoned for 18 months:H Though the cx.istenc~ of the NCL remainc:d a 
secret, Cox left the organisation as a result <)f rhis.-'8 
By 1963, the new NCL was ready to launch its national campaign of sabotage. Again. no central 
decision had been taken as to the nature of targets members had to attack. later Adrian 
Leftwich was to testify in court that there was no specific view as to where sabotage would most 
burt the South African government "objects were selected [randomly] and almost nippantJy··.-'9 
Decisions rested with individual branches and, in practice, the members who were actually 
involved in the attack had to make up their mind& for themselves. 
"When you went out on reconnaissance trips ... you decided on your own whether a 
target was good enough ... We. usually chose a likely target and we discussed it at a 
group meeting. Members of the group would then be aware of where the target was ... 
but they did not specifically know exactly where; it was."50 
Tbere was only one clear directive, and that was that human life wa~ on no aecount to be 
endangered.51 This considerably complicated the business of sabotage, and increased the risks 
involved for NCL members: every target had to be carefully surveyed so as to make certain that 
there was no risk of injuring innocent bystanders. 
Despite these problems, the NCL managed to become quite an active sabotage grouping. 
According to Lbe charges later brought by the Stale - and it should be remembered that the 
Sta(e on!y alleged the attacks I hat it could pro';t: - it launched 11 "attacks"" on 16 different targets 
between 25 August 1962 and 18 June 1964, sometimes causing extensive damage .51 Altogether 
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I refer only to acts of sabotage anributed to !he Johannesbllrg and Cape Town groups. The Durhan 
grouping was no1 accused of any acts of 5abotage. Accardi ng to Olifant ( Hinon/Olifant p. 20-1) I he ~a tal 
group was mcapacitated because they were knOWII to - and watched by • the police. 
According to the state. the pylon a !tacks were: 
25/U. .-\up§l 1962 A power pylon near Putfontein pollee stanon. Beno111 Disuic! (AD 1912 "Judge says no 
to squash plea from Prager", The Rand Daily Mail. 10 -...:o,·t:rnber 1%~: Edward Feit. op. cit •. p. 329. item 
-JS). 
W S.pttmbtr J96J Power Pylon between Denneboom and Eerstefabnel<e. lop. til. The Rand Daily Mail. 
10 ~>cr.-ember 1964). 
9 Odober 196J: Power pylon between Phomolong and \f.zimhlope (ibid,) . 
18 ~Qvember l%3 attempted 5abotage on pylon at Muldersvlei {This a!lacl; failed as the charge went ofl on 
the site (interview with Eddie Daniels. Hout Bay. 12 :"'ovember 191!8)) 
lol Jan111tl)' 1.964 Power traction mast lle..,.·een l~ne and l.}ttelton (AD J9t~ . The Rand D•il)· :\111il. op. ell .. 
10 \'ovember 1%<1. ). 
lOB 
what was to be one of the NCL's most <.uccr:~:;,ful operations. it blew up cables at Woodstock. 
Mo'h·hray, Roscbank. and Kenilworth on 3 September l9r>J,54 cau:.ing a major di~ruption for 
commuter!.. The Johannc~burg group emulated thi~ on ~~ January and 12 February 1%4.55 
Other attack~. planned for equally ~pectacular effect. were not ~ucccssful. There were two faikd 
attacks on the Constantiabcrg FM tower in Cape Town · one which had to be abandoned and 
another on 18 August l'->63 in which the charges failed 10 go off as pl<!nned.5tt A number of 
attacks on power-lines in black townships around Johannesburg al.!to failed, apparently because 
tbe explosives were simply being handed over to MK.57 
There wtre also projects that never got beyond the planning stage: a plan for burning down the: 
Government Garage in Cape Town, for example, was abandoned as too complex and because 
the risk of tak.ing human life was too great .sg In addition, t~.e NCL considered the pos:.ibility of 
harming agricultural production, either by incendil!ry attach on wheat fields,59 or by dusting 
crops with bacleria.60 The complexities of blowmg up really large targets, such as reservoirs, 
were invesrigatt:d, and members speculated about the possibility of rt!scuing Robert Sobukwt: 
from Robbt:o fsland6 1 • a pro.icct which !>Cern~ to hark back to the early NCL's rescue-operation 
days. 
Orher plans stretched beyond the limitations of the lield of sahotagc: to include preparation for a 
possible stage of guerilla warfare. In Cape Town, some members drew up a ''do-it-yourself· 
sabotage pamphlet" that explained basic techniques such as the: manufacture of petrol bombs 
and forms of low-level industrial 'abotage. This pamphlet was to have been distributed in the 
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invesligated the possibili1ies for shipping arms to South Africa in the Torquil. oflloading them 
on the PonJoland co.ast.b3 
Another lnng-1crm projccl was the formation in t%.~. by Rosemary Wentzel and Hugh Lewin in 
Johanneshurg, of an "esc~pe commiltce".r>-1 If members v.·erc being watched by or actually on the 
run from the police, it would be to the organisation's bcnclit if that member could be whisked 
out of the country quickly. h was therefore imperati\·e that a detailed knowledge of the 
unmarked routes inro Bechuanaland be built up, and a routine be worked out to deal with such 
eventualitii!s. Wentzel's account of the routine is revealing: 
" ... anyone on the run would contact me ... \fy home was to be phoned ... They were 10 
ask for Jack Rossouw four times. And I was to say "Sorry. wrong numbd'. Within the 
hour Clf that they were to be picked up outs.ide the cathedral. A black armbad round 
their left arm and a newspaper underneath it. And 1 would take them out."ns 
Rosemary Wentzel was later to br: characterised as someone who was interested only in action, 
"in a somewhat boy-scoutish, devilish manner"/"' and lhe rather self-consciously cloak-and-
dagger tone of the escape proccdure67 rc\'ca!s something of the atmosphere of the NCL's 
activities at this s1age. I have already pointed out the commitment to immediate action that 
characterised the NCL/ARM: to be part of 1he NCL/AR~ v:as 10 he part of something that 
implied great risks., that demanded loyalty. courage and trusl. This scn5c of shared moral 
commitment and trust made membership of the NCL at once an intensely demanding and 






"lt felt good, you know. Because you were with like-minded people. And you realised 
that the people who you w~::re with ,.,, .. ere people whom you could trusr. Because they 
held your life or your future in their hands. And you held theirs in yours. And that 
brought about a great uw;.t in each other, That there was that feeling of goodwill when 
we would meet... it was a wonderful thing! Here you had !>Omcthing in confidence. 
something of great danger... (WJhat always thrilled me about the people I knew: they 
were such lovely people, they were such gentle people, they were such nice people. And 
here they were taking all 1hese tremendous risks because of an ideal. And ... I really 
saluted them for that." ()8 
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and orange h.ead-band. The escapee apprc>~ches her an(! «.>o.ks. 'What is the time?' She "111 reply. 'What 
ma kcs you th1nk I've g01 a watch '.1' He wrl\ say. 'Dec a use you are c·a rr..-1ng that red book ."" ( S ,. Daniels. E.\ I\ 
Ci8.) 
!nte J"oiew with Eddie Daniels. Hour Bay. 11 :'\o,·emher I 988, 
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This simple commitm~nt !u and fulfillment in actilm was not, howen·r, enough to sustain the 
organisation indefinitely . Al'> time went b~' it b~camc more possible to evaluate the impact of the 
~ahotage strategy, and to assess its implications for members' own political involvement. This 
assessment, given the nature of the NCL, was of course unsystematic and uneven. Before I 
discuss members· different reactions and the effect lin the NCL's political programme (or lack 
thereol), it would be useful to sketch the concrete problems that faced the NCL on a general 
level. 
Firstly, the NCL now functioned in a conte.~ very different from that in which the initial decision 
to go over to armed struggle had been made. It is trut: that NCL members had never expected 
the South African state to collapse at the first puff of breath, and they were very consciou!'> of the 
fact that the struggle ahead would be a long and arduous one. But it mus1 be remembered that 
the founder-members had all decided on sabotage a>. a strategy in the heat of the post-
Sharpcvillc crisis, when the end of apartheid had to many seemed close at hand. As the 1%0s 
wore on, however. South Africa entered its boom years. The South African !ilate seemed 
stronger than ever. The government recovered completely from 1he crisis that shook it in the 
early 1960s, and indeed set about consolidating its position. Not only was it able to bring a 
growing array of security legislation to bear on the liberatory mo,·cmcnt, but in doing so it had 
the supporr of parliament and the white public. This was perhaps most concretely indicated by 
rhe 1961 referendum which could be seen as a vote of confidence in the policies of Verwoerd . In 
this area, the policy of sabotage could eYen be sc~.:n to play squarely into the government's 
hand::.. II acted as a challenge to the gove.rnmenr to put the lid on dissent and to rally white 
~upporr behind it through promises of cffecti\'e security action. Sabotage was a matter where 
even those critical of the government suspended their criticism and gave their tacit con:o.cnt to 
governmcm action.69 
69 A case m pc1nt. for example. is the Cape Times· reaction to Lmkhonro'.s fi~t artad;;. According to the 
editorial! AD 1912 "Cseless Bomhs". The Cap-e Time~. 18 Decemher l!J6t) "It would lle I he earnest hope of 
most responsible people •n South t\fma ... that the flurry of would-he terronsm ounng the wed;end IS nor 
the prelude to more ... [A] campaign of rerromm "ould (nmJHI the authonties !0 ma~e uf.l: of. .. the 
formidable ~pecJal powe~ with "'"hlch successi,·e parliaments have armed them ... " The word "compel' 
temphasised by me) is a telling il1dicanon of the ne .... -spaper'5 altitude to state ac11on. The Rand Daily \lairs 
approval of the possihiliry of a stale crat'kdo"n .,..as. 1 f an}1h tng. mort: explicit. In its edllonal it said that 
"[i!r is 11ot too mu~:h to hope ... that the pollee 11-111 qutckly manage ro break up whatever org~nisation e~ists 
at prer.enl.. .. " {AD 1912. "'\o Cause for ,\larm". The R;~nd Dail} .\lail. t8 December !961 ). 
Some md~<:;mon ot' the relahve mildness of these react1ons can be gleaned from the sentiments of 
Prof. Herman Venter. Professor of Cnmino!ogy at the L'm>e~tly of Pretona. who stated (AD I'!L1 "Stet 
Saboteur.; summter rereg" Dit> Burg~r. 22 Octoher 1962) that the nicwes of criminal procedure were 
lusunes '" the South African context and thai sahoteur.; should be summaril)' shot. Although he amended 
hts opm•on slightly when challenged (.-\0 l'li2 "Profes.!ioOr.> dash m·er sall01age". The Star. 23 October 1%~). 
~:ven tus ameliorated sJ arement dearl}" showed that the not ron 1 ha 1 saboteurs should he supposed mnocent 
unt tl prov~n gull!)' ~rill rankled deep!)·· 
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An additional limilation of the ~abotagc ~!rategy lay in it~ effect!' on members' general political 
involvement. Security consideration~ eompelb:l member~ to remain in whatever vth~:r pvlitical 
organisations they haJ belonged to, but al:;o meant that they could not act there with th.:ir 
earlier effectin:ness. Their very security con~eiou~ness e~nd fear of exciting suspicion meant that 
they felt les:; free to speak out and hampered their political lives.70 
A different set of strategic problems related to the :SCL's position within the broader :.ahotage 
movement. Even if the problems inherent in the sabotage suategy were ignored, it was clear 
that the NCL's part in sabotage operalinns in South Africa was t•~ he very limited. An analysis of 
the two-year period after August 1961 shows thai the :'>JCL's activities for this time comprised 
less than 3 % of the known acts uf sabotage committed at that pcriod.71 Moreover, \vhcn it 
came to public impacl. the NCL was vastly overshadowed by Umlchonto we Sizwe. AILhough the 
NCL, in its chosen tenain of technical competence, was more sophisticated than the ANC\ 
military v.ing, it made far less of a public impact than it or Poqo. Whereas Berman's NCL had 
attacked its first target well before 16 Decemllcr, that event had initially made no press impact 
at all, and was reported in South Africa 1Jnly after m·erseas journals picked up the story. 7.:! 
Sabotage only exploded onto the media with Umkhonto's own inaugural attack, which seems to 
have guaranteed ~abmage attacks extensive media covc:rage for a while. Only after thi~ event did 
acts of sabotage by other organisations such as the NCL gain cx1cnsi\'e publicity. Thus, though 
the NCL's sabotage of pylons near Rembrandt Park on 20 December 1961 were covered with 
some prominence in Johannesburg ncwspapcrs,73 this only scn;t:.s to underline Umkhonto we 





lnten.oew wi til John Laredo. loc. cit. 
StatistiCS for this period are difficult to calculate e~actl y. Accordtng to ~unel Uorrel (Action, Ruction and 
Countu-Attion. p. 59) the ~iniste r of J uMice ru;senetl that ~I}] art~ of sahmage had be~n rom mrtred hy IO 
~arrh 1964. E!se'll"here she allege5 that Rivorua r ria lists were charged "-lt h 2:!:! acts ( op. (it •. p. 57). Stephen 
Da~ii (Apllrllwid's Re~ls. p. 17) gives a figure o( t93 art~ of sabotage commuted herwecn August 1961 and 
July I'J63. This figure seems to be hased oo the aone~ure to the Rivoma rndicrmenr reprodun:d rn Edward 
Fett (l"rb1111 Rtmtt in South Africa. pp. 3~5 . J.l5). "'hich lists that number of acrs. Da ... ,s rhus seems to 
assume that the Rivonia list does not inr\ude only the arts 1 hat rould spc.cifira lly he at tritouted to L m lhonto 
we Sizwe. tout in fact CO\"e~ all l.:no;o.n acts of sat>orage conr milled in r hat rime. This assumption does not 
seem ro he unwa !TD.Ilted. The 1 ndkrment doe.5 not rncl ude only those a cts of sabotage 1 hat <'3n t>e spec-i fically 
attributed to L'mlmonto we Sizu.·e. Quue d few of the olems (no.~. p. 325: no. 9, p. 3~6: no. :!9. p. 3:!8: no. 45. 
p. 3:!9) ran posrtively be rdentified as ~CL/AR.\t altart.;s . This sun does nor e.\-plam the drscrepanry 
between r heir figures. In eir her l'ase. il would appear 1 hat the '\Cl was responsrl!le for a r.mnr :!5'';( of tile 
aC!s of sabotage commuted during rhts trme. If the figLtrt:s are mwrrect and the list is in fat:r in<·omph:te for 
that penod. then this pe rcenrdge t~ of cou 1"5e sma lie r. 
See The ~ ...... Vork Times. t3 O~robcr !961 (Cartcr-Kans Collection. J<~ggcr Libra!)·. Cmvec;rty of Cape 
Tmvn. BCZA 79/ 65. 1:Zl3/2/~6(a ): "Planned Sahotage C«mpaign m South ,\frica alleged". Ca~ Time§ 16 
Octol!cr l%1. 
AD Jill::!. "Time Bombs htt IY nd". Tlw Radd Dail) .\1ail, ~I De,'enlber 196 J; "" We bombed two pylons· 
group datms"'. The Rand Daily \fail J2 De("t:mher 196!. 
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seem to concentrate- on the birth ot' !v\K to ~uch an t::>.tt:nt that the) ignme the existence of the 
NCL. 7~ 
To make malters more complicated, the gap bt:tl~een the NCL and the ANC seemed to be 
widening. The ANC's newly formed military wing went .so far as to publicly deny that it had any 
!ink~ with the NCL, and in London, Juc Slmn rejected Berman·~ adYances . "Joe Slovu," Berman 
remembers, "felt uncomfortable with the: idea that there should be a separate movemenl. They 
wanted control ... "75 
Neither was there much chance of the NCL expanding its operations extensively in the near 
future. for all the resources that their as~ociation with John Lang had seemed initially to 
promise, the organisation was now drastically short of money. According to \.tyrtle Berman, <~n 
initial sum of money had been made available: to the NCL with the assurance of regular 
payments later on. "But so far as l can remember," she says, "we struggled like heU and no 
J.c.lditional funds came".76 No money from Ghana was forthcoming 77, and the London 
committee responded to repeated enquiries by promising that they would try to sell the boat and 
aeroplane, 78 but as time passed, no further monies arrived?J The organisation's activities had 
therefore to be rinaneed out of !>Ubscriptions by its own membcrs.80 
All the~e factor!> meant that the NCL could not lon~ continue merdy blowing up one target after 
the other. The increasing obstacles that were being !lung into its path meant that sooner or later 
a major reconsideration of policy would be needed if it was to play a meaningful rule. Although 
no such major revision ever occurred, members did increasing!~ start debating the future of the 
NCL. Before looking at the course of these discussions. I shall however describe the underlying 






See The ,\nnual ~pon <~f the Commi\~ioner uf th~ South Afriun Police for 1961 ( R.P.I.S / 1961} pp. ~ - 5 
which. while covenog L'mkhonto 's ;mac~ . does not eq:n mention the e~islenl'e of the '\CL 
I01e!"1ew WJih ~onry Be nnan. toe:. ~it. 
Interview WJih Mynle Berman. l.ondon . J June 1'!89. 
There are t~~.·o possible reasons for this. i"' irstly. If Htrsan ·~ COilJeCIUre about Zwa11e ·~ am:st IS correct . Bing 
may Simply never l'lave recet~cd an) more fund applicanons. The Berman~ conjecture that after the 
fonnalion of L'mkhonro we SiZ~~-·e. the Gllanatan go,ernment may also have been more relunanl to make 
funds available to a wllite·repre~ented organt~ation (inter...tew. london. 3 June 1989). 
Hir~n/l.efi'Wich. p. 9. p. 22.; Hir.Pn/Oiifant. p. -13. 
According to Ei.sen~rein the boat " 'as finall) r.old . bur funds were never sent to :"CL (inren~ew. fiX. l'ii.)-
Bennan alleges that tilts was because the boat ,.·as almost worthless and was resold for only a fraction of the 
iniTial ourtar. 
See Hil'l>on/Ohfant. P- -13. In Cape lown. rhe :\CL monoes were paid mto an account opened in the Trusr 
Bank under tile name of the Independent Students Bursal)· Fund (S' Oanieh. P- 1~9) . 
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5.3 The growth of radicalliberali:.m in tht' :"1/CL after 1962 
In the light of the ~hJry -.u far. it should be d.:.1r th;.~t it would he wrong to ~uppo~e tlut the NCl 
reacted a" J co-ordinated whnle to the prnhlems I ha\'c ju~t sketched. The org;misatinn was 
simply tuu luu~c for that. The rcj!ionally uneven n~tturt: uf its rc~ponse to developments in S0uth 
Africa, as well 3S its ideological diversity preclude anv easy generalisations. and we have to he 
very careful of being ovcr·h.'lsty in seeing any local dc\clopmcnts as evidence of general and 
overarching trends. 
It is however possible to detect a definite trend in the overall 1deological character of the NCL. 
In the years immediately aftt:r the merger. the ideological trends rcprcscntt:d by the Socialist 
league, the AFM and Berman's NCL would be increasingly marginalised, and the organisati'..)ll 
would fall more and more unc.ler the sway of radical liberal members. This is not to say that 
there ever was a direct ideological showdown, or that liherals even self-consciously started 
exercising control over the direction of the NCL. Rather there wa~ a ~low procc!>s of change 
which left liberals lhe most influential group in the organisation. l'ot only were they de facto 
the most numc:rou~. but from l%3 onward~ the mo!.t energetic and innucntial member~ in thc 
organisation all happened to be lihc:rab. 
Thi:. i:. an important change in the internal politics of the organisation. One could even go so far 
as tu make a distinction between the politics of the NCL'~ origin on the one hand and the 
politics of its cart':cr as a national organisation on 1 hl' other. The politic~ of the !'iCL'~ origin was 
bound up with the vicissitudes of Congre~s politics: the three original groups that had played a 
vital. even a dominant. part in the coming. together of the organisation - Berman's NCL. the SLA 
and the AFM - had all split, one way or another. from the Congrc~s alliance. They however 
played the part only of planting the 5.eed crystal around which a radically dHferenl llrganisation 
was to take .!.hape. After the merger the alliance: of con"enicncc with liberab like Lang, Vign~ 
am.l the Pragcrs was to attain a nt:w imponancc:, and the concern)> that animated the: original 
group~ were to fade increasingly into tht: background. 
Why did thi)> happen'? Superficially, the am.wcr lie!> simply in their numerical predominance:: 
liberals constituted from the beginning by far the greatest majority in the organisation. 
dominating not only Lang\ group but having a definite presence even in Berman'~> NCL 
(through his links with Lang and CoK), as well as in the Socialist League (through the presence 
of the Pragers). Furthermore, after 1962 members \l.'ho were not liberals tended more and more 
to withdraw from the NCL: Berman was in London and could not influence tht: events inside th~ 
country v~ry easily. Hirson, involved in pioneering 3 new physics cour~c at the University of the 
II~ 
Witwatersrand, withdrew almost totally from the NCL and buried himself in academic activity, to 
the extent that dissatisfioo members demanded that he be jettisoned.81 Though some socialists 
continued to play a role, they lacked Hirson's interest in giving ideological direction to the 
organisation as a whole. Raymond Eisenstein was less inclined than Hirson to see sabotage as an 
instrument for his socialist beliefs. Bernice Kaplan, another relatively marginalised SL member, 
disapproved of the alliance with liberals, but was in no position to intervene. Disillusioned with 
politic;; after her expulsion fmn lhe SACP and the growing liberal presence in the NCL, her 
reaction was rather to withdraw more and more from the organisation. 
But these; facts only explain part of the story. They do not explain the difference between the crucial 
role non-liberals played in the founding of the organisation as opposed to their later irrelevance .. 
Their early, if evanescent innuence - as evidenced, for example, in Hirson's ability to dictate the 
NCL's constitution- stands in sharp contf"<ISt to their later marginalisation. 
The factors outlined above could only have the effect they had in the context of the discursive and 
institutional conditions which shaped the NCL's being. To understand this dynamic, we have to pay 
auention, firstly, to the differing ways in which the disrourses of the various groupings constituted 
their members as subjects and enabled them to define themsc:lves in opposition to other political 
tendencies. Secondly we should bear in mind the changed institutional context in which the NCL 
existed once it had left the shadowy world of informal d.isa.Jssion groups and tenuous political 
contacts and conslituted itself formally as a discrete body. 
Three factor:s contributed to Hirson's apparent initial success in putting his stamp upon the 
organisation. The first lay partly in the fact that libernls, though numerically more prominent in the 
organisation, had hitherto existed in relative isolation from cad1 other in the different centres, and 
were consequently in no position to act in a co-ordinatoo way. Seoondly, there was an another 
important difference in the ways in which Hirson and the radicalised liberals tended to conceptualise 
their own activity. I have already pointed out that radical liberalism had no independent political 
existence, and was as yet an evolving and nascent political position. It existed mainly as a tendency 
inside the Liberal Pany, defined by its antagonism towards the more conservative liberals 
on the one hand, and the SACP on the other. Splits were not even on the horizon; and 
consequently the occasion had never arrived for the radical liberals to articulate their 
differences from the LP in programmatic and independent form. Thirdly, Hirson had been 
schooled in the ideologically sophisticated and fissive tradition of Trotskyist politics in 
81 Sc:e lllnGn!llir.son, p.B. This proposal came lo uoghl, 11ince he w;~s io aoy ca~ due lc tlepan for England allhc 
c11d of 1962 fer J year's .study scbob,.hip (lhld). 
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WIL and the NEU.M. Trotskyism was <1 discourse which placed a far higher prcm1um on 
theoretical and ideological clarity. and tended to treat ideological Jiffcn:nce as ~uch very 
diffe-rently. Hirson had articulated hi!. pm.ition in a number of docum~nts. could formulate an 
independent political programme with clarity. and related hi!. whole political involvem~nt to that 
programme - l>eeing even informal contact!> within COD in its light. He was thc:n:fore in a 
position to act hegtmonically in the organisation. defining its nature, goals :1nd strategit:s, and 
gaining other mcmhers' assent. 
But the very di!>rc:gard for doctrinal issues which mad~ it !io ~asy to win a:.sent for his manifesto 
undermined the importance of this advantage. rf Hirson thought that he could transform the 
NCL into a socialist body, he was wrong. As l have shown. the as!>enl he won ar the merger 
meeting in May 1962 was empty, indicating more of a disinterest in ideological issues and a 
clesire to get ahead with action than commitment to Hirson's program. In addition, the formal 
exi!'.tcnce of the NCL created a new situation in which the Socialisl League and the AFM 
suffered a crucial strategic disadvantage. In th~ context of a formal organisation, the liberals' 
numerical and regional predominance gained a ntw importance. Liberal control of the NCL 
existed on a national scale: while ideological tn:nds closer to the Congress and Trotskyist 
tradition!'. were represented only in Johann~sburg, liberals were pr~s~nt in every branch 
throughout the country. 
This meant that though fundamentally the same political tendencies continued to exist side by 
side in the NCL, they now interacted in a fundamentally different context - that of an active, to 
some extent nationally co-ordinated underground ('lrganisation operating outside the 
institutional conteJrt of Congress politics. A crucial fealUre of this new institutional context was 
the advantage it gave to liberalism when it came to the recruitment of new members. The 
organisation wa.~ initially formed out of a series of splits from the Congress alliance. splits that 
occurred in the semi-underground catacombs of the Congress alliance itself. But in the act ot 
spliuing, each organisation put itself outside the context of its own genesis. The NCL's formal 
constitution as an independent organisation created a distance from Congress, which meant that 
new members could no longer be drawn from those networks, which were in any case going 
deeper underground. For the liberals the situation was different: none of them had abandoned 
the legal and above-ground politics of the Liberal Party. Each of them was therefore still in 
contact with a network of social and political ties from which recruits could be drawn. The 
community of liberal whites was a small, tighr-knit one, and it was ine\itable thai al parties, 
social functions and discussions, "like-minded people" crossl'd paths and nmiced each other. 
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This meant that even in a context where 1here was a danger of police spies, recruilment could be 
carried out with relative ease and security. As Eddie Daniels has pointed out. 
" ... you chat and you g~l to ... knov. people and ... discuss their ideas and some will tell you 
thai we musr continue to pray .. . others say wdl you know let us do something more 
definite like slogan painting. And mhers say that won't bring us anyv.·here, and let us do 
something more positive; violence. And your ears prick up. And ... that is the way you 
recruit."8:! 
Though members' anitudes towards the ANC and the SACP continued to be a very imponam 
issue inside the organisation, no new members were drawn from their ranks • each and every 
one of the new members recruited after the formation of the NCL as a oational group in 1962 
was a member of !he Liberal Party. 
When Hirson returned to South Africa in 1963, he found a changed NCL.83 In Johannesburg, 
new recruils included Liberal Party members like Hilary and Ronnie Mutch, Rosemary Wentzel 
and Hugh Lewin, a journalist on the Rand Daily Mail. Rhoda Prager, the Socialist League 
member who had taken his place as secretary had died in mid-1963 of a heart attack. On the 
Johannesburg Action Committee. Hirson and Green of the Socialist League had been replaced 
by Lewin, Wentzel. Higgs and Dhladhla. of whom only the latter was not a liberal. 
In addition, it was now liberal members, not Trotskyists !ike Hirson, who were behind attempts 
to fuse the organisation into a more cohesive unit and formulate some sort of political plan. lt is 
difficuh to gauge the importance of these efforts. Very few facts about such developments are 
available, and one has to patch together a picture of their dynamics from connicting and 
divergent accounts. The importance and influence of such initiatives are made even more 
difficult to judge by the fact that the organisation was crushed before any of them could bear 
fruit. Nonetheless it is dear that from late 1962 or c arly 1963 onwards, lr ansformations in the 
structure of the organisation were being suggested, and that Iibera( members were behind these 
suggestions. Though on the whole. the NCL remained an ideologically diverse association of 
groups, liberaJs came to exercise more and more of an influence on the organisation's direction. 
Initially, Watson seems to have been a central person in this process. Watson had made 
suggestions that the NCL reorganise itself in a more unified way, proposing the creation of five 
depanments with one person at the head of each. This discussion continued at a meeting 




lntervieow -with ~die Daniels. Hout Bay 5 June 1988 
Hinon/Hi~n . 
Hirson/I.eftwich. p. l3. 
there was a funher meeting during this time attended by Watson, Leftwich, Higgs, Rhoda Prager, 
Olifant and Dh.ladhla, at which a new national executive of five people was proposed,85 which 
would also have meant a more unified and coherent NCL. Dut as time went by, more and more of a 
centr<!l role seems to have been played by Adrian Leftwich. 
lbe recruilmenl of Leftwich by Neville Rubin seemed a major coup for an organisation as 
fragmented and loosely organised as the NCL. Leftwich was one of a new generation of NUSAS 
presidents: literate, intelligent, with great skill in constitutional maneuvering. Even among their 
number, he seems to have been a remarkable individual. Albic Sachs describes him as 
" ... a young liberul whose unusual drive and personality had quickly made him a leader of 
thousands of White English-speaking students angered by Government interference with 
theiT universities ... AI the many public mcctings which he had addressed, his fervent and 
witty spcaches had invariably aroused his audeience to passionate opposition of Apartheid. 
Both young and old were attracted to him. and so patent were his resilience and integrity 
that he seemed to typify a spirit of urgent and indestructible idealism :•86 
He had been I he youngest person ever electc41 to the posilion of NUSAS president, 87 and his two 
years in this post had shown his marked organisational and administrative ability - according lo 
some accounts he was the "best president NUSAS had ever had" .88 According to Raymond 
Eisenstein, it was in part due to hi& talents that the NCL. initially so dive~c and informal, first 
stnrtcd to function in a more coherent and unified fashion : 
"lbc first person who actually tried to inlr<X.Iuce some kind of more formal structure was 
Adrian Leftwich. He wns the only person with organising ability among all of us. He 
knew how to go about organising things."89 
Leftwich must occupy a prominent place in any account of the NCL. Dut today he is most 
commonly remembered, oot for the characteristics mentioned above, but as the mll5t crucial figure 
in the destruction of the NCL. lbe issue 'of his role as a central force inside the organisation is 
therefore a difficult and complex question, one about which, as J shaU show, there is seriously 
contl.icting evidence. II also raises questions about his personal motives. Although I have argued 
that the problems raised by NCL's career should be analyS<XI on the level of political discourse and 
not that of personal psychology, a knowledge of some of the private concerns that infonncd 
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to explain his actions by reducing them to the psychological level: armchair psychology is in any 
t:ase hound to be specious, especially when detailed information is lacking. Something can, 
however, be learned from looking at the way in which Leftwich rdatcd to his ov.'Il political life 
and the concerns which formed the background to his attempts to work through the political 
problems which faced him. 
These concerns are reflected in a series of letters Leftwich wrote to Hugh Lewin during 1960 
and 1961.90 Lewin and L~ftw1ch met in July 1959 after both had been elected onto the National 
executive of NUSAS, and cemented a close frknd-,hip.'' 1 Though Lewin lived in Grahamstown 
and Leftwich in Cape Town they kept in contact, and Leftwich's Jcuers speak of a close, indeed 
trusting, relationship between them. Though the letters tended to dwell on news about NUSAS 
in Cape Town and his own political acti\itics. Lcftv.·ich would occasionally arliculate hi!> 
alienation from the society in which he lived. South Africa. he ~ays in one lcuer, is slowly 
turning into a Sartrean hell "where all that is meaningful to man is rhe knowledge of the 
unpleasantness of uncommined people."n frJ another Jeuer he remarh that " .. .in this vicious 
country one must try to keep w1thin the bounds of objccth.·ity- otherwise one will wander down a 
murky alley of emotional depression and snarling hatred."93 
This sudden observation is surprising: it comes in a letter that i~ char<Jcterised mostly by cheerful 
commems about the year that awaits them both on the National Executi\'e {with Leftwich 
warning Lewin that "as Pres{ident) I am going to be putting bombs up your arse" if he docs not 
pull his weight in the organisation). For all that, iL is a theme which crops up time and again in 
the letters. Leftwich's prose seems to vacillate between a confident, businesslike discourse about 
the political work that occupied so much of his time. and intense and even hyperbolic statements 
of personal alienation. In a later Jetter, in the midst of a discussion of the pressure on his time, 





" ... I wish the political cnvironmcn! were more soothing- but the brutality and sadism 
mixed with mania and obsession. rabbit punching and rabbit courage, only serves to 
make one's outlook tainted with two screaming colours - black and white, black and 
These are leuers whirh C\'entuallj ended up as pan of t ~e e\'hioits for the Johannesburg court case (S ~ 
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supplied ltte clues and htn rs 1.1sed in 1 ne dete rnu na loon of dates . 
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Adnan Leftw~rh. lener ro Hugh l_ev.1n. S:Hu"-1a} 7 ~lay ll'J60J {S ,. Hirwn. Fxh ~/Ill {~2)). The lener was 
wn!ten while Leftwich was sla)ing a! a !lat 1n Clapham Court. Claremont. This was dunng 1'.1&0. In 
addlfmn. reference to a contemporaneous calem:Jar shO"-> that 7 \fay 1960 ua~ a Sa!Urday. 
Adrian Leftwich. letter to Hugh Lewin. p Fehruarr 1%01 (S v Hirwn. Exh :"/8(::!2)). The letter is dated 
simply "Tuesday eve" and speaks of LefrY.ich·s 1mmonent departure far Accra on "Friday 5th". Friday. 5 
February 1960 was 1mmed1ately he fore a maJOr conference on Accra . attended by more than one lir.eral from 
Scuth Afn.-a (see Patrirk 1·an Rensburg. Guill) Land. p. --1 I). 
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white. It even effect~ (sic) our language, and -:ven how we drink our tea and coffel:. It 
pervades, like a fine poisonous dust every aspect of our living in this country and poses 
an immense moral problem. Our consciences can nl'\er e~·er be clear in this country .... 
Y .:t what the hell can we do? What the hell can .,.c do:-'l-1 
Like the pre\·ious passage, this outburst does not only ~how Leftwich recalling from the 
inhumanity of South African society; it also conveys a sense that he personally was also being 
polluted by it. 1t thus reflects a rejec1ion and alienation from his own id.:::ntity as a white South 
African.95 As he put it in a letter written more than a year later, ..... we seem to be quite 
abnormal and we arc unaware of our abnormality because we move in circles which arc as 
abnormal as we are and hence do not meet with the brutality of normality.'~)fl 
It is not surprising, then, that despite Leftwich's ability and commitment a.s a NUSAS 
administrator, he sometimes seems to he alienated particularly from his political work. Coming 
back from a trip to Europe in 19ol he wrote to Lewin that 
" ... I have experienced the thing which I mo!>t fear: an inertia, and I have continually to 
say to myself, now get cracking man, move, get energetic. man. pull - there is work to 
do. I suppose that at the end of the year when I take two weeks off completely the old 
drive will come back. Pray god, daddy:·97 
Tbe corollary of this feeling of alienarion which made it necessary for him to force himself to 
work was a separation of this political life from his private life and free time. This is evidcm in a 
certain longing idealisation of Lewin's life as a newly marri~d man: 
"How is Liz? How is married life? From the tone of your !euer there is a calmness 
about you... [TJhis is wonderful, and I am pleased. We all have to try to keep calm ... 
Sanity is so important now. I sometimes feel that we should all get away fur three 
months just so as we can look back and gain some perspective. You will be a far more 
valuable person in the fight if you do get that respitc ... "98 
In the above two passages. the way in which Leftwich talks ahuut his need for a holiday is 
revealing. On the one hand he is simply aniculating an understandable need for res!. At the 
same time, the passages seem closely related to lhe expressium of revulsion quoted earlier. His 
alienation from the "brutality" of political life in South Africa which. as he saw it, corrupted even 
those who opposed it, meant that he looked to his personal friendships as a haven from the 
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private individual, was not without its own :ilicnating a!.ptcts: At the end of I Q60, he wrote to 
Lev.in that he was arranging to mo\e to a cottage in Rouwkoop Rl)ad: 
.. , am sick of this tJloody llat[ :f the unly thing \\hich ;, personal about it is the numb<!r 
on the door, becau~e ncHme else in the hJooJy bloc[kj has the SAME one. The cottage 
has a liule garden and will be more of a home:·'''~ 
In another letter, deeply moved by a letter Lewin had \',:ritten to him. he said that he was at his 
happiest when he was with Lewin and his fiancee Liz. He W(!nt on to confess that 
"Sometimes 1 think that there is something missing in my life, like love, and John and 
the boys egg me on about 'getting. a girl-friend'. I think that such egging on is foolish. 
One doesn't 'get' a girlfriend (and even that word girlfriend is stupid). What one needs 
is friends and love from them. h doesn't really matter what they are, or who they are, 
as long as there is compatibility anJ rapport. I believe that the 2 of us have that and I 
pray God it never breaL:s:·100 
In this letter, some of Leftwich's most private feelings an: revealed. h is true that to expose 
these letters to public scrutiny sec:ms like voyeurism. These leuers are nevertheless relevant to 
understanding Leftwich's political choices. They are illuminating, no1 only for the personal 
sentiments they express, but also for the clues the~· give about the network of presuppositions 
and expectations that underpinned those ~entimenls. In discourse-theoretical terms, my 
attention is focused on the syst~m of diiT~renc~s in which these personal feelings arc expressed. 
As I pointed out in Chapter Two, discourse analysi~ is concerned, not so much with feelin~ as 
with what they mean. to I 
What is signifrcant about Leftwich·~ letter is the wa~ in which his notions about love and 
personal recognition presuppose an underlying distinction between rhe sphere of hi~ public, 
political self and that of recognition and acceptance of himself as a private person. This is not a 
unique personality quirk; indeed, it forms part of an ideology of personal identity which is a 
central stream in Western thought since the Renais!>ance. It is the presupposition that the self 
is deeply different from the eX\ernal details through which that sdf acts; that, as Hamlet puts it 
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self and the accidental details of it:. external manife:.tation that I \vant to highlight in Leftwich's 
lette-rs. l~ndcrlying his alienating sense of being tainted by the corrupting inllucnce of politics in 
South Africa. there seems to be the notion that the details of his public self (the "abnormality" of 
"normal" life, the number on the door of his impersonal flat) are tmly di:.10rted reflections of his 
own private idcmity, separated from it by an unbridgeable gulf. 
This is why his confession in the last letter quoted is important. Leftwich seems to deny that the 
accidental differences of external identity matter {note his rejection of the word "girlfriend" in 
favour of "friend"; his insistance that "it doesn't really matter who they arc and what they arc") 
and articulates, instead, a belief in a personal recognition ("compatability" and "rapport") that 
transcends these details; 
''Does one go out and get it? Does one coldly and calculatingly .:ausc it? No, I don't 
think so. h must arrive, and it must arrive mutually. I hate the idea of 'chasing' a girl, 
and then being the great victor in a cave man sense .... I feel it is a very private thing and 
a very personal thing, tied up with the spiritual relationship which is the cement... 
Anyway the maio thing is love in the world, and so many of us have forgotten how to do 
iL. It is non-sexual in the sense that it has nothing to do with the sexes - it is an 
independent factor .. :·103 
This di:.tance betw.::cn rhesc two worlds . his public, political self and his sense of his private 
identity · is also retlected in a profile of him by C. J. Driver. publbhcd in the University of Cape 
Town student newspaper, \'arsity, whe-n Leftwich first became NUSAS president. Leftwich, 
writes driver 
" ... had intend..:d to go to London university to continue his studies <~nd to "get free from 
the continual dirt of polilics ... and live like a human being"1l14 
This division between his extGrnal identity as a white South African and his private self as a 
"human being" was to have serious consequences in the NCL/ARM. Its implications are 
preligurcd in the way in which Lcflwich, as NUSAS member, handled the occasions where he 
faced administrative choices that he could not reconcile with his own personal feelings. Writing 
to Lewin about a decision in which he removed a fcllow-NUSAS member, Martin Bobrow, from 
a Nl'SAS delegation to a Seminar on Racism held in Kampala 1961 by the Makerekere 
Students' Guild of the University College of East Arrica in late March and early April 1%1 1115 
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"My christ I have never hated taking a decision like that in all my life and I felt 
so snit thai I was sick, physically. I wa>. force[d] not 10 sec the thing in personal terms, 
bu1 it seems that it was taken like that in Joburl!. I helicvc that it was the ri,ght 
decision" !06 - -
It therefore seems that. as long as Leftwich wa:, acti\'e as a member of NUSA.S and the Liberal 
Party, there was little chance !hat hi~ feeling of alienation from his identity as a white South 
African could be resolved. Indeed, the contradictions that these letters bear witness to seem 
only \() have become more intense in the neiO. few years. As Ernie Wentlcl recalls, Leftwich 
seemed more and more to be under severe emotional stress: "'From being gay, witty, extrovert he 
became increasingly introvert and even morme. There was a sense of sin in being a participant 
in the fruits of white supremacy ... "10' In a letter written to Leftwich ncar the end of his career 
as NUSAS president. Wentzel dosed a message of thanks and appreciation for his !.ervice on a 
note of fatherly concern: 
"And now also some advice which may he difficult for you. The struggle is long and 
hitler and many of us will know suffering in the years ahead. We will need men who are 
mature in every a:-.pect of their personalities. The next few years are crucial in your 
development as a personality. Use thos~ years to develop yourself in every field. Relax 
and laugh and you will be much more use in the days whkh make us cry biuer tears. 
Bless you." ws 
By then, Leftwich had already heard about the NCL from Neville Rubin. 10'l In August or 
September he joined i 1. 110 To this his activities here he brought the same administrative and 
organisational nair that had distinguished his career in NUSAS. Though he was recruited 
substantially later than Watson, he rose to prominence far more quickly. His old NUSAS 
friend Lewin saw him as being definitely "the most energetic and effective person" in the NCL's 
administrative affairs. I II In a memo compiled after the organisation's breakdown, he 
remembered getting the impression that Leftwich's "whole life" was concerned with the 
organisation. By July 1%3 Leftwich had already become a central figure in the Cape Town 
branch, giving Johannesburg members the impression that he was definitt'iy the "C.T. [Cape 
ToYJT~] Kingpin", and by December of that year he de facto ran a National meeting in Cape 
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In mid-September I%J Leftwich kft on a journey in his capadty as cx-NUSAS officeholder to 
the Netherlands, where he was to meet members of the International Student Confcrcm:c (lSC) 
to di!icuss certain matters regarding a project.:d conferencc. 113 He took the opportunity to visit 
th~ NCL\ London committ~e. and, at a meeting attended by the Bermans, Lang, Rubin and 
Hirson, Ldt11.ich represented the South African bran\.'hes of the NCL. It is perhaps dang~rom 
lo over-interpret this meeting. Leftwich's mandate, aftl'r all. concerned fairly routine and 
technical matters- he reported back on sabotage activities. enquired about the funding situation 
and the sale of Lang's boat, 114 and handed on:r a watch to the London committee so that they 
could gain ad\ice on how to change it to a timing de~ice. 11 -' But Leftwich's presence here i!> still 
significant. He was, after all, a relatively junior member of the organisation, and his presence 
at a meeting attended by people who were the founders of the organisation, seems to be an 
indication of his growing centrality in the NCL. While Hirson played a passive role Leftwich, 
appears to have acted in an assertive manner: Monty Berman alleges, for example. that he took 
a very Strong and aggrcs<.ive stance on security in the organisation, insisting that all 
communication with the NC L in South Africa should henceforth happen through hi m. 116 It is 
also important to note that tho= meeting ranged over a much wider area than mere routine 
matters. They also apparently discussed the matter of the NCL's name: the name was not 
"sufficiently indigenous", they argued, some other name, preferably containing the word 
"African" had to be found.il7 
On his return to South Africa Leftwich was in a mote powerful position than any other person in 
the organisation. Through his contact with members in Johannesburg and London. he had 
acquired much authority. At a meeting held some time aft~r October 1963, Lewin remembers, 
he appeared to be the spokesman for the Cape .. - and obviously in touch with London and 
otbers." He gave. according to Lewin, "an impression of fbeing theJ sole org.ani~d'; this. 
impression. according to him, did not seem to be merely to boost his personal ego118 but 
seemed, apparently, to reflect real centrality. Leftwich. in fact now had an unparalleled 
knowledge of the organisation. While most members' knowledge of their organisation was 
confined to their own cells, he had a broad understanding of its extent and workings - even to 
the extent of knowing other NCL/ ARM members· real names. In the long term, as we shall see. 
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But the immediate meaning of these proc~ss~~ for the NCL Jay in the way in which liberal 
ideology gained a dominant role in its structur~:s. In analysing the process by which members 
dealt with the political questions thrown up by the strategy of sabotage, the ideological 
underpinning!. of radical lilxraiism are therefore of prime importance, and for that reason it is 
in a deeper understanding of liberal discourse that I will seek the key to an understanding of 
their course of action .1! 9 
SA The politics of sabolage 
The NCL/ ARM has been seen by some commentators a~ having broken lAiith liberalism, and 
even as having "betrayed" it. To some extent this i~ true: the decision to go over ro violence was 
indeed a dramatic departure from Liberal Party policy and from the commitment to non-
violence that bad charcaterised liberal attitudes to eonnict in South Africa. But on another level, 
of course, NCL/ARM member!. still remained liberals, and thdr thinking remained 
characterised by many of the themes thai marked South African liberalism. Their antagonism to 
the Communist Party was one aspect of thi!'i. But their liberalism i_, e.,idenced even more 
powerfully in their understanding of the purpose and meaning of sabotage as a political act. 
A central theme in the liberal thought of the late 1950s and early 1 %0s, a theme und~:rlying their 
faith in the eventual triumph of liberal opinion, wa_, a faith in the luminous _,elf-evidence of their 
values, the sensible, reasonable common-sense aspect of their ideology. This notion was 
articulated with blithe cheerfulness in an early edition of Contact: 
"Where lxlief is strong enough and an idea big enough and the organization strong 
enough, even race prejudice must take to its hech. In the political arena the Liberal 
Party has an idea much bigger than anyone el:,e has on offer- that of a common society. 
Given sufficient faith and t.he strength of our purpo~e and organisation to get the idea 
across, the Party can look forward to putting prejudice throughout South Africa on the 
run."l~O 
This conception effectively di,tated the nature of the political programme of the Liberal Party. 
Its political inrerventions were always aimed at "bringing people to their senses", showing: them, 
119 
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signifying. in some wa~. the "big"ncss of th~ Liberal Party idea and the insanity of government 
policy. Though many liberal activities were important fl)r what they accomplished, they were 
eveo more important for what they showed. Christopher Gel!, for example, lauded liberal 
participation in the Alexandra bus boycott in the following terms: 
"If the boycott has one lcss.on for Liberal$ it is this - that their way forward lies in 
repeatedly rescuing the white majority and authorities from the consequenct:s of their 
own folly. Only by successive demonstrations that generous white altitudes and positive 
cross-colour contact do evoke generous non-White responses will it gradually permeate 
the 'traditionaJ' South African way of life that we must learn to co-operate as people at 
aJilevels or our society will fall apart."l 21 
This conception was also dominant in the NCL's conception •lf sabotage. It is true that the 
clement of damage was vital. Eddie Daniels, for example, denies that the NCL's acts of 
sabotage were acts merely of symbolic protest, and points out that they would never have 
considered, say, .a statue as a target for sabotage.1:!2 But, though essential, damage was not the 
sole reason for sabotage. It was not the deed in its heavy materiality, in the physical harm it 
inflicted upon the enemy. !hat mattered. What was more important was the point that this 
material harm made. Sabotage was above all a sign, a signifying act. "We at least showed the 
world," says Eddie Daniels, "that there were people who were prepared to resisr . t23 
Sabotage, through signifylng resistance in this way, was thus an act that the members of the 
NCL/ARM saw as speaking to a whole range of South Africans. In the first place it was a 
message to whites - a message that they had to come to their senses before their policies 
plunged South Africa into irreversible conflict. The controlled damage of sabotage sec ms to 
have signified the real destruction that could result if the madness of apartheid continued . It 
appears that its extremity was important precisely insofar as it reflected, in an inverted mirror, 
the destructiven~ of Aprtheid. Furthermore , it was a sign ILl oppressed South Africans. 
Sabotage, it was hoped, would "boost the morale '· of the masses - maybe even ''inspire" them to 
rise up. As Jobn Laredo put it, such an act would show that the government was not as 





", .. what [weJ wanted to show ... to people at large is that the state does not have absolute 
control over what is going on. Isolated acts of resistance would demonstrate to people 
that there is some resistance. The mere demonstration of this resistance would revive 
the idea that whilst the state has power. it does not have complete contror:· l:!~ 
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This illustration might then make it m(lre possible for the mas'> of the people to ri.~e up in .:.m 
insurrection. Sabotage would I hus be a sign precipitating "sa me son of chain reaction". 1~5 
But, as I have ~htlwn, this did n(lt happen. White South Africa showed no sign l)f "coming to 
their senses", and as the mass expressions of out rage that follow~d Sharpeville faded further into 
the past it became clear that ssuch sustained outhurst of popular re~istance could he expected in 
the ncar future. How did NCL members react to this" 1 ~6 
One course of action was to abandon the NCL altogether for other organisations that were part 
of the C(lngrcss alliance. This was the cour!.e taken by Allan Brooks and Stephanie Kemp, both 
or whom became more and more troubled by the organisation's distance from Congress politics. 
While still an NCL member Brooks became increasingly interested in Marxism and soon joined 
the Communist Party. 117 Though Stephanie Kemp was not to join the SACP just then, she also 
became increasingly active in Congress acti\itics. 128 
Other members simply dropped out of the organisation and went on with their personal lives- a 
move which was made even easier by the organisation's security precautions: in a context where 
fellow members did not know each others' names, it seemed possible to leave ont:'s NCL 
membership behind simply by withdrawing fwm it. Thu~. John laredo left Durban for Port 
Elizabeth to take up a lecturing post, and though there was a IClcal NCL branch, he never 
actively linked up with it. Bernice Kaplan left for England in 196J. For a while, she was 
peripherally involved in the NCL there. helping dispatch by sea a large crate of cut glass with a 
hidden consignment of plastic explosh·es to the Cape Town branch; but, disillusioned by the 
increasing prominence of liberals in the NCL, she soon Withdrew and lost all contact with the 
organisation. 
Matters developed still further with Leftwich's return from meeting the NCL's London 
commiuce. When he arrived back in Cape Town he reported back at a National meeting.129 AI 
this meeting, there was a long discussion on the need to formulate a broad policy for the NCL. 
The meeting decided that the groups in Cape Town. Johannesburg and London would submit 
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How far this process progressed, and in what m~asurc the different centres contributed is not 
dear . Though ;j number of documents relating to l'iCL policy were to serve as damning exhibits 
in the Stale · ~ case against NCL members accused of '>abotagc, only two of them can be positive!~ 
identified as hJving their origins in this proces". One of the'>C documcnls was produceLI by the 
London Committecl31: the other was written by Randolph Vig.nc.m 
It can be stated with some certainty, however, that the!>e issues were the subject of intense 
discussion in the NCL. During the trial. NCL/ ARM members stated - from the dock as well as 
from the witness box • that there had been growing doubts inside the organisation regarding the 
efficacy of sabotage as a srrategy. Care must be taken in the treatment of evidence here. The 
testimony of witnesses as to their comrades and their own growing second thoughts should be 
read in the light of the fact that they were, during trial, concerned to minimise damage and 
therdore under pressure to exaggerate such doubts as thtre were. tl3 In some cases. as in the 
ca~c of Lewin and Daniels, trial evidence sc=cms 10 he borne out ~y other testimony. In other 
cases, as with Ldtwieh, C\idenee is contradictory and accounts conflict. 
Doubts as to rhe value of sabotage was raised, according to trial evidence. by Spike De Keller. 
who felt not only that ~a~otagc was ineffective and counterproductive. but als.o that the NCL was. 
an undemocratic structure, and that he- was being used ~y people whose decisions he had no 
chance of influencing. De Kellc=r put these doubts to Leftwich.13-l Leftwich testified in courc that 
he accepted their objections and was convin~.:ed of their pmition. According to him, "Mr 
Schneider. Mr De Keller and myself had an informal discussion and we had decided to abandon 
sabotage: we considered rhat it was dangerous and futile. we decided to drop it .''135 
Leftwich has it that th~ Cape Town Regional Committ.:e agreed to this decision and tn~· 
organi~ation was then divided up into four sections. 1~6 The groups, which would have more of 
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ascertain current political auitude.s. Jnd situations": 
··Long Term intelligence" headed by Lefn~o:ich: 
S ,. tlir.-.nn. E.~h \i~( l ). According m LeftY.·ich l Hil'\onjl~h~o~.·icl't (recalled). p. :!) ot 1"11~ sen! to I hem r rom 
l .c>ndon by \iynlc Bcm~n . 
S' Hir~on. Exh \1J(~). It wa~ mamly Vtgnc\ v.aril;. though 11 tnrorponned tdc."l) t!y Lefrwtch and Watson 
(Hir..an/l.ef[Yo.'t~h (rc~allcdl . pp. 3--11 
Rarucll Hirson. per>. comm .. ~8 .\olarrh tCJ89 
S ' Dan if b .. p. t 08·9 
S ,. Danieb. p. 1~0. 
rbid •. p l-10. Sec also 9CZA C.Httla. p. 5 }, which ,;ccms to rdcr to rhc s.ame di5~u~sio~ . 
L:-.8 
3. "Shan tt:rm intdligt:ncc" headed by Schneidt:r; 
4. "Action" headed by Danids and charged with "keeping people au f11il with what they 
had lcarnr thus far". 137 
~LlnC of these mmmittccs, Leftwich a\'crs. was concerned with sabotage. ··we rclt uncertain 
and unsure in our minds.'' Leftwich said later, 'we felt it ]sabotage] was futile but we remained 
uncatain." 138 If this is accurate, splitting up the organisation in this way seem.!> to have been a 
way in whicb the: organisation could continue to exist in an "underground" form while abstaimng 
from sabotage. 
There: is, however, some evidence for doubting Leftwich's trial evidence. A different perspective 
on the rc:mucwring of the organisation is pro\'idcu by the exhibirs used by the State in the 
NCL/ ARM trials. One of the documents seized by the state in its crackdown on the Cape Town 
grouping was a te XI. in which just such a change -0\·c r is argued for _139 This text, which I will 
analyse extensively in the nc~ two chapters, ~ecms to suggest that the Cape Town NCL's 
"uncertainty" over sabotage did not extend to actually abandoning it. The document, which 
Leftwich alleged in court had been written by himself, does not call for an abandonment of 
sabotage. II argues, rather, that it should b~ placed on a more long term b<tsis. Sabotage. 
according to this text, should be seen as merely one of a range of different insurrecuonary 
activities which would lead to the demise of apartheid. The document argue~ that the NCL had 
to plan, not for big. ambitious projects, but for low-key. low-profile attacks and await the 
maturing of popular re~istance. If the c ... idence of the document is to be believed, Leftwich had 
by no means decided to abandon the strategy. 
Even more doubt is cast on Leftwich',<, cvidenct: by Hirson"s account of developments. 
According ro Hirson, he met Leftwich in early NM, while delivering a "carload of dynamite"' to 
Cape Town. It turned out that Daniels had started raising objections to the.: strategy of sabotage. 





"Tbere was a delegation of two tu mct:t me. They felt that Eddie Daniels was opposed 
to sabotag~ and therefore there was no place in the NCL for him. I rejected this, 
saying that there was nothing in the constitution that demanded that any person agree 
with the tactic, and that Eddie could not be faulted on those grounds."l-+0 
S v Daniel~. p. 1~0. Tlus i!> conrlTlnell l:>y Hirson 1·1ne Stale of E.mergency". p. \0) according to whom 
Vigne suggested that he ;\'CL should start a parallel organisation wh1ch \loould have a legal. al>011c-ground 
e.~i ~~ c n .-e. 
Htr1o0n/Ldtwich. p. ~B . 
S v Dani~ls. E.~h C6. See the appendix for the full te\1 of the document. 
Bal'\lch Hn·son. op. cit, p 1 I Dame is h1 m~df ha~ stated •n an 1nte r•1ew 1 hal repons 111 the tnal of h 1s 
oppo5111on were exaggerated: mhn 'CL member.; ho.,.;ever remember 1hat opposition 10 the Mrateg) did in 
fact (ame from him (~e below). 
Matters were forced to a head in April 1%-l, when the National (\:Olral Committee met for 
what was to be its la~t and most crucial meeting. Daniels had apparently persisted in his 
opposition to sabotage and had now come to Johannesburg lO urge that it be stopped. The 
meeting. was attended by Leftwich, Hirson, Higgs and Lewin. At the meeting, 
.. Daniels said the organisation had been started to ... show that there was opposition but 
also to try and get - to try and motivate people into opposition as much as to 
demonstrate that there was opposition. And he said if we look at what has happened 
and take the successes... what have they in fact done, what have we achieved in this 
way. We haven't in fact achieved anything. We have shown that there is a little bit of 
opposition but our organisation has not grown, nor has there been any evident sort of 
remotivating of the population. He was saying that in fact... we should rethink the 
whole thing. n!'IJ 
This was the first time that the question of the continuation of sab01age had been raised 
formally and at a National meeting. Th.e very commitment to sabotage as a strategy was now 
seriously challenged - especially since other members seem to some cxLcnt to have shared his 
doubts. Lewin has it that he tended to agree with Daniels, and Lewin was in fact considering 
leaving South Africa at that stagei-H and while Hirson had not taken a decision on th.e matter, he 
too was nagged by a suspicion that "the work we were doing might be getting us nowhere". J.U 
What Leftwich's role was at this point is not dear. According to h.is own evidence he did not 
argue eith.er for or against sabotage. and it was Higgs who strongly rejected the notion of 
discontinuing sabotagc. 1~ Whether this is quite true is however Lobe doubted: Lewin's version 
of events certainly does not depict him as having such an unequivocal role. According to Lewin, 
Leftwich had visited him before the meeting and warned him thal Daniels. had become a coward. 
In the meeting itself, 
"Leftwich then launched into a ve.ry strong attack on him (Daniels]. Said this was ... 
chicken and yellow and the rest of it and obviously we h.ave ro continue and it was very 
important that we continue:·l45 
Be that as it may, Daniels' propo5al was not accepted. Instead, a new notron was Ooated: after 
the Rivonia trial, ARM was to act in a concerted way to h.il pylons on the Rand and in the 
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How dic.J this happen? Why were Leftwich (and po~~ibly Higgs) able to prc\·ail, to convince their 
fellow-members to continue with sabotage? In his Elegy for 11 Re\'olulionary, C.J . Driver 
im agincs. the crucial meeting degenerating into ph~s ical and psychological violence as James 
Jeremy, who is obviously intended to refer to Leftwich, 1 ~ 6 bullies his fellow-saboteurs into 
submission. 147 In The Fourth or Jul)' Raids Broke:nsha and Knowles similarly refer to the 
psychological hold of dominating personalities on the "wavering desire" of weaker-willed, 
doubting members: according to them. ''li!t wa5 not nard to bring them roumi. Stronger minds 
were at work. Higgs was determined 10 continue i1. Harris was bent on it. In the background 
there lurked the shadow of Watson." l-IS "Every form of intimidation", they allege, was used on 
members who seemd to waver. l~'l According to them, Watson was "particularly adept at this -
especially blackmail",150 and was able to "sway and mould tbem like the plasticine he used in the 
lessons." l5J 
This is, however, not very convincing. Neith.er Harris nor Watson were present at this last 
meeting: Harris was a peripheral member and Watson hac.J by this stage already left the 
organ.isation. Brokensha and Knowles are also unable to explain why the other members, 
aJready opposed to sabotage. swallowed their growing doubts yet again, and say only that 
"Somehow be (Higgs] convinced them that the organisation's future lay in violencc ... ". 152 
The real answer. I would suggest, is at once more prosaic and more interesting. There is no 
need to invoke a bullying Leftwich (or a sinister Watson and Harris, for that matter} as the ~vii 
genii of the NC'L. The crucial role wa5 played not so much them as by the elusive yet concrete 
fact of ideology: by the invisible and unconscious network of tacit equivalences and oppositions, 
the system of differences in terms of which sabotage made sen!ie and which shaped their efforts 
to think through their political dilemmas. h is in the dissection or this structure that the key to 
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6 
"Ordinary People": Ideology, Fighting Unity, and 
Technical Competence in the Discourse of the NCL. 
1'be jrngling mus1e seemed full uf the 'wacity. rhe 'ulganw and 1he rrratoonal ~a.lour of rile poor. who in allthe~e 
unclean streets were clingmg to the decencies and chant res of Christendont .... !lk felt htm~lf] as tl\e ambasr.ador or 
all the~ c-ommon and kindly people 10 the s1ree1. who every da~ marched into banle to the m11sic of the barrel-organ. 
And this htgh pri<le m being humiln had lifted him unaccountabl~ to an 1nlinite herght above the monsrrou& men 
around htm. for .ln Instant. .. he looli:ed dO'IIo11 on all their ~prawhng crcentncuies from rhe stany pmnacle of the 
commonplace ." 
G K. Chesrenon. The :'Irian who was Thu~day 
6.1 ,\nalysiog NCL di!lcourse 
We now face the task of investigating the und<:rlying concc:ptual framework 1hal structured the 
NCL's choices. If we are to undc:rstand why .sahotage seemed the only politically valid course uf 
action left to NCL memhcrs. we <,hall have to under!ltand. first. what sabotage - and politics itself 
• meant for them. To answer thes.:: questions. f shall use three distinct but related sources. The 
first source: is the collection of documents used by the State as c~idence against the organisation 
in tbc court cases.l The second .source is statement) by NCL members themselves in the trial 
records of these court cases. The third is material obtained in inter.icws with NCL members 
during my research for this dissertation. 
Before I continue with tbe analysis a numbc=r of preliminary comments about its nature and aims 
seem in order. The first set of questions arises out of the limited and sparse nature of this 
source material. Only ten of the exhihits~ in the court cas~s contain useful political discussion of 
any length relating to the broader purposes of the NCL. These documents were written by a 
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constitution adopted in 1%2.~ and a discussion of the London Committet:'s perspective on tht: 
future of the NCL5 - were not authort:d or co·written t.y Leftwich. All the others seem either to 
ha\·e been written exclusively by him or to ha\'t: had him as a major contributor. Thus there are 
two different versiom6 of an eKt.:nsive treatment by LeFtwich on the NCL's internal strategic 
options. This treatment argues strongly for the di\'ersiftcation of the NCL into four different 
~ubgroups and seems to have been produced at tht: time of the Cape Town branch's 
discussionsJ Another document8 sets out the parameters of one of the four subgroups, a 
projected politic::~! intelligence unit. This docum.:nt, too. set:ms to have been produced by 
Ldtwich. Then there art: two drafts of a discu~sion oft he role of the NCL in the context of the 
broader liberation .strugg!e9 which were, according to trial evidence, produced Vigne, but which 
contained ideas by Leftwich and Watson. ':)till another 10 is a declaration of the aim5 of the NCL 
based on an extract from the second of these drafts and on the balance of probabilities seems to 
have been written by either Vigne or Ldtwich. The last 11 is a pamphlet which according to 
witnt.'sses in the trial was again almost exclusi\ely authon:d by Leftwich. 
Care should therefore be taken in the intapretation of these documents, and the opinions 
expressed in them should not be taken to be representati\-e of the organisation as a whole. They 
art:, however, very useful in spite of this. Firstly. as we have seen, Leftv.ich's intervention was of 
crucial importance in the NCL\ decision to continue with sabotage. The documents offer us a 
glimpse of a key player's understanding of the issues at stake in tht: continuation of ~abotagt:. 
Secondly, • ~nd more importantly . such doubts rest on a misunderstanding of the aim of 
discourse analysis. It should be remembered that my analysis focuses not so much on the 
substantive poibts made in these documents but on what they reveal of the underlying 
assumptions that structured the NCL's thought. In Chapter 2 I emphasised that ideology 
functions most crucially on the level of the "ob\·ious", and gives the subject the seemingly 
~pontaneous and incontrovertible substratum of tacit assumptions that shape its experience of 
the world. 
My analysis will be aimed at this level. The under~tanding of these tacit assumptions are crucial 
if we are to make sense of Leftwich's position at aU: without it, we are in danger of 
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initial part of my argument will be gean:d towards understanding Leftwich's own reasons for 
arguing for the continuation of sabotage. But the purpose of this analysis eXJ.ends beyond the 
limits of a consideration of Leftwich's position to that of his fdlow-NCL m~:mbers. For, as my 
consideration of court material and imerviews will shmv, the underlying assumptions of these 
document~ were shared by Leftwich'!> fellow-members in the NCL - even by thos.c who, like 
Lewin and Daniels, were in 1964 becoming increasingly doubtful about sabotage. These 
documents thus offer a springboard to an understanding of the particular ways in which liberal 
NCL members in general conceived of themselves and their political project, the shared 
framework of assumptions within which the sabotage issue was debated in the NCL. This will 
make it possible for us to consider, In the next chapter, the implications of this framework for 
the possible choices that eventually seemed to offer themselves. 
Finally, some general points should be made about the fashion in which this analysis proceeds. I 
have chosen to pitch my analysis at some distance from its own technical operations. Here I 
follow a course slightly different from that of other analyses of South African political discourse 
where Pecheuxian terminology was explicitly used. 12 The problem with a too explicit and step-
by step usc of Pecheux's methodology has defmite drawbacks; Through its repetitive focus on 
preconstructions, articulations and yet more preconstructeds and articulations, it can make an 
analysis inaccessible and difficult to read. On the other hand, one cannot simply present the 
results of discourse analysis without showing how that result was arriYed at. The interpretative 
nature of discourse analysis as a strategy means that its results - unlike, say, the conclusions of a 
statistical analysis - cannot, if they are to be fully understood, simply be presented in self-
contained form. Though analysis does make possible the formulation of general hypotheses and 
remarks about the overall logic of a discourse, its point lies in the way in which these hypotheses 
enable us to re-read the texts in question. Thus there is nn shan cul, no option other than to 
trace the analysis as it unfolds. 
I have thus pursued the road of compromise: in the initial stages of my analysis, I shall make 
use of Pecheux's terminology, and show the process by which my conclusions were arrived at. 
As my analysis proceeds, I shall leave its mechanics. increasingly at an implicit level, 
concentrating more and more on its implications. In addition, the reader might fmd it useful to 
read the texts presented in Appendix 1 before working through the analysis. This should make 
the analysis easier to follow and will also make much clearer precisely what a discourse analysis 
can contribute to an unreflective. "natural" reading of a te.\1.. 
l1 See Andrew ~c:rriheld . ''Beyond Clas.s Poli IKS: The Politic~ I Practocc of 1 he :->.:~ti,·es Rcpre.sen tallve 
Council-
6.2 Justifying sabotage: an apparent contradiction 
E\·en a cur~ory reading of the documents should show that most of them Jeal, explicitly or 
implicitly, with the central problem the NCL faced towards the end uf 1963 and early 196-1. 
namely the value of the strategy of sabotage and the organi~ation's place in the wider ~trugglc 
against apartheiu . By that time it was plain to sec that sabotage haJ haJ no immediate effect 
and had onJy solidified white support for the state. After Rivonia and the waves of arrests and 
trials that foJiowed it the liberation movements seemed pitifully weak and the strength of the 
state was increasingly evident. As Leftwich points out, 
"The might of the regime, its preparedness and effectiveness and willingness and ability 
to crush internal resistance cannot be under-estimated ."-13 
Neither did tbe NCL have illusions as to their lack of mass ~upport. The London Commince 
states in its analysis of the organisation's tasks that 
"[the) NCL still remains a small elite group, distinguished by its technical competence 
and secure organisation, rather than by its size or effectiveness. In the existing siruation, 
having failed to e!>tablish itself as the means of co-ordinating and federating all 
revolutionary activity, it is unlikely to grow to the ex1.em where it can displace The 
Spear or Poqo from their posirions as being the revolutionary arms of the ANC and 
PAC."1"' 
As can be seen m this passage, a clear distinction is made between the arena of mass 
organisation and the NCL's nature as a small technically competent elite, and it is recognised 
that the NCL's smallne!>s is a serious drawback. Almost all the documents reflect this acute 
consciousness of the organisation's difficult position. The weakness of the NCL, the might of the 
state and the difficulty of the task that lay ahead are omnipresent and central themes. Quite 
clearly it cannot be said that the authors of these documents miscalculated the might of the state 
or overestimated its own strength. As one would expect, this means that there are very strong 




"'it is generally agreed tl1at sabotage work can. at this stage, be valuable only in th.at it 
keeps the political climate warm, indicates that there are groups still around, and 
provides training for the members of the company. It should not be seen as a challenge 
to the centre of power. Fur!hermore, it can involve incalculable risks for the members if 
the jobs planned are too ambitious or dangerous, and risks which, at that, are not offset 
by the gains accruing from the jobs. be they political, financial or purely of propagandist 
value."' 15 
S v Danial\. Exh C7. p. ~ -
5 ~ Hinon. Exh ::\U( l). p. L 
S ~ Danitts. E.~h C6. pp. 7. 8. 
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Yet in spite uf these nbjcctions, NCL members somctim~·~ seem unexpectedly ~anguinc about 
the NCL's relative chanC"es. In the very \arne breath in which the London Committee points uul 
tht: NCL's va.~r ui!>ability in terms of size and mass support. it announces that the ~CL 
" ... has, however. an undoubted initiative over the other organisations (in the degree of 
its technical competence)."!6 
The precise advantages of technical competence arc. howe~·er,.not made clear. Neither is it 
explained how these compensate for the disadvantages flowing from a lack of mass support. 
Similarly Leftwich, immediately after stating in great detail the case against sahotage, argues for 
another position which, he says, 
"'accepts the hasic security objection contained in the first argument, but does not accept 
that this need necessarily mean that current urban action must he ruled out.'' 17 
Surprisingly enough, this conclusion is not based on any more positive evaluarion of the effects 
of sabotage. There is in fact no indication that Leftwich can offer grounds for dissenting from 
the "general agreement"' that lhe risks attendant upon sabotage outweigh the effects. Nowhere 
does he question the assertion thai it does not succeed in challenging central power; neither 
does he offer an argument in terms of which the effects of sabotage can be seen as worthwhile 
even if they do not challenge central power. It looks a~ if th~· argum~.:nt ftlr sahotagc does not, in 
fact, accept (as Leftwich says it does) the security objection". Instead, it appears to be based on a 
simple disregard for its warnings. 
This impression is reinforced by the hopes Vigne and Left'-~~"ich seem to have entertained for the 
future of the organisation. In the passage below, which I have alre3dy referred to in Chapter l, !I! 
they descrihc the NCL's role in any projected resurgence of popular struggle in the following 
terms: 
" ... (it must beJ an immediate aim of the NCL... to strengthen its organisation in such a 
way that the revived military bodies of the ANC and PAC may in rhe course of time 
come together in the National Freedom Army which it is the NCL's chief business to 
recruit, train and joindy lead:·t9 
On the face of it, then, these documents seem to suggest that Leftwich and other NCL members' 
arguments for tbe continuation of sabotage can indeed be explained only in terms of hlind 
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South African condition~ but rather nn the frustrated need w g0 ot·(;r to action, no matt~r what 
kind. 
It -will be my purpn!>e in th.is chapter and the nc~1 to show that this \iew is based on a 
misunderstanding. My analysis will show that the decision to continue with sabotage did indeed 
make sense in ib own term:->. Blindnt•ss did play a role, but it was a blindnes.~ of a H:ry subtk 
sorr. rooted not in frustration or in a rdusa[ to se.: \1. hat was in front of their face~. but rather in 
NCL members' most basic assumption!>, their very way of seeing. 
6.3 Anned struggle and •deological dh•ision in NCL discourse 
Perhap~ the be!.! place to start is with a paragraph in which the basic shift to armed struggle is 
described. In ''The NCL- background and aim~" . the text written some time between September 
1963 and early 1964 by RanJolph Vignc wt: find the following dt:scription of the South African 
situation: 
"Tbe banning of Congress and crippling of other liberatory organisations by 
proscription of members and by laws remo\'ing freedom of assembly and speech, 
effectively forced the leaders of the rightless four -f1fths of the South African people to 
seek military means of libnafion now that the means of civil struggle had been struck 
from th.eir hands. '20 
Remember that. in analysing this paragraph, our focus is not so much on the substantive conlenl 
of the passage, on tht' truth·value of the propositions regarding the turn to sabotage. Rather, 
we should try to unco\·er the basic assumptions that underpin them. the presupposed distinctions 
that arc underlying these propositions. 
In the above passage, for example, the two emphasisd phrases should be recognised as 
examples of Pt:cheu:fs "preconstructeds". As I pointed oul in Chapter 2, the crucial feature llf 
the operation of preconstruction is that we see discourse talking about an object as If it already 
exists in the outside world. By recognising the~c phrases a~ preconstructeds, we focu~ attention 
upoa an aspect of the passage we usually ignore: normally, the questions one might ask oneself 
upon reading such a passage would pertain to the truth-\alue of such a statement. In other 
wor<h, one might dispute whether it wa!. in fact the banning. of Congress which led to the turn to 
armed slruggle or whether the armed struggle was in fact the only means of liberation now open. 
In other words, one usually tends to look at a texr in the light of the question whether it refleCI.s 
20 S v Hin.on and Oth~n. E.~h 'l,f.j( .J). p I, \.ty em phast~ . L nles.li -otherwi!ie stated. aU ernpha~s 1 n Chts and the 
sub5equent chapter have been made by me. Where thts was relevant. I have highlighted preconsti'\JCteus by 
prmhng them in bold and artcculations b} pnnt1ng them in clatccs. 
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reality aca.Jrately or not. Discourse analysis, instead, focuses on the text as a political act in itseU. It 
points out the interesting and complex: logic of the faa that the armed struggle and civil struggle are 
"recognised" as entities at all. Here there is already an imponant difference between NCL discourse 
and other liberal discourses· for example, that of Alfred Hoemle. The chief difference between their 
attitude to fonns of political struggle is not so much that the NCL was "for" sabotage and Hoemle 
"against" iL, but that Hoemle's discourse does not even recognise it at all: "military means" as a way 
of implementing liberal aims is not even an object in Hoemle's universe. By focusing on this faa, 
the notion of preconslruction opens our eyes to the different way NCVARM members were 
"installed" in society, the different political universe that was open to their eyes. 
But discourse analysis would be a feeble tool if it stopped at this insight. Its crucial role lies in the 
way in which it refuses us the right to stop here, confident that we know what is meant by the nolion 
of "mititary struggle". This is why P&heux's emphasises, after "preconslruaion", the concept of 
"articulation". Besides cataloguing the objects that were "real for the NCL", we have to uncover the 
relalionships the NCL saw between them. Here. for example, a clear opposition is presupposed 
between two preconstuctions: "civil struggle" on one hand, and "military means" on the other. In 
effeCI, therefore, two separate and different political spaces or fields are constructed in a relation of 
opposition to each other. On the one hand there is Lhe field of parliamentary, non-violent struggle; 
on the other there is the field of military action. Much of my analysis will tum on the precise value 
this opposition had in NCUARM discourse. 
A closer investigation shows that these two terrains of struggle are seen in very different - indeed, 
irreconcilable - terms. This should be clear from the following passage from "The NCL -
background and aims": 
"There had seemed to be ideological reasons for the fragmentation of the liberatory 
movement in South Africa into mutually antagonistic groups. The end of political 
struggle rendered such division meaningless, and the ftrst move to organise military 
action against the South African Government was made by a group of South Africans of 
various political allegiances, from various communities and language groups. who in the 
semnd half of 1961 fanned a national committee to plan the military action ahead ... " 21 
This is a crucial passage, and in a sense most of what I will say about the NCL's understanding of 
revolutionary politics flows out of the distinoion made here. Notice, again, the way in which the 
text "ruts up'' reatity in a specific way. As before, it differentiates between political and military 
struggle. But here the difference between civil and mitiLary means of liberation noted 
21 S v Hinon and Oihfn, E:.h M4(4), p. I. 
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above does not merely differentiate violent and non-,·iolent struggle: it creates a division 
between "military action" on the one hand and "political struggle" it~elf. 
This is not merely an analytic move. Ob\iously it is possinle to distinguish, at a theoretical level, 
between ~·o different but complementary levels of the same struggle. This is however not the 
case here. This should become dear from the scrutiny of a new preconstructed, "ideological 
reasons". This signifier !abies {and thus carves out from the general domain of "reasons") a 
specific and delimited category of motivation, a category which is thus singled out as having its 
own logic. its own characteristics. In addition. this signifier is articulated in a very specific 
relation to the preconstructed. "political struggle": the text states that the end of the political 
struggle made ideological division meaningles~. Military and political struggle are thus seen a~ 
being finally irreconcilable or atlear.t separate: ideological considerations and commitments arc 
seen as belonging to the field of political struggle, and as the argument "the end of political 
struggle rendered such division meaningless" indicates, they are alien to the rtcld of military 
struggle. The Iauer is seen as a field unto itself, one which does not involve politics or ideology 
at all. 
This is a deep and prevalent theme in NCL discourse: although it linds its most systematic and 
elaborate elCpression in the documents it recurs throughout liberal and libertarian NCL 
members' discourse. It is, for example, at the bottom of Eddie Daniels' anti-apartheid non-
sectarianism: 
"I lean towards socialir.m .... but [it) wasn't the ideology that unilied us. We wen: 
fighting, as far as I was concerned and as far as those involved with were concerned, we 
were fighting to gel rid of apartheid."22 
The central elements of this statement - the general unconcern with ideological orientation. the 
pragmatic insistence on the simple, material exigencies of the struggle against apartheid - crop 
up time and again in the words of ex-members of the NCL. Even in the discour~ of members 
of the NCL who were not Liberal Party members, similar themes crop up, as in Raymond 
Eisenstein's insistence that he is no "organisation man"::!3 this formulation is linked in his 
discourse precisely to his libertarianism and his refu!>al to be bound to any specific ideological 
commitment. 
In the documents it seems that there was, at the root of this understanding of the nature of 
military struggJe, a deep suspicion of ideology and ideological commitment. Not only was 
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ideology irrelevant; it was actually counterproductive . To the London Committee. fur example. 
the Communist Party's analy&is 
·· .. dt: monstrates the ba!iic r-igidity of the C P and its in:l'lexibility in a nrw !>ituation 
which Marx did not conceive of, and which none of th(': carlv Rev. theorim did not find 
themselves in.(sic)":!-t . 
The alternative to a pragmatic rejection of ideology was a rigidity that did not allow 
revolutionaries to adapt flexibly to new situation:<> and respond to objective conditions. 
Furthermore, Vigne and Left\\-ich argue that 
"(the) crushing of both the Umkhonto we SiL'ol;e and the Pan Africanist Congress, as 
well as of these minor bodies, has both taught a tragic lesson to all who continue to 
nght l"acb other o11d llm.r pJay into the hands of thr common enemy, and has left in 
existence only the original military organisation in the lidc..l, the National Committee for 
Liberation, itself formt>d on the basis of national, non-racial unity and ideological 
reconcillaUon and compromise • a degree of flexibility basrd on a wish for fighting 
Ubity.''2'1 
It is clear, even before analysis, that this passage implies an almost causal relationship between 
ideological division and the fact that the P.A.C. and MK were "crushec..l". What discourse 
analysis can contribute Js an account of how thb argument depends upon the way the key terms 
of NCl/ ARM discourse are articulated here. Notice, in particular, how lht> notion of 
"ideological division" is articulated in terms of the preconstructed "all who continue to light each 
other", which is in its turn (through the words and rhus) articulatec..l as equi\'alent to "playfingJ 
into the hands of the common enemy". Here one can see in practice what is meant by the 
Saussurian dictum that meaning resides in rdatiuns of substitutability bt!tween terms. The 
logical force of the argumem depends on the presuppo!>ed equivalence" of these terms, on the 
way the discourse creates a whole chain of equivalences ("&.ision" . .''fight each othcr" ... "play into 
the hands ... " .. . etc.); its now is dependent on the way in which this chain makes it possible to 
slide from one substitutable term to another. 
The general resull of this chain of equivalences is the contrasting ways in which the NCL and 
other organisations can be seeo to inhabit the political space delimited by the phrase "military 
means". Whereas the other organisations in the fielc..l were. as it were, "visitors" from the terrain 
of political struggle, importing its imperatives into the tield of "military means". the NCL was 
"true" to the inherent logic of the field, eschew~d ~xtrancous ideological division, and survived. 
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The 5.eparation between ideologicaljpolitical struggle and ··military means" has an important 
consequence. The discursive demarcatiun of th<: lidd ,)f "military struggle" means that armed 
guerilla action i5. given a privikged and central place in their di5.cour5.e. Furthcrmon:, this 
warfare i~ understood in a very narrow \\ay. NCL documents are markt:d, in tact, by a very 
limited and narrow strategic focus. In the opening paragraphs of his strategic paper, Leftv.ich 
states his intention to provide 
·· ... a broad analysis of the SA situation. compared with other situations at other times in 
wh.ich the overthrow of regimes has taken place. Th.e lirst sections will deal... with a 
broad enunciation of the factors which appear to be necessary for the effccti\'c 
overthrow of a regime, measured against the existence - or non-existence - of these in 
the SA context . .. .zli 
The empha<.ised precon5.tructed - "factors which appear to be necessary ... " - is a very impnrtanl 
one in Lef1wich'5. discourse and crops up repeatedly in hi:. formulation a:. well as in the writings 
of the London Committee. Leftwich's entire strategic argument is concerned with such "factors", 
with what Lefl\loich takes to be the "conditions for rev. activity (sic)"27• But these formulations 
are articulated in terms of phrase.~ such as "the conditions for effective warfare;'18 "factors that 
make the Gghr possible" or "conditions for effective strike polential",29 and are opposed to the 
notion of "factors that militate against such warfare on an effective basis."]() The problems of 
revolutionary organisation are thus reduced to questions of mililary strategy. The following 
extract from the statement of the London Committct: shows the consequences of this limited 
concept of revolutionary strategy. According to them, 
"[looking) at the strategic situation beyond South Africa for the moment it seems that 
the free world has provided for South Africa very few of the services It l'fquires if the 
revolution is to proceed. Amongst these ar<! proper training facilities, transport and 
supplies"31 
The implications of understanding the "strategic situation" in terms of "services it requires if the 
revolution is to proceed" should be emphasised. Not only are questions of revolutionary strategy 
reduced to military problems, but military problems are in turn reduced to purely technical 
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6.4 Technical c:ompetence and fighting tJnity in l.A!flwich'!t tonception or the role 11f the 
NCL 
The N(Ts distrust pf ideology had scnou~ implications for the manner in whit!h the:_y 
conceptualised their po~ition. The organisation had been founded on the basi!~. of the assumption 
that tbe political fight was over .. that the stale had cru5hed all the possibilities for mas~ 
orgamsation - and that now, force had to bt: used. But when it came to using force. the odds 
against the NCL seemed insurmountabk . Tht: implicatiuns of this fact can be traced clearly in 
tb.c thought or Adriao Leftwich. Numerous elllraet~ can bt: dnal~~ed, but here a ft:W e~mples 
should !.ufficc. Note, for instance, th.e way in which the problems facing the NCL are described 
in the following passage: 
"When a country has reached the stage of industrial development which SA has, lhe 
problems of revolutionary overthrow arc far more complicated than where the 
economy is either under-developed or just de\ eloping. The state of organisation, the 
extent of the infrastructure, the ability to mobilise forces are all dependent on the 5tate 
of the economy ... "3~ 
Notice the limited way in which the preconstruct~:d "the pr"blems of revolutionary merthrow' 
arc understood. The problems facing the NCL are articulated cxclusi\ely in terms that relate! tc 
the strength of the state. In another passage. this strength is in turn discussed in revc!aling 
terms: 
"The recent report:,. ~)n [the cstabli.shment of] factories at secret places in the country i~ 
evidence of the degree: to which preparation is being laken seriously. The country i.!> 
covered by a last network of roads, rail~Nays and communications; police stations arc 
(onnected by radio and the air force, plus helicopters, is in a position to ~ach an) 
(OrDer or the (OUntry within hours, if not less:<.\3 
Note, again, the purely physicaL logistical terms of the articulation of the concept of the might 
of tbc state. This was the logical coJlsequence of thC' separation of the political ;snd the military 
field: the enemy had 1o he defeated lhrough !ttrength, and consc!quently the main obstacle in lhc 
road to victory was the enemy's own strength. 
It is important to understand the level at which this pLlint is being made. Even a superlieial 
reading of the documcnt5 shows dearly that Leftwich and other central NCL members believed 
that NCL would not be able, on its own. to challenge such a powerful foe as the state at all. My 
analysis in this chapter should enable u~ to go further. lc shows that this impossibility was not 
merely an empirical conclusion . It was an a priori judp.emcnt: it nowcd out of the \'ery terms i11 
whicb the field of revolution:.~ry ~truggle wa~ conceptualised. Their separation of armed and 
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political l>truggle meant that Leftwich saw the NCL <t~ operating in the very battleground in 
which the enemy was strongest. The notion that the i'iCL could not succeed on its own was 
rnn1ed in their most basic and unconscious assumptions regarding the nature of revolutionary 
'>lrugg.lc: they could not do otherwise than to ste th~mselves · and any other small organisation 
for that matter - as a small, weak protagonist heavily outnumbered by a well armed, well 
organised foe. How, then, could they hope to play a role in such a fight'? How could they 
possibly entertain hopes of victory'? 
Leftwich did not think the NCL'~ weakness doomt!d it to irrelevance, as implying that they 
should give up \iolent struggle altogether. Instead, h~: argu~:d for a reconceptualisation of the 
NCL's role. According to him, gu~:rilla force'> should not be s~:en as th~: only ones acting in the 
revolutionary field: 
"the chances for a successful armed effort against the SA Go\1. forces are small. More 
specifically. the possibilities of a freedom army achi~:ving power by military means, that 
is by military conquest of rhe SA regime, are limited, if not out of the question. This 
does nO£ mean that we dismiss the role of armed fighters in the overall struSKie. The 
struggle will not be a simple one. It will not simply be a qut::stion of warfare.").! 
Instead, he reconceptualised their role in apparently more limited terms: 
"'While we have been pe!>simistic about the possibilities of a rreedom army actually 
overthrowing the regime, we do not sugge:,t that guerilla rorces are therefore not to be 
trained, and prepared for action. Far from it. There would seem to be a most 
significant role which they can play in the futur~: - not as a vast army, but as small 
isolated pockets of men, harassing and sabotaging the rural areas, railway lines and 
most important of all, operating in the reservt>s or Bantustans where ... armed and 
trained local pea.sant.ry could be of great significanc~: in the contclCt of the complex 
arrangement or rorces which we suggest will finally cause the demise of th~: apartheid 
system in sA.·· 
A new preconstructed is thus introduced into the argument at this point: b~:sides signifiers like 
"guerilla forces" and "isolated pockets of men·· there is now al50 a new entity: a "complex 
arrangement of forces" which is larger than, and includes, these subsidiary objects. This was 
how Left-.vich reacted to the new scenario that faced them after Rivonia. The oveniding 
strategic problem now became the question of the possibility of an alliance with other, mass· 
based organisations and the issu~: of th~:ir place in such an alliance. 
On the face of it. then, the NCL is seen here as occupying a marginal rok: it would only be pan 
of a wider scenario, a group of fighters playing a real but small rok in a larger struggle. Bul this 
appearance is deceptive. To understand why, we have to follow through in more detail the 
Ibid •. P- 9. 
implications of the NCL's separation of political and anned struggle. Firstly, Leftwich argued that 
despite its. small size, the NCL would have a dear role to play as a source of technical skills and 
information. The NO.., is thus conceivcc..l as a wing of expec1s, presenting a Freedom Army 
" ... with technique/ information and intelligence information, which will be basic to their 
effectiveness. "35 
Note the crucial phrase "basic to their effectiveness". In the light of our analysis unlil now, its 
significance should be clear. lC the terrain of revolutionary struggle is understood as posing 
primarily logistical and organisational problems, then the role of technical advisors would not be 
incidental but crucial to success in this field, vital to the success of the struggle. The London 
Committee's phraseology is even more emphatic: 
"We suggest... that the NCL look upon its.elf as a sort of specialist cadre which will set up 
the sinew~ or the struggle. That is the procurement or materials, their transport and 
tl"''linlng. We must continue with direct operations. We must try to panidpatc in the field 
to an increasing extent. Should we liaise with other groups with manpower, we should 
concentrate on ma~timum exploitation of our specific abilities."36 
The central prcconslructed, ''the sinews of the struggle" is artiallated in terms of included terms that 
relate only to logistical problems. It gives the notion of a merely ancillary and secondary structure 
(what arc sinews wilhout a brain to guide them?) It suggests that the NCL's role would be neutral 
vis a vis any one of a number of different political aims, as if it should not hope to influence the 
overall political or ideological charader of the struggle. 
Ilut this is precisely where the "sinews" metaphor is misleading: the very opposite is true. This 
shouW be clear from the earlier analysis of the aniculation of the concept of the international 
strategic context. As I have shown it is understood precisely in tenns of the concept of "services 
required if the revolution is to proceed" - which was in tum discussed in tenns of materials, 
transpon, and training.37 The field of application of the notion of "sinews" (which might at first 
glan<.-e look relatively rnarginal) is thus precisely cotenninous with the whole field of of "strategic 
problems"!. There is simply no recognition of any other question which might fall under the rubric 
of strategy: the only valid imperatives of the struggle are logistical. To extend the London 
committee's met.aphor, the NCUARM would be the sinews of a revolutionary body that was 
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This might 5ccm fanciful. The same point can however be illustrated via another route. Note, 
therefore, the terms in which the London comminee suggests the idea of co-operation with 
other organisations: 
"The proposal that is made to each of these organisations \hould dearly be a joint 
command. Each of these organisations should be asked to do what it can do best. It is 
to be hoped in due course a complde blend will be achieved and a full unity of effort 
and purpose ... 
lnitiaHy, we suggest a liaison based on a practical project to be decided by you ... 
Ultimate joint command to now from practicalliaisons."3!:! 
It is important to consider very carefully indeed the meaning of the preconstructed "unity of 
effort and purpose". As I have pointed out, the NCL saw ideological difference as irrelevant 
and counterproductive in the field of revolutionary struggle. This position has a coro!lary: an 
omnipresent concern with the possibility of non-sectarian unity. The rejection of ideological 
commitment as the rool of sectarian struggle depends, in other words, on the assumption that in 
spite of these divisions there is, in fact, a large degree of actual concurrence on pragmatic 
revolutionary aims. The ARM pamphlet released after Rivonia thus stales: 
"We salute other Revolutionary Freedom Movements in South Africa ... While ARM 
may differ from [the men of Rivoniaj and other groups in the freedom struggle. we 
believe in the unification of all forces fighting for the new order in our country. We 
have enough in common.''39 
lt is because they had so much. in common that ideological division was to be rejected. ln his 
paper, Vigne contrasts the ideological division that characterised the struggle sharply with the 
overall similarity of revolu!ionary aims: 
"Smaller groups also launched military actmty. retammg their outdated mutual 
hostility to other organisations with. tbe liberation of tbe rightless people or South 
Africa as a common aim.·.JO 
This "common aim" in other words, is articulated as qualitatively different from the :-.ectarian 
aims that belong to the terrain of political struggle and ideological difference. It is a non-
ideological aim, one that commands an over-arching loyalty, and that transcends sectarian 
division. And it is in terms of such a transcendent aim that the goals of the NCL are 
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The L'nit will act for the furthering of the broad aims or nonracial democracy in South 
Africa ... As its members will be drawn, possibly, from all these groups, and will include 
individuals associated wilh none of them. it will be in the best position to inOuence 
evems without the encumbrance or sectional party loyalty .· '-~ 1 
Note how the notion of a commitment to "the broad aims of nonracial democracy" is contrasted 
to that of "'sectional party loyalties"'. For Ldtwich, the NCL's own principles exist on a 
completely different level as do those of other organisations. They do not derive from the terrain 
of political struggle and ideological division at all. When Leftwich proposes that members of the 
intelligence unit 
" ... will be required to give loyalty to the Unit, to accept its discipline completely ... '"12 
- this loyalty should therefore be seen as fundamentally different from the sectarian loyalty 
commanded by ideological principles. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by many 
remarks by other NCL/ ARM members. When Eddie Daniels, for example , states that ''If you're 
a socialist and you're prepared to light for this and I'm a capitalist and l' m prepared to light for 
the same cause, let's join forces",·H it is precisely this view of a trans-ideological goal that 
underlies his poinl. Members like Leftwich and Daniels hoped that other organisations wouJd 
discard ideology so that all could come together in a fight again~t apartheid. 
h should now be clear what the London committee meant when it wrote of the "full unity of 
effort and purpose'' that would hopefully follow practical liaison. It seems as if this unity could 
only be marked by a replacement or specif1c ideological viewpoints and limited seclarian 
loyalties by the commitment to those overarcbing, transcendent goals that just happened to 
characterise the NCL's politics! Though the NCL was in one sense a peripheral org&.nisation. 
lacking the muscle and following of other organisation!>, it was in another sense quite central, 
much more than a group of technical revolutionary experts. If the struggle was to succeed at all, 
the NCL would have 10 be instrumental in bringing about the unification of the fragment-:d and 
split revolutionary move men! under the values that everybody (deep down) would recognise as 
valid anyway if they had not been led astray by spurious doctrinal issues. Basic to the very 
concept or the NCL co-operating with other organisations was the idea that the NCL would 
eventually displace competing ideological commitments. 
It is in terms of this understanding of the importance of the idea of a non-sectarian and 
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recruit, train and jointly lead a National Freedom Army should be understood. Immediately 
following that statement, Vigne and Leftwich argue that such a role is indeed necessary; the 
crucial and concluding passage in that argument runs as follows: 
"The raison d"etre of the National Committee for Liberation is the proper organisation 
and strategic use of such force, in the light of a major prerequisite to its usc, that the 
more firmly, resolutely and speedily such force is used, the more quickly can be ended 
the current stagnation of South Africa's growth to nationhood as a free African state, 
and the more rapidly can be achieved the liberation of all its people from slavery in its 
20th-century capitalist form, from ignorance, poverty and fcar. '41 
The justification for the continuation of sabotage should be understood in terms of this raison 
d'elrt. This should be clear from Leftwich's :<>~rategic paper, in which he listed the following 
advantages that according to him flowed from sabotage: 
"a) Training and experience for company members 
b) ~;ouplcd, at the present stage, with propaganda and publicity, it would help 
create the feeling of uncertainly and fear which would be necessary as a start to limit 
immigration ... and foreign capital. 
c) it would give the company a !)lock of credits which would be to its gn:at 
advantage when the struggle move!) into a later :o.tage 
d) it would be a morale boosting function- not so much for company - but for the 
masses generally, since it would show that there are still groups around which are 
active. 
e) it would unnerve the gm1 and police by its accuracy and choice of objectives, 
and again, coupled with effective propaganda, it would create a climate or uncertainty 
and angst among while South Africa"'~5 
It should be obvious that the underlying notion or the nature of sabotage as a political act is of a 
piece with the liberal notion of sabotage arliculated by Daniels and others.~fl Sab01age - for 
Leftwich, as for the other liberal J'CL members - was in tht! final analysis a signifying, 
performativc act. The notion that the NCL could build up its stock of credits through sabotage 
makes sense primarily in terms of this conception. For Leftwich, the NCL would through its 
acts of sabotage signify to the masses its revolutionary seriousness. It would indicatt: their 
uncompromising commitment and their technical competence - and therefore their essentiality 
for any successful revolution. Through this the masses would recognise them as the group most 
suited to help them in their struggle and play a unifying role. 
The crucial point here is that sabotage is not meant to be a central weapon in the insurrection 
itself. As we have seen, the NCL's centrality is conceived to lie. not in the damage it could do to 
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and the eschewing of divisive ideological commitment it insists. on. And sabotage is thus meant, 
not to bring the state toppling down but to ensure that Y.hcn the masses rise, the NCL is in a 
favourable pmition to ensure that its un-idcological and pragmatic vision helps shape that 
struggle. 
Here we have the answer to the apparent contradiction pointed out on p. 136. There it seemed 
as ii the argument for the continuation of sabotage \\oa~ based un a ~imple disregard for the 
arguments against it. Now it is clear that this impression missed the point. The interesting thing 
about Left\\'ich's justification of the continuation of sabotage i>. that he does not disagree with 
the observation that insurrectionary conditions do not ex.ist. He simply side-steps it. His 
arguments do not depend upon an appeal to the direct re.~ults of sabotage. In terms of 
Left\1/ich's argument these are irrelevant. Whereas the argument against sabotage depends 
upon the assumption that conditions do not favour effective guerilla war, Leftwich simply states 
that the NCL should be ready when they do. His arguments for sabotage and intelligence 
training refer to the need to build up the skills and revolutionary credibility "against the day 
when this will be possible and effective:··H The point of its activities. are simply preparation, so 
that when guerilla war i~ pos~ible, the NCL would be in a favourable position to intervene. 
This notion is closely rdatt:d lo another recurring theme in NCL discour~e: the central 
importance of building up lechnical expertise. ln the document~. time and time again, reference 
is made to the need to build up "a highly compelent wing of expens"-48 and to accumulate a 
"pool of knowledge and know-how concerning field techniques",-49 to build up a databas.e of 
"facts ... and up-to-dale information" that can be made available to selected political groupings.50 
h is in terms of this category above all others that the NCL'~ relationship with the ma~es it 
hoped to liberate was conceived. Since most of it::. members did not themselves number among 
the oppressed it~ claim for a place in the ~truggle was crucially problematic, and s.ince it was not 
in touch with any trade union or popular organisation which itself represented the oppressed it 
could not even jus.tify its exi!.tence with reference to its organisational work with the oppressed. 
Instead, that relationship would have to be mediated through the category of technical skill; the 
NCL would have a place in the struggle because it had access to a pool of know-how and 
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The above analysis has shown that Leftwich's sanguine expectations of the future uf the NC'L 
must be understood in terms of the political logic of their underlying assumptions. Though at 
first glance they appear simply arrogant and irrational, they proceed in fact from the underlying 
assumptions about the relation between the lield of revolutionary struggle and that of politics. 
Though the position expressed in them did not proceed inevitably from those assumptions, they 
are made possible by them: the notion of "military struggle .. and ideological difference as (ields 
extraneous to one another enabled Leftwich and the London committee to see the NCL in terms 
that made it, in their view, central to the light against apartheid. 
6.5. Th~ ethics of being an amateur: the conc:i'pt of the ~ordina.., person" 
The analysis so far has shown the extent to which the NCL's discourse was characterised by a 
deep suspicion of ideology. The centrality of this concern should not be underestimated. In part 
it reflected a judgement about the relevance or counter-productiveness of ideology. But it was 
also more than that. Its relevance should be understand mainly in terms of a certain moral 
vision -a moral vision of some power and simplicity. Thi~ moral vi~:w can be explored in termr. 
of two closely interlinked themes. 
The first such theme in NCL discourse i~ linked to the notion of an "amateur". [I is indeed 
striking tbat this notion should occur so often in contemporary interviewr. with ex-members of 
the NCL Sometimes, of course, the use of this term is not surprising, and NCL membt:rs seem 
to use it to indicate, simply, that tht:y were not professionals: 
"Nobody had any idea what it [sabotage] actually meant, nobody had any training, 
nobody had any idea of how it would (be] organir.e[dj ... So it was very much a sort of 
hand-to-mouth and am ate urist (sic) thing."5 1 
All the same, the use of this term by an organisation that plact:d so much emphasis on technical 
efficacy - an organisation that was, in fact, in its use of shaped charges and electrical timers, 
quite sopbisticated for its time - should not be taken quite for granted. More is bound up with 
the term "amateur" than just amateurishness. Indeed, it seems to carry a range of meanings 
beyond that, and situates NCL members in political space in a very specific way. Eddie Daniels, 
for example, uses the notion of being an amateur in much the same way as does Lewin in the 
passage above: 
.51 
"When we formed this organisation, we were amal~urs. We learned as we went along. 
We were not highly trained professional §oldiers. All we were trying to do, what we 
felt was our contribution to the struggle . 
Inrel"ooiew ,.irh Hugh LeWin. Harare. J February l!J'lO. 
... We had a chap by the name of Watson who was a parachutist in the British Army, 
and he gav-e us some training. But besides that woe had no training at all. We were just 
ordinary people :·52 
To deline oneself as an amateur was therefore also to define oneself as an ordinary, common 
citizen, a member of the civil society that Verwoerdian apartheid was attacking and in terms of 
whose values liberalism's central appeal was couched. And opposed to the notion of being an 
amateur, therefore, was not only that of the professional, but also that of the politician; 
" ... the people in the ARM ... were just ordinary modest pwple who had no great ideas 
of running the government or running the country or seeing themselvc:s as Prime 
Minister or generals .... [W)e just had the general understanding that we wanted a non-
racial country, democracy and justice ... Who was going to run it did nm interest us .... 
(Njone of us had any ideas about holding high oOice. All we wanted was to make a 
contribution to the struggte:·53 
A similar sentiment is uuered by Hugh Lewin who points om that 
"I did oot see mysdf as a polilidan in any way. I was, if you like, an ordi.nary citizen 
who happened to be doing things. "~ 
In this form, the cluster of notions surrounding the concept of the "amateur" is not incidental but 
central to the NCL's discourse. h is a set of notions that comes up time and again in the self-
identiftt:ation of NCL members. The: recurrent notion ot the NCL as a group of like-minded 
people referred to earlier and Eisenstein's characterisation of himself as not being an 
"organisation man" falls precisely on this terraio.55 NCL discourse installs its subjects crucially as 
citi.ztns - citizens who ordinarily would not become involved with politics but who are forced 
inw action by the assault on the fabric of ordinary life, so that acts which do not ordinarily 
partake of the political becomt' political acts. 
··r was not a politician, I was against the Injustice rhar was taking place .. .. You know, 
you take the making of bread. That is politics in South Africa! It involves job 
reservation~ They say to the black man you can ·t take that job because you are black. 
That's politics! So even the making of bread. So every rhing in South Africa; who you 
associated with. That's politics. Where you stay. Almm,t the air you breathe, that's 
polirics.''56 
Note the highly significant way in which Daniels opposes the idea of being an politician and 







lruer-iew with Eddte Daniels . Hour Bay. 5 June 1988. 
[nre!"\1ew ~~oitt\ Hugh Lewin. Harare. -1 fel"lrua"'· 1990. 
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office" forms lhe guiding imperatives of action. The terrain where the love of justice m()tivates 
people is precisely that of ordinary life. Just as in the documents of Leftwich and the London 
committee the field of ideological commitmc::nt wa~ enernal to that of revolutionary struggle, it 
i~ here seen as alien to the values in terms of which apartheid are opposed. Paradmucally, these 
values arc also in essence non-political. Note Daniels' emphasis on the fact that it is in South 
Africa tbat ever~1bing is politi~al. The implication is that the politicisation of ordinary life in the 
South African situation is abnormaL The fact thai the acts of ordinary citizens have become 
treated as political acts is therefore an indt:lt of the abnormality of the South African situation. 
This is linked to the second central theme in the thought of the NCL. The NCL's exclusion of 
ideology should be seen, not merely as a judgement about the appropriateness or not of a rigid 
theoretical scheme but also as pare of a powerful ethical and moral vision, a belief that there 
were tasks that had to be accomplished, and that these tasks were self-e...,idt:nt 10 all who cared 
to see them. that they lay obviou!>ly to hand. In such a moral universe, ideology and theorising 
served liule purpose. 1£ is significant, for example. that even in th~ most systema1ic statements 
of lheir political programme, such a~ in the trial documents, the NCL's revolutionary character 
was not seen as lying in the fact that it had formulated the ··correct line", that its revolutionary 
doctrine was the correct one. Rather, members spoke about its revolutionary character in 
ethical terms. This tendency is revealed when Leftwich clo!'.es his suatcgy paper with the 
following warning: 
" ... it is suggested that reg10ns do not even begin to operate until they have reached a 
stage of erfedive internal organisation. till thl!ir members have been tried and tested 
and their long·tenn commitment to the cause and their willingness to stick it through 
to tbe end have heen proved."57 
What maltcrs is not so much deciding what the tasks were that lay ahead. Those tasks, for the 
NCL members, were ob...,ious, and plain to see. What mattered was whether one bad the 
toughness., the gumption to carry a difficult task through to the end. As Hugh Lewin comments: 
"I know I accept that this is a very simpli!>lic 'view, but 1 still think that when you know 
that one should not get cluttered by all the nonse~ical arguments that are put forward 
which are basically ju.st timc-wasting."58 
l:'il 
This theme seems to provide an important indication as to the terms in which members were 
interpellated as saboteurs. We have seen, in Chapter 5, that it was precisely in the dangers of 
action. in the risk of doing something that 1hcy believed to be right. that some members found 
57 
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NCL member~hip mcaning.ful.59 lt seems, in uthcr W~lrds . that the mmal appeal of sabotage 
against apartheid was closely bound up with thi!> impatience with mere talk. This is certainly 
reflected in the pamphlet with which the NCL/ ARM announced its ex.istence under a new 
name: 
"ARM states it~ dedication and commitm~nt to achieving the overthrow of the whole 
system of apartheid and exploitation in South Africa ... 
ARM does not only talk.. ARM acts. ARM has declared and will declare itself through 
action."60 
The oote or moral defiance is significant. ft should not be seen as mere revolutionary bravado: 
the ethical terms in which it declares itself rcflecl precisely the space in which NC'L/ARM 
discourse situated its subjects. It was not a space in which ideological debate and difference hau 
any place; it was a sp<~ce in which the choice offered to its subjects was simple: !hey could aa 
and do what was right · or they could participate in mere talk. tbe ideological debate that was 
obfuscating the issues. 
To summarise: the NC'l 's ideology is deeply marked by its exclusion of ideological commitment 
from the terrain of struggle. That exclusion made it possible for them to see the arena of 
guerilla warfare as the- supreme and privileged terrain of struggle. In the case of the more 
prominent mt:mbers such a~ Lcfcwich and the London commiuee, it lay at 1hc botwm of the 
cooception of the: NC'l as the "sinews of the struggle" and it .shaped their conceprion or an 
overarching commitment to anti-apartheid struggle that would overcome sectarian division and 
malce possible a focus on the pragmatic questions of struggle. In the case of the ordina~ 
members it formed a central patt of their commitment to action and their impatience with doubt 
and ideological hair-spliuing. The rejeetion of ideological struggle was, in other words, a very 
important and ceotral part of their discourse. II was part of a moral clarity and an insistence (Jn 
praaical action which was one of the organisation's greatest strengths. The linkage hetween this 
moral clarity and the concept of being an "ordinary person". standing up against the 
government's attack on the moral fabric of civil !>ociety wa!\ a cruc1al factor in the mobilisation cf 
members ro sahotage. It was central to the moral economy of the NCL, to t.he ethical 
commitment of members to each other and their organisation in spite of the danger to which 
they exposed themselves, to their sense of purpose and fulfillment in active struggle against the 
repression of the South African government after Sharpeville. 
59 
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6.6 The t:on~pt or the "ordinary cititen" in hi~tury 
To understand the NCL. it is not enough to understand the centrality of the discursh·e clements 
I have analysed ~o far. I! is also important to undc:r-.tand their historically situated nature:. The 
s~mbolic order, we should r~mcmber, has its own independent materiality, and when men and 
women, acting in history, conceptuali~e their political identity and the nature of their struggle, 
the conditions imposed on them by history include the discourses which enatJle and structure 
their self-identification. That identification is dominated by lhe signifier in all its historical 
specificity. 
In identifying themst:lves with the notion of independent, morally commitcd ordinary citizens 
taking part in an es!>entially non-ideological struggle. NCL members were drawing on a a set of 
notions that formed a central and important pan of British cultural life. I therefore close off this 
chapter by tracing a part of the genealogy of this cluster of concepts:6 1 I will show the 
occurrence of these notions in other, earlier context.o;, and conclude by asking some questions 
about the implications for this particular intellectual heritage of its articulation in a Soul h 
African context. 
Broadly speaking the self-confident and experimental amateurishness we trace in the discourse 
of the NCL seems related to a :.et of notions expressed in a whole range of ways in British 
middle-class society. These themes crop up, for example, in the "British empirical tradition" in 
colonial administration;6~ it marked off British philosophers from their continent31 colleagucs:63 
it was <~ crucial component, for example, of British war-time idcology;U-1 it crops up repeatedly in 
British popular fiction. 65 In each of these contexts a similar thread crops up: a view of praxis 
61 I use the rerm "genealogy·· m ns Foucaulrean sense: ldeologlcal elemc:nrs rh~r seem Similar are upon do,;er 
invu1 igatian very divergently an iculated m different contex!s. The ~tudy af such elemems cannot take rhe 
form of 1 he tracing back an unbroken. connnuous strand - or e1:en a tanglecl web • 10 its hi51orical source. 
Instead of ll)1ng to find. beneath 1 hese .. hscontinuit ie~. a hidden unity. genealogy focuses precisely on such 
breab and n~ptures. For a deta!led o.:liscusston see H. Drqfus and P. Rabinow .. \tichel fiJutault: ~yond 
sh'\l(turali~m and Hermtn,~utics (Chicago. L ni•·ersil) of Chtcago Press. 1983 ). p . l!H ff. 
Dr W, :"asson. pers. comm. 
For a slightly e)(aggerated thumbnatl sketch of thts aspect of the "Oxford School". see Jasper Griffin. 
"lntroductton", in Ved ~ehta. fly lind tile fly-bottloi!: encounn•r~ "ilh Brilhh Jnlelledual~ (:"ew York. 
Columbia L:nivc:fliity Press. 1983). pp. :~:i1 • xni . 
The tn.Jcial difference between R.tefensrahl"s Triumph of the Will and. for example. Humphrey Jennings·s 
Li~ttll to Britain is the emphasis in 1 he l~uer ftlm on 1 he munds of dome~ tiC' Britain. The theme reflected in 
the opening of the laue r film (the lark singing in 1 he wheatfield, the Spuftres roaring 0\'er J and the way in 
which it emphasises the continutty of rural "11h indu.strial life ts significant. not only bt:rause it constructs 
Brilam as a class-un tfied en ttl}' but also bee a use tl i nststs on the um!Jilical chord connecting I he mechanical. 
steely world of the war tndu51ry Wtth the organ•c values of Bntam·s rural past (see Jim Hiller. "'Humphrey 
Jennings'. in Alan Lovell and Jim H11!er. Studie~ in Dotum~ntary (london. Scclier and Warburg in 
association w.th the Bruish Film ln5!1tute. J97J). pp. SS(l- 87). 
To take. for example. the te rrat n of detective fiction : the si<Jtu~ of being a comfonat>ly nuddle-class amateur 
is what llnl.::; TogeTher Sherlocli Holme!> and \;ft~ :\tarple. Contrast this 10 the hard-boiled detective of 
grounded not in systematic theory or a going back to first principles, but in simple common-
sense, which is conceived to be deeply different from and systematically opposed to the terrain 
of self-conscious, systematic theory. 
This tradition was articulated in many ways, and obviou.sly could often form the backbone of 
extremely reactionary political positions. But it also formed a crucial clement in popular British 
radicalism. In the 19th century these notions formed an important part of the anarchistic 
ideology of the British craft unions of the time, and was forcdully articulated by William 
Morris.66 The most forceful twentieth-century articulators of the.se traditionf> have been, of 
course, George OrweU67 and E.P. Thompson;6S the popular music of Billy Bragg can also be 
seen a!> carrying forward this tradition.6" Whatever their differences, the r.:markable similarity 
between these writers was the way in which they situated themselves as "ordinary, decent men", 
strangers to the terrain of politics, and yet forced by the values of civil life to make a stand in the 
public world. 
In Britain this self-conceptualisation t:nabled a broad range of radical political practices, and we. 
have seen tht:ir centrality to the NCL/ ARM's moral appeaL But what were the implications for 
l.rus tradition of its enunciation in the specific conditions of .South African .society? In the next 
chapter I shall return to this question. I shall explain how, while they did play an "enabling" role, 
these elements also curtailed the NCL/ARM's conceptions of the politically possible . They 
formed the basis of deep limits to its conception of the role and place of sabotage - and at the 
same time they prevemed NCL/ ARM members from seeing these limits, made it impossible for 
them to address the questions that were most crucially posed by their own project. [ shall argue, 
in other words, that in the very themes that sustained NCL members in their commitment, there 




American fiction. (Chandler. Ross :\otacDonald) ""~'~= relauonship to bourgems soctety is precisely one of 
alieRalion. lack. of contact Think also of rile wa:; m which. 111 novels like Wafu~hip Dooo-n and rhe fiction of 
J.RR Toll>ien a kind of domestic cabbage-patch ll'tliness. a plain-spoken down-to-eanh toughm:ss and 
pluck. IS the characteristic that finally brings VICtory. 
See E. P. Thomp&on. William :\otorri .~: Romantic to R"volutioMry. especially the letter quoted on p. IQ2. 
See al5o Rusl:.in 's crit ique of alienating labour quoted on pp. J..l - 39 of the same boot and wl'!ich was to 
innuen~e .:\4orri~ deeply. The opposition tlern.'l:en the m:alr\·c freedom of the craftsman and the rigidiry and 
soul!e~ precision of Victorian engmcenng echoes the way tn wlltch the \"CL ~~oas later 10 oppose pragmatic 
non-sectarianism witll ideological commitment. 
Examples abound: !Oee. however. the e!iSay "England . yo11r England" (l"side the Whale and Othn Es~ys 
(Harmondswonh. Penguin. 1983}. especra!ly pp. 62 - 71. for a detailed ·treatment of r hese themes. The .same 
author's The ROlld to Wig~!" Pier (Harmond..,.,..·orrh. Pengutn. 1962) stares these values in the J:!roader 
ron text of a commitment to socrali$m (see. for example. pp. 216- 230). 
For a powerful aniculation of these concep15 in relation to British left -wing politics :~ee his e:<.SOJy "Tite 
Deren~ of Britain" (m E . P. Thompson. The Hea•J· Dannrs). espertall)' p. 75 and his description of the 
women of Greerrham Common on p. 85. 
:'l:ote. for example. hOYt· he sttuates "the patient milltons" precrsely outside Parliamentary politics and over 
and against "the sound of ideologies clasht ng" ( B1lly Bragg. Back to Basks (Chrysalis. AGO DP 8) ). 
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The Inconceivability of Politics: The NCL/ ARM and 
the concept of the "Ideological Fantasy" 
"What then en the last reson a~ the rrurhs or manl.and'1 - fhey are the irftfutabtt> ~n-ors of mankmc." 
friedrich Nietrche: The Gay Science 
7.1 The mustard·!teed and the prison-hollse: optimi!tm and pessimi!tm in Uberal protest. 
In this chapter J shall investigate the limit~ impo!>ed on ~he political vit.ion t.lf the NCL hy its 
basic discursive terms of reference. I will show ho., its discourse. though it dlleS have a certain 
le\'el of coherence, is ultimately plunged into a series of vii iating paradoxt::~ and coni radictions. I 
will start by exploring the implications lor the lit.eral underpinnings of that project of some 
aspects of the South African context in which the :o.;cL found itsdf. We haw already seen how 
the NCL's commitment to sabotage wa!'> essentially a continuation of liberal concerns and that ir 
.!.hould be under~tOtld as a pcrformativc act. We ha\e also seen how underlying this 
"performati\'e politics" liberals . whether NCL-meml'!ers or non-violent campaigners -
constituted themselves crucially a.s representatives of the "ordinary", non· political life of civil 
society. and how in doing this they drew on ideological resources similar to those of certain 
strands of radical English plllitio;_ It would probably be an o\·ersim plification to suggest that the 
NCL-... radical liberalism and the libertarian leftism of Morris. Orwell and Thomp.son are 
directly related. There are however enough similarities between the different discursive positions 
to make possible a useful comparison . Such a compariseon will show how the meaning of thi!!< 
particular set of notions had been shaped by the history of the llrticulation of liberalism in South 
Africa. 
Liberalism in South Africa was crucially shap~:d by ih concern, among other things. with th<.: 
question of South African unity. It was deeply inllucnced l:ty the way in which that question had 
first been addressed in the context of the time leading up to the unillcation of South Africa in 
the first decade of the century. Belinda Bonoli has rointcd out the: emergence of a dis.course -
enunciated, according 10 her. by the organic intellectuals of manufacturing. capital • sigr,ificantly 
different rrom the: ideology of Britisb South Africanism. In its ccmcern with the unification of 
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South Africa as a single nation and the community of interests uf its citizens, this discour5e. 
which she names the ideology of "South Africani!>m" \Vas markedly different from the 
conceptualisation, in imperialist &;coU:rsc. of South Africa's interests as an outpost of the British 
empire. Bonoli points out how this concern with South Africa'.r, unity as a single nation led to a 
certain ambiguity about the place of politics in that nation. Its emphasis on social unity in spite 
of the differences that threatened it and the extension and protection of trade and manufacture 
through all four Provinces meant that they had to deplore "divisive" issues: questions which could 
threaten such ;;a union were defined out of the proper arena of politics: 
"The nation was one, and should not be divided; hence its political activities should 
renect this. Politics, as an activity, should not be rejected but should be harnessed to the 
common goals of society - industrialisation and capitalist development. Thus the 
ideology, while it accepted the legitimacy of party politics, attempted to divest it of its 
overtly political content... This was the foundation of the idea of politics somehow being 
'non-political' ... "1 
As 10 the ca~c of the examples mentioned above, much of the effectiveness and appeal of thif> 
discourse rested in it!. ability to centre itself politically. To the moral weight of plain-spoken 
pragmatism it contrasted an ideological commitment that it suggested was the prerogative of 
factionalists in Parliament. Thus Hiram Strong signi£ican! ly argues in a passage quoted by 
Bozzoli that "(Ljhe electorate is tired of this cry 'Progressivr vcr,r,us Bond' ... "2 
Though the liberals of the I95U.r, and 1960~ were hy no means the organic intellectuals of 
manufacturing capital. as Bozzoli makes out Strong to be, they w~re deeply influenced by this 
concern with the unity and interests of the whole country. The notion of political snuggle not 
being essentially ideological in nature, of its being about the simple interests and values of 
"ordinary life", was linked indiswlubly with the notion that those values transcended all the 
divisions that threatened the unity of the South African nation. In this they differed greatly from 
the discour!\e of radical British libenarianism. One clement that can be found in the political 
discourse of Morris, Orwell, and today, Bragg, is precisely its unashamed and committed 
partisanship. The social tensions that occasioned the devclopmem of capitalism in Britain could 
be given interested and partisan expression: the "ordinary persons" implied by these writers were 
on the whole ordinary working class persons. or at least middle - class persons commited to 
socialism or democracy. The:o:.e very elements can aho be found in the left-libertarian Congress 
tradition I have spoken about.3 lis discourse is marked precisely by the articulation of a subject-
3 
Belinda B<moli. The Politirsl "iature olr a Ruling Cia~'· (London. Rmulcc!ge Kegan Paul. 198 I) pp.lJS- I 36. 
Hiro~m Strong. South Mri"an Commtrn ~nd \1anufacturer·~ Record. I S (September 1907). quoted 111 
Bouoli. op.dl .. p.l~'i {mv emphasis). 
See p. ~0 above. Helen Joseph's autobiographical TomorrtJoo'\ Sun: a Smullllled Journal rrom South Mrka 
(.'lo:ew York. Joh11 Day. I %7) i~ a good example. Joseph's subjetl posnion never departs for a moment from 
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position which permits an identificatiun with oppressed Suuth Africans. In contrast, liberals 
tried 10 address all South Africans, and speak for the unity of interests of the whole country. 
In the discourr.e of radical liberalism these two tendencies came more and more into connict. 
On the one hand left-wing liberals tended to conceptualise themselves as ··ordinary people" 
involved in a politics that was not really politics because it transcended the divisions of Soulh 
African society and was concl..'rned with the weal and woe of the entire nation. On the other 
band their commitmen1 to the values of democracy, human rights and human dignity Wt:re 
increasingly forcing them to face up to and deal with issue!'. that were deeply divisive. While a 
neutral position could be taken up relatively unproblematically by the practical manufacturers 
whose main interest pace Bozzoli. was "business", it was !he source of s.:rious paradoxes in the 
discourse of liberals altempting to come to terms with and act upon the existence of syslematic 
division and injustice in South Africa. For if they spoke for the really "ordinary" and simple 
truths that represented the interests of all South Africans, how could they deal with the - after 
all, fairly obvious - fact that they were a small and shrinking minority in a deeply divided 
country? What happened to the liberal notion that they were speaking for all South Africans if 
those South Africans rejected their argument? There was something contradictory about a 
politics of demonstration in which liberals tried to show that they were not pursuing some 
outlandish ideology but were in touch with the standards of decency and sanity. that they were 
the really" ordinary people", while it was everyone else who was out of touch. 
Liberals resolved this problem by differentiating increasingly between two levels of political 
reality. This was the only way in which they could maintain their position with any :.emblance of 
consistency. On one level, they had to admit that their politics was being rejected by the 
overwhelming majority of South Africans; had to acknowledge the existence of this gap between 
them and the people they were trying to speak to. Indeed, the "blindness'' of the public to the 
Governnment's authoritarianism, their failure to prote:-.1 the curbing of the liberty of others and 
themselves, was a perennial feature of liberal discourse in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Examples are rife; here is a passage in an article appearing in Contact in 1956 under the 
ocadline "What will we swallow next?": 
"So much restrictive legislation has been turned out... par1icular!y during the last eight 
years ... that to-day ~outh Africans seem to have become dangerously close to being 
inured to it. A few years ago many people could not only see what was happening in 
tbis country, they also felt a need to do something abou! it. .. As time has passed ... many 
of them seem to have lost the will to do an)'thing about it. Slowly, a paralysis has 
her conception o! her;.elf as an ordinary woman. The hool sri !I manages to r~:present antagonism, but this is 
because her identtfication is abo one "ilh the on.Jina11 lll~cl: women of Smuh Africa and a~in~l the brutal . 
fasct~t glwemment. :Xow!lere o.Jocs sh.e imply that her politics !S non-pohucal. 
1~7 
o\·crtaken them. The lack of :1 rousing Union-wide: prntcst and camp1:1ign against these 
Acts ... makes nne wonder if the will to oppose is not n·aporating under the regular 
hammer-blows directed at civil liberties in South Arrica ... J 
This failure tu rise up in protest against the ~ationalists was not incomprchcnsihle to th<: 
liberals. This is where the somewhat glib dismis.o;a) of liberalism, according to which it could not 
understand the malerial basis of apartheid, misso 1hc point. They under!>tood it all too well. 
Nationalist policy was, for them, not totally irrational. dm)mcd to failure. It had a degree of 
success. As Lewin points out, apartheid obviously brought material benefits for the white 
population: 
" ... it is a very insidious society, b~ically. It has become highly sophisticated ... basically it 
is the sort of place that very quickly drags yuu in. It has got so much going. for it irr 
terms of comfort, in lerms of leisure, in terms of making the good life. It is a highly 
attractive and therefore very seductive type of society. And when you look at the way in 
which your white protestant European can get dragged into it very quickly ... as long a~ 
you are white and as long a~ you are protes-tant and as long a~ you have got a skill it i~ a 
marvellous place to be. And because of the ~tructures of apartheid it is - you know you 
can live in it without actually seeing the dangers.''5 
But if it was true that liberals had to admit that they were a small minority, they couh.l still in a 
sen,..e see themselves as speaking for the interests of all South Africans. It was true that on one 
level the politics of sdf-interest and apathy made sense. But that rationality was a myopic 
rationality; remember Duncan· ... insistence on the short-term nature of apartheid's "dazzling 
success··_6 On another level. in the long term (and it is no coincidence that Paton and Brown's 
political column in the pages of Contal.'t was entitled 'The Long View") it wao; disastrou~ to the 
South African nation and the shared future of all its peoples. It was at this level that liberals 
situated themselves. If they thought of themselves as motivated, not by ideology. but by 
c-ommon sense, as the spokespersons of ordinary South Africans on all walh of life, it was 
precisely hecause they spoke for the South Africa-that-could-be, the South Africa that Wa!> 
potentially there. 
The distance between the political reality of the divided South Africa on the one hand and its 
underlying community of interest was a major theme in liberal thought throughout the 1950s and 
1960s . .Many of the apparently divergent features of liberal thought at the lime seem to have 
been consequences of the inability of liberals to think their way through this impasse. Two 
different courses of action were open, each of them a response to one of the horn!) of lhe s1:1me 
5 
6 
"What will we swallo,.· ne.~t~". Conlad, Juh· l'J5b. See at~o "The Police Slate". Contart. :-.:oventber l'lSJ. 
especially "One m1gh1 expect .. .forged for 11" ~nd "A rearrul Silence". Contart. rehrllaty l'l55. ~re~·ially "II is 
mcredible .. . ttv;se people unduly". 
lote!View Wllh Hugh Lev.'in.. Harare.~ f-ebruary I'll)() 
See p. 60 above. 
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dilemma. Despite their superficial dissimilarity, these courses of action were mirror-images of each 
other; the opposed moments of a double movement dominated by the same root assumptions. 
On the one hand there was the poosibility of always insisting on the validity and the obviousness of 
the unity of interests of South Africans. Uberal discourse was concerned centrally with insisting on 
the reality, beyond the sectional interests of different racial groups in the country, of that community 
of interest that unified all of its citizens. The interracial contact and the social mixing - the "tea-
parties" for which liberals have so often been lampooned was important precisely in this rcgnrd. 
They showe<l what South Africa could be like if good sense prev<:~iled. 7 For many liberals, the 
Liberal Party was. in effect, nothing less than a microcosm of this South-Africa-as-it-could-be, a 
seed-crystal round which a rational society could take shape. or as Paton was to put it, "the seed 
from Which the m USU:lrd-tree of I he future Will grow, the tree Which Sheltered all the fow Is of the 
air." 11 
On the other hand liberntism could fixate itself on the irrationality, the selfishness, the short-
sightedness of white South Africa. If the creation of a vigilant public, the building of a oommon 
society was a powerful ideal in liberal thought at the time, if the social mixing and the exemplary 
attempts at interracial co-operation were demonstrations of civil-society-as-it-should-be, then 
apartheid's destructive eiTe{.'ts, the way in which that organic unity could faU apart, became a central 
thread in the criticism of government policy. 
Oy the early 1960s, this theme was not used only~ a warning, but became a category in the critique 
of South African social life itself. It is a development which can be trac:cd in the literature of the 
period, where South African society becomes conceptualised more and more in tenns of the 
category of the absurd, the unreal, the irrational. It was a feature of the political satire of the period, 
ranging from the rather pointed and heavy-handed irony characteristic of the political fairy-tales of 






This again i~ an inslan<:c of the way In wbicb di~our~ ~boulll be seen as exisling, not ooly on tb~ linguistic level, 
but as involving political pndlce ~s well. This upecl or libeul polltic.o; shows us precisely bow political acls 
tbc:mselves imply a cena in politk..a( space, conMrucl it in a specific way. Here we see, in other woro.ls , the 
perforrnath·t dimension of liber3( political ~clivity (Andrew Merrifield, per!>. (:Omm.) 
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In a slightly different guise this concern played an important part in the articulation of South 
African liberal alienalion: it was expressed in a vision of a South Africa that lacks organic 
oohen::nce, an exploded, artifical society, motivated only by selfishness and devoid of living organic 
relationships. This theme is powerfully reflected, for example, in Robin Farquharson's story "The 
Drifters", a satirical look at the liberal and left intelligentsia in Johannesburg in the early 1960s. 
Farquha~n (a close friend of John Harris)ll focuses on their shallow experimentation with non-
racial par1ies, the narrow social confines of their segregated lives, their rootlcsc;ness and the 
shallowness of their political and emotional involvement with each other. "The drillers," 
Farquharson intones, 
" ... waver on many boundaries. The lines between races and sexes and economic classes, 
sharp as they are, fade and shift disconcertingly and unpredicLably ... Nowhere in the world 
is it more difficult for a relationship simply to exist between people rather than between 
members of groups, classified and identifie-d even if they refuse to be stereotyped or 
segregated. South African society is not a single organism, not a smooth surface: it is a 
body sliced in segments, a field strewn with trenches and landmincs. No wonder the 
drifters drift." 12 
It is interesting to note the same view of South African society reflected in the discourse of two 
NCUARM ex-members. Ronnie Mutch's semi-autobiographical novel Remembered Violence is 
notable for the vision of a desolate, absurd society through which his alooholic and cynical central 
character moves. Similar themes crop up in Hugh Lewin's reminiscences of prison life. In the 
massive, bleak meaninglessness of its rituals, the nak.ed relations of exploitation that grow up 
between its inmates, in iLs elaborate and lifeless artificality, prison became, for Lewin, a metaphor 
for South African society itself: 
11 
12 
" ... the outside society was based on something totally arbitrary, based on amorality. It had 
no central driving force other than total selfishness. And it maintained itself... through 
coercion... Now that is [precisely] how the prison system works . ... [YJou are keeping 
people in a situation of total boredom and trying to maintain law and order. You have 
all sorts of ... mechanisms for keeping that society working. But essentially because you 
have no driving force. you have no ethic which actually drives, motivates, stimulates the 
lives of the people inside. Without that ethic, the only way to maintain some sort of 
semblance of ortler in that society is through coercion. And particularly in Pretoria the 
prison society is a total paradigm then of the outside society.... Central was 
AD 1931 ~ p. 13<1. 
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the best example of that because it has the final symbol of state coercion, the gallows . 
.. J3 
L.:v.in's metaphor is interesting because an exploration of its ramifie<~tions allow us an insight 
into the paradox at the heart of the liberal politics of protesl. Prison was apposite as a metaphor 
for South African society, not only because of its rigid regimentation, but also because that 
amhoriarian rule deprived people of the ethical centre:, the "driving force" of their beings. 
Prison, for Lewin , was obscene because it turned people into crooh. I-! It was in this that prison 
and South African society, " ... a rotten regime, devoid of moral jusitification, maintaining wntrol 
through double-dealing, and, in the process, befouling everyooe"15 renected each other most 
accurately: they destroyed the very foundations of the ethical principles on which a future South '. 
Africa must be built. 
This point should make it clear that the alienation from political life which Leftwich conveyed in 
his letters was not merely a private psychological quirk. On the contrary, it was the expression 
of a deep and prevalent theme in radical liberal discourse. His comment about the corrupting 
infuence of apartheid pervading "like a fine, poisonous dust, every aspect of our living in the 
country"16 is just another example of this general concern; and the rc5ultant growing chasm 
be!Ween his external self and his true. "human", private sdf that this perception implied was 
nothing but the extension into the personal sphere, of the increasing dichotomisation of all 
South African life, the growing space between the two levels of political reality, that 
characterised liberal discours<= at this time . 
II also touches on a serious dilemma in liberal thought . To resist authoritarianism, there needed 
to be a healthy, organic, civil soci<=ty. But South Africa seemed to be characterised precisely by 
the absence of that civil society - and indeed, every repressive law passed by Parliament made 
the chances that such a society might take root yet more remote: 
"The plain truth is that moral values have changed radically in the last few years. Each 
and every one of them has lost its old validity ... In such times of erosion people lose 
their heads. Whether they know it or not, their standards of value change.... He who 
will not strike a blow for the rights of others ... will soon lose his own. And what is more, 
he will lose the very taste of being free ." 17 
Here we have come to a crucial point in the analysis of liberal discourse. This is the point of its 
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flows out of the root assumptions of the liberal projed, out of the very conceptual framework that 
underpinned liberal identity. 
For liberals, their assumption that their politics was not really politks, that it was plain common 
sense, was linlccd to the notion that the truths they stood for were so trano>cendently reasonable that 
only someone deeply unreasonable could reject them. For the NCUARM, for example, sabotage 
was a call to resistance and a plea to awaken to truths that seemed in the final instance obvious. As 
Lewin puts it: 
"I just felt that ... if you looked at the base issues... in South Africa you arc dealing wjth 
something which is totally arbitrary whidl is totally stupid, and which could be changal 
ovemight. .. .lt is ridiculous.ll is based on no sense whatsoever." 18 
Uut what if, as seemed to be the aJSc, that body of reasonable political opinion that liberalism 
appealed to did not exist, if" ... factors which arc calculated to cause an anti-government swing in a 
normal democracy simply don't operate in South Africa"? 19 
That was the question aslccd after the 1958 election, and pointed at the fact that liberalism had set 
itself a task that in tenns of iiS very definition, was doomed to failure. On the one hand, hope for the 
future depended on the creation of a body of reasonable people who would not allow the 
govemmcnt to trample roughshod over potilical freedoms, on the creation of a "vigilant public". zo 
Uut the most alarming obstacle to this project was exactly the absence of that vigilant public and 
apartheid's tendency to destroy whatever hope there was of such a public spirit taking root and 
flowering. 
Although Uberals could recognise this impasse, they could not formulate an alternative political 
practice in response to this realisation - not without a substantial reformulation of lhe entire 
political project. Since apartheid was so obviously invalid, since what was required was that white 
South Africans "come to their SeJlses". no altcmative to the politics of protest was conceivable. 
Within the tenns of liberal discourse as it then existed, only two options were available: liberals 
could either doggedly continue, trying to signify to the blind eyes of South Africa the 
destructiveness of its course, or they could abandon politics altogether. Losing faith in the vatidity 
of protest meant losing faith in politics as such - often to such an extent that bound up with the 
question of whether or not protest was worthwhile was the question of whether life in South Africa 
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Liberali.<.m thus seems to have been caught in a series of extreme reactions. From self-
confident, blithe preJietions of success liberals moved to revulsion from a society they 
ctm~idered to be soulless; from the assumption that the ;-.lationalists were doomed by definition, 
to Paton's elcistentialist quietism. Thc:y seem to ha\e hecn for the: time being unable to make 
sense of, and to think politically about, the fact that other whites did not feel addressed by the 
the values they them.<.dves saw as obviously and transcendently true. They were aware of that 
facl. but they could not relate it to the general nature of their own projecl, Liberalism inside 
and outside the NCL was chus marked by v.hat can best be described as a fatal inability to 
"place" difference. In a s.ense, politics was inconceivable within its terms of reference.~ 1 People 
ei1her saw the truth, or they did nm; if they did not, all you could do was point it out, doggedly, 
patienrly, till they did. This made the conceptualisation of a different political practice 
irnpos.<.ib!e: political choice was limited to a choice bctwc.:n the practice of prote:>t - and no 
practice at all. 
7.2 On the bus and orr the bus: I he question of the "desire of the masses" 
Having analysed the structure of the dilemma in which members like Lewin and Daniel5 found 
themsdve!;, we are in a better position to evaluate Lcftv.ich's intervention. For Ldtwich's paper 
was an attempt to transcend this dilemma. He did not merely insis£ on the strategy in spite of 
the objections; he offered an alternative, a new vision of the place of sabotage in the struggle for 
liberation, one that attempted to cope with the obstacles the organisation had encountered. 
Leftwich's intervention is interesting for anotht:r reason. His justifkation of sabotage differs 
from Olher examples of liberal discourse in one fundamental aspect: it is centrally concerned 
with the relationship of the NCL to the:: oppressed Sourh Africans they were trying 10 liberate. 
The crucial stumbling block of sabotage conceived as protest action wal> the:: deafness, the sJ10rt-
sighh:dness of the white electorate and the government whom they were trying to awaken. 
Leftwich was able to believe in the cominuation of sabotage only becau5e he introduced a new 
:t Obviously I am U5t!lg politiCS m a sper1al sense. Poll! 1cs 1 n this sense is an activity cenlrall} related to I ne 
no\ ion of t !le e.s.sential ~onlestabilil)' of even fundamental issues. Wllere diffcren<·e~ exist within a ~hared 
and agreed procedural matrix. the resol11tion of these chffercnces does not tum on a politkal struggle for 
hegemony hut on technical questions. A good example llf slleh a non-poh!ical conceptualisation of -~·onflict 
re50iution· 1s. 1romcally. tne \o1an1st tenel rnar rhe government of men shall be replarcd. in t!le cla55less 
sociery, by 1 !\c administration of Tning,s. { A.J . Polan's l..enin and the end of Politic~ (London. \ofethuen. 
198·1\. pp. 57 - !1.5. Liberalism. in its msisrence on an otwious and common-sense set of non-pan isan ~-alues. 
shares man)· of 1he characteri~tics of 1h1s ,.,e.,.·. It sees poiH1cal stl'\lgglc as taking place .,..itnin a given 
framc:worl.. that cannot 1t~lf he called inro question in the political protest . Within the tcnns of !he 
discou rs.c of this 1 hcsis. "poht•cs • is a I im ll·com:cpl. I di>euss the problem of !he meaning of I he word 
"pohti~" in my conclusion: s.ee p. 1W 
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actor into the world-view implied by liberal discourse: the oppressed people of South Africa 
themselves. Traces of this can be found in the conceptualisations of other NCL members. 
Daniels. for example, as we have seen, hoped to "inspire·· the m<Jsses to take action. In Leftwich's 
discourse. however, we find the clearest -and perhaps the only- C);ample of a liberal attempt to 
think through the ramifications of such a conception. It is a radically different conception of 
liberatory politics from the one ( have explored in the first section of this chapter, and 
transcends most of its pitfalls. But as an attempt to transcend the limits of liberal politics it 
eventually fails. 
A I first glance, the co nee pt of "the masses" does play an im portanl role in the discourse of the 
NCL. In Leftwich's strategic paper. we find him discounting the possibility that foreign pressure 
aJone could {Opple apartheid in the following terms: 
" ... the onus of carrying through the re\·olutionary changes during and after the collapse 
of the regime will inevitably fall on the shoulders of the SA people themselves. Their 
role in tbis procc~s i.o; cruciaJ:·22 
In this passage "the South African people themselves" is seen a~ the central actor in the 
revolutionary struggle: it bears the main responsibility for liberating South Africa and is the 
most important agent of liberation. It is therefore in effect constituted as a ··revolutionary 
subject". It would seem therefore that the struggle the NCL saw itself as being part of was the 
struggle of this revolutionary subject and that it would therefore want to align itself with it. 
A closer look at this centrality reveals however that it is deceptive. In the following passage, 
Vigne argues in favour of the NCL\ recruiting, training and leading role in the struggle. His 
argument rests apparently precisely on the centrality of the masses as rn·olutionary actors: 
" ... such recruitment is not only possible but intensely desired by the oppre~sed people 
of Soulh Atrica" .?.3 
Note, first, the importance of the notion of the "desire" of the "oppressed people of South 
Africa". The argument here seems to give "the people" a very central role in the struggle indeed. 
In terms of its logic, the mere fact that the people of South Africa "desire" that recruitment 
counts as justification of the NCL"s project. In the NCL's discourse, they therefore occupy 
precisely the same place that Althussds policeman occupies in his "little theroretical theatre" 
described in Chapter :!. In the place of the policeman's 'Hey, you!'" in relation to which the 
subject identifies itself as an offender we can put the notion of the desire of the masses. Here 
22 
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we can see thal tht' oppressed people of South Africa were what Lacan wouiJ cJII the ~CL'~ 
"Other". the Subject whose mandate they acct!ptcd. 
\Vhat is more. rhi~ formulation seems to indicate one pt.)s~ible reason for the NCL':. neglect of 
pulitical work. The helief that the NCL's leading. and recruiting role was already "ini:::n~dy 
desired" by the 1)ppressed would imply that it wa!) not nect:ssary to build political support for that 
role, because that political support <.~]ready existed. This is not merely a particular quirk of 
Vigne's. Here, for example, we see a similar move in tbc discourse of Eddit: Daniels. !)peaking 
25 years later. When asked about the NCL's rdation to the masses, he responds: 
" ... our aim of course was to bring about changes for the masses. The only reason wby 
we did not g11 out to the masses to recruit was because ... it is difficult because that's 
what happened to the ANC and the PAC in the early years. Tbey had so many 
informers that they were smashed . So we did nm go public and advertise our presence 
but our ideal& wen! the same as the ideals of tbe masses . We wanted change.2-1 
The logic uf this passage is similar to the previous one and the pre constructed "the ideals of the 
mas.ses" is very similar to that of "the desirt: ... ". Notice how Daniels's argument relates 
essentially to recruitmt:nt: although a concrete link with mass struggle was too risky, that lack 
did not really cut off the NCL from the masse!>. They wert: still linked with the masses because 
they, as it were, occupied the same place as the:: masses, desired the same thing. 
But how is the question of the "desire of the:: masses" decided'? An e)(ploration of this question 
shows that Vigne and Daniels' conceptions conceals a complex parado)(. After invoking the 
desire of the ma~ses in the passage quoted abo\"e, Vigne justifies his assertion in terms that arc 
surprising. According to them. this Jesire is evidenced 
" ... by the contemporary social. political and economic condition of our country."25 
It is upon the basis of a discussion of this "social. plllitical and <:conomic condition' that the need 
for the NCL's leading role is finally assertt:d. The crucial point here is that nowhere in tht: 
discussion that follows is the consciousness of "the masses", their actions and their 
understanding, problematised for even a moment. The "desire" of tbe oppressed, it seems, is 
simply "read off' from the social context. Precisely at the moment when the mas!">es and their 
de5.irc are invoked, th<:y disappear from view. 
The only way in which this move could m:~ke sense is if Vigne is understood not to be making 
an empirical poinl. He is not talking about what any specific oppressed South African might 
ln1emew wuh Eddie Dan•els. Hou1 Oa) 18 OteL"II>er 11)87. 
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articulate as his or her wish. Rather, this is a point abuut what would count as the desire of the 
masses. It refers to what the masses would want if they knew what to want! In a sense the 
"masses" with reference tn whose desire the NCL justifies its leading role is a metaphysical 
construct . .::x.isting outside and beyond any spccif~e manifestation. In NCL discourse, behind and 
beyond the quiescent proletariat and the backward peasantry. there existed ""the African masses·· 
ln abstracto, who must eventually support the NCL, reject apanhcid, and rise up in revolution. 
This, then, is how the "'disappearance·· of the masses from centre-stage in the above passage. and 
their replacement by a "social... context" is possible: :--.ICL discourse places the masses in a 
specific and final way, and closes the question of what it is that they desire. 
Perhaps the bet.t way of explaining this problem is to refer to the critique mounted by the 
Yugoslavian theorist Slavoj Zizek of the justification, in Eastern-Bloc countries, of the rule of 
the Party by referring to the will of "the People". This justification, Zizek observes. contrasts 
interestingly with that of kingly rule. Whereas a royal monarch lcgitimises her rule .,.ith 
reference to a divine right, and can never admit that she rules only because the people allow her 
to, the party makes this fact the centrepiece of its legitimacy: 
" ... the Party thinks [it] is the party because lit] represents the People's real interests, 
because it is rooted in the People e:<prcssing its wii1 .. :<?6 
Zizck points out that the conventional critique, namely "the obvious fact that the majority of the 
people really doesn't support party rule", rh.ough it might be true, misses the point. Such a 
criticism is premised on the presupposition that this justification functions on an empirical level, 
and is hence open to empirical falsilication. Zizck argues, however, that what has to be grasped 
is that phra.~es like '"the whole people supports the Party"" cannot be ralsified: 
" ... behind the constatation of 3 fact we have a circular definition of the People: ... the 
real member of the People is only he who supports the Party: thos.e who are working 
agains.t the rule of the Party are automatically excluded from the people ... "~7 
This circular defmition is not a piece of "bad faith", a cynical totalitarian lie. It proceeds, Zizck 
observes, precisely from the fact that in such discourses the People is constructed "as a unit.)'" 
and that the party tries to represent that unity.~8 The notion of "the will of the people" is a 
construct: it is the result of an operation of abstraction from the disparate, fragmented, 
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abstraction that one can detect both in Vigne's document and Daniels's statement. A close reading of 
the NCL documcnl.s shows the full implications of such a move. 
An interesting consequence, for example, is the disappearance of the ~masses" as historical actors in 
crucial passages of the documents and the curious way in which the role of the oppressed people as 
an historical agent is downplayed. Vigne, for example, closes his paper wilh the announcement that 
"we sec the mortal struggle to come as our own responsibility which, on behalf or the 
oppressed people or South Arrica, we accept to the full."29 
The contrast with the previously quoted passage in which the oppressed people are constructed as a 
revolutionary subject should be clear. Though the onus for making the changes falls on the 
shoulders of the people, they are, it seems, absent from the polilical field when it comes to acting on 
that onus. '111ey act only by proxy, through the NCL 
A similar tendenq is noticeable in Vigne's description of the transition 10 armed struggle: 
"The banning of Congress and crippling of other Iibera tory organisations by proscription of 
members and by laws removing freedom of assembly and speech, effectively forced the 
leader.; of the rightless four-fifths of the South African people to seek military means of 
liberation now that the means of civil struggle had been struck. from their hands."30 
It should be Guile obvious that it is the leaders who arc the acting subjects in this passage; it is they 
who seek military means of liberntion, and from their hands that the means of civil struggle have 
been struck. Again, the "rightless four-fifths'' seem to act only at second hand: they are present 
only in their leaders. Note, too, the revealing language in which the NCL's London Commillee 
assesses the organisational strl:ngth of the ANC and PAC. According to them, inside the country 
"It is difficult to assess to what degree [the ANC has} been destroyed by the Rivonia 
nrresl'i ... they would still seem to have personnel but seem to lack mntedal.s and 
tr-aining ... We cannot comment on the PAC at home. They seem to have received their 
quietus. "31 
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The PAC by cnntrast is broke and badly ~plit abroad ... "J: 
Here, th~ pn:construckd "" being in good shape "' is articulated in relation to it~ "having money" . 
Again, the f<)CUS. of th~: discussion relates in the first pi<:.tce to their efficacy, to the technical 
aspects L)f tht:ir functioning, and not to their pulitkal strength. Nl)te. also. the. rderence above 
to the ANC's mass support constructed in terms of per!'jonnel . In a parallel formulation , 
leftv.ich refers to the elmer contact other organisations ha\·e with the mass of oppressed South 
Africans in revealing terms: 
"[At that} time we shall be ablt: to present to an army. recruited either by us or by 
others mon: closely in touch with a pool of potential recruit!'j, a highly competent wing 
of experts ... "33 
This operation of abr.traction explain~ why the 1'\Cl could continue with sabotage, even when all 
the indications seemed to be against it, why, though individual mcmbers might leave, it WM at 
least possible to go on. By extension, it also explains the NCL's lack ol" attention to the need for 
ma.'>s political work. The fact that the mar.se!> did not rise up in response to the NCL's acts or to 
anything else would not invalidate the assumption regarding the desire of the masses, and the 
\ faith that they would eventually act in accordance with this desire . ll would only mean that the 
time was not yet ripe, that the masses did not yet know their desires, or that the NCL was not 
being effecti'v·e enough in its "inspiring' role . Any specilic fact about the urban proletariat, then, 
is seen as external to the question of what they really desire. No merely empirical comradiction 
would necessarily force the NCL to question its basic assumptions. 
Note, for eKample, the terms of Leftwich's discussion of the difficulty of establishing secure 
guerilla bases in South Africa. He compares the South African s.itualion with Algeria, where 
there were 
" ... vast areas of land which were uninhabited and when sparsely inhabited there was no 
french presence. These areas served as internal bases and had the l'.Upport of the 
population, UNITED in its aim of throwing off Frueh rule."~ 
Note the meaning which is given to the notion of having "'the support of the local population". A 
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The comparison ~hows us the meaning. in NCL discourse. of the pre constructed "the support of 
the popuJation": the argument implies that becau:<.e the masses support the FLN, it must mean 
that the FLN's aim is lhl'irs. Then: i~ an implicit ~!ippage from the notion that the population 
desired to throw our the settlers 10 the notion that they supported the FLN: the two are taken, in 
this discourse, to mean the same_ 
There is, at first glance, not much that is surprising. But the interesting point is that the converse 
is not true: if rhe masses do not support a11 initiative, it docs not in .... alidatc thC;' NCL's 
interpretation of the n3ture of that "desire". the idea, as Daniels put it, that their ideals "were the 
same as the ideals of the mas5.cs··. Thu~ Leftwich argues: 
"while there are obvious concentrations of whites in key areas, there are, generally 
speaking white farmers or traders in almost every area of the country. The white 
population must be !>ecn as part and parcel, for military purposes, of the regime and 
its forces. In addition to this there are the plain and regrettable fact of inrormers, 
tumcoats and Go,·t. supporters amongst the mass of the people. the Africans . 
... If it were not discovered hy the vast net of police and army. and if it were not 
discovered by the smattering of whites, then it would still have to hope to avoid 
db;covery and reporting by the people in the rural areas where the le't'l'l or political 
consciousness i!> not yet at a point where it could and would support the guerillas.''3(, 
Though the possibility is admitted that {sections of) the masses might substantially diverge- from 
the ~CL, thi!'t does not invalidate the project t)f the guerilla organisation or the notion that it is 
acting out the desire of the people. It is seen as being either due to the fact that people have 
turned traitor ("informers, turncoats and Government supporters"), or, revealingly, to the idea 
that consciousness is not developed enough: consciousness would be seen as "developed", 
presumably, when the rural population do support the NCL. This shows how the. concept of the 
"desire of the people" can survive empirical difference untouched. This is the meaning of Zizek's 
point regarding the concept of the People in Party ideology: the Other is not an empirical other. 
but a construction, a presupposilion about who the People must be. 
But something even more important is shown by this passage- than the mere di!>juncture betwee-n 
the (abstract) notion of the desire of the people and particular cases of articulated desire about 
what they will or .,..;,11 not support. This is revealed by the treatment of the realisadon that the 
rural population might be politically undeveloped. Wherea~ it might ordinarily seem to imply 
automatically that their consciousness needs to be developed, and thus opens the project of 
politi,al work. in the rural areas, this possibility is simply ignored. Leftwich. having pointed out 
S v Daniel~ . Exh C7. p.3. 
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that se<:ure bases are difficult to establish, simply cominuc.s developing other areas of his argument. 
It seems that the task of developing that consciousness is not the task of any party or organisation. 
Instead, the notion that a "developed" consciousness would supersede the ••undeveloped" 
consciousness of the peasantry. and that the "turncoats" would continue constituting just a small part 
of the population seems to be based on simple assertion. Here, it should be poosiblc to detect echoes 
of the confidenl Liberal assertions or the triumph of democracy that we saw in Chapter 3. Just as 
radical liberal discourse was baSeL! on the presupposition that the injustices of apanheid were so 
enormous, the rationality of non-racial co-operation so evident, that all sensible people must in the 
end be won over to the liberal cause, so Lefiwich's faith in the inevitability of revolulion seems to be 
based on the simple a~umption that the spirit of resistance is s.o undying that it must inevitably 
prevaiL In Vigne's document, a similar faith is expressed when he states that 
"The former political strength of the ANC and PAC make it cenain that their presently 
smashed military formations will revive in due course. Very heavy losses have been 
suffered, but their spirit of resistance has in no wise been broken. 37 
At other times lhe NCL seems to have had a strongly teleological conception of the nature of the 
development of political consciousness. It would develop automatically in a dire<:lion the end-point 
of which the NCL had already detennined. lllis teleology can be discerned in the NCL's conception 
of the proo;ss of political unification and co-operation with other organisations. It is interesting to 
note lhat it is not seen as ne<:css.1ty for the NCL to go actively about convincing the other 
organisations to accept its position. It seems as if this acceptance would not primarily now from 
such persuasive wack. Instead, practical co-operation is seen "in due course" as leading of itself to 
politia:!l resolution; unity of purpose is expected to now naturally from practical work. lt looks as 
if for them there was something about the very nature of pragmatic co-operation in itself which 
would lead to political agreement, so that the c)l[periencc of practical work iaseU would be the 
persuasive force. Look, for example, at the way in wh1ch the London Committee conceptualises the 
process by which the NCL would replace the SACP in its alliance with the ANC: 
37 
38 
"while those fctlows arc still certainly part of the partnership abroad, ... they will soon [be] 
seen to have outlived their wefulness lo lhe ANC here. In fact we are continually asked 
to do certain jobs for them here... It should be the motlo of the NCL "by our works ye 
shall know us" and deeds make friends quicker than words ... Js 
S vII !non, M4(~). p. 3. 
S v lllrson, M4( I), p. 2 
170 
The conceptual oppos-ition between wonls and d.:e& .. is significant here. "Words" are mere talk, 
an: irrdevant to the struggle, have no real con~equences in ~truggle. win no \ictorie~. They 
belong, ohviously enough. to the realm of ideological ~truggle and commitment. Deeds. on the 
other hands, have consequences, are "useful". Org.ani~ations that did have ideological axes to 
grind would, afler the experience of successful pragmatic co-operation, hopefully see !he 
counterproductiwness of this attitude. and would start to be guided, like the NCL, simply by 
"objective" imperatives of how best to fight the revolutionary war effectively. These two 
processe5 - the winning over of the ANC to an alliance with the NCL, and the development of 
the consciousne.<.s of the peasantry follow, I would suggest. !he <;arne general logic. For the 
NCL, they would both flow from the ··nature of things". 
One aspect of Leftwich's downplaying of the need for practical political work is thus easy to 
explain. The NCL did not emphasise con.!>cientisation of "the ma~ses" because they saw no need 
for it. Tbe masses would rise up, as it were, on their OWTl steam; and the ANC would simply 
recognise the superior virtue of the NCL. This, however, is only half the story. There was 
another reason for the NCL's blindness to the need for mass politics. 
This reason flows out of the basic logical assumptions upon which the abovementioned teleology 
is based. It is premised, as we have seen, on the differentiation between a flexible pragmatism 
on the one hand, which took cognisance of objective facls and was adaptable in the face of 
altering circumstances, and ideological inflexibility. which was rigid and did not adapt itself to 
changing circumstances. Tha~ was precisely why the former was preferable to the latter: only 
revolutionaries who thought on their feet, as it were, would survive and succeed, whereas the 
wages of blinkered ideological commitment were failure . 
But how, then, to fight those: ideological blinkers? Leftwich supposed that the experience of the 
objective advantages of pragmatism would open organisations' eyes to the disadvantages of 
ideological rigidity. The NCL's technical efficiency would win over allies. But logically speaking 
those very objective advantages were preCisei~ what ideology hid from you! Differently put, 
ideological narrowness and sectarian commitment was a disease which rendered the patient 
immune to the cure. This means that in a very important sense, the NCL would not be able to 
bandle cases where the oppressed population's eonsciousm:ss diverged from the organisation's 
notions, The "correct" understanding of the South African situation was (for the NCL) so 
obvious, flowed .r.o naturally from objectively a\·ailable, self·e..,ident fact.<., that a different 
understanding was incomprehensible. They could only see such difference as belonging to the 
realm of illusion, caused ~ither by the blinkers of ideology or by the misguiding efforts of the 
<;tate. 
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This was to have very problematic consequences for Leftwich ·s notion of the function of political 
wor.k . Thi~ i>. evidenced in Leftwich's argument against the Communist Party line; 
·'The CP /Spear people argue that one merely needs to get the (working dassl organized 
and the probkms arc over. To us. this is facile. Firstly the problems of organitation 
are immense. The network of informers is so wide and so efficient that the moment 
one becomes efticient as an organizer or the moment a group is formed it will either be 
crushed, arrested, or its leadership shorn from iL Furthermore , it is our contention that 
in the context of the booming economy, and the ri:o.ing wages for African workers • 
which is a rather clever move by the induslrial supporters of the regime - the African 
urban proletariat is UNLIKELY to respond 10 a call to rise - unle55 there is some real 
c~rtainty of winning. There have been too many failures in the history of SA politics, the 
might and fury of the police has been demonstrated only too often, and the mood of the 
urban population is one which suggests to them that quiet apoliticism, enjoying what 
vicarious benefits come their way as a result of the economic expansion, is by far the 
safer course to follow."39 
The above passage shows that Leftwich doc:r. not seem to have had any illusions regarding the 
mood of the urban proletariat. The lack of emphasis on mass politics in his discourse i~ not the 
result of a "tinderbox" hypothesis regarding the political understanding of th.e masses, a notion 
that the masses were ready for revolution. 
Ic this connection, it is particularly revealing th.at Leftwich, with perhaps a tinge of irony, uses 
the phrase "merely needs lo get the [working cla<is] organised'".-'0 Although Leftwich criticises 
the Communist Party for underestimating the difficulties of working-class organisation, it is he 
wbo is guilty of this. An investigation of his argument shows that in his conception working-class 
organisation contains no inherent difficulties of its own, that it presupposes already-existing 
political support that merely ha~ to be "cashed" - that it is, in other words, merely a technical 
and organisational task. From this flows the passagc"s strangest feature: it seems to operate in 
terms of a completely inverted notion of the importance and place of political wor.k. Whereas 
usually a knowledge of the un-revolutionary state of mass consciousness is the main argument in 
ravour of mass political work, here it is the main argumem against it! 
This inversion, it seems, is a consequence of the abovementioned incomprehensibility of 
different auitudes to struggle, the closure of the question of the "desire" of the masses. As in the 
case of liberal discowse more generally, Leftwich's position is characterised by an inability to 
handle diiTtn:nce. h seems as if the NCL's teleology made it logically impossible for them to 
"'place" instances of consciousness th.at diverged from what they understood to be the "desire'" of 
the peopk of South Africa. As in the discussion of Algeria and South Africa quoted above, 
S"' Daniel5. EJ(h Cb. p. 8 . 
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con!:ic iou~ness is e i thcr sc en a~ simp lc cnncurrt>nce with the ~uerilla figh tc r~' aims, or considered 
as antagonistic to the NCL, or at l~ast nut ~upporli\'c. In neither case is there a conception of a 
coh.:rcnt and independent project of allt:ring that consciousness. Leftwich's conception of the 
nature 1..'f revolutionary consciousnc~s. in oth~r words, can bt: summed up in the <.logan u5eJ by 
Ken Kcsey in The Electric Kooi-Aid Add Tr!.t. namely that "you're either on the bus or off the 
bus".~ 1 Popular consciousness was either developed. in accordance with their aims - in which 
ca!'.e political work was not nc-ce55ary - or that consciousness was undeveloped or misguided, in 
which 01.~e it was a given outsid~ the NCL's controL and political work ""'as useless. 
The consequences of this impossibility can he dt:tceted throughoU! Leftwich's texts. Though 
sahotage was primarily a signifying act. a "prupaganda tool". that "propaganda" function wa,r, 
conceived of in a very limiteJ way.~2 The: idea that the NCL would, through actf, or sabotage of 
sufficient competence:, he: able to huild up legitimacy in the eyes of mass organisation, a "stock of 
credits" that would "earn them a place·· in the re\·olutionary alliance is tla!>ed on a similar 
assumptiun. Once again, it is assum~,J th;ll ~uch rc\'olutionary legitimacy is not invested with 
ideological value: 1 hat its appn.:ci at ion is ideologically nc: ut ra I and that pol it ica I war k i!> t hercfore 
not necessary in the proCt'SS of earning it. The ~-ery metaphor of a "stock of credit~" betrays much 
here: it reveals the presupposition that there is a common currency, valid throughout the terrain 
of revolutionary struggle, anJ immecliatdy r~cogni'>ahk as such by all. 
This has serious consequences, for it eventually means that the NCL's rok in the broader 
struggle is conceptualised in a deeply contradictory way. This contradiction comes out 1ery 
ckarly in Ldtwich's papers: on the one hand, it is .-,~en in \anguardist terms, as occupying quite 
a central pos.ition in an insurrection, "leading ant.! recruiting" the National Freedom Army. hs 
~kills and services form the logistical backbone of the struggle. and il.s non-~ectarian valut's anJ 
ideological fle:tibllity arc- what should be adopted if the revolution is to succeed at all. 
But at the samt"" time the grouping is abo 'kscdht'd in lt"rms that put it in a position oddly 
distant from that mass struggle. Throughout m~ discu~sion of Leflwich's papers one obvious 
question is nol considered: namely. the question of how such an uprising is to occur. Even if 
·II The f uti text of Kesey·s quote os: There are gotng 10 he t1 mes... when we can't '''~it for somehO<Jy 'I. ow. 
you're: etrhcr on the l:>us oi off the I:> us. If you're on the l:>us and you get left bchmd. th~n you'll ftnd it agaon. 
If vou·n: off the bus in the fin! place. then ot -..-on't malic .a damn." !Tom Wolie. Tht' Eletiric Kook~id -'cid 
Te~t. p. 7.1.) Sec my comments on the sl rurt urc of Kcscy'!> log••· on p. J78 . 
Th15 t!> true not onl~ of Lcfi"-·Kh-s dJ!>cout"5c. but ~lso of oth<:r .'\Cl memt>er..· thought on the masse~· 
response to s~botage. To s-ec sahmagc as po!>Sthl) inspll'lng the ma•~~ 10 nsc up 111 onsurrcctoon would 
make -.:nsc on!~· tf the masses aiNad) Jesne<l freedom and re.-ogniscd the ncc<.J for forceful re\'olutoon 
aga mst the stat e. !'he same goes for the rc late<.J ode a of >al:>ot-.ge t>oosting 1 he mo r-.Jic of 1 !le m;;sses. or of it 
mdKanng to them that the go•cmment ~>oas not all·po10.-erful anoJ that re.stsoance ~>oa' ~ttl! pos~tl,lc . Sat>otage 
mad~ >e n!>t on!~ on the .usumpt ion 1 hat 1 he polittcal hall te v.·a~ a! ready sci\ led. 
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such a spontaneous insurrection did take place. another probll:m arises vis a "is the notion that 
the NCL would play a kading part in il. Both these eventualities seem to be taken for granted 
as inc\itable. The NCL is therefore in the paradoxical position of a vanguarJ party which has to 
wait for the ma:-.scs to arise spontaneously - and has to hope that they will equaUy spontaneously 
recognise it as their leader! 
This contradiction can be der,cribed from a different angle. for it has curious consequence!. for 
tbe way in which Leftwich conccptualilie!'. time. We ha\·e here an essentially eschatological 
conception of political time. In its terms. acts gain meaning in terms of some future event, while: 
their present meaning is relatively unimportant. In this, the NCL's discourse bears a remarkable 
similaricy, for e;gmple, to peasant millenarianism or Christian traditions tllat focus on the 
question of the "readiness" of the subject at some (uturc moment of judgement and which 
tbr;rcforr; arc conc~rned not with the present effect of an act. but wirh its eventual meaning:H 
This is in marked contrast to the prevailing organisation of political time in literate societies, 
wbere time is conceived as a linear progression and the value of political acts are conceived 
precisely in relation to the accumulation of their consequences .~ 
These point:. seem to me to indicate tile central t:nigma of the NCL One question above all 
others is raised by the documents of Lehwich and the other central members: if their hopes for 
the future depended upon the possibility of a mass uprising, why did they never recognise the 
task of organising such an uprising? Their entire political project seems to have hinged on £Wo 
basic assumptions - firstly that a mass insurrection would rake place, and secondly that, come 
sucb a mas5 insurrection, the NCL would, even though it has played no role in the creation of 
such an insurrection, be in a position to lead it. But both these assumptions seem to be based on 
simple assertion, a simple act of faith. 
43 b ·cn more signific-dntly it resembles. m thi~ aspect. renain strands of 'vtarxism. A rlose reading of the texts 
H in.on produced under the aeg~s of the Sociahst League of Africa . for irmance. re,·eals a $imilar 
didtctomi:ioatton of ttme. On the one hand there is the world of present day struggles in whi<"h (I J worker1; 
have no danry about their rmere~ts and are led a~! ray b)· the opportunrst mac·hinations of Congre5S and (!) 
theore11roan~ (not being '"'o r~rng class) ran never iul\1.· pen~:trate the 'etl maskong the way fo!"'ard to 
socialism. On the other there ts a crucial break marlied hy rhe setlUre of po ... er by the ~~ooorking class . The 
interesting thing is rnar rhe relationsh.ip berween these f'Uo'Cl ttmes rs deeply problematrc. In talking about the 
wa;r in whit•h the worktng dass y,1\l ··;n r he end '' accept its revol uuonary class rote. Hi ~n fa Us ba<"k on a 
mnception of struggle be ing "clc men rar and rn a cerra in dimensron unt heorisahle tin re rvie" . lond.on. 
5.5. !989), His .Marxism becomes therefore a spencs of polttrcal mollenanamsm at which the moment of the 
workrng rlaSl.'s acccptan<"e of us "troe" role 1s removed from any direct relation to the here-and- nD'l.' polttrcs 
of South Afri<"a. and recedes to 1 he hanson of faith in "h istoncaltne• otability". 
nus ronception of political time should not be confused with the essen1ially cy~liral conreption5 of ume thai 
chararferi~ pre-literate. oral sorienes (see Benedict Ander5oo. Imagined Communitie~: ReOenion.~ on the 
Origin an&! Spn-ad or :\ationalio;m (l.ondon. \'er5o. 1 ')B3) pp. }8 - ~OJ The eliChatologrcal ronception of 
politicalume founll in the :\'CL belong>. (or all its unu~ual features. solidly to modern. liternte temporality. 
A "blind spot" characterised their thinking -a blinu <;pot in the rull phy<;iological ~t:nse. the point 
flf which is not so much that the vie\'vl:r doL's not scc a g.i\·en object, but that the gap caused by 
the !->lind spot is itself also invi~ible: for Leftwich seems to havl.' found it impossible to think his 
way through this contradiction or t:vcn to set: it as problematic. ln the following passage, fur 
exampk he points out that the NCL's proposed 5tr:.~t~,;gy 
" ... is predicatt:d on the assumption that a time: will come whc=.n guerilla warfare will be 
possible. u-15 
He seems to be on the very verge of making the assumption itself the subject of his argument -
and then simply continues blithely as i£ it doe5 m1t t:\t:n merit discus!>ion. He simply says that at 
that time the NCL shall step in, proceeding to write about the insurrectionary "army" as if its 
existence is an accomplished fact. 
This move is .a perennial feature of these documents. In fact. the reader is often struck by the 
way in which the possibility of such an insurrection, while forming the very basis and hinge of 
NCL strategy, i~ presented subjunctively. Leftwich's te),l abounds, for example, with disclaimers 
10 the effect that "We do not attempt here to prophecy the patterns of change nor altempt to 
indicate just how or when it will occur,"-16 and in a later pa:\sage his argument about the 
possibility of an insurrection hinges on the eventuality of "if a state of emergency were to 
rcsult..:•.-17 But at the: same time. the -;trategy of contmuing with sabotage and intelligence 
gathering depends crucially on just such an eventuality. In each of these formulations the idea 
of a general insurrection is projected forward to some unspecified - and, the te.l(t~ suggest, 
unspecifiable ·point in time, while thdr inevit.:~bility is never questioned. 
As an attempt to come to grips with the problem of continuing effective resistance against the 
apartheid regime Leftwich's position is thus deeply problematic. It was characterised by an 
inability to answer or even pose the questions that arose from the very terms of the project he 
c~1nceiveJ. In addition • and this is the crucial point - it did not allow Leftwich to state an 
alternative practice beyond the continuation (albeit lower-profiled) of sabotage. 
1.3 Liberal discourse and political choke 
We are now in a position to return to the NCL'.s decision to go over to a renewed attack after 
the Rivonia trial. Although the evidence about that meeting is contradictory and vague. my 
S ,. Dani,h. E.~h C7. p. 6. 
S ,. Danitl~. Exh C6. p. 9. 
Ibid •. p. ll. 
17:' 
analysis places u_~ in a pt•sition to understand th<! dilemma in which the NCL was placed, and the 
framework within which it addn:ssed the probkm!> it faced. In particular, we can now 
understand the limitation~ of this framework. and the wn;,equences of this fram~work fur the 
1'1CL's decision. 
The central categories. uf the NCL's conceptuali~ation of politics, while they played such a 
central enabling role, at the same time placed fatal limits on their strategic thought. In the first 
place it vitiated NCL members' thought on the organisation's relationship to the masses. 
Leftwich's intervention, together with the opinions exprcs;,ed in the documents of the London 
committee, was an attempt to rhink through these problems and did succeed in raising the 
question of the NCL's relation to the pntentially rcvt~luti01;1ary mass of oppressed South 
African.'\. But their exclusion of ideology from revolutionary struggle meant that mass support 
could never be seen as one of the stakes of that struggle. h was impossible for Leftwich to 
conceive of the masses having a political understanding different from the NCL's, a 
eons.ciousness eluding or exceeding the NCL's attempts at formulating it. but which could still be 
described as (potentially) revolutionary. IL was therefor..- also impossible to conceive of the 
raising of the level of consciousness of the masses as a discrete and political task. And in the 
end, it was impossible for him to conceive of the masses. as having any role beyond that of mere 
muscle-power. 
When the ~.trategy of sabotage became increasingly problematic towards tlu: end of 1963, it did 
not offer them a framework within which they could "place" those difficulties and think them 
through politically. They were unable 1 o politically assess t h cir lack of success. In terms of the 
position enunciated in the documents by Ldtwich, Yigne and the London committee, the NCL 
could do nothing except mark time and accumulate know-how while the masses were quiescent. 
The very project of organising the insurrection itself was inconcei\•able. They could only wait. 
Secondly, a similar problem cropped up in the discourse of the liberals in the NCL whose 
involvement proceeded from a perception of themselves as ordinary peuple trying to bring the 
governml.'nt to its senses. In the end, liberal discourse offered to members of the NCL <.~nd of 
the liberal Party alike only two choices; either to give up · which meant giving up politics 
altogetner - or to "try harder", to continue doggedly in the face of ddeat. Thus, even though he 
acknowledges that "there is a contradiction"-'8 in his s.aying so, Hugh Lewin 5til! articulates a 
belief that it seemed at the time necessary to continue trying, that e\·en if one despaired uf the 
white electorate ever coming w it!> senses there was still the hope that 
lntervu~w with Hugh Le10'in. 10<'. cit. 
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" if you create enough, you know. crooat~· ..:nough disruption, if you create cnou!?h 
awarenes:. then people might actually come to their senses. "-t'' 
To gin: up was a choice that indi\'iuual mcmhcr~ could make, but m terms of their own 
commitment to the NCL it was a difficult one. It would, in effect, he a choice for abandoning 
politics altogether - and that, in view of the strong ethos ol commitment hound up with being a 
member of the ~CL, was not an easy step to take. (iiving up would betray everything the NCL 
had stood for. It is small wonder then that they decided to continue trying. 
Here lies the irony of so many liberal critiques of the NCL: in their discourse, the commitment 
to peaceful protest of a Paton and the headlong rush into violence and sabotage are opposite 
poles.50 Paton's statement that "Although we do not live in a democratic wciety, we intend to 
b~::have as though we do""51 is therefore seen as a keeping-faith with liberal ideals - ideals the 
NCL betrayed through its choice for sabotage. It now seems that on another level, the 
NCL/ ARM and Paton had come up with precisely the same answer to the question posed to 
them hy the apparent failure of protest. Though the NCL differed deeply from Alan Paton in its 
choice of as dramatic a strategy as sabotage, Paton'.<. insistence on perseverance in a symbolic 
protest even if it fell on d~af ears is mirrored precisely in the NCL's eventual choice to continue. 
7.4 Theoretical interlude: lhe conetpt ofthe "ideological fantasy" 
In the last two chapters I have analysed the suhterranean logic of two related but discrete 
discourses: the presuppo,.,itions of the politics of sabotage-as-protest on the one hand, and 
Leftwich"s effon to place the NCL in the broader conte:<t of the armed struggle on the other. 
Though their concerns were quite different. my analysis has shown a number of points of 
similarity between them. These arc: partly due to their shared roots in liberal ideology. But the 
analysis has also shown a similarity at another lc\·el: the level of the structure of these 
discourses. 
A central moment in the analysis of both bodic:s of dhcourse was the uncovering of the point at 
wltich the rich play of substitutions - the way in which one preconstructed IS articulated as 
equivalent (or oppming) to another, and that is again related to still another- suddenly ceases. 
Concepts such as the notion of tht: desire of the masses (what the masses would desire if they 
knew what to de: sire), the transcendent obviousness and universality of liberal values (the values 
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further equivalences. They were not thcm~dws further explicable in terms of yet more 
signifiers. In other word~. they were not subsiuiary term-., th~ crucial organising noti•ms in terms 
of which the 1\)tality of clements of NCL and liberal di ;.cour-..: make sense . These terms seem to 
occupy the pr.:cisc place of the policeman's cry of · He~. You!" in Allhusscr·s metaphor for 
interpellation. 
At the same time we saw the essentialty paradoxical, sc!f-dl:constructive nature of these central 
terms. For though they enabled a political practice, they did not allow the answering of the 
question~ that political practice raised. They confronted libcral5 with difference, but did not 
allow them to place that difference . Though liberals were conscious of the distance between 
them and their fcllow-muntrymen, they could not relate that distance to the overall terms of 
their project; though Leftwich was aware of the empirical fact s of the <,late of consciousness of 
oppressed South Africans, he could not conceive of the implications of thc5e facts for his notion 
that the NCL was acting out the "'desire" of the masse5. In both cases I have shown how this led 
to a proliferation of paradoxes. ln the liberal di!>course of the "'ordinary person" as well as in 
Leftwich's papers on the NCL"s place in a mass insurrection one can detect a series. of extreme 
and opposite choices: in the former, complete tli.c;illu:;ionment versus the dogged faith in protesl-
for-its-own-sake; in the Iauer, a commitmcnl to being the vanguard of the masses versus an 
inability to do anything to mark time until they arose. These contradictory movements were 
united, for all their contradictoriness, under the centrality and the unquestionability of these 
organising terms. 
These paradoxes were not an incidental aspect of NCL and liberal uiscourse. They were part 
and parcel of its very being. They llowctl, from the central move by which the5e discourses 
abstracted from empirical reality. This is why Ken Kcsey"s quote about being ""on·· or "off" Lhc 
bus52 i5 such an appropriate way of under<;tanding the problems of NCL discourse. The 
wonderfully circular logic of that epigram (if you're on the bus. you 'll lind it again, and if you're 
not, it doesn't matter) is structured by the fact that the central category (being ··on the bus") is 
col an empirical given but is abstracted from the empirical. The same goes for the discourses 
here analysed: the central concepts of liberal anti NCL discourse were based on a similar 
abstracting move In liberal discourse generally thi.r, abstracting move war. that by which liberals 
distinguished between the 5hort-term rationality of apartheid on the one hand and the wisdom of 
the "long view" on the oth.cr: in the discussion of the "'desire of the masses" it wa5 the distinction 
between lhe empirical desires of individual South Africans and what they would want if they 
knew what to want. In each case the discour5t.: in question. whether i1 was the world of Kescy\ 
52 Sec (oar note -H above. 
followers or that of liberal N'CL members was protected against the pressure of empirical 
counterfactuals: the central and organising co no.: pl.'> of their discourse transcended these 
counter factual.'>, they organised the em prical. ami cxi~tcd on an entirely different plane from it. 
Tbe :'-iCL/ ARM's apparent hlimln~ss. in other words, was the product. nut of frustration or 
irrationality but of something much mnrc elu~i, ·c . It was not a mere absence in their thought, 
not an oversight or lacuna that could simply he filled in or supplemented. It ran much deeper 
than that. Their inability to face up to the question of the organisation of an insurrection was 
not an incidental but an e5sential ckm~.:nl 11f their discour~: it was structurally part of it. In 
fact. the positive consistency of the NCL's discourse, the entire edifice of their ideology 
depended precisely on an oversight. on the precondition that they could not ask c~ rtain 
question,r,. In the NCL we come up against the crucial question, not only of the way in which 
ideology interpellates individuals as subject~. but of how the successful interpellation depends 
aJso in a manner of speaking upon blindness, a gap in the ideological facade. I am stating, in 
other words, that "blind spots" have their own logic+ that they are not a mere absence, but have 
their own structure and ,r,olidity. 
Zizd:: focuses on this moment of "blindness" and suggests that it is an e:.scntial feature of evel)' 
discourse and not just of the ideology of the NCL - or, for that matter, the Merry Pranksters. 
This point is based on Zizek's Lacanian interpretation of Althusscr. which focuses on the 
implications of the linguistic nature of the ideological interpellation. 
A close look at the logic of the s~mbolic realm as CLmceivcd by Saussure show,r, that his concepr 
of meaning as relational, and of language as a system of differences, has apparently problematic 
consequences. Since there is no element out~ide and undetermined by the system the value of 
any given element depends on tht: play of difference in a tield without positive terms.53 The 
importance of this point cannot be overempbasi'\ed. Its general tendency is to undermine the 
notion of the signified as scl£-containcd. dS united with the signif1er in a reciprocal unity. A:. 
Jacque,r, Derrida points out, undermining the concept of a "transcendental signified", of a 
meaning which would itself be independent of the play of difference, extends the domain and 
play of signification indelinitely . s~ Meaning's relationality therefore implies irs unlixity. It is 
never stabilised: each term's meaning lies in its sub<:>titutability with a term [urther down a chain 
which in essence can he seen to be infinite. The implications of this point of view can perhaps 
be well explained by thinking of the way in which, j[ we ask ror the meaning of a signifier. the 
5J 
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answer is usually supplied in tenns of another signifier. 1he meaning of that signifier must be 
explained in terms of yet another ... The moment when the play of signification comes to rest is 
indefinitely deferred. Lac..:.an recognises and places great importance on this unftxity of meaning: 
For him, every signified is commutable, can function in tum as a signifier. Meaning is always 
provisional. never resolved back: into a pure indication of the reaJ.SS 
But the subversion of the idea of a self-contained signified does not mean that meaning disappears 
altogether. The incessant sliding of signification, the play of difference between floating elements, 
can be temporarily and partiaUy checked by what Lacan terms points de apiton. These arc nodal 
points at which ~ central signifier fixes lhc relationships between itself and the other signifiers, thus 
ending the ceaseless play of subsitutions and thus creating what P&:heux has called ~ "logically 
stabilised universe".S6 ln such a universe, lhere is no need to continue the potentially infinite play 
of subsituttion: at a ccnain point. we have simply reached what is 'too simple to explain'. The 
central ooncepl<> I have isolated in the previous pages have precisely this status. Though in principle 
there is no need to "stop" anywhere with the substitution of one signifier for another, in any stable 
discourse it does stop at some leveL These basic moments at which the play of signification 
(provisionaUy) stops correspond precisely to the central concepts of NCL discourse 1 have isolated; 
the unifying signifiers that I have compared to the policeman's cry. 
Zizek emphasises one important fact about the point de aplton: they get their value precisely from 
their mere organising and tota!ising function within the discourse. The implications of tttis 
point might be explained in relation to a familiar phenomenon: lhe way in which inter-
ideological debates oflen end up in people talking past each other in a very fundamental 
way: the very concepts that seem luminously self-evident, that seem to overfiow with rich 
but inarticulable meanings (think: of the Amcri01n Declaration of independence: "We hold these 
truths to be self-evident") are vacant, and meaningless, mere tinkling cymbals, to those on 
the other side of the ideological divide. 1bis reveals a central aspect of the way in which 
ideology operates: our subjection as subjects always occurs in relation to a signifier which 
seems to us to contain this inexhaustible plenitude. But what this experience of "not understanding 
what seems so obvious" symbolises is that lhis experience of luminous self-evidence is a subject-
effect of ideology: the truths arc only "self-evident" if you arc already interpellated by it. Zizck's 
argument rcassens, then, some of the paradoxicality impHed by Derrida's argument about 
55 
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unrucity of meaning: the points d~ capiton hm·e <~ central, organising status. but this is not 
because they are more in contact with the " r~al"; rather, they seem more in contact with the real 
because they arc the last concepts in the discourse, the "bottom lines", the place where the 
~:xp!anations end and a<;sertions begin. The fi.xing operation of the point de capiton has thus a 
deeply circular aspect: the organising concepts of a discourse are in a very important sense 
empty signitiers. 
The concrete implications of this aspect of the point de capilon is focused on in Zizek's concept 
of the moment of idtological rantasy. The notion of "fantasy" is perhaps a miskading term. It 
should not be regarded in the way that the word i:, usually understood, i.e. as referring to pure 
illusion. The term derives from Zizek's Lacanian elaboration of Althusser\ concept of ideology 
and should be understood as having a specific technical meaning. The fantasy. in Lacanian 
terms, is a response to the essential. radical openness of the question of the "desire of the 
Other". The desire of the Other - the polict~man in AJthusscr'.s example, the masse,r, in 
Leftwich's discourse, world opinion and civil ,r,ociety in liberal discourse - i~ . he poinls out, 
always marked by a radical, traumatic ambiguily. What is it the policeman l"eally wants? What 
does the ANC/COSATU etc. really mean with its demands?57 Just what is it that is demanded 
of liberals when they are faced with what Peter Dreyer called the human disaster of racism? In 
a !".Cnse, the ideological interpellation, to he successful at all, depends crucially on the subject 
closiog the que.r,tion of the desire of the Other, finding a provisional answer to it that lessens its 
ambiguity. This is precisely the significance of the way in which Leftwich trcal.~ the desire of the 
masses. It is a certain construction of what the desire of the Other must be. Without this 
closure. without such a moment where this. radical ambiguity and the (in principle) endless 
proliferation of questioos and "yes-buts" that it engenders is tc~porarily put aside. the 
interpellation would simply not occur. That is precisely the function of the point de capiton: to 
check the sliding of the signilier, the radical uniiXity of meaning that is the very condition of 
language. But, by the same token, that moment of closure always depends on !he closing off of 
questions that could still be asked. 
This last assertion seems to me the point where many South African Marxi.,r,t scholar,r, part ways 
with Lacan and the deconstructive strategies of Derrida that lie alongside Lacan's discourse. 
Although it might be true that there is a b ·d at which every certainly is open to que~tion, there 
is also a level at which decision~ must be taken. What is the point. then, of insisting on this 
This radical amt'11guity is prec1sely whal 1s a1 stale in the wcll-~no"'ll racist statement tllal tile demands of 
the mass organi:~alions should nm be taken seriously because "1( you gi•·c them a ham/ thcy"ll take the arm." 
The notion that tile"" 1S alway~ !.Omethtng more at stale {after the arm , whal then '.') indicate~ precisely th.c 
way in wh.rh desire. as Lacan puts 11. resides always in the "beyond" of demand. 
supposed "radical ambiguity"? Zizek'!i application of this question to the theory of ideology, and 
my analysis of NCL dif>course in the previous two chapters suggests an answer. As Zizek shows, 
this notion implies that every ideological interpellation, by ,·irtuc of closing off the question of 
the radical unfiXicy of meaning, has a moment where it falls back on blank assertion. At this 
point the possibility of further explanation, of further equivalences and substitU£ions, vanishes. 
This is what Zi1ck irrelevantly calls ideology's moment of "dogmatic stupidity'' These point:o, arc 
at the same time the moments of ideology'.<; failure (because the circular, empty character of the 
nodal point is exposed here) and its greater success . becaust" it is here that we sec the su bjcct 
most clearly "in the grip", as it were, of ideology (as is e\'idcnced precisely in its insistence that 
these truths are self-evident. its inability ro understand why we can't sec the obviousness). 
Ultimately, ideology depends on this moment of dogmati!>m, on this ability to maintain "closure", 
to insist, for example. on the validity of one\ concept of the desire of the masses, or on the unity 
of the interests of all South Africans beyond their apparent division. In other words, Zizck's 
argument -and this is borne out by the way in which we see thi.s question being handled in NCL 
discourse - is that it is precisely through the abstracting and closing operation of the ideological 
fantasy that ideological interpellation can handle the cxiste nee of counterfactuals. As he puts it, 
" ... insofar as every interpellation fails at a certain point, fantasy i!> a mealb for an ideology to 
take inw account in ad\·ancc its own failurc:·58 
Zizek's argument is thus in the end that we should go beyood discourse analy~is . For the crucial 
fact of the fantasy is that it is not something which can be further analysed. H is rather 
something that ha!> to be "gone through", which ~imply has to be recognised as a fantasy. Beyond 
the task of showing the myriad relationships between significrs there is thus al!>o another task: 
the recognition that behind the signifiers that dominate and fu political identity there is no 
inexhaustible and inarticulablc fullness of meaning but a gap, a blank. As Zi7ck puts it, 
" ... the crucial step in the analysis of the ideological cdiftce is ... to dctecl. .. behind the 
dazzling ideological facade, this self-referential, tautological, performativc operation"5'> 
My analysis certainly bears out the notion that this "circular" moment is of crucial imponance in 
NCL discourse. Paradoxically it is in the success of that discourse, (in its failure to fail!), that the 
failure of the NCL as an organisation lay: it was because the NCL's project did not give way 
under the weight of evidence that sabotage was not going to awaken the white voting population 
and bring them to their senses, that the urban proletariat was not simply going to rise up in 
insurrection, that the organisation could not formulate alternative strategies. 
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Zi7ek thus helps us understand how the ideological subject can disregard facts that seem tC'! 
~tare it in the face. Ideology, in order 111 ~cl the suhjcct in motion at all, depend~ on a movement 
of Jh~traction, of closure. For the subject to act in the world, it has to act in relation to some 
issues and not to others; if it is to see certain things. it cannot see everything. But this closure 
means that the subject can continue to act c\·en when the symbolic order is thrown into crisis. 
The ability to inkrprct certain fact-. im:scapably in\olves the inability to read others. Blindness 
and insight arc inextricably part of each other. 
To this explanation we can add a corollary. Zi<t•k's is essentially a transhistorical point; it refers 
to what A!thusser calls Ideology as such and not to the concrete particularity of the praclices and 
institutions that make up, for example. the Ideological State Apparatuses. Zizek is saying, in 
effect, that there is a worm in the heart of ideology, a virus in language, that all intcrpellations. 
all discourses contain in themselve~ this momt:nt of potential failure. The example of the NCL 
confirm!> this, but allows us to add that althllUgh tht.: ideological fantasy may have a 
transhistorical logic, its occurrence must be understood in its historical specificity. hs central 
elements are drawn from the ideological contexr of their time, and attain their importance in the 
concr.:teness of a particular historical contcxr. Their consequences exist, not only in their ability 
to sustain the subject in the face of challenge, but in the way concrete historical subject~ thus 
ideologically sustained, make their choices. 
8 
Conclusion: Amateurs, Activists and the End of the 
NCL/ARM 
.. rhere are an inrreas1og numt>er of l.1nl.' 1n thmgs: 
there 1s always a fre~l1 i llfe~t«tiun v f fad1orc · 
Wilham Ua!» 
Pmnck Duncan. m a lct!er to Randolph \'igne 
8 February !9671 
8.1 ~fiance and disaster 
The idea of the post-Rivonia pylon attack proposed at the April !9~ meeting had been lloated 
some time before. During the Rivonia trial the NCL/AR\1 h:Jd dr:cidcd, in deference tcJ the 
safety of Congress leaders on triaL to place a mor<Jturium on sahotage. While the Rivonia 
leaderl>hip were in the dock, no acts of sahotage would br: committed. But alter the sentencing, 
the NC L would strike again in a display of renewed Jcllance. 
In terms of the Easter discu~sion, th1s proposition wa.'i sc:<:n at leaJot partly as a comprom1se:2 
The course of action proposed in Leftwich's l>tratcgic analysis documentl'> did downplay sabotage, 
denying that it was a central revolutionary strategy, and thus constituted (without abandoning 
the strategy altogether) a concession to other members· reservations about sabotage. Leftwich ' .!~ 
argumem in fact side-stepped many of Daniels's obj~ctions. No longer would it be seen 
primarily as aimed at con.~cientising white Soulh Africa: it was now conceptuillised more m 
terms of the need for training and the importance of accumul::~ting revolutionary cn:dibility. 
In terms of these imperative.!~, the notion of a spectacular sabotage attack after Rivonia made all 
the more sense. The post-Rivonia situation, in terms of Ldtwich"s argument, was st:en as 
Quoted 1n C. J. Dnver. Palriclc. DunClln, S4luth .Urican and Pan Mrican. p. :!55. 
I n[eryiew l"it h Hugh le,."in. Harare. 3 Fet> rua I) l 990. 
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granting the NCL a crucial opportunity to establish its legitimacy. A spectacular sabotage attack. so 
soon after the sentencing of the Rivonia trialists would be a dramatic assertion of continued 
resistance in the face of a repressive state. In addition it would, in the tern porary absence of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, be an effective way of asserting the centrality of the NCL in the sabotage 
field. It seems as if this attack. might have been seen as a new beginning for the organisation. 
Significantly this occasion was chosen for launching tho: group's new name. The recommendation 
of the London discussion had been taken seriously, and the group was now to function under the 
altogether more dramatic name of the African Resistance Movement, (ARM). A pamphlet was 
drawn up announcing the "formation" of the "new" organisation. 3 
Tlle ARM now embarked on one of its most elaborate and large-scale operations yet. Detailed 
maps and photographs were used.4 Ev.:ry move was carefully worked out, inventories were 
compiled. The action was carefully synchroni.'ied on a national !eve~ and Lcllwich travelled 
specialty up to Johannesburg to ensure that the attacks happened just after sentencing. On Thursday 
18 June, they attacked, using shaped charges: the Cape town ARM struck pylons at Lynedoch, 
Fisantekraal near Durbanville and Stellenbosch. 5 The attack on the Lynedoch pylon was 
unsuccessful that night, but it was brought down on Sunday 21 June.6 The Johannesburg group 
struck at two pylons at the farms Welgedacht and Vlakfontein in the di">trict of Nige~ bringing down 
one.1 
As an attempt to launch the name "ARM", the attack was but a moderate success: newspaper 
coverage of the pamphlet annoucing their ''launch" was not very prominent. 8 Nonetheless, I he 








" ... One day in the press there appeared reports that electricity pylons had been toppled in 
various parts of the country. Six had fallen in one night; another one was to hit the ground 
two nights later. The police announced that explosives had been used. Many people were 
angry at what they regarded as new outrages, others were delighted by the evidence of 
continuing resistance, but everyone, including myself, wondered what organisations had 
been responsible and what sort of people had had the daring to organise such activity at a 
time of such danger."9 
Originally Hir1on and Eisenstein {members o( th~ SU\) drew up J pamphlet l.dtwicb however discarded tbeil 
version and wrote one himself, whic-h was then approved by other ARM members (Hirson, nn.e Slate of 
Ernergcocy", p. ll 
S v Daniels., p. 52. 
Ibid., p. 52·3, 141, 151. 
Ibid., p 150. 
lllnon/Kbumalo, p.l; JllrsonNiktor, P-1; lllrson/Wentzd p. II; AD 1912 "Jadge ""'YS oo to squasb plea from 
Prager", Rand ()ally Mall, 10 !'llovember 1964. 
llugh Lewin, pers. comm.; see, fm e~amp!c, tbe coveroge of the story In the AD 1912 "A.R.M. -'New Resistance 
Movement'", Star 22 November 196.1, where the nistenee of the !'IICI.. is t<"ported in a story llarely thr"" senJenees 
tong. 
Albie Sa~hs. Sttphank llfl Trial, p. 22. 
Tn the terms of its conceptualisation, the Jction had b~c.:n ,\ rclati\e succe~-~- The ne\\ly-rcnamcd 
ARM was now in a comparativdy favouriJblt: po~ition. Firstly. pruce~ses were under way to 
transform it from a loose and fragmented cnll..:ction of sahot.:urs into d dh·ersiflcd and more or 
less i:Oht:Si\e organisation . It was starting tu function in a m1.tre organised fashion. and that 
degree of organisation had paid off: the co-ordinated attack on pylons in the Western Cape and 
tht.: Transvaal had made 3 definite puhlic impact. SeeonJiy. disastrous as the Rivonia raids had 
beeD, it meant that the field was now clear for ARM. and that it was a much more important 
organisation in the sabotage ticld than it had been before . Perhaps most encouragingly, despite 
the doubts of its members, their ideological differences and the hca\y state repression of the 
past three yean;, the organisation still survived intact - which ~ccmed in some measure a 
vindication of the group's strategy. Ahhough the immediate prospects looked blellk, ARM thus 
faced a more positive long-term scenario. 
Tbe~c hopes were however to be dashed. On Saturday-* July l964, security police vis.ited the nat 
of Adrian Leftwich, and started the process that led to the utter ruin of the organisation. 
Usually, the breakJown of an organisation does nor form a central part of its ~tory. In 
comparison with the history of its achivements, its collapse has a rdativcly peripheral status. 
This is not so for the NCL/ ARM. Here, a concatenation of chance events - lOgether with 
factors rc~uhing from the peculiarities of the organisation's development - conspired to ensure 
that the organisation fell apart in a particularly catastrophic way. The memory of that cn!lapse 
and the way it was reported in the media play!> an impurtant part in popubr perceptions of the 
organisation today. While political trials are often occasions at which the state acti\'cly .<.ignifies 
ih power anJ reas.serts its hegemony and legitimacy. they have, on occasion, been turned into 
sites of struggle. As Davis has pointed out. the Rimnia trial was in itself a contested arena, a 
struggle within the legal framework or the trial to anieulate and impose alternative mt:anings on 
tbe ANC's use of violence. 10 This was not at all the case with the NCL/ ARM: its trial simply 
became an occasion for the organisation's humiliation by the state. It is therefore important to 
understand precisely the process of the organisation·s death. 
It is. unlikely that the visit which led to Leftwich's arrest was specifically aimeJ at the 
NCL/ARM. The raid on Leftwich wa~ only part o( a nationwide crackdown on members of the 
while left thal, according to R. W, Johnson, was "'to eliminate while radicals almost a~ a 
lO Denm~ \t . Da,1s. ''Vio!enre and the (.av.·: th•e use ol the ~cn~11re •n political rnal~ 111 ~ou!h Africa·. 10 :'1.. 
Chabani .\ofanganyt. and Andre Du To11 (eds. ) Pntili(al Yinlrnre and lhr Strugglt in Soulh :\Frira (goll<y 
proof of 1.1npuhhshetl book. '.:~w York. Sl \fartln. pro1ected put>l1sbmg date : !Q<)OJ p . .311. 
species"_ II AccorJing to a statement t>y ncn..:ra! H _ J. \an den Bergh. thi~ crackdown had been 
some time in the planning and had ;.tartt·d on ~2 Jun.: . I~ 8~ 1..\ .July. 40 p<:nplc had hcen picked 
up. Only 10 of these arrests were dt:arly l'<CL/ A R.M rc!atcd.l3 In the same crackdown, 
numerous member~ of COD and others suspected of involvement in the SAt:P were abo picked 
up; in 1965 some of these would, along with BrJ.m Fischer, b::: .:hargcd under the Supprcs~ion of 
Communism Act. 1 ~ 
Light can be shed on thi~ question too. by the cn:nt~ surrounding the career in the security 
forces. of a young man named David Plotz. After th.:: crackdown on ARM and the conviction of 
it s members, he came forward and claimed in an interview with the Sunday Times that he had 
been an agent for the SADF's Military Intelligence:. He claimed that in December l'J62 he had 
Slumbled across evidence uf the exi~tence of the NCL through his contact with an American 
girl-friend of Watwn. Plotz. then in Germany. contacted the South African .:mbassy, and in 
February 1963, he wa~ rccruit~d by Military Intelligence. He was <,ent to South Africa, assigm:d 
tbe ta<,k of in[iJtraling Robert Watson's cell in Cape To· .... ·n.15 In ~ay, he abandoned his 
investigations, ha~·ing failed to inlil!rate the I'(_ L. Aftt:r the publication of the interview on 6 
December 1964-, it transpired tflat the Securily poliec had been unaware of hi~ investigations or 
his suspicions regartling Rober! Watson. He was later questioned by th.e Snuth African Police, 
who appear to have bclic\"ed hi~ story.1f ' 
It seems, therefore. that it was throu~h compl.:tc coincidence that the police. during the raid, 
came across four typctl ~heels hidden inside a bnok at his bed~ ide table. 17 Thc~e sheets 
contained damning evidence of the l'CL/ARM·s activities. One pair dealt in detail with their 
project procedure for ~abotage at!acks. The second set out the ""current rc~ponsibilitics"' of 
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and contained CKplicit reference~ to guerilla warfare. I~ Th-: policeman. Lt. A. J. \'an Dyk, did 
not arrest him immediately, but returned later Ill J.11 so.l''l 
This sort 11f crisi~ was not compleH:ly unfnresccn. On th..: contrary. Leftwich had giYcn some 
thought to the implications of just such an t:ventu<.~lity . lnuc~d. it i~ ironic that the idealism and 
moral integrity Leftwich projected, and the values he had enunciated as a NCL/ARM member, 
all concerned precisely the questions that were now at <;tak~ in his behaviour subsequent to his 
arrest. Thus Leftwich had apparently taken part in an cxp.-riment conducted by the University 
of Cape Town's Department of Psychology on the effects of solitary confinc:ment.JO And the 
papers later seized by the state contained a memorandum to hi,r, fellow-NCL/ARM memhers, 
detailing the effects of solitary confinement and selling out strategies for resi~ting am: st. 21 And 
although the paper speaks eloquently of the negative effects of solitary conrmement and the 
power and resourcefulness of police interrogators. it left no doubt that Ldtv.ich believed that 
NCL/ ARM members had to resist, had to - and could - avoid becoming tooLs of the police. 
Here, we once again confront the problem of understanding Leftwich\ role. There is a danger 
that the ironies and contradictions surrounding his hehaviour after the arrest are understood 
crudely, so that, instead of contributing to a com preh~:n~ion of the issues invul\·ed in his 
breakdown, they serve merely to damn him. to amount to a moral conucmnation of his eventual 
role. Beyond sucb condemnation there i~ the need to understand how Leftwich could have 
played the role he did. 
An interesting ligbt i5 thrown on Leftwich's concern with detention and imprisonment by notes 
taken hy Gwendolen Carter concerning a conversation betwc.:n her and Leftwich on 29 July, 
1963. Their interview was out-of-doors, and during their conversation they wcr~: passed by a 
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number on a piece of paper", explaining that it Wi.lS useful in case one could recognise them 
I " D . attr.-w unng the course of their convt:rs;Jtion, L~:rtwich emphasised that his motivation as a 
NL:SAS leader W3S difft:rent from ··nClrmaJ political moti\·ation": 
"Youngsters such as himself wen: not int~re .. tcd in power. In fact, they did not 
themselves expect to come to power. They were no! interested in glory or wealth. They 
were fighting for .a cause, a principle . It soum.kd wry much as if the Lihcral cause was a 
religious crusade. He retogni:-.cd that bis present activities would not lead to security, 
to wealth, or to inllucnce, but most likdy- in the short term, at least, to jail."~ 3 
Another interesting incident is recalled by Dot Clcminshaw, a fc!!ow-Libcral Party memner. 
After a meeting. Leftwich gave her a lift home and asked her whether she would ever get 
involved in sabotage : 
" .. .I said no, because I have two young children and my first duty is to th<!m.... And I 
said something about if [ got involved I would have to be able to get away with it. And 
he said - I have never forgotten it -you can't get away with it. "2~ 
These passages show Leftwich articulating a moral attitude of almosl complete idealism. In the 
first incident, this idealism is overt in the second, it appears more implicit. In either case, the 
self-image expressed in these two interviews is of someone who sticks to his principles even 
though they lead him to imprisonment and personal danger. Moreover. Leftwich appears to 
have been sincere in articulating these ideas. To be sure. one must suspect him of a desire to 
impress the American author. but no such intention could nave been present during his 
conversation with Clcminshaw: he seems to have bclie\·ed sincerely in the values he was 
enunciating. In facl, his participation in the NCL/ ARM does not seem to have been based on 
the hope that he would escape the consequences of his aclions. Indeed, he seemed to accept the 
risk of prison and to believe that he would be equ3.lto the experience of interrogation. ll was 
pari of his commitment to the NCL. 
What is particularly interesting about the ideals Leftwich expresses here i.s their relation wirh the 
passages from Leftwich's leuers lo Lewin quoted earlier. There, Leftwich articulated a self-
disgust, an alienation [rom his own political identity as a white South African that contrasts 
strongly with the idealism of the values projected in these conversations. Though at one level 
there is a sharp contrast between the different ways in which Leftwich articulates his image of 
himself as a South African, they arc, at another level. intimately connected. ll is striking that the 
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moral compromise~ that were forced on ~oulh African liberals. an identity unaffected by the 
ambiguities of their po~ition . But this suhjcn-position was also just the one in which those 
moral compromises would stand out in their most gli:lring .... dicnating. harshnes!>. and which was 
therefore ~uarantecd to be thrown into nisi' continually h~ th~ intractable facts of e\'eryday 
c.ristenc~: as a white South African . 
After Leftwich's arrest, Lynelte van der Rict, an NCL/ARM memher who was with him at the. 
time, went to her nat and removed the suitcase~ full of cxplusi\cs and other material. These sht:: 
took to Schneider's flat in Sea Point. Unknown to her. ~h~ was followed there by the Security 
Police. Later that day, she was arrested. With this. the cri~is, alrt:ady serious, rapidly deepened. 
On 6 July, acting on information given to Warrant-Officer Spyker van Wyk by Lynette van der 
Riet, police went to Mike Schneider's tlat in Sea Point. Schneider. though caught by surprise, 
was able to make a dramatic escape,lS but in hi!> garage. polic~ found a wooden crate and a 
number nf suitcases containing explosive~. detonators, ekctril.'al cquipmt:nl and manuals on 
demolitions and mine warfare. They abo found sketch plans llf pylon demolition jobs,26 map5 
used in the June 18 attack, notes on the construction and repair of timing mechanisms.!? lists of 
members' ··subscriptions" with payments marked off against code names, documents relating to 
the variou~ pylon "jobs", inventories, corre~pondcncc relating to the arrival of the case of plastic 
explosives. and copious notes on attack procedures and responsibilities. Leftwich had been an 
able. administrator, but under his guidance, >.abotage auacks seem to have been planned with the 
systematic profusion of detailed memoranda and inventories usually reserved for NUSAS 
congresses . And the police now had first incontrovertible and concrete evid<!nce of the 
NCL I ARM· s c ,Ostence and activities. 
The nature and import of this evidence has to be appreciated if Leftwich 's suhscquem role is to 
be understood. For though the police were now in posse~ion of a vast quantity of material 
e\idence. it was ~1.:idence that did not clearly implicate anyone beyond Leftwich, van der Riel 
and Schneider. This fact should make clear the imporlancc of Adrian Leftwich's detention and 
his detailed knowledge of the organisation. The police were now in possession, not onl~ of 
concrete and detailed evidence. but they had custody of someone with enough working 
knowledge to interpret all the evidence for them - and who in many cases knew the real names 
of the people referred to by their aliases in 1he papers they h.Jd found . And about four days 
S 1· Dlu,ieb. p. 17. 
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after his detention Leftwich, though he had him~clf lakcn part in an experimental simulation of 
the conditions of solitary confinement.18 started telling the police what they wanted to know. 
It was almost immediately clear to NCL/ AR~ members that Ldtwich wa~ talking, ami that 
their detailed security arrangement!-. had come crashing down in ruins. As members hitherto 
cardully segregated from each other in different cells and protected by false names were picked 
up one by nne, it became obvious that the police were acting on information that was of high 
quality indeed . The alarm was !'.pread to branches throughout the eountry.lr) But the safety 
procedures and emergency measures so carefully worked out before had a~umcd that any state 
action would affect only a limited part of the organisation: in this context they were useless, h 
was now up to individual members to sa\·e themselves. 
Some tried to escape. In Cape Town these inc!uJed Vigne who &;appeared on 2 July and 
arrived in England on 14 August..JD Watson was questioned "for a couple of hours" by Lt. A. J. 
Van Dy.k, the man who had detained Le.ftwich, on the evening of 4 July, and decided to leave for 
England via Salisbury as it then was. 31 On 8 July, on his way to Swaziland, Schneider stopped in 
Johannesburg to alert members that, as Wentzel was to put it later. the police had caught "some 
of the boys down there"32_ This warning gave the Johannesburg members a \·aluablc head start: 
Ronald and Hilary Mutch fled to Bechuanaland and Rosemary Wemzcl to Swa7iland. where she 
wa<:> granted political asylum. Green also went to Swa;-iland_:n 
In the next few days, about eight more NCL/ ARM members wer<;: picked up.~ De Keller was 
arre5ted and dragged away across the lawn of the re~idence he was staying at Juring a NUSAS 
conference in Pietermaritzburg in the early hours of 7 July.J~ Eddie Daniels tried to save what 
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possible "so as to detract suspicion away from those who were already detained".36 But the quality 
of the information at the disposal of the security police was simply too high, and Daniels was picked 
up on 7 July, before he could do anything_37 Lewin, given the chance to ge1 away, after Schneider's. 
warning, initially remained to warn John Harris; he eventually decided to stay behind to face the 
consequences.38 lie was arrested at his work on 9 July.39 On the next day, Baruch Hirson was 
arrested at a road-block on his way back from a conference in Durban,40 while Eisenstein was. 
arrested in Johannesburg. 41 Stephanie Kemp and Tony Trew were picked up during the weekend. 42 
In many cases, though they were conscious thnttheir comrades were being arrested one by one, they 
could only wait and sec whether their names, too, had been given to the police. 1be position was 
not without its ironies: 
"1lle day before 1 was arrested I saw Nat Nakasa in the newsroom of the Rand Daily Mail. 
Nat told me of the arrest of Hugh Lewin, and he said it was very sad because it was like 
cattle. These were his words, you ~ow, that you take one of the cattle, and the rest of them 
carry on eating and munching the grass"43 
Within two weeks afier 4 July, the NCUARM was to all intenLs and purposes crushed. At least ten 
of its members had been detained, many more were on the run.44 lbe members in detention tried to 
limit the damage by confessing only what they surmised the police already knew, but it gradually 
became clear to them that the police knew jus.t aboot everything. 45 
Now events took a truly disastrous tum, Higgs had len without removing the small suitcase he had 
left at Helmstedt's offia!. He wrote to Denis Capatos, a student at the University who was friendly 
with Higgs46 and peripherally involved in the NCUARM, to pick up articles that were being stored 
there; from the context it was clear to Capatos that the suitcase contained dynamite. Higgs also 
wrote lo Helmstedt, saying that "friends of his" would collect the suitcase.47 Ilut it was too late. 
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where the cxplosi\'cs were kcpt.-t8 Th~ nl!xt day. on 9 July, Harris met Hclmstcdt at a cinema 
and told her that he wanted to collect the cont<.:nts of her cupboard, and on that S3turday, 11 
July. he did so:~q When Capatos arri ... -..:d at her office the cupboard was empty.50 
Harris had by all accounts been a peripheral mc:mhcr of the ~CL/ ARM. He had served on the 
Executive committee of the Transvaal Liberal Party and on the Parry's national executive in 
l%2. At the end of that year he hadjoin~d 1he S<lUth African ~on-Racial Olympics Committee= 
(SANROC).51 He rose quickly to hccomc chair and dee-chair of the organisation. and in 1%3, 
had represented it at the International Olympic l\1mmiu~c in Genc\a.s~ In late 1963, authorities 
~cizcd his passport when he was on the point of kaving on another jllurncy: on 12 February 1%4 
he was hanncd in term~ of the Suppression uf Communi~m Act.S3 Harris had joined the 
NCL/ARM only in December 1963, quite late in it~ career. He= had not bc:t:n a very active= 
m~·mbcr, and had been invol\'cd in only one projc::ct: nn 2-' January 19t.i4 he: had bc:en involvt!d in 
an attack on a power traction mast b(;tY.ccn !rent! and L)'11klon. and, on the same night, an 
attempt to f>abotage railway signal cahlc:s al a p<Jint betwct:n Angus and Natalspruit. On this 
project he had heen used only as a dri,-er and to stand guard.54 Harris does not seem to have 
been part of the post-Rivonia attack at all. and wa!> later to testify that other ml!mbers of the 
J'CL/ARM had viewed him with ··eonkmpt".5.5 
Now, however, he was in a central and crucial position. By this time all tht! Johanneshurg 
members of the organisation had either ned or were= in the hands or the police . all, that is, 
except Harris and John Lloyd, Lewin's 11atmatc. On 1-4 July. they met to discuss possihk 
courses of action.>o Harris felt that it was a situation .. which was so ddicate l_v poised that by 
giving a push in the right way. the right pu!>h al thl! right time. you will get a redistribution of 
forces. ·57 In the nt!xt ti"e days, Harris and Lloyd met four times.58 They initially considered the 
poc,sibility of Lloyd planting an incendiary bomb in the Prc=toria post office or in an undergrl-mnd 
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at the Johannesburg ~tation.60 But towards the end of th~ week, Harris had an idea v.hich 
~cemeJ to him "to have a sort of m:.tgnilic~.:ncc about it that the original idea did not havc :·61 He 
wnuld plant a bomb in the station itsdf, warning the .JUth1'ritic'i to cleo..~r the concourse. Lloyd 
agreed, and they decided that Lloyd would do a rcconnai~s;..mcc of the post-office while Harris 
would plant the station bomb. But Lloyd could ne\'er play hi~ pari in the events to come: he was 
detained on ~3 July. 
Whether Harris hlld considen:d the po~sibi!ity that people might be endangcn:d is not at all 
clear. His telephone c:.tll to the authorities indicates that hi.' did at least make an effort to clear 
the concoUr!>e. In his trial he alleged that the possibility that J.nyone might be close enough to 
the bomb to get hurt simply did not occur to him. 
"1 had a very clear picture in my mind of a loud bang. and a narc about ... 18 inches 
wid.:, and standing all around ... there would be people. Mostly very s1ruck by the 
explO!>iOn and thi~ nan: ... I thought of it... like in geometry. You nave got a point, and a 
circle around it, you know, where you put your protractor's sharp point in. lt would be 
like that, and it would ju!>l be empty space around the point"62 
Sucb testimony <>hould of course be handled with care , T cstifying for the State, Lloyd would 
!.late that Harris had foreseen that people CCluld be killcll. but had argued that the loss of life 
would, in the long run, save more livcs.1'3 During the preparation for the attack on the station, 
Harris had Y..Titten a lcuer to Verwocrd, in which he demanded that the Prime Minister "meet 
our requirements". If these requirements were not met, the letter ~tatcd, "we hJVC plans for ... 
killin!?, and with great reluctann~ we will put these plans into operation i[ you reject or ignore 
our initiative " .~ He never mailed the kth:r . not bccau-,-: o( having >.ccond thoughts about the 
tltre.:Jt, but because Lloyd com·inccd him that the police, convinced they had smashed the whole 
NCL/ ARM, would not take it seriously.65 In court, he would say that the threat had been mere 
empty bravado, but it should indicat\: that he might ha\\: been conscious of the bomb posing 
some risk to human life. Ernie Wentzel, characteristically cynical in his unpublished memoirs, 
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explosives. "111ey disOJssed more dramatic action. A bomb on a Boeing en route to Durban; 
a bomb on a station, a bomb in a P'drk.ing garage. Perhaps this would have remained talk. 
Perhaps, but for the arrests, others would have been involved with Harris."66 
Wentzel however docs not cite any sources for these allegations, and does not make it clear how he 
came by this .information at all; NCUN{M members also strenuously deny that the possibility of 
tak..ing human Ufe had ever been considered. 57 
A last consideration when treating the matter of Harris's intentions is the circumstantial evidence 
that is available. The most striking feature of the way Harris went about planning for the station 
bomb is his great amateurishness. He was almost suicidally careless about security - for example, 
he travelled around for two days with the incriminating threat letter to Verwocrd casually folded in 
the plastic Jeatherette pocket of his car door for the simple reason that he did not think of throwing it 
away ("1 am a hoarder. I just keep things", he told the court later). 6B He had no knowledge of 
explosives: the detailed manualo; contained in the suitcase made no sense to him, 69 and he did not 
even know how many detonators to use to set off the dynamite.70 Not certain whether the explosion 
would be effective enough, he simply took some cordtcx, "that yellow cord stuff' and "wound it 
round into a sort of loop" and added that to the contents of ttH: suitGlSe. In this context, his apparent 
naivete in describing his conception of the explosion seems more believcab!e. 
Friday, 24 July, Harris put his plan in action and planted the bomb. Less than seven hou~ after the 
bombing, Harris was arrested. 7 t He was interrogated and so violently assaulled that his jaw was 
brok:en.12 On 11 September he made a statement to a magistrate admitting to planting the bomb. 73 
On the same day he was charged with murder and sabotage. 
Afier the station bomb the situation of those members who had been detained changed radkally. In 
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with the NCL/ ARM or not. were badly a~~aultcd in detention . --;~ Thi~ was the first time \'iulencc 
had been used agaimt white political pri!>oncrs. ·c; In Ltddhion. thert wa.~ a second ra:-h of 
detentions. possibly linked to the bomb and the accurnpan~ing ilSsaults. After \~ .July, the 
:SCL/AR~t arrests had pr;lctically ceased.'') Now t\\~o:h~· more pc~>ple v.cn.: :un:stcd on 
suspicion nf being involved in the NCL/ AR:".C7 
Even members who had safely cro~scJ the countr~ \ borders v.cre m1t ~are. Higgs, who had 
emigrated from South Africa in June '8 was allducted from his new home in lusaka by 
kidnappers who spok'' in hea\'Y South African accents . He was drugged and drin:n back to South 
Africa through the night he woke to find himself next to ZliO Lake, in Johannesburg, where he 
was arrested later that day.79 1t was never finally establish~d ~ho did the kidnapping. Later the 
cars they drove were found lo have heen government propcrty,SO but the Commissic)ner of 
Police, General .J. M. Keev~. squashed speculation that the !o?.ovcrnment wa~ involved as 
"irresponsible". 81 Higgs. in any event • .:ventually eluded the grasp of the South African 
authorities. He was a British citizen, because it could be established that he had been a 
kidnapped person when arrested,A:! he could not stand trial and had to be allowed to leave the 
country. 
Rosemary Wentzel was Jess lucky. She was detained near Ermdo On August 11.83 She alleged 
that three men had forced her out of her hou!>e, bound ami gagged her and broughl h~r back 
into South Africa. There she was tricked into getting into her own car, which had also been 
brought back to Soulh Africa, and driving back to Swaziland. She almost immediately drove into 
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AD 19\2 "A.U the way b~ Car .. .''. 1M Star. 4 Scptemher 19h~. 
AD 1912 "Kid nappe~ u~cd Carl hough I h}· Government" Th~ Rand Daily :\tail. 18 Septemher IIJ6J 
AD JQJ2, "Car Rcpo11 rs rrrespon~1ble. ~y~ Keevy", Th~ Sl~r. lR Scpu:mbcr 19b-l 
AD 191.?"1Gdnapperl used Car.; hought 1>~ (jo,ernmnel". Th41 Ra11d Daily :\obit. 18 September )9(>.1 . 
AD 1'112 ·war. thi~ another snat('h'?" . Tht lbnd Dail) \fail. 8 'ieplen\her 196-1 . 
:\frica", ~he told the ~ccurity policeman whu ~l11pp..:d her car. ··who do you think you an: . .lames 
Bond?" he replied and arrested hcr.EH The c,l[uniL!l Oflicc h.Jwcver '>lated, in response to 
WentLel's allegations. that its positilm wa~ based un tht' rcp._lrt ,J[ the s~·atihmd pnlice, which 
~tated that ther~ wa~ no c1·idencc of kiJn apping."'' She was later Ill h~· a key Stale witne~~ in the 
trial. 
In th..- long term the consequences l"ur NCL were much more serious. Though the dt:ath penalty 
had been hanging over their head~ in any ca~e. its ~hadow now loomed aU the darka, !!specially 
when Ethel Rhys died on 19 AugusL In practiet: this meant that the pn:ssures on 1\CL/ARM 
members to turn state witness increascd.gt> lt'n~idcrahle pressure wa~ applied on ARM 
members to become State witneso;c5: .John Laredo and Eddie Danit:l!'., for example, were offered 
freedom in exchange for their tcstimony.H 7 At lea.~t nine l'CL/ ARM members in the end 
accepted this. offer.S8 Other ARM members, like Li1·ingstone Mrwt:tyanaS'.l and Eddie Daniels' 
cousin Neville Hillman90 agreed to become state witnesses but were never catJcd. But it Wa!"> 
.-\drian Lefrwich whose decision to te~tify had tht: greatest impact. 
It has to he remembered that in spite of the plentiful evidence the State had accumulated, it 
needed witnesses to make it'> ca!'.c watertight. The confes1\ions otJtained from detainees were not 
admissible court evidence, and much of its other c1·idence was circumstantial, referring to 
anon)mnous code names rather than to the accused. Albie Sach.s·5 cnmmcnh on his 




"These documents recorded in remarkable detail the acth·itics of the organisation over a 
period of nearly a year, but fonunately for the members, did not mention anyone by 
name. It was clear to us that the pro~eeutiun would ha1·e no difficulty in pm\ing that the 
organisation had cx.istt:d .. . but we all fdt equally convinced that the only way in which 
the accused could be personally implicated 1\0U)d b~ if an important member of the. 
organisation took the stand and d~:nounccd them:·'.ll 
AD 1912 "Rosemary Wentzel tells ~tO f) .. :. TM Rand llail) \-tail!~ Septemllcr l'l(>.[ 
AD l'lll "Wentzel case for Colonral Offire"" The Rllnd Daii)· \fail, !0 Ortoher J'lW. 
At the trme of the \Cl/r\R.\1 tnal. the o.Jecrsoon to herome a state \Ortness <'amed a new serrousne~. \"01 
long tldore. dunng the trial of Dr ,e,llle .\le,ander ;ond other.; .ll"cused of tn'olvement in the Yu Cht 
Chang Club ~everal of tl!ose ,.,·ho had been offered t11li\Hrnity 1n rctllrn for testrf\lng for rhe Sr.ue llad hccn 
able to obstruct the proseruuon"s ca~e \lv gl\·tug ev1clen<'e that wa~ very \"ilgtJC. or smtpl) matntainong that 
they could not rememt>er. In l%-1 th~ Crimmal Pro<·edure Art of l'l55 ."'n had heen amended. ~o that a 
"n:cakitrant v.itness· could be puntshcd Wtth up to one )·ear's impnsonment 1f he or she could not gtvc 
evidence to the coun·s sati~facllon. ln addttion. the tmmunny could he .... -nhdrawn ("Detainee~ facing crisis 
of choice·. CaJM Timt~. 7 Octohe r l 91)..1). 
Eddie Daniels op.tit .. p. l2: John Laredo. lot .. cit .. 
They were Adnan Lefr..1ch. L)nctte van der R.Jet. John Lloyd. Rosemary Wenuel. Denis Capato>. Jane 
Helmstedt. Willie Tihane. Samuel Olifant and Jt>harlnes Dhladhla. 
lntemew Wlth Dot Clem1nshaw lor .. ~it .. 
Ed~ie Danrels. op.cit .. p.ll 
Alt11e "iachs. Sttphani~! on Trial. p. 71 
Still, few people suspected that it would be Leftwich himself who would be the star witness. Since 
his detention, it had been assumed as a matter of courE that Leftwich would be in the dock92- so 
much so that before the trial started, it was swiftly coming to be known as the "Lcflwich case".93 
When he was not charged along wilh his feUow-detainces,94 it came as a shock to many.95 Sad1s 
reasoned: 
"The only reasonable explanation for Adrian's absence from the court seemed to be that he 
W&'l going to be a witness against the others. This was incredible. He should have been lhe 
chief aCOJsed, not the principal witness for the prosecution. lltc earnest speaker, the 
buoyant, youthful, sincere organiser ... no, it seemed impossible."% 
That Leftwich had now bcoome a State witness seemed the supreme irony of the NCUARM':\ 
roUapse. Firstly, there was Leftwich's centrality in the NCUARM, the fact that he was a leading 
figure testifying against those that had followed him. As Daniels was to write fifteen years later, 
"At the lime of the trial I was certainly disapJX)intcd in him. Partly because he had let the 
side down but more because he had saved hlmself at the expense of those whom he was 
responsible for. He was not responsible for me, in the sense that he had not recruited me. 
To my knowledge, I was a member of the NCL before he was, but he had recruited ... the 
other four who were in the dock with me. In this I feel he slipped badly." 97 
Leftwich appears to have crumbled totally under the hands of the police. ln his behaviour during the 
trial, there was no vestige of resistance. He seemed to have become entirely a tool of the State. Not 
only was he sending his friends to prison, but he sJX)ke freely of the futility and uselessness of the 
whole exercise, seeming to deny not only his comrndcs but the principles he had stood for. And, in 
another alarming indication of the extent of his own breakdown, he wrote on the wall of one of the 
cells be had occupied, that he had learnt for the first time how weak he was, and how great was the 








"Det~inees facing crisis of choice". The Capt' Tlmt~~ 7 October 1964 
Op. dt., p. 40. See also Mit~s Brokensha and Robert Knowles, The Four1h. of July Rakls, p. 95. 
AD 1912 "Eight in C..pe Preview of Sabotage Trial", Th~ Rand Dally Mal~ 29 October 1964. All in all, thirteen 
NCL mel!lbers appeared in four separate NCUARM trials. (According to Muriel llorrel (Adlon, ReacUon .nd 
Counter-Adlon, p. 82), there were ~ix nl~ I$; bow she arrive~ 11 this figure i5 not clear. ln addition. she wron~ly 
states that the trials tool:. place in early 1964). In Cape Town, Daniels. Kemp, lk Keller, Trew and llrookcs 
a ppn red ou a main cbargc of 51> borage (ChJrge ~heel. S v Daniels, L()Un~el's Pape~ ( Un !ted Pa ny Archives, 
Priva I~ Collection, Pilkington Jordan Paper:;, File 13 (I) (2.7 .I)). Though a separallon of trials o~currcd for I be 
purpo~e of sen tc ncing, it was still for all other purposes rcganleo:l as one trial. In Durbn, Evans a no:! l.•nedo were 
charged with !i3boL:Ige ('Two men face ,_.bot.oge chuge~", Th~ Dally News. IJ Oc!Ober 1964) 1ft Pretori~, there 
were two tri3ls: li>nis was chrged wilh murder (AD 19ll "SL:Ition bomb de~th: Teacher charged w!th Murder", 
Th~ Slllr, 14 Septel!lber 1964}; llirnon, Lewi", Prager, EiscnsteiD aDd Cox were cbarge<.l witb ,_.boL:Ige {AD 1912, 
"State uames 25 u conspir•to!S", Rand DaUy MalL 2 Oct\lber 1964. 
"Detainees facing cri~is of choke", The Capt" Thnts 7 October 1964 
Albie Sachs, op. cit., p. 45. 
Eddie Dan ids , "S peo I 15 year:; on Robben Island", p. 12 
Albi~ ~chs, op. dl., p. 73. 
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This last painful detail po!.es the problem L,f Ldnvich's breakdown in parlicularly !\trikmg form. 
Again. It i!. crucial not to ~tay men:ly at the levd of the iwn~ in\olvcd in ~uch .t sentence hdng 
\\Tillcn by !\Omcone who was sending his friends and comrade~ to pri~on. lnsteJd, it pro\'idcs an 
imporlant clue to tht: naturt: of the collapse of hi~ personality. and the way in which I hal C••llapsc 
linked up to the concern.!> that ch<:~ractcrisL·d hi~ political life until now. A-. I ha\c pointed out. 
the available clues seem to indicate that Ldtwich·s Intense rcvubion from th~-7 corrupting moral 
in£luence of apartheid was closely rdatcd to his idealism. Hi;; own political identity seemed to 
him infected hy the violence and abnormality around him. I ha\'C also shown that, 
accompan~ing Leftwich's anguished sense of his pcr!\onal in\·olvemcnt in South Africa's \iolence, 
there wa~ the tendency to ideali~e the terrain of hb pt:rsonal. private sdl'. iind to ideali..,~ his 
fricnd~hip with Lewin as ,,ne in which he was recognised and acccplt:d in spite of any of the 
cxternill features of his character. It ~~ this. theme that Leftwich'., rcrutcd c~!ll·wall in5cription 
seems to pick up. ll is more than ju!'t an idealising cliche about the natun: of love. Rather it 
seems lo ~how how, as his commitment to tht: \alues he had earlier articuht!cd stancd to 
shatter, this wilhdrawal to the realm of pri\'ate recognition became more and more prominent. 
While his public actions did not live up to his moral commitment, he could, in this private 
sphere, believe that his intcmions were still pure. his commitment to those \alucs still real. 
This separation seems indeed to t-.e a general feature of his behaviour of the time. His t-.chaviour 
seems marked t-.y the belief that he was the same person, and that his changed role wa~ an 
external matter. one that did not reflect his own self. This might explain the way in which 
Leftwich seemed curiously unhowcd by his O'IA.n \'Oite-face - a point which seemed tu many 
observers almost unt-.elievable. Here. for example. ar~ the words of Albic Sachs. Whl' Juring. the 
preparation for the trial had refused to condemn him outright. and haJ tried inst~ad to 
understand his breakdown: 
"From the moment he had walked into court. chatting in a friendly way to members of 
tbe security police, I had realised th:st my spontaneous feeling towards him now was one 
of uncomplicated hatred. If hi.' had grown a beard or worn dark glasses or b~come so 
haggard as to be unrecognisable, my anger might have: t'lccn less strong, but he was 
exactly as l had alway5 knm~;n him, t-.uoyant. ~erious and at'lsorbed. The \'ery familiarity 
of his stance, of his facial exprcs~ions and c\·cn of the timbre of his voice seemed to 
inlensify my emotion. This wa~ the same Adrian: all that had changed was his rolc ."99 
Sachs was not allowed the luxury of uncomplicated hatred for too long. Leftwich's astonishing 
compmure was not impenetrahle, and on the third day of the 1rial. \\,hen counsel for Daniels 
Op. cit .. p. 116. 
;; t t ' 
asked him whcchcr he was happy wi1h hi~ Jccic.ion 111 bt: \late wi1ne:>. he nroke d11wn . H~ 
refused euunscl's offer of adjournment and continu.:d: 
"I loathe, God, I loathe aparth~id and all that it means. Thi<. treachery here I place at 
the door of the -.ystem ..... I am twenty·four yNrs old . I have been stupid: I think we've 
all hecn stupid, and I think wr: realise we·\c: he~n stupid ... I am giving evidence, very 
simply, because ... I realised the case against Eddie , the case against Spike. wa.s hopeless 
anyw·.Jy ... As far as Stephanie Kemp and Alan Bruoks was concerned, I hdic\·ed they 
stood to get a very light sentr:ncc. If I sroocl a chance of gelling five, si.'(, seven. eight, 
ten years, I would not give evidence. not again~t people I am close to. But I bdicvc, I 
don 't know, that if they were in my position ... and the evidence that stood against me, 
and they stood to come out possibly when they 14CTc forly·ninc, fifly years old, they 
would have and I would have welcomed them to do the same... I ccrlainly hope that 
there will be a time when, if thme people I am gi' ing evidence against, can forgive me 
and understand that I do not move one jot from my ideas and if they can forgive me 
that rhere will be a time ... when thi5 counrry sees a ... better situe~tion .. . well. I just hope 
that when that day comes, rhat we will all be together again. And that i!> why I have 
given evidence ,'' If.() 
But though Leftwich could distinguish between his private !;elf and his public acts, and though he 
could hope for such an eventual reconciliation, when he would not be judged by externalities but 
be accepted in spite of rhem. the world Judged him by his public actions, His about-turn was 
v.idcly publicisedl01 and the mor.JI condemnarion was almost universal. When counsd at one 
stage called Leftwich a ral, Judge Prcs1d~:nt Beyer~ did not intervene; while giving judgement, 
however. he remarked that this was "a trine hard on th..: genus n~Uus." 101 Others were less 
inclined to gloat. and found in Leftwich's breakdown only cause for distress. In ., letter to Alan 




'The trials are dragging their dreary way through the courls. It is not pkasant to watch 
the breakdown of lhe human personality. I lind great difficulty in expressing what I 
feeL Clearly the law must be obeyed; and equally clearly acts of vioknce cannot be 
s ,. DlttlifiS. pp. 197. 198. 
The extent of the newspaper coverage of the \C'L t ·\R\1 fnal de~en·c~ ~ome mcnutJn . l'hc tnal receiVed an 
llnusual amount of publicity. especially'" view of the fo1C1 that h) the rime the ~('t tt\R\.t members we~ 
formally r harged. sahorage tnals had become 1f nor a routme. at leaSE a regular and well - ~no~~o·n event '" 
South :\(rican ('Ouns. (BeM-een Fehruary 1%.3 o1nd Deccmher 1'~ . ~~36 people had h~~n charged ~~oith 
.~.abotage en South African rouns . .tnd of these 130!\ had heen found gvtlt~ ) 
\:evertheless. the newspaper cm·er~ge .. rcordcLl '.;CL; .-\R.\1 rna I~ wa~ "''despread . intense . an<l 
prominent. Speculation had been rife ~·nee •horll~ after the arrest of LdMil"h. ~~o· tth •om~ ne~~o~papen 
'~nturing to say that there m!ght be an upcoomtng tnal thai ~~o·ould l•e "one o f the h1ggest legal operauoos the 
Supreme Co un has known"(AD 19!.:?. '' legal ~len Stud}ing Thousands of papers·. Th~ Star jt August 
19bol. "Advocate on ~rctal dut y m Prc10na". The Star. 9 September 196-1). fhcM~ 1>pc'NI31111AS v.·e~ panly 
grounded on the ~upposit ion thai fh<:re would he: one tnal tn " htch all the ~CL memhen u.ould he tned at 
once (ibid.). In addi11on. the st ,,l). had all the detail~ thai made scns.auonal <'Opy· the yourh of n•any of rhe 
mcmhcr.;. !he ra,·t that ~oman)' wen: whole and moddle class. the hnk ro the Maho n l>oml> the drama of the 
~odnappings . Even when it wa~ dectded thai each o:ntrc ·~ mc:mt>e~ would be fried 'cparatdy. OC"-'$paper 
('overage was sullrntensc. 
S ,. Dani~h. judgement. p ~ 
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tolerated. But what docs one sav ~)f legislation that permits indi .... idual being!; to be 
bullied and cajoled into betraying th~ir fri~nds'.'" 103 
H is interesting that this was Leo Mar4uard's on~rriding impression of the trial. F\1r him and 
many other liberals it was Leftwich's bctr:..yalthat ultimately dominated it. In the end, most of 
the NCL/ ARM accu:;ed were duly con\'ictcd and served their sentences in jail. JO~ But the defeat 
of the NCL did not lie in their imprisonment. For many, their imprisonment .,.,.as but the 
consequence of the very moral idealism and refusal to compromise that characterised their 
commitment to the NCL. Ultima1ely it was the spectacle of Leftwich, betraying his fricn(.!.<., 
himself and the ideals he ~tood for that most thoroughly symbolised the defeat of the 
organisation, 
8.l Amateurs, activish and lht' politics of citizt'nship 
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In the previous pages I have trit!d to tell the story of the NCL/ARM and how the very 
intellectuaJ and moral traditions that im.pircd tht!m to take up sides with the oppressed people of 
South Africa prevented them from acting: out this commitment effectively. Three concerns have 
been braided together in this tale. Firstly, I ha\'C uicd to recount their course of action and 
C)(plain the reasons for the choices they made. My .<.econd concern was methodological: I have 
tried to show how an understanding of di~course and the political subject can help us understand 
historical event:<.. And thirdly, I have tried to narrate a chapter in the history of a .specific strand 
of the intellectual history of the white left in this country. These three strands, as I have wown 
them, end in the painful and terrible seem: described in the end of my story: Leftwich's betrayal 
of everything he once believed in and stood for, and his utter collapse and defeat in the dock. 
Why end the story there? The NCL/ ARM story could just as well be said to ha••e ended, for 
example, on 4 July, or on the day of the release of Eddie Danids, long~st-imprisoncd of the 
NCL/ARM members. Though Leftwich'~ collapse is a dramatic moment it is also, I should 
\03 
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Leo :\olarquard. lener to Alan Pacon. 8 :\ovemner l <Jb-1 { BCZA 77/~ A 382 ). 
In the Johannesburg r rial. Hin;on was sentenred to mnc years· i>11prisonment: while F.•r.enstein and l.ew>n 
each n:ceived 5even years (AD 1912 "She !>aved son 's life only ro see him jailed for lOollll"l!age" . Th~ Rand 
Daily "'ail. 2 Oecemt>er l%-1 ). Charge~ against Co~ were witltdra~>n (AD 1912. "Co\ :'\ow rn Lusa~a· Th~ 
R.aad Daily '\-!ail. J l October 1 %-1). and Prager was acqu>rte.:l due ro l~ck nf eV>denre 1 r\ D I Q 12 "Pr.~ger 
r~e: Satmtage is ended · Collnr.el". The R..1nd Dail) 'Wail. 1 Decemher !96-1 ). Hams "·as >entenced to 
death .. (AD 1912 "Harris ts Sentenced to Death". The Star I> :\ovember 196-1) In Cape Town. Trew and 
Broo~ were each !oentenced ro [our )-ears. with two suspended. while Kemp was senten,·ed 10 five year5 ~>ith 
three suspended. De Keller was sentenced to J() year5. whtle Danrels wa~ sentenced to 15.. In 
Pietermantzhurg. t h.e Stare ,..-,Hu.l~,..- i Is al!egattons of conspirac-y tn to !oal">otage: Evans and La redo ....-ere 
sentenred to fi1-e years each for po!iSe!.S>On of e .~plo~t\·cs ("Five yeaf!; for men who had u}namtte" Daily 
:'iew~. 24 '\o•:emher 1%--1)_ The \:CI./AR.\f was declared an unla.,.ful organtsal!on in Proclamation R. 2-42 
on 25 September 1 Qb-1 ( S '' D~niels Charge Sheet. Pitl..tngtan Jon:lan pupers File !3 ( I J ). 
roint out, one that presents the historian with some difficulties unusual to her or his craft. Though 
history does deal with pain or moral defeat. it is usually separated from its subject-matter by the 
pa<iSage of yean;. The moment of human weakness and pain we confront here is much closer, and 
involves many persons still living. It is a moment, moreover, that cannot be confronted 
dispassionately and without a measure of moral judgement. Why, then, tell the story in a way 
which puts the spotlight on this scene? 
To ask this question is to tum the textual tables somewhat; while I have been analysing the 
discourse of the NCL, this issue raises the question of my own discourse. 1bis could be understaoo 
in a weak sense: thus the question oould be taken to problematise simply my own decisions about 
emphasis. But it could a !.so be undcrstaoo in a strong sense: the narrative here presented is itsell a 
discourse, is also structured ideological interpellation. What I have nrecognised" in the NCL, what I 
have seen in its history - the critical moments, the slow processes, the crucial signifier.:; and blind 
spots- is therefore also open to a discourse-analysis. 
But the subject must needs be blind to the ideological mechanism that sustains it in the world, and 
the question as to my own discourse is the one I am least qualified to answer. What I am do, 
however, is to consider the strange place of Leflwich in the story of the NCUARM, and the 
meaning of that place for our own time. Bound up with the question of Lefiwich's defeat and the 
significance accorded it is the question of the significance, for us, of the whole story of the 
NCUARM, the point of studying its career. 
It has been a strange fact that Leftwich's betrayal of the organisalion has occupied such a prominent 
place in the "popular history" of the NCL, and is such a central concern for so many of the people 
that ha\'e been in"'olved. It Lc:; a prominent event, for e~ample, in many of the e~isting acounts of the 
NCUARM, and ls the crudal momenl of C.J. Driver's novel. Leftwich loomed central in the minds 
of almost e .... ery participant; the first. question from practically every member I interviewed was 
"Have you seen/will you see Leflwich?" This is an interesting and unique situation. In our own 
minds the story of Rivonia, for example, is the story of Mandela and Sisuiu • n_ot of Bruno Mtolo. 
Piet Beyleveldt also turned State witness; but his name does not still e:o.:cite the passionate 
condemnation Leftwich has received, even yean; aflerward, from many people not even afftx:led by 
his acts, lOS 
My own decision to focus on the NCL/ARM in my study of radiQI.lliberalism Oowed partly from a 
fascination with the human drama and starkness of the organisation's betrayal. In my own 
105 An interesting example is Ken Owen'!;. description of Lefrwic~ u "a lillie weuel of 1 m;n~ (See "SA lucky lobe 
living In Ahn Pa1011's Sh,dow", Thf C•pe Tlmn, 5 May 1987) 
202 
TCSI.!arch. howc\'t:r, I became ~usplClOU~ uf l his r J~cination and tcndl.!d morl.! and mar(' to 
consider thi::. concern with Leftwich as I.!Xtr::~ncou_~. I decided that my focus should be not on 
the~e question:; of commitment and hctrayal. but on the ~CL/ARM's underlying and implicit 
political understanding. 
This view, it ha' become increasingly clear, j.., mi,takcn. The quc.:.tion of the political discounc 
of the NCL/ ARM and the moral questions raised by Leftwich's betrayal are inseparably 
intertwined. Leftwich's collapse is important because it signilics, not only the ~CL/ ARM's 
defeat, but the crisis of a moral tradition. His collap~e cannot be treated as external to the n~sf 
of the story. The words above all other~ that haunt Leftwich's witnes::.-box an: the words he 
\~TOLe a few month5 before when he stated that members' "long term commitment to the cause" 
and their "wiUingness to stick it through to the end" should be provcJ. 106 As I have ubi to show 
in the above pages. the irony of Leftwich's defeat is that he failed to live up to his own moral 
position. 
This is partly why I accorded so much space to a consideration of Leftwich's own mmivations, 
anJ why I was concerned to show that Leftwich had few illusions about his chances of escaping, 
that he had considered the possibility of impri::.onmcnt and had decided to take that risk. The 
significance of his failure woulJ be mi~understood if Leftwich were taken to be a hypocrite, or 
for somebody who did not think through the consequences of his actions. His collapse is the 
fruit, not of simple cowardice, but of a moral commitment that did not know its own perilous 
frailty. 
There is, to be sure, room for speculation about the private ur psychological motives for what 
turned out in the end to be such a massively self-destructive course of artion. Why, for example. 
did Leftwich, always so security conscious. keep ~uch detailed records in the suitca::.c at Vander 
Rict's Oat? How did he allow himself to know so many names? But the answers to these 
questions do not lie in a simplistic assertion that Leftwich was "arrogant", or in a complacent 
rejection of his moral stance. Rather, th~se must be reconciled with the fact that a::. far as is 
ascertainable, Leftwich's invocation of these ethical values - "long-term commitment to the 
cause", "wi!lingncs::. to stick it through," were made in earnestness and good faith, that the ideah 
he announced were ideals that he tried to live up to - even to the extent of joining an 
organisation com mitred to sabotage. 
This is indeed one of the central thrusts of the methodological turn to Jiscoursc analysis. We 
should be aware, not only of how the ~CL/ ARM addressed others, but al:;;o of how they were 
t06 Seep. 15t ahove. 
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addr~:.scd. how ideology gave the w~1rld a \oic~.: "~' that it cnuld speak tP them. The acts of 
sabotage cummiued by its members ...,ere not <>nly a!><>crtiolm uf deliancc but responses to a 
moral quel>tion po!)ed to them by the inju:-;tic.:s they confronteu in South Africa, and Leftwich's 
words :o.hould be !)et:n, not only as a judgement on him. as an enunciation of virtue:. which he 
himself did not have. but also as the question \Vhich h.: a"kcd himself. a challenge to which hi:r. 
own actions \\as a response. This is the signilicanc~.: of his collapse. Its irony lies in the fact that 
it was unthinkable in terms of his own di~couN:. that it did not haw a place ill the mural 
universe of the NCL/ARM. Its bitterness lies in the f<lct that he faik:d on prcci.~cly the tcrraill 
where he tried to respond to the challenge, where he tried to live and act his commitment. 
In this dissertation, Lcflwich's betrayal of his colleagues there fore [orms the com plcmcntary 
moment to that of the ideological fantasy. Whereas my treatment of the Iauer focused on 
ideology in its surprising resilience and elasticity. whereas there I em phasiscd the way in v.·hich 
ideology can maintain itself even in fhc face uf what to the outsider seem~ incontrovertible 
e\idcnee, we now confront ideology in it~ brittle fragility. And, a~ in the case of the idrolugical 
fantasy, this fragility is an aspect of ideology "as such": in LcfNich'!> collapse we see the 
instability of every interpellation. Interpellation and ideology cttnnot be understood with 
reference only to the interplay between the Imaginary order (within which identification takes 
place) and the Symbolic (which structures and dllminate~ that id~ntification). Besides these 
there is anmher order- that of the Real. Without a concept of the Real, any theory of id.:,llogy 
tends towards an ideological determinism in which the subject appears to be ftxcd furcvcr in a 
position of subjection to an ideological Other from which there can be nu escape; we would be 
unable to explain ideological change and crisis. 
The R~al is perhaps the most difficult and paradoxical nl" Lacan·s concepts. On one b-d, its 
meaning seems obvious enough: Lacan uses it to refer to the order of the outside world in its 
dimension as a "brute, external force". But Lacan conceives of its relation to the Symbolic order 
in terms aim o.o;t directly opposite to those of West c rn posit i\isr and idealist thought. 0 ur 
cClmmon-sense model of the effect of the rc al world on our interpret~tions of it can be 
symbolised by the traditional conception of the progrcs~ of science: science i~ the long labour uf 
many men and women, ever refining their insights, sharpening their conct!pts, drawing 
asymptotically closer and closer to the true answers. Lacan'r. view of the relation of the: reJ.l to 
the symbolic questions this view: it sugge'it5, instead, Kuhn's view of scientific progress as 
characterised by deep breaks. radical revolutions which change not only the answers scientists 
search for but the questions they ask. Th~ relation of the Real and the Symbolic is one of crisi5. 
In the place ol the image of the sdentist at ht.:r microscope. we should put the !o.Udden and 
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unfore!ieen collapse of Eastern European cnmmuni~m. For although, as I have emphasised all 
the while, the Symholic order d~"lminatc~ the Real and structures our experience: the real is 
always only present to us through being represented in dil>course. But that dominatil1n is 
radically unstable. The fact that it is sci f- wnrainc J docs not preclude its hd ng fragile, crisis-
ridden: always, without exception, susceptible to the traumatic irruption of the unforesccn, of 
that which was not symbolised. The real and symhnlic urders arc therefore fundamentally at 
odds, in a relation of interruption. The Real imping.::s on our interpretations only insofar as it 
disrupts them. I! is not something that is Jisco\'ered: it is the unexpected, it is what one "bumps 
into", it is the moment at which an interpretation founders, when the smooth gears of the 
discursive process crunch on an unexpected spanner, when the statue of Lenin comes crashing to 
the ground to the cheers of the workers. 
The real is therefore a limit-concept. The real, in a manner of speaking, is nothins but the 
moment at which the intcrpr.::tatilln founders - in Lacan's formulation, the: real is the 
impossibility that things could be otherwisc. 107 As Zizek puts it, the real is. in Hegelian terms, 
at the same time p~suppo~ed and posed by the symbolic. lO!I It can only be detected or inferred 
at the moment of the failure of interpellation, detected as an interruption in the smooth 
circulation of signifier!>: a gap, a hole, a failure in the interpellation. 
Why is it important to emphasise that the real is nothing but the way in which ideology 
stumbles, is thrown into crisis? It is hccausc he is concerned to deny that this moment of crisis 
is something the ideological can hecome progressively inured to, something ideology can ''learn 
from", as if, if our interpretations have been disrupted often enough, we shall slowly he ahlc to 
piece together what is "really" ··out tncre". Lacan refuses to say anything more about the ··actual 
nature" of the real. To do that would be to ad\-ance the idea that a final interpretation is 
possible which is safe from shipwreck. Lacan insists that any such interpretation must always in 
its turn be open to disruption. The unexpected shock that occurs when the interpellation can no 
longer be maintained, when we fed that we are awaking from the ideological dream - this 
impact can be dealt with only by an altcmpt at ~-symbolisation, re-hegcmonisation. This re-
S}'mbolisation Joes not take us any closer to the real; it can only suture us, once more, into the 
self-contained, world of ihe signifier; an interpellation that is in its turn again open to the 
disruptive effects of an encounter with tht! Real. 
107 
108 
"irhel Pe'"heu~. "Discour.;e: S1r1.1cturc or event?" . p. 637. 
Sla,uj Zllek. "Approache~ to the l.acan1an Real". p. t9. 
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Thus we can see, in the trial of the NCL/ A R~1. hov. each of its members rearticulatcd his or her 
discourse so as to deal with the at first incnm pre hesiblt: fact of failure. There was nothing 
inevitable about the cours~ of this rcarticulation. Leftwich articulated a discour~~ of self-
exoneration in which he separated his pri\·ate and political ~elves; Daniels and Lewin extended 
their ideology of integrity and commitm~rll to include the choices they faced in detention, and 
made their \·ery im pri~onme nt a coni in uat itm ami vi nJication of t h~ ir political beliefs. Brooks 
and Kemp, on the other hand, moved away from the idl·ology of liherali!.rn 10wards that of 
Marxism - Kemp, like Berman, is today inclined to talk about her membership of the 
NCL/ ARM as an abberation, anJ emphasises her journey towards the ANC as the important 
story. 
But if there was nothing inevitable about such a process, ncilhcr was it completely free, 
completely arbitrary. In realigning themselves . ..:ach NCL/ ARM memhcr made use tlf the 
discursive resources that was a\'ailable to them. Leftwich's discourse is mark~d by an 
exaggerated continuation of 1 he oppositions we detect~d in his discourse::; Danie Is, Lcwi n, 
Hitson, Brooks and Kemp all maJe sense of the crisis of th~:ir project by using the discursive 
res.ources that were available to them. As Peter Hudson has pointed out, the way we move 
from: subjcct-posilion to subject-position is nut totally randnm or indeterminate. True: its logic 
does not belong to the iron laws of matt'rial necessity; it is the logic o! the articulatory practices 
that constitute the di~course in question,IO'l And !hat logic means that the ideologically 
disclocated suhjecl cannot pick and choos~: th~: dcm~:nts that cnn.~titule its own subjectivity: 
rather, it takes up place in a discur.sivc sys.tem which has its o~n regularity and structure. Thus 
what is i nte resting about the pn:se nt crisis of Congress. diswu rse aft t' r February ~ 1990 - a crisi~ 
rt:sulting from il.'.o efforts to incorporate the new politics or negotiation into its fram~:work • is 
precisely the way in which it is marked, not by a prolikration of idiosyncratic positions but the 
homogeneity and systematicity of positions that arc in fact taken up. 
Leftwich's breakdown is important, then, for two reasons. In the first place, it faces us with an 
interesting challenge. In these pages I ha' ~ pre.s~:ntcd the process of interpellation in it~ 
synchronou~ dimension: I ha.,.·e looked at the subject's con.;;titution towards a particular set of 
crucial signifiers. I have shown how this focus on the signillt::r in its moment of "~uccess" can hdp 
us understand a historical event But the field of history is the field of diachrony; it is no 
coincidence that my discussion has ended with the prohlem, not of the success, but of the crisis 
of the signifier. For it is in the lielu of history that we can investigate most fruitfully tht: way in 
tf)9 Peter Hudsor~. "Causality and lhe Suhjcn •n a 'uiscour5e·lheoretirar approach to ~arxi~m·. pp lU · 1~ . 
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which the subject is not only constituted, but reconstituted. Individuals move through a host of 
subjcct·posilions in their lives. Sometimes they interpellate us simultaneously (Christian, worker, 
consumer, mother). Often such a hannonious intersection of subjed·positions (soldier, South 
African) can be thrown into sudden crisis; a crisis which can in its tum read to a fundamental re-
articulation of identity. And beyond these personal histories there are larger discursive shifts; the 
breaks by which the discourses that constitute our public identities are reartirulatlXI. In the field of 
history, then, we face the challenge of describing these rearticulations. 
Such a history shall have to go beyond a reductionist explanation of changes in terms of economics. 
It shall have to deal with the complexity that these shifts have on their own discursive level. How 
such a description will look, I cannot yet say, except that it shall have to spotlight three questions. 
Firstly, it shall have to follow Foucault and emphasise the discontinuity of this process. A«. we 
move fmm one position to another (liberal, socialist, democrat) we do not move incrementally over 
an homogenous (left to right?) continuum. Rather, our movements (though never arbitrary) arc 
both discontinuous and erratic. Secondly, iL must deal with the way in which in the narmtives we 
produce about our identities as socialists, workers, South Africans, we efface that radical 
heterogeneity; our stories (about ourselves, our communities) explain how we arc always becoming 
what we were going to be all along. 'Jbinlly. it must look at the way, in these these accounts, a 
crucial role is played by what one could call epochal events, founding ads · breaks (Sharpeville, 
February 2, being shot at, sexual assault, a strike) that serve as focal points for the ideological re· 
artirulation .. 
Leflwich's collapse has a second, more concrete significance. His departure from his own code of 
commitment does not only symbolise in an extreme way the general openness to crisis of the 
discursive, the need to understand ideological change. It aLso leads to the question of what became 
of the ideological traditions he and the NCUARM represented. Leftwich's failure did not only 
touch himself: his self-conceptualisation as an ethical subject drew on ideological resources that 
shaped the NCUARM as a whole: whereas the fourth of July raids mark the moment of the 
organisation's strategic defeat, Leftwich's collapse symbolically marks the crisis of its moral 
project. How, then, was this tradition rearticulated? How, after the NCUARM, did the ways in 
which white radicals conceptualised their radicalncss change? 
This seems at first a mistaken question. lbe ethical subject position implied by so much of NCL 
disoourse · the self-conceptualisation of onesell as an "ordinary person", an amateur, taking up a 
stand against injustice - is, after all, one maucr: Leftwich's failure to live up to it is another. 
II I I. 
Other NCL/ ARM members- Lewin and Daniels, fur ..::<ample. did not turn State witness; as my 
references to interviews show, their di:.coursc is today still marked by its characteristic 
opposition'> and equivalences. But this is to miss the 'ignilicancc of the NCL/ARM'5 project. 
Its turn to 'iabotage was an attempt by whit~s to iJcntify Lh~mseln:s with the movcml!nt of the 
mass of opresscd South Africans. In that they 01.re unique. What was unique about the 
NCl/ ARM was that it was probably one: of the most raJieal of attempts to make the basis of 
that identification the subject position o( the "nrdinary citiz~n··, the person-in-the-street, taking a 
posit ion regardless of the te aehings of idcoiO!,Y)' or Joel rine . And though this 1 r ad ition con\ inue d 
and the discursive subject positions associatCL! with it are still a feature of modern-day South 
Africa, no sustained anempt has been made to identify within the terms of this tradition with 
the aspirations of the oppressed majority. It has vanished, in other words, from the discours~: of 
the organised white left . 
Instead, another subject-position came almost exclusively to characterise whites' attempts to 
identify with popular struggle . h was based, not on an identification with the subject-position of 
the ordinary member of civil society but on its rejection. In the 1970s, with the rise of popular 
resistance among industrial workers after 1973 and the h.:gcmony of black con~ciou<.ness, this 
rejection took the form of a critique of that civil society and the presuppositions of liberalism. 
Identification with the struggle of the oppre~sed took place, in other word~. through the nexus of 
theory. This subject-position marh the discourse of the left from the theoretical writings of 
Richard Turner. through the theoretical intervention of revi~ionist historians like Lcgassick and 
O'Meara, to the activities of white intellectuals in.,.·olved in the lahour struggles of the early 
1970s. 
With the resurgence of Chanerism in the early 1980s and the discursive construction of a non· 
racial SoUih African subjectivity this changed again . The dichotomisation in Congn:.~s di&course 
of polltical space into a ··people's camp'" and ;m ·· (!nt:mies· camp" with membership decided not 
by s.k.in colour or class but by commitment to the ideals of democracy and non-racialism. 
rendered the mediation of identification through an elaborate theoretical critique unnecessary. 
Ta.k.ing up th~: flag of Chartcrism wa~ in itself a suff1cient act of alliance. But in spite of this the 
relation of opposition and contrast in the sclf-conct:ptualisation of the white left between itself 
and the notion of the general. "ordinary" white public remained. Here identification occurred, 
not througn a notion of plain·spoken commitment and technical expertise, nor y~·t through a 
concept of commitment to the interests of international socialism and proletarian power, but 
through a notion of the corrcctn~:~s of a line: the characteristic self-conceptualisation in the 
organised white left for lhc last decade has been that of an acth·ist. 
:111 I 
This subject position almost completely permeates the political culture of the left today. Even 
the efforts by organisations like :"lUSAS and the ECC since the early 1980s lO regain the white 
left's moral appeal in ''the white community", efforts, in <Jther words, to formulate a political 
di!>course with which whites can identify, those dfnrts remain !;[ructurcd by this implicit self~ 
conceptualisation, the implicit division between a body of activists and the public th<:y are nying 
to app..:al to. 
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This political heritage constitut~s the ideological re.r,~.mrces available to us for the tasks that face 
us in South Africa after :! February 1990. This South Africa is one in which Congress politics 
takes on less and less the character of a vanguard mo\'cment, leading the struggle forward 
underground. The political terrain that faces it in the period bdore negotiations and after it is 
now radically different. The topography of this terrain is as yet difficult to sketch. But surely one 
of its central characteristics b the possibility that the concept of citizenship will form, not the 
"other" of the democratic politics of the future, but its very basis and matrix. 
It is with the very difficuhy of sketching precisely what this entails for the politics of the left that 
r wish to end. It seems rhat that difficulty i.s the result at least partly of the discursive re.sources 
at our disposal in facing up to these tasks. In fact, here is where the discourse of "activism" itself 
faces a central and serious crisis. For there is ont: crucial a!>pect shared both hy the di.r.course of 
the NCL/ARM and the position characterised by the assumption of a subject-position as 
"activist". This aspect I have indicated in my analysis of Lhc moment of fantasy in NCL discourse 
as an inability to conccptualise with and deal with diiTerence. Ha\'e the discourses that 
constitute the Congress. tradition don~ very much better~ To be ;ure, the importanco: of the rask 
of building political consciousne~ has been emphasised: but the challenge of dealing with 
different conccptualisatiom. of the liberatory process has on the whole not been met. In the 
above pages I have shown the way in which Leftwich's discourse has "closed" the question of the 
desire of the masses. Does. the Congress tradition not face very analogous dirficulties in dealing 
with the gap between its representation of the desire of the "people" and the divergent ways in 
which speciflc desires will be articulated in the political s.truggles that lie ahead '~ This question 
seems to be part of the challenge recently uttered from ,,:ithin Lhe ANC by Albie Sach.~. As the 
task of winning over support as a legal movement in the face of counter-hegemonic challengts 
becomes a reality, this is a challenge that looms all the larger in our future. 
I cannot, therefore, conclude with any sdf-contained, closed~off answer about the significance 
for us of a study of the NCL/ARM. Instead, I must end with a question, a question the 
NCL/ ARM poses us. Jn my analysis, terms like. "an inability to deal with difference'' have played 
a central role. Bul what does a political project look like that can place difference·~ How does 
an identification look that can think its (lwn pruvisional nature~ 1!> it p<lSsible to acl in l~rms of a 
cnnccpt of political unity in which the hasis of th<~t unit~ i~ ;.ccn not as <1 point of departure but 
as a process'? And could such a discourse ~till enable a radical political project. capable of 
c0ntinuing the concern with democracy. equality and justice th<.~L has chMacteriscd left 
discourses until nnw? 
Although my analysis has been ideologically structured hy a concern with these issues, it has 
nowed, not from any certainty about the shape of such a politics, hut from a knowledge of 
uncertainty. It has been motivated by tht: hope that even if it is not yet possible to say what ~uch 
a politi~ looks like, it is possible to learn much from a realisation of what it does not look like. 
My thesis has been concerned, in other word~, not only witb filling in gaps in our knowledge 






To ensure ea~.: of reference: l have retained the: paginalion of the original documents. Minor errors llf 
spe IIi ng, etc. have been re ctific d. 
Document I National Committee for liberation: .-\nnouncement. This is a pamphkt distributed by the 
NCL after their :.!0 December )ll(l) pylan attack.t It has been reproduced from a copy 
in AAS 254 Red 7 (Fl fm) 
Docun1ent Z Socialist Ltagbt Political :\laniffsto: This manifesto was drafted by Baruch Hirson and 
read and accepted atlhc NCL's national formation in May J%.2 . .:! It has been 
reproduced from a copy in Baruch Hirson's personal possession. 
Document 3 S 'V Daniels Exh CS ("AR..'\'1" pamptllell Thi~ pamphlet was drafted mainly hy Adrian 
Leftwich in pn:paration for the lS June pylon attack. 3 
Document 4 S 'V Danieh Exh C6 This is a discussion of the strategical problems facing tht NCL and 
was apparently written b) Lcftwich.4 
DocumentS S w Daniels [llh C7 This seems to he an earlier draft of Document 4, and was also wriuen 
hy ldt"'ich. ~ 
Document 6 S ,. Daniels [xh C9 This comprise~ two different JraJts of plans for ll .. political intelligence 
unit". Leftwich aJlcdgcd in court that these were "rill en by Vignc.(. but tht:y also show a 
great similarity to the plan!. outlined ~y himself in Documents --1 and 5. 
Document 7 S w Hirson [)(h M40) This discus.~ion of the NCL"s position in the broader liberation 
struggle 1.11a!. sent from the ;-.JCL's london committee, apparently a~ part of the effort 
to formulate a national position for the NCL.7 
Document 8 S" Hirson Exh M-'IJ) This d(lCumcnt is a !.Urn mary of the goals and principles of the NCL 
and appear~ to be condensed frurn the poinb enumero.ttcd in Documents 9 and 10 
below. 
Document 9 S ov Hirson Exh M4(4) ("The Nalional Commitl~e ror liMration • Background and aims") 
This document, like Document 7, wa~ produced a~ part of the attempt to iorrnulate a 
policy for the NCl aher Ldtwich'~ rcturh from London som~ time after September 
1%3. It contains idea~ cnmtrihuted hy Leftwich and Watson. hut wa~ mainly wrincn by 
Vigne.8 Where significant. handwritten addition!> to the manuscript have been 
enclosed in curled brackets ( ~) ). In some cases the original wording has been deleted; 
where this st:cmed material to the meaning of lhe tc~1 I have indicated this by by 







AD J9E ·we Bombed Two Pylons. Gwup Clam1s" . Th~ Rand Oail} \t;til . .!~ De1·ember l'i61 
Hir'leln/Olifant. f'· --l.!: lnte<" '~" w11h Raruch Jt,n.o!l. London . 15 \1ay !989 
S v Oanieh. p. lfll 
(bid. 
Ibid. 
S' Dani~l~. p 16.2 
11iM.on/~fr-.1ch (recalled). p . .! 
Hinlln/l.efN·ich (recalled). pp. 3~ 
Document JO S ,.- Hirson Exh ~1415) Thi<:. appear'> tn he an earli'-'r t.lral't ol' Docum ... nt 1) . and was draY.n 
up by Vignc .'' As in the prcviou~ k'<l.. hanJwriuen in::.o:rtion~ have been indicated with 
the use of curled brackeh and strikdhrough. 
Documenl ll S ., Hirson Exh MS(O This is the formal con~titulilm of the NCL, adoptcJ al its merger 
meeting in May 19M. 
Documenl I~ s" Hirson Exh M5(2) "Draft r()r Di~cus~ion" This i,.; a more elaborate VCTSion of the 
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Document 1: National Commiuee for li~ralion: Announc~ment 
The ~ational Committee announc~s that on 20 Ol.!cembl.!r 1%1 it tkstro~cd power lines 1n 
J ohannc~nu rg. 
The Narional Committee for Liberation has been rc~ponssiblc for: 
1. The remo11al of banished people to places nf ~J.fcty 
2. The transpL\Tiation of people .wcrseas. 
3. The taking of 20 nurses to a point of embarkation to Tanganyika. 
4. The burning of the record~ at the Bantu Administration Ta.~ Off~ee in Delver~ St, on U/9/61 
5. The destruction of a p0wer line on thc 9/lll/1•1. 
The !':CL has laken this action as there is no longer am legal democratic way 10 oppose the Nationah"'t 
Government. 
The 1'\CL welcomes the appearance 1lf the ".-hsegai of the Nation". Both the "Assegai nf the ~ation" and 
the NCL ~upport the Liberatory Movement. However. no on~ group has the responsibility for fighting 
for the freedom of it~ country. 
The NCL is a non-racial organisation \Vhose member~ hold varying political opinion~. our attack is 
against the Nationalist Government and not indi\'idual~. and our members are trained to protect the lives 
of people in all circumstances. 
We warn the Government that we will fEght umil the last vestige of whit!! domination has been 
eradicated. We stand for a non-racial state based on equality for all and we will cary on the fight until 
this has been achieved 
Document 2: Socialist league Political manifesto. 
'The Socialist League of Arica is the ind~:pendt:nt mm~:mcnl of th'" workers of Africa. Its aim Is to 
organi~e the working class in order to ~trugglc for a soci .. li~t Africa. To c~tablish this end, the league will 
(1) Establish contact with working-class bodil!s throughout Africa bccau'e our struggle is pari of 1hc 
larger struggle of establishing th.:: ll nited Sociali~t States of Africa: 
(2} Support every positive step taken hy the ~atitmiil Libt:ratllry Movements in Africa, that help to 
establish any or all of the democratic rights that arc imcparable from the struggle for 
democratic socialism: 
(a) the defeat uf imperialism throughout Africa; 
(b) the establishment of full citizen's rights and granting the vote to every man and Wllman 
without qualification; 
(c) the taking over of the mines. large industries and banks for the pt:ople; 
(d) tht: taking over of the land by those:: who Wtlrk it; 
(e) the removal of all discriminatory laws with outlawing of any colour or racial 
discrimination. 
3 The League will urge all workers to join their trade Unions, hs industrial program wilt be: 
(a} to break down any colour bar in industry: 
(b) to achie\'e full jobs for all with equal pay; 
(c} to fight for the lcgalisation uf the Trade Unions to achieve their right to co!lective 
bargaining; 
(d) to raise wages. until a full living wage i~ ohtained: 
(c) achieve trade union unity throughout Africa. 
4. Th~ league declare!"> its working-class independence and will ally itself with any organisation 
working to achieve part or all of these democratic aims. 
5. The league's. imernational policy will be determined hy the principle that its first concern is the 
interests of the working class. It will stand together with tho.se states who fight imperialism. 
oppose capital ism and work in the interests of world peace. 
Forward to the liberation of the world working class~ 
Document3: S" Danieb and others Exh. C5 ("AR..\1" pamphlttl 
The African Resistance movement (ARM) announce~ its formation in the cause of South African Freedom. 
ARM states its dedication and commitment 10 achieving. the on~rthrow of the whole system of apartheid and 
exploitation in South Africa. ARM aims to assi-.t in e~t<.Jbli.,hing a dl'mocratic society in terms of the ba.r,ic 
principle..-, of socialism. 
We salute other Revolutionary Freedom Movements in SoU!h Africa. In our activities this week we particularly 
salute the men of Rivonia and state our deepe.'>t respect k1r their courage and efforts . While ARM may differ 
from them and other groups in the freedom struggle. we belie\·e in the unillcation of all forces fighting for the 
new order in our country. We have enough in common. 
The time for talking is past The present regime and its l'.Upporters, internal and foreign. have sh.own that they 
are not prepared to respond in any way to the peaceful demands of the people of South Africa for full 
participation in all aspects of the political, economic and social life of the country. Instead, opression has 
increased. 
ARM Joes not only talk. ARM acts. ARM ha:; acted . ARM has declared and will declare it:;elf rhrough action. 
This is the only language our rulers unllerstand. And ARM. with other freedom forces will harry and resist the 
opressors until they an: brought to their knee s. 
White South Africa has often been given the opportunity to ali~n itself with progress. It has eonstantly rdused 
to do so. It has sough! only to build for itself on th.e backs of the people a comfortahle bastion of profit power 
and pri\ilege . 
ARM declares its fight not against the whites as such, but against the system they so jealously defend. ARM 
"Will avoid taking life for as long as possible. ARM would prefer to avoid bloodshed and terrorism . But let it be 
knoWI'l that if we are forced to respond !o personal \·iolence -- anc..l we cannot forget decades of violence, 
torture, slar\'ation and brutality against us-- we shall do so. 
For the present ARM will inconvenience and confw;e . ARM will di~rupt and d!!:>troy. ARM will strike where it 
hurts mos1 . We will not cease until the present vicious system and rule by force is crushed. ARM dot,; not 
wish to see one form of domination replaced by another. It works for a full political and social revolution. 
To Vcrwoerd, Vorster and their men we .:.ay; you will NEVER stop the pulse of the new society which even 
now, beats in our factories and cities, our mines and farms -- and YOU K.NOW IT. 
To the people of South Africa, we say; 
ARM NOW FOR FREEDOM 
Document 4: S v Daniels and others Ellh. C6 
lntroduc1ion 
This paper serves to outline the present strategy and thinking of the company in relation to its role and 
activities in the context of the SA situation, a~ we see it . ~aturally. individual points and examples can 
be questioned and need greater explanation and expansion. aod hence we ask that the general thesis he 
the focal point of a critical examination of this paper. It is 1his which, if accepted, must form 1he basis 
of immediate future policy and activity of the company. 
This paper is divided inlo a numher of sections. The lirr.t s.:ctions Jeal with a broad analysis of the SA 
situation, compared with other situations at other times in which the overthrow of regimes has taken 
place. The (jrst sections will deal too with a broad enunciation of the factors which appear to be 
necessary for th.e effective O\'erthrow of a regime. measured again'it the existence -- or non-existence --
of tbese in the SA conteXI. The concluding l'.ections will outline our views and plans in terms of the 
general outline, and an explanation of why we believe the~e plans and views to be realistic. 
1. In our view, the SA society can hardly be compared with any past or present situation where rev. 
acrivity has overthrown or is overthrowing an opressi\'e regime. The SA economy is a booming 
expanding capitalist economy which has been de\cloped by able and tough men. rhrough a process of 
exploitation of the mas~ of the population which it has harnessed to achieve th~ end. 
In the proct:S'> of thi~ development an ad\·anccd industri<tl economy has been built. and is being buih. 
which is pro1·iding well-being and affluence for the white opressing minority, and in minimal proportion 
to the {wealth?] or the eoUnlry, some benefit w the African working population. The white minority in 
SA is not an effete f~udal group. IL is a rough husines~ minded sector m<Jde up of high powered 
financiers, skilled industrialists and carefully protcct~d worh'rs. 
Thus. it would be "Tong to com.idcr tht: white minority in South Africa to be in any way comparabk lt) 
the dfcte Chinese middle classes as rt!presented by the Kuomintang, to the feudal and aristocratic 
Czarist rcgim<! in Russia or to the Cub:ln ruling class prior 10 the advent of Castro. The S.A. minority 
is also nm typical of a colonial settler group such as the French in Algeria. The French in Algeria could 
still have been regarded as "5ettlers" -- a term which suggest<. their comparati\'dy recent arrival and the 
possibility of their departure to a metropolitan country. The French in Algeria did not form an integral 
part of the economy & social structure in the same way as tht! SA whites do. Firstly, Algeria not bdng 
an industrially ad\·anced country, th<!ir presence was t:ithc:r in the l'icld or farming, administration, 
military or some busine:ros and commercial undcrstakings. Their allegiance-- in the main --was owed to 
France, and there was always the possibility or a return IO France if conditions so determined, and il'i 
e\'cnts subsequently !!.howed. In ~A, however. the white population has passed tht: "selller'' stage; it has 
become identir1ed with tht: country and has become totally enmeshed and entwined in the very ha:.es 
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of the economy which it has guided and Llir...:cLCd [for it'>?] own domestic benefit -- though not. of 
course. without the support and a!\~istancc \~hich foreign L:s anJ Brit capital in\·cstment has pro\iued. 
SA is an independent state and the purpo~e of the -;tall:' -- in one rc!\pcct -- is geared towards the 
imprming of material conditiom (for white:<.) and not IO\\·ards wpplying a metropolitan power with 
certain raw materials. nor being the market fnr got1d~ from that merropoli~. In othc r words, the white 
minority in South Africa is not a scltlcr group-- ir i'> a dominating minority. It cannot tu; compareJ to 
the French in Algeria -- or the English in Kenya~ the society itself is representati\'e of an advancing 
industrial capitalism. The colour composition of the population and the Jiametril:'ally opposed political 
and economic interests of non-white and white. offers no hopt: of army defection which took place in 
Russia, China and Cuba, and which was of mmc importance in achic\·ing the revolutionary changes in 
those coumries. 
Our first point then i~ that in SA, an advancing indu!\trial capitalist society. with a cul!urally 
heterogenous population make-up, offering almost no chance of defection from ruling group to 
opres.sed, and an independent state drawing locally on the loyalty and support of the white group, and 
not owing effective political allegiance to a metropolitan power fnr the benefit of that power, a 
clas.s.ical revolutionary situation doe.:. not exist. and hence an orthouox strat.:gy ror freedom can not be 
applied. 
2. Where re\'. activity has occurred bdlJre. then: haYc inc\ it ably hte n a certain set of conditions, 
indi,·idu<Jlly or in differing combin<ttion<.. These Jn:: 
a) Suitable geographic conditions such a~ the 1\bl;~yan jungle or the vast Chine~e hinterland; 
b) an effete regime from whose ranks army ddection has been possible; 
c) areas where base~ for fighters have been pus.~ible. either in independent horde ring states such 
as Tunisia and Morocco in the Algerian case. or the Sierra mountains in Cuba's cast:; 
d) usually the state of th~ economy has either been an agriculwral one or one which is on the 
verge of industrial development. 
In South Africa fe~·. if any of these conditions are effectivdv presenL Firstly. the SA terrain IS 
unsuitable apart possibly from isolated areas in the NE cape near the B.asuwland mnuntains, th~ far 
North of Natal, and one or two other spots. Generally the terrain is poor for a guerilla army and 
coupled with the eHectivc slate of readiness of the armed forces, ih training m I his f1dd :.tnd its 
expnience in learning from other situations, the po.<>sibility -- from a geographic puint of view -- of 
succcs~ful military overthrow of the regime se~.ms small. E\en !ill a grnup of fighters were to establish 
themselves in one of these areas, their dfl'cti\·eness would be minimal un!e~s they were ;Jble lo 
penetrate to key centres of the countr~ where they could be dfectivc. 
Secondly, as we have seen, the possibility of army defection is nil: the n:gime will nol crumble overnight 
and will enjoy almost total white supporl. 
Bases for rhe freedom army will be hard to lind in th~ country. for the effective supply lines will 
rule om certain central area~. As tobases being pro\'it.kd by independent states. we are. for the 
foreseeable future, equally pessimistic. E\en if the ,t3te~ bordering SA -- Basuto!and, Swaziland. 
Bcch{uanaland/ Mozambique and SR -- were to become inJcpenJent v.ithin the ncxl two or three 
years, to assume that they will be prepared to as"!i,t the SA f rL"cdom fighters either practically or tacitly, 
in the face of the might of the SA regime and armed fnrce~ would be foolish. These wuntries will have 
fragile economies and delicate political ~ituations. The~- will not be prepared to give much actual 
assistance to the SA fighters . They will have their own problems-- as East Africa has shown in the last 
few month~ and indeed their most valuable contribution to the SA struggle will be lO build themselve~ 
up as quickly and effectively as possible wi1h viable (?J, in order to assist, from strength, at a later 
stage. 
This is not to suggest that they will not be able to help at all. Clearly, as 1hey have done in the past two 
or three years, there will be much which they can do . Our point however is this; if say Bech[uanaland) 
were to house a freedom army and allow it to train. bui!d up supplies and cross the SA bordl!r, this 
would approximate, \·ery closely, to an act of war again~t SA. The SA army would have littk trouble in 
dealing with Bechuanaland in quick time . Likewise for other adjacent territories. Our point thus is 
that the bordering states are going to rdu~,;,: to pro\ide thi~ ~ort uf help for some time to come. The 
fact that TANU refused to allow the PAC to unload arms-- so we are told-- at Dar. i.'\the beginning of 
indications of this kind. When the form of the fighting opposition to apartheid reaches a point where 
troops, arms, supply lines and fighting forces are involved to a considerable and realistic 
extent, then at that pnint the African countri..:~. unk~~ th~:y ha\·c reached a kvd of g.n:c.~tcr ~t::Jbility :.md 
internal stn:ngth and unkss the International pmitit\n hils chang~d raliica!l~. nut se~ thl'ir way dear l<) 
helping in way which will be ncce:-.sary at that ~ti.L~e . 
little help can be expected from the USA. Their intcn::,t is in stability and their as~es,mcnt i~ no doubt 
that the SA governmenl can hold the [ort for .'lnmc timt:. The u~ v.:ill make odd noise., in prntest and 
may even exercise "pre,5ure" -- they will not act to dS!>tsl practically in the ovcrthrO\\ of \he ~ystem. The 
Russians are hardly likely to do so, given tht: international reaction which will result. 
Finally the SA econom~ is strong enough .lt !his slagc to support, industrially, an army lighting against 
guerillas. The recent reporb on [the establishment n~ factories at ~ccret place~ in the CQUntry is 
evidence of the degree to which preparation is being taken ~eriously . The country is covered by a vast 
network of roads, raiJ>A·ays and communications; police !>liltions are conn~cted by radio and the air 
force, plus helicopters, is in a P''sition to reach any corner of the country within houn. if not less. 
Throughout t be country there is white ~cnlement, in ~orne cases sparse and in the urllan areJs 
substantial. The wh,,Je white population mu»t be regarded a::. potential active lighters tn 5uppurt of the 
regime, and hence ;my ~u~piciuus Jctivity or mO\·emcnt o[ men in even remote ar~;J!'. could well be 
reported in a matter of hour:. to police 
army HQ·s. 
Even if. J5 has heen pointed out bdore, a guerilla army WAS ahlc Ln establish itsdf in a rcmott: area of 
the country. and mak~ ~mall and n;gular fnray-. . it 1\tluiJ ha\ L' tn pt:netratc: ~om~ Ji~tancc from ib base 
in order to strike cffectivc:ly. When .\1ao Tsc Tung cstahli-.ht:d his "liberated areas" in ~orth China he 
was in a position to hold them and devdop them into ... mall Stwiets, because; a) the Kuomintang army 
could not or would not reach them there. being extendL'd on all other frong b)thc technique t>f air/ land 
routing of forces was ar its most elementary ~tagc:!\ "hich it has progressed far beyond today and c) the 
size of the. country militatt:d against locatin~ :md then planning an aHack on the "liberated areas". In 
terms of rrrilitary ovcnhrow, an army is necessary, and occupied arc:as have to be administered and 
governed. 
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When a country has n:ached the o,tage of industrial dnclopmcnt which SA has, the prohlcms of 
revolutionary ovc:rthrow arc far more complicated than where the economy is either under-developed 
or just deYdoping. The state of organisation. the extc:nt ()f the infra~tructurc, the: ability to mohilise 
forces are all dependent on the state of the economy. An advanced economy ~.~o·ill naturally have ~11 
these facilitit:s built-in a:; a pan of the !'>ystcm and their 3pplication to nther lield~ is .simple. 
tt is generally agreed moreover that urban sabotage wnrk can, at this <;tage. be \·aluable only in that it 
keeps the political dim ate warm, imlicated that there: :~regroups still around, and pro\'iJc~ training for 
the members or the company. Tt should not b(' seen J!. a challenge to the centre of power. 
Furthermore. it cao involve incalculable risk<. lor th~ m..:mhcrs if the jubs planned ;m: too ambitinu:. or 
dangerous. and risk:; which, at that, "'n: not t'tf~~:t by the gains accruing fn>m the jQh.,, l~ they political, 
financial or purdy of propagandist va luc. 
Thus far the picture looks pessimistic. We feel that an~ other picture of fal~c optimism would be 
unrealistic. The CP /Spear people argue that one mcrcl:v needs to get tht: [v.orking class! organized 
aod the problems arc o\'cr. T '-' us, this is facil~ . Firstly th~ problems of organitat ion arc immemc. 
The network of informers is ~o wid!! and ~o efficient that the moment nne become~ efficient as un 
organi:c:er or the moment a group i:. formed it will either be cru~hcd, arrested. or its leadership shorn 
rrom it. Furthermore, it is our contention that in the contl!xt of the booming economy, and the ril-ing 
wages for African workers ·- which is a rather clever move hy the indU!'>trial supporters l1f the regime --
the African uri"J<tn proletariat is L'NLIKEL Y to resp<lnd to a call Lo ri~e ·- unle~~ there is some real 
cen.ainty of winning. There haYc been too many failures in th~ history of SA politics, the might and fury 
of the police has hecn demonstrated only too often. and the mood of the urban population is one which 
suggest!> to tht!m that quiet apoliticism. enjoying what vicarlou!"> bendit!> come their way as a rcsull of 
the economic cxpan!>ion, is hy far lhe safer course to follow. 
It seem!'. then that it is to the Rural areas that we must turn. Crban sabotage can be ~· ital and 
important and will take on greater significance when rural acth·itics get under 
way. We ~hall return to the argumcnls for and ag.ainst its cuntinuation \hortly. 
It ha~ bet:n suggested that the chances for a ~uccc.,~ful <Hmed effort against the SA Go\1. forces arc 
small. More specifically. the possibilitic~ of a freedom army achining power by military means. that i~ 
by military conquest of the SA regime, arc limited, if not nut of the question. This docs not mean that 
we dismiss the role of armed nghters in the m·crall struggle. The struggle will not be a ~implc one. It 
will not ~imply be a question of warfare. Gi\"en the complexity of the 5A situation int..:rnally and the 
comple."<.ity of international relattnns and their pressures. ~o I he method of change in SA will be equally 
complex. We do not attempt here to prophecy the pattern~ of change nor attempt to indicate just how 
or when it will occur. Insofar as the internal ion a[ pressures arc wncc rncd there is lc::ss swpe for 
analysing the possible line· Up of forces or their manife~tati1'n against the SA Gmt. This side of things 
willthereore be ignored for the purposes of the further sections of this paper, but it m u;,t be assumed 
that we ackowlcdge that international pressure . which may take <.orne time to build up to an effective 
peak, will be a further [facet] of the overall as!>ault on the s~ stem of Apartheid anti exploitation. In any 
event the onus of carrying through the revolutionary cha11ges during and after the cullapse of the 
regime v.ill inevitably fall on the shnulders of LhL· SA people themselves. Their role in this process is 
crucial. 
White we have been pe~~imistic about the po~sihilities of a freedom army lctually overthrowing the 
regimr.=, we dn not suggest thai guerilla rorccs are thcrdorc not 10 be trained, and prepared fiJr action. 
Far from it. There would seem to be a most sig:niticant role which they can play in the future- not as 
a \'ast army. but as small isolated pockets of men, harr assing and s.Jbotaging, the rural areas, railway 
lines and most imporlanl of all, operating in the n:scncs or Bantu:.tam wher.: -- as a long term project 
·-an overthrow. in the Transkei. for example -- of the Matan7.ima rl!gime by armed :md trained local 
pea~antry ccould be or great ~ignificance in the conteXl of the complex arrangement of forces which we 
suggest will finally cau~e the demise of the Apartheid system in SA. 
Tbe role thus of such forces would be to adopt the tactics u!>cd by Wingate in Burml and Ethiopia. 
oamcly to a\·oid aU possible contact with 1he enemy, but ~Mike at his supply lines. his road~. his 
railways, his police posts and communications. leaving hi~ area immediately ami hiding out where they 
can. The results of such activity would mean that the ~A forc~:s. are going to ha,·e lo deploy \'3!>1 
numbers of men to ~earch out the!>e pocket~ (which mu<..t be small and effective) to guard insrallatiom 
and to protect key targets. If lhe ex1ent of guerilla acti,·ily \Vas wide enough thi!> could mean that men 
v.ill be dra\I.TI from industry. commercl! and the administration, leaving the country on a quasi-war time 
basis of manpower in these tields. Thi~ would mean a CCS!.Jiic~n. if not a rerardation of the economy. 
For the ~on of progress to be achieved which the 
economv is achieving at present, it is necessary for Lherc to he continual gowth and expansion -- J 
pause in this process can upset the whole pwc~·ss in many ways. Now, if a slate of emergency were to 
re~uh through rural acti\itics annd urban disruption. couplt:d with increasing prc~'>ures of one sort or 
another from abroad, plus the drying up or the all-vital in\'Cstmcnt capital Y...hich the economy as 
presently constituted depend" on, the effect nn the country could he crippling. If this. followed hy 
strikes, rural unrest of a non-military nature. cou!J bl..' cfkctcd. the reg:ime could be near its end. 
There are a number of levels at which pre par at ion must be umkrlaken if a state of affairs such as the 
above is lo be achieved. Whether this situation is reached or not, and whether the general thesis is 
tenable or not, it is our contention that in any event the ~ pronged plann suggested below will be of 
value in the light - in what e\n form it takes - which lies ahead. 
1) lt is basic that we know. politically. what is happening in the country. By this we mean what forces. 
personalities and group~ arc emerging in the urban and rural areas. in the Bantustans and in SWA. We 
must know what local initiatino: is being taken. we must be able to know who to '>peak to and who lo 
give help to, who to train and who is to be trusted. At the same timl! the rural peasant groups such as 




5-peaking, the role of political intelligence . A gn1up of thi-, kind '~ill be responsible for g~uing to the 
root~ of the genuine oppo~ition mo\·cml'nt~. kn<~,. ing the .rn~onalitics. the problems and !he aim~ and 
ambition~ nf tlu: pePple concerned. !t i~ a k~y function in ;~ny revolutionary organisation for it not only 
enables the compan~ to have at its finger tip.., thl' fed uf the country politically, but it al~o open" the 
way to recruiting, training and the ~stah!ishm(!nt of .. at the Jctivc level -· the ,·cry guerilla groups 
which were referred to above. 
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2.&3. Long 1erm intelligence . This must be dl1scly coupled with long term military planning. It is quite 
clear that if groups such as those we sugg.e~t could upcr<Jte. are 10 get into thi: fidd, they must be 
equipped, trained, and have a go11d working kno\\kdgc of l'ic!d techniques ant! must also know where 
key targets arc, where possible sources of arms, ammunition and equipment are . This is the role of the 
two long: range planning groups. The one group -intelligence - must start plouing such things as police 
camps, key inslallatinns, arm~ dumps. coast lines. narbours .. umy m\Wcmcnls, key roads and railway~ 
in am.l out of given areas, local1crrain and hide-outs e1c. This is a long and tedious job, but one which 
must be done. 
The long-term military team must set about building up a pool of knowledge ami know-how 
concerning field techniques, arms, ammuni!ion. plane nying, advanc~;d s<~botage, unarmed combat. 
military science and a host of other practical dt:laits which tl!ams in the field must know J.nd be able to 
apply. 
4. FinaUy there is current act ion. The poin1 is debatable. There is the argument I hat all such cur rent 
action 
should cease: immediately in favour of the l• mg tam ohjL' ' 1 in~~ list.-d undn ~.3& ~- It is argued that 
urban and peuy sabotage is suicidal and apart from '-llmL· put·b1Jiling dkcts, ha~ no\ sufricicnl political 
or di~rupti \ "t! value to off se 1 1 he dangc rs in ,-nh .. d. 
Tbe otbr.!r argument accepts the basic security objection wntained in the Hr.,t argumcnl , but due'> not 
accept that this need ncce,sarily mean that curro.: nt urban action mu~t be ruled out. Those v.no support 
current action could argue as follow<.,: I) There arc jl'bs. simple and comparati,"ely straignuforward. 
whose risks CAN be minimized, though ncv~:r dimin<lttd. ::!) ll i:, thc'>e jobs that must be tackled 
regularly and immediately 3) the \"3]ue of such acti\·ity lies in 
a) Tr;.tining and experience for c~lmpany mcmhcr~ 
b) coupled, at the present stage, with propaganda iind publicity. it would help create the keling of 
uncertainty ;.tnd fear which would be nece:o.sary a~ a start t~J limit immigration ~ hich is really a 
strategic function :md foreign capitJI. 
c) it would gi\·e the company a stock of credit'> which would he Ll> it'> great <Hhantage wnl!n the 
~truggle mo\ e~ into a later stage 
d) it would be a morale boosting function - n•1t ~n much for company - hut for the m<t~scs 
generally, since it wouiJ show that the rc: arc ~till groups around which arc ;JCtiVt! . 
e) it would unnerve tht! go'v1 and police by its accur ac~ and en oice uf ob jcct in!s. and again, 
coupled Ylith effective:: propaganda, it would create a climall' of unce nainty and angst among 
white South Africa 
Thu~ for the fourth ~ection , it is argued bearing in mind the' current debate on thi<. question that apart 
from the important aspect of training. building up ckctrieJI and ll:chnnic;.tl experts, the secti1m ~hould 
be instructed to proceed on small, welt planned ;.tnd regular job:c.. 
At no :c.tage, may we add, do we underestimale the ~ecurity prob\cms involved in the whol::= plan of 
operations as laid out. Further. it is suggested that regions do not e\en begin to operate on the ahnvc 
lines, or similar ones, until they have reached a sl;.tge of df!!cli\c internal organisation, till their 
members have been tried and tested and their long-term cummitmcnt to the caus(: and their willingne!>'> 
lo stick il through to the end have been proved. 
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rn re\iewing the pa~t military O\'erthrow of tyrannical r~gimc~ in other parts of the world a number of 
broad facrors and trends emerge. Firstly it must be dear that the old classical theory of revolution in 
relation to Russia and China, despite their different forms (the one based on an urban proletariat, the 
other agrarian based) cannot be applied holu!'. bolus to the colonial situation. Wars of national 
liberation such as the Algerian war was a different proposition to the Chinese Revolution of Mao Tse 
Tung. In the Algerian case the purpose of the FLN was 10 throw off external rule and~ the foreign 
presence in order to attain independence, In this situation the Algerian fighters had a number of 
factors on their side which made this ta:r;.k possible. Firstly there were the two independent and 
sympathetic countrie"> of Tuni5ia and Morocco on either side of Algeria. These served as useful and 
effective basi~ from which penetration could be made, training facilities provided and to which retreat 
could be made. As Mao Tse Tung has shown "Guerilla warfare cannot survive for long and develop 
itself without a base." There are two types of base. There arc the bases internally in a country and there 
are the ba!>es in neighbouring countries which arc sympathcric or at best neutral. 
Secondly, 1he geography and demography or the country. 
There were vast areas of land which were uninhabited and when sparsely inhabited there was. no 
French prc~cnce. These areas served as intern:.!! bases and had the support of the population, UNITED 
in its aim of throwing off French rule. 
These ''""'0 factors are cardinal in any milit<Jry struggle. We must consider their relevance in the SA 
case. 
Firstly there are no independent, sympathetic or neutral states on our borders. This would mean that 
apart from air suppor£ or secret routes along which fighter!'> could pass back and forth -- which would 
necessitate the most complex and limiting framework on the war -- the essential core of re!'>istance and 
its base would havt" to be located internally in SA. If the geography of SA and the population 
distribution were such as in Malaya, or Cuha where vast areas of dense Jungle or inacce!'.sible plains 
with a s~mpathetic population made the tight possible, then the prospect nf effective guerilla war would 
he worth, at this stage. considering. But let us look at the factors which militate against such warfare on 
an effecti\'e basis in SA today. 
1) South Africa does not have vast Jungle areas whc:re a Guerilla base could establish itself. Apan from 
the Easlcrn Cape forest!> and a few area~ elsewhere, the basic lay of the land cannm 
., 
be compared to the endlcs$ ~tretchcs of Chin01 or the impcnctrablt' jungle:. of Malaya. A guerilla base 
would bt' \·ery difficult to hide. 
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2) Then one must conJ;ider the population distribution. While lherc are otwioul> concentrations of 
whites in kc y areas, there are, generally spc ak i ng \\ h ite far mcrs or traders in almost e\'e ry area of the 
country. The wh.itc population must be seen as part and parcel, for military purpo!.es, of the regime 
and its forces. In addition to this there are the plain and r<!grettable fact of informers, turncoats and 
Govt. supporters amongst the mass of lhc people. the Africans. 
Even if a guerilla band were able to find an area in which it could base itself it would be limited to that 
area and its striking range would not be far. [f it were not discovered by the vastr net of police and 
army, and if it were not discovered by the smattering of whites, then it would still have to hope lu avoid 
discovery and reporting by the people in the rural areas where 1he level of p\llitical consciousness is not 
yet at a point where it could and would suppmt the guerillas. 
3) Finally there is the simple but enormous strategic and logistic might of the armed forces and police. 
Never before in a colonial situation of the type which SA represents as such an effective build·up of 
fore~:, geared essentially to internal security, been paralleled. The French in indo China or even 
Algeria did not have the time nor the experience of other colonial powers 
in which to huild up and prepare in advance. Tht: SA gl'\1. has ha~ just tihs opportunity. It has had 
men in Al~ni<t to oh~~:m: the war Lind poli~c ructhoi.h th~·rc; it has estLlhlishci.l a vast network ol nome 
guard<:.. comm;;ndo unit~. helicopter ('!] squadron.:,. and has geared the army and police force to an 
almost {()tal concern with internal security and the ~ma.'>hing of guerilla forces. The might of the 
regime, its prepar~dne~~ and effectiveness and willingnes~ and ahility to crush internal resistance can 
not be under-estim<~ted. 
Bearing the ahov~ m mmd, (JUT position in this -;ituatJOn mu-..t be Rry carefully ami thoroughly 
considered. 
Thus far our \vork has been confined to internal sabotage, disruption of communication~ and power 
ami odd peripheral escape and transporting: wurk. No-one would claim that, apart from pot-boiling 
and slight incon\'enienCL\ this has had no effect whatsoe\·er in weakening the power base of the regime. 
If it has done anything it has strengthened their propag:mda hand, made them more alert and geared 
the state machinery to an all-out drive against genuine opposition. 
We can aL~o ace~ pi 1hat the continuation of our work along: present line~ at any pitch cannot effect the 
do1knfall of I he regime. Even if it were abk to create an atmosphere of panic and economic disruption 
and opposition. we would uot, if the Govt. fell han~ the ba~ic force and pow~;.•r to estahti~h a 
government and rule. At this s!age there is no group which could do this. 
Further than this, we must accept that on our pre~ent stn:ngth and in terms of our present supplies 
and ability, our chances of long term survival -- with or without dfectivc action -- arc \·ery slim. 
Th~ thesis thus far then is this: as yet in SA there are not e\·en the most essential and limited conditions 
for effective guerilla warfare and the present sabotage phase has not real effect militarily, and stands a 
very good chance of being smashed. All it can hope to do i~ affect the climate:. 
If we consider that the overthrow of the regime and the replacement by a govt. based on mass support 
(and willing and capable of introducing the radical -~ocial change which is necessary in ord~r l'or 
effective political and economic democracy to be established can only be achieved by military means --
or must essentially be achieved by this -- then we have to think out our strategy in long terms. It is 
ne\'er fe:~sible to pred1ct changes wh kh may affect the situation, such as international repercussiom, 
depression or any number of a host of forces which may influence events in any given direction. Be 
that as it may, it is necessary for us to have any idea of where we are going and how we are going to get 
there. 
If we accept that final overthrow is to be a military one, then we must accept that this is going tn be 
one based on an 
internal military uprising consisting esst:ntially of guerilla groups with an effective ~trike potential. For 
this the conditions mentioned above: is a base of retreating to and working from; a broadly 
sympathetic population (African) and certain areas free of whitt: presence must be satisfied. Even 
then, if these were all pnssible what chances are there for success? The mo:o.t realistic possibility is an 
independent state on our borders. Even with this can a guerilla army making quick forays, hope to 
penetrate to the centre of things with any cffecti\·cness? Would not the border areas be so well 
patrolled and policed that any movement of men would become noticeable[?) Any group of black men 
'"·ould be spotted and resisted. 
These are pessimistic thoughts, but realistic onl."s. 
We have reached this point then. Internal sabotage, of the present form is not effective, and involves 
the most appalling risk.s. For the foreseeable future the hope of a guerilla army is wry smalL What 
then is to be done(?) 
There seem 3 alternatives and possibly a 4th: 
1) The Company change'> its direction immediately. It drops its present action and concentrates solely 
on building up a vast but concentrated pool of skill, knowledge and technique in the arts of warrare, 
and especially guerilla warfare, against the day when this will be possible and effective. This view is 
predicated on the assumption that a time 
• 
will come when guerilla warfare \viii be pm.sibk. IAt th<lll tim<! we shall be able to prc'>ent to an army, 
recruited either by us or by others mllre closdy in touch '.l.ith a pool of potential recruits, a highly 
competent wing of experts with technique; infurmation and mtdligcncc tnformation. hich will be basic 
to their effecth·eness. 
2)That we abandon all activities in toto, confine our~el\"es perhaps to the production anJ distribution 
of underground newpapers, pamphlets and journals, po~"ibly attempt to create an effective escape 
group, pulling off daring escapes and rescues and transporting individuals abroad. 
J) That we concentrate our energies on widescale and effective urhan, and some rural sabotage work, 
with the aim not of overthrowing the regime. v.v.·hich we \\OUid accept to he impossible. hut aimed 
rather at loosening rather at loo!iening the deadlock and allowing a more fluid situation to develop 
where perhaps panic, capital flight, drying up of investment and immigration will cause a new situation 
into which others will moYe, or we ourselves ">hall move at a later ~tage if we are around to do so. (n 
01her word~, this suggests that we accept the v~ry limited objective of uying to create some nuidity in 
the situation, the internal continental implications of which we could not. apart from genera!ising, 
prophesy. 
4) That we effect a compromise between 1 & 3. That i!i. we e~tablish an independent wing, newly 
recruited and maintained quite separately from the present organisation, with the 
7 
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purpose of building up the inlelligence and military <.kill.., \\ing of the organi~ation again~t a day ·o~.·hcn 
they will l:le needed. At rhe !.ame time, rhe prc~~:nt "action" wing r.::mains in the field, pulling of regular 
t'lut highly effective and planned job-.. with the objecc (,f keeping the: poli1ical climate f>Uitahh:: fl>r 
tension and hence connict. 
A few other points must 1-te made at this point. 
1) It should be our aim. 'tated and accepted . that as ~oon as <.ccurit}' el'kctiwnc~s and political aim are 
known, for us w team up either on a unity basis or on a feclcral hasis with one or another of the: PAC 
or ANC. Uhimately there is going to he the need for one major freedom organi1ation if, again. it is 
accepted thJt internal military a.:tion will be the answer. And. even if not. thl're will ha\·e to be a group 
which, come the change ·• however that may he •· i~ capable of taking over. 
2) If point 4 is accepted then a hmad plan for thi~ ne\\ line is at hJnd . 
3) rr point 3 is accepted then our prc:!>C:nt structure dfectin:ly and finally tightenl!d up can he used, 
Overall we must finally dear up and estal'lli!ih nur ultin1ate pnlitical goals in :1 policy statl!m~nr. 
• 
The broad CP and apparent Congre~~ Line at the moment is thi~. The working cla~s i~ the ultimate 
force of change . Until it ha~ been organilt:d - which they naturally in~ist it is - and until it has 
at! ained 1 he !eve l of political con5eiousness \\hie h .,.ill pr1.>pd it into dfect ive act iun, nothing can be 
done. In an industrialist:d country it i~ the working class ""hich holds power, potentially or actually. To 
attempt abotage is "bourgeois impatience'' (although they themselves --or was it they? -- started thil'> 
'Nith Ukooto) and can only do no good. They argue that the PAC poqo campaign was wrong and 
harmful, for the efft:ci of iot wa.~ to stimulate the 90 day laws and oprcssive legislation which, while it 
aho meant the cleaning up of tht' PAC, also resulted in the emasculation of Congress. There is much 
spurious thought in this whole argument and it demonstrates the basic rigidity of the CP and its 
inflexibility in a new situation which Man did not conceive of, and which none of the early Rev. 
theorists diud not find themselves in. 
Be that as it may, our aims should be to establish linh Yo.ith Congre~s and their military wing if for no 
other purpose than to exchange views an analy.~es of th..: situation. 
These are brief and vague thoughts on our directions for the coming year. Detailed expansion of point 
ts ncces'>ary. 
But we have to think about it. 
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POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT 
A.i.lm The Unit '.~till aim to collect facts and seck out trends relating to groupings and personalities in 
the developing political situation in South Africa, the High Commission areas, South West Africa. and 
contiguous territories. The material and up-to-date information so collected will be available to 
certain groups and parties whose interest in the SA freedom struggle i~ genuine and who, in the view of 
the leadership of the unit, are commit!ed to the basic and broad common denominator of the 
democratic ideal and form. 
The Unit itself 'kill retain [ull records, stored outside the Republic. and wiU aim to position itself in 
such a way that by being fully informed on groups and trends and political situations it will in turn be 
able to influence events. 
Thus the Unit will both collecr and present facts and analysis as well as play a part in the developing 
political situation which its members will be studying. 
Principles: 
The Unit will act for the furthering of the broad aims of non-racial social democracy in South Africa, 
tbe concept as undestood by the non-communist seclion of the ANC, the official leadership of the 
PAC, the left wing of the Liberal Party and possibly c~rtain more progressive Progressive~. The 
members of the group will have no particular party loyalty. but will enjoy unity uf action by virtue of 
common adherence to the broad belief in basic social and democratic principles, and a concern for the 
future of SA 
Activities 
The Unit will consist initiaUy of as few members as successfully accomplish the tasks, possibly not 
more than 20 throughout the country as a whole . They will be required to give loyalty to the Unit. to 
accept irs discipline completely. They will ope rate regionally and all i11formation with the necessary 
security precautions taken will be channeled through to a central point for assessme11t and analysis and 
tben stored abroad. 
At the outset seven key areas will be visited by the unit. and members wil cover them individually or in 
pairs. 
Their job wiU be to map out the entire political activity of the area in rerms of a questionnaire which 
the exC"cutive will prepare as well as collect background data and information on th.e area and the 
personaJities. In some cases at the same time, in others as a later operation, they will be given specific 
objectives to accomplish, persons to visit, points of view to put across. actions designed to combat 
immediately initiatives taken at the political level by the Repuhlican Government or its agents. 
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT 
~The Unit \Will aim to collect facts about the dc•·c\oping political !;ituation in South Africa. the 
High Commission territories, South West Africa, and contiguous territories. The facts so collected 
will be analysed and recorded for supply to organisations needing a up-Io-date, absolutely reliable 
inside information, such organi~atiom being. required to pay towards the costs of operation. The facts 
so presented will be prepared for the use of bodies requiring them, and will be angled for their use. 
The Unit itself will retain full records, stored outside the Republic, and will aim to auain posttton 
from which itself to inOucncc events through being in po!>session of the essential information in any 
given situation. 
Thus the l!nit will aim not only to collect and present facts. but also itself to play a part in the 
developing political situation which its members will be studying. 
Principles The Unit \Will act for the furthering of the broad aims of nonracial democracy in South 
Africa, that concept as undestood by the non-communist body of the ANC. the official leadership of 
the PAC, the Liberal Parry and the more advanced section of the Progres!>ive Party. As its members 
will be drawn, possibly. from all these groups, and will include individuals as.5ociared with none of 
I hem, it \Will be in the best position to in Ouc nee events without 1 he e ncum brancc of sectional party 
loyalty. 
Activities The Unit \Will consist of as few members as successfully accomplish its tasks, perhaps twenty 
in the country as a whole. They will be required to give their primary loyally to the Unit, to accept its 
discipline completely. Their functions will be carried out regionally. At the outset scYen key areas will 
be visited by members of the t :nit. travetling some limes alone and sometimes two together. Their task 
will be to map out the entire political actiyity of the area concerned. in the first instance, in terms of a 
questionnaire prepared by the executive of the l.Jnit. In some cases at the same time, in others as a 
later operation, they will be given definite objectives to accomplish, persons to visit, points of view to 
put across, actions designed to combat immediately initiatives taken by the Republican Government or 
its agents. Thus, in the immediate period,a tour of South We5t Africa, following on the heels d Dr 
Verwoerd, BAD Minister Nel and deputy-mini5ter Borha, is to be undertaken by a member whose task 
will be not only to gauge the effect of the Government's new SWA mea5ures, but to kill any attempt the 
Government may be making to win local nonwhite apprO\·al for these measures, especially through the 
emergence of "stooge" spokesmen for the people concerned. Also in the immediate period two 
members are to go to the Transkei, one for an indefinite period, completely under cover, to place 
himself in the centre of political affairs there. as a press agent, the other to do an exhaustive tour of the 
East Pondoland area, where reports h.ave been received of imminent resumption of the 1960 rebellion. 
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1. The ;-JCL !>till remains a small elite group, distingui~hl:d by its technical competence and secure 
organisation. rather than by its size or effectiveness. In the existing simation, having failed to establish 
itself as the means of coordinating and federating all rc\·olutionary activity, it is unlikely to grow to the 
extent where it can displace The Spear or Poqo from their positions as being the revolutionilry arms of 
the ANC and PAC. It has however an undoubted initiatin.: over the other organisations in the degree 
of its technical competence. At the moment it s.:ems better organised in the Cape than in the 
Transvaal where its level of activity is very low. 
2. The need for unitY. There is, an overwhelming need for unity. 
Outside South Africa. The parties here consist of the NCL"s own committee. The ANC which seems 
to be in very good shape not only in Dar cs Salaam but also in Algiers and London. It seems to have a 
certain amount of money. There seems to be a distinct difference in attituddc to members of the NCL 
on the part of ANC members in Dar where several distinct suggestions of cooperation were made 
recenlly to your representative. In London there seems to be no .such feeling. This may arise from the 
fact that all the White comrades seem to have congregated in London. 
The PAC by contrast is broke and badly split abroad. Molotsi and (RJadebe seem to be following 
Leballo wbile Mahomo is trying to build himself a new empire in the Congo. The latest information 
from Mahomo suggests that the PAC in Ma~eru has fragment~d and that Molefe and Leballo have 
fallen out. Our impression is that the PAC h:~s become frankly opportunist and has liule organisation 
worth ha\ing. 
Inside South Africa. Here by common consent is where unity of command must first be established. 
There seems to be three other possible parties apart from NCL. These are the Spear, Poqo. and 
Apdusa. From events known here and at home it seems that we might well be nearest to Apdusa in 
that (they] seem to have been crippled by recent arrests and Tabata seemed keen to cooperate --
indeed this is the line that he has been selling Kambona. However, if we cooperated first with Apdusa, 
this might alienate the A:-.tC and this is an important consideration. Also Apdusa is very sectarian . 
A:"JC abroad seems keen to cooperate. II is difficult to assess to what degree they have been destroyed 
by the Rimnia arrests. If accounts of sticker campaigns in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town are 
correct they would still seem to have personcll but they seem to lack materials and training. In this 
regard it is worth noting that they ha\·e in excess of 150 persons waiting the end of Federation with a 
view to returning to South Africa. All these have been trained but not to the satisfaction of Makiwane 
in that they have had a standard military course. We cannot comment on the PAC at home. They 
seem to ha\'e received their quietus. If we are not in touch with ANC at home then contact can be 
proceeded with in Dar. The pulling power of the ANC out~idc South Africa must be appreciated --
especially in relation to I he commiuee of 9. This is far Jess true of PAC. 
ProposaL The proposal that is made to each of these organisations should dearly be a joint command. 
Each organisation should be asked to do what it can do best. lt is to be hoped that in due course a 
complete blend .....-iU be achieved and a full unity of effort and purpose. There has obviously been for a 
long time an unexpressed reluctance to gelling invoh·ed with the Communist Party of SA. It should 
be recognised that whatever the facts of the situation, the Spear is a partnership between the ANC and 
the C.P. and it is recognised as such by the ANC. Therefore unless it is suggcMed that an organisation 
should be created in oppo.si1ion 10 Spear -- which seems frankly impractical -· NCL members should 
face the fact that the C.P. is to play a part. On analysis it seems that if unity is achieved this par! will 
decrease with time. Our analysis in the early days of the movement included the assumption 
that most of the CP members with any ability would be l.:n~1cked off by the gm·ernment or exiled within 
a short while of sabotage commencing. This has prm·ed to be true, Therefore while those fellows arc 
still certainly part of the partnership abroad, they are not so at home •· for obvious reasons -· and they 
v.ill soon -..een to have outlived their usdulne~~ to the ANC here. In fact we are continually asked 10 do 
certain jobs for them here . This is curiou~ in the light of the facts 1 hat there are folk like Slovo and 
Hodgson in London. We suggest therefore that now is the time to try and find unity with Spear at 
home and that the fear of an association with the CP should be diminished by the facts set out above. 
It should be the motto of the NCL "by our works ye shall know us" and deeds make friends quicker 
than words. Eric feels about the CP: They will continue thdr dominant position from overseas in same 
way as happened in Spain because they will be in position tn control !low of money and supplies at later 
stage of struggle. Don't underestimate Joe and Co -- en:n though they will be (weakened] in South 
Africa. Thc=ir dominant position abroad will be of maximum importance. This does not affect our 
possible working with Spear but our poerspective must be clear on tncir future role. 
lntitiaJly we suggest a liai~on based on a practical project to he decided by you. We give as an e.g. 2 
points 20 mile di~tant on a railway line. NCL and Spear to do one each at the same time. ONly one 
member from each group to be in contact therefore maximum security. Ultimate joint command will 
have to now from practical liaisons. 
What can the NCL offer? We can offer a number of things that remain unsolved in spite of the fact 
tbat three years have gone by .since Sharpe villi! . Looking at the strategic situation beyond South 
Africa for the moment it seems that the free world has provided for South Africa very few of the 
services it requires if the remlution is to proceed. Amongst these are proper training facilities, 
transpon and supplies. The key to some of these problems might be provided by the independence of 
Zambia but not all will be solved m nearly as many belit=\'e . 
Iranspon; This is linked of course to the a\·ai!ability of supply but it is doubtful whether the 
independence of Zambia will ease the prohlcm. The link between Zambia and Bechuanaland i5 
through the pont at Kazungula . Hac at best Zambia has fifty yards of the river bank which will 
probably be policed. At worst none: . What sec=m s abundantly dear is whatever this situation might be, 
while it may be possible to pass men through tnis gap back into Bcchuanaland for transport to SA (and 
even this might be dirficult if pmpt:r controls arc placed on the crossing by Bechuanaland), it will be 
virtually impossible to u5e this route for materials. The question that is rabed by these facts is 
whether, for the moment materials can be transported into S.A. from the North. If money was 
available we suggest that the NCL should seriously consider the suggestion originally made that 
Torquil be used from the Cape to Jiase with passing vessels, using Betty's bay or a similar plac.c for 
unloading. It is interesting to note that Torquil has aroused interest in Dar es Salaam quarters for 
this very reason. 
Trajgin&. Northern Rhodesia is about to hecome the new training ground for SA. We should 
consider what pa.rt we can play in this. We have already transl<Jted certain works into Sotho. We have 
a lot of know-how. Will we want our own training place or can we in concert with others make a very 
materiaJ contribution to training facilities in Zambia. 
Materia]s. In spite of much talk about the a\'ailability of materials it seems clear that there is not much 
likelihood of these being provided by nations in the quantities that will be required. 
We suggest therefore that the NCL looks upon itself as a sort of specialist cadre, which will set up the 
ninews of the struggle. That is the procurement of materials, their transport and training. We must 
continue .,.,ith direct operations. We: must try to participate in the field to an increasing extent. Should 
we liaise with groups with manpower, however. we should concentrate on maximum exploitation of our 
specific ahilities. 
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Tbe aim of X is to build a new South Africa. The ncv. soci~t~ will be based on the broad principles of 
sociali5.m and democracy. It will be established through radical social change and the overthrow of the 
whole apartheid system 
The revolutionary government v.ill: .• 
1. Abolish segregation in all its lormo; and protect the individual rights of all. 
2. Establish and guarantee the fret:dom of e.xpr~ssion, association and religion. 
3. Establish a socialist t!conomic system, based on democratic planning over which the people 
will have the decisive control and which will ensure equitable redistribution of wealth in all its 
forms. 
4 Embark on an extensive programme of nationalisation to ensure an efficient and expanding 
national economy with full employment. 
5. Redistribute the land for the overall benefit of the society. 
6. Establish free and compulsory prim and sec education for all, with free tUition in higher 
educatio for tho~c who merit it. In addition, a large-scale and intensive adult education 
programme v.ill be instigated. 
7. E!>ta hlish free social se rw·ice s for all. 
8. Ensure that the judiciary is indepcndcnl. 
The X recognises that, in order to achieve the above: llbjects. there must be unity between allliberatory 
movements within South Africa. The X i..-. prepared to n.:goriate to thi:o. end with all organisations 
f1ghting for the liberation of the country. 
The X recogni!.e~ that Africa has been artificially partitioned by colonial powers and must overcome its 
heritage of imperialist exploitation. In order to uplift itsdr and take its proper pla•e in world affairs, 
Africa needs political and economic unity. 
The X rcgarill. the Addis Ababa conference as the lirst step towards such unity and gives the 
conference and the permanent committees set up by it its wholehearted support. 
Furthermore the X supports all those o;till struggling against imperialist and colonialist oppression 
throughout the world. 
Once a provisional government has been ~stablished in South Africa. the X will eall for a national 
convention as the lirst step towards forming the n~."w society. 
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The National Commjttee for Liberation .. bac~rcJUnd and aims 
REASONS FOR MILITARY ACTION: THE TIME FOR VNITY 
Har:.h counter-measure5 to the 1960 campaign uf the Pan Africanist Congress and the 1961 Slril..e 
called by the African National Congres~ hrought to an end the fifty-year old non-violent political 
~truggle for democracy and social justice in South Africa. The banning. of Congresses and crippling of 
other liberatory organisations hy proscription of members and by laws removing freedom of assembly 
and speech, effectively forced the leaders of the {oppressed) right less four-fifths of the South African 
people to seek military means of liberation now that the means of civil struggle had been struck from 
their hands. 
Tbere had seemed to be ideological reasons for the fragmentation of the liheratory movement in 
South Africa into mutually antagonistic groups. The end of political struggle rendered such division 
meaningless. and !he fir~t move to organise military action against the South African Government wa:o. 
made by a group of South Africans of various political allegiances, from various communities and 
language group!>, who in the second half of 1961 formed a national committee to plan the military 
action ahead. 
The commiuee was named the National CommiHee for Liberation, its members heing drawn from 
regional committees in the cities and rural areas of South Africa. 
Successful acts of sabotage were carried out in l%1, and a number of engagements involving the 
.:scape of impri50ned and conf1ned leaders were accomplished. 
December 1% l saw the launching of the military wing. of the 
ANC under the name Umkonto we Sizwe, although approaches had been made by the NCL to 
CongreS!. Alliance leaders in the cause of forming one united military force . The career of the 
Umkonto we Si:twe has been halted by the capture of the high command at Rivonia in August 1963, 
after many heroic act in the first sabotage phase of Umkonw's campaign. Meanwhile the rank and llle 
of Umkonto member!'>, if they happened 10 escape the South African Police net that Rivonia made 
possibl~. are scattered and leaderleS!.. 
The Pan Africanist Congress meanwhile remained pledged to its promise to the African people of 
'' freedom in 1963", bur March 1963 5aw the crushing of the projected rising and the imprisonment for 
long periods of PAC men, among whom were the bulk of thl! countrywide leadership. 
SmaUer groups also launched military activity, retaining their outdated ( mulualJ hostility hr·oMM 
twgMisitkoAS-wi~hdlt--l~atiOII-£14:-tM.- righ~ less--peoplt>-of-So!Kh-Aff~a-as-a-wlflmen-aim. The passing 
of savage laws allowing for indefinite solitary confinement and gaol without trial f + use of torture} has 
been instrumental in enabling the South African Police to root out and smash such !>maller group~. 
The use of torture has become commonplace in the investigation of sabotage, and I he effect ha:; been 
to destroy those smaUer groups that have sought to build up from purely local strength. with the 
dangers inherent in recruitment witin a particular local community 
The crushing of both Umkonto we Sizwe and the Pan Africanisr 
Congres:<., as well a~ of these minor bodies, [ha\cl both taught a terrible and tragic l~!'>son to all thost= 
who continue to fight each other and thus pby into the hands of the common enemy, and has ldt in 
existence on!~· the original military org:anisation in the field, namely the National Committee for 
Liberation, itself formed on the basi.s of national. nonracial unity and ideological conciliation and 
compromises. {a degree of flexibility based on a wish for fighting unityf. 
3 
The former political strength of the ANC and PAC make it ccrlain that their presently smashed 
milirary formations u.ill revivt= in due course. Very heavy losses have bet=n suffered, but !heir spirit of 
resistance has in no wise been broken. This must make ir an immediate aim of the i'ICL both to fill 
what would otherwise be a power vacuum in the coming phast= of military attack and lo strengthen its 
organisation in such a way that the re\'ived military bodie~ of the ANC and PAC may in the cours.e of 
time come together in the National Freedom Army which it is the NCL's chief bus.iness to recruit, 
train and jointly lead . 
PRESENT EVILS A:-.JD THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EVOLUTIONARY POLITlCAL CHANGE 
That >.uch recruitment is not only pos~ible but lntens.dy desired by the oppress.ed people of South 
Africa i~ evidenced by the contemporary ~ocial. political and economic condition of our country. 
Suffice it to say bere that four·fifths of the people of South Africa arc without social, political or 
economic rights, their denial being sanctioned by a legislature and executive drawn entirely from the 
remaining ftfl.h, the membership of 
hoth majority and minority being determin.:d o;olcly on ground<. of racial origin. thus the ruling group, 
so-called "whites" of Western European dl!sc~:nt. have complete and absolute power over the 
indigenour. African people, who form the great majority, ..LS wdl a<> over those of Asian <~nd mixed 
stock. The apartheid ideology of the Afrikaner Nationalists nor only has transferred to the statute 
book the mass of social disabilities that the nonwhites ha\·c .,uffercd since the days or ~laver~ and 
military conquest, but has also become accepted by the non-Afrikancr-Nationali.st minority among the 
whites as well. Any thought of political l;'volution within the context of present legislative forms in 
South Africa has been dismissed by the undcnia!lle phenomenon that the whites of South Africa have, 
wilh few exceptions, dosed ranks a~ainst the ad\'ance of their non-white "inferiors." 
J 
The vested economic interests of the whit!! population, backed all too strongly by the capitalist system 
tlf Western Europe and the U nitcd States. together with their total political and social privilege, added 
to which is their deep and abiding fear of the n:ngeance aroused by the guilty conscience of their entire 
community. rule out any real hope of a pha~ed. gradual, controlled transfer of power from the minority 
to the people as a whole. In order to achic,·c this transkr of power, nothing short of revolutionary 
mean~ have 10 be adopted, and in a South Africa which today denies political eltpression, culkctin~ 
bargaining in trade unions. and the liberty of almost an enlire section of political leadership, to ils 
opressed majority, such a revolution 
can only be brought aboutth.::rough the u~e of force. 
The raison d"etre of the National Commiucc for Liberation is the proper organisation and strategic 
usc of such fore<:, in the light of a major prercquisit<.: to ils usc, that the more firmly, resolutely and 
speedily such force is used, the more quickly can bt: ended the current stagnation of South Africa's 
growth to nationhood as a free African slate, and the more rapidly can be achieved the liberation of all 
its people from slavery in its 20th-century capitalist form, from Ignorance, poverty and fear. 
A NEW SOCIAL. POLITICAL. ECONOMIC ORDER FOR SOUTH AFRICA. 
It is not the \iew of the NCL that such a military overthrow of apartheid is an end in itself. For the 
achievement of tru.:: liberation a new social, political and economic order must be im~d--OA 
[instituted inJ South Africa. The ba!>ic reasons for the appalling state of racial opression and white 
overlordship in South Africa are, of course, to be found in the present social and economic pauern, an 
inheritance of hundreds of years of ycllrs of exploitation, colonialism, unbridled capitalism, and even 
qua:.i-religious racialism, rather than in the physical or mental make-up of indi\iduals in the minority 
or majority groups. The people of South Africa are the prisoners of a system inherited from the past, 
dead ages; liberation for South Africa mu~l mean the de.r,truction of this system, and its replacement 
with a new order capable of releasing the immeasurable human and physical potential of our country. 
Consequently the NCL was ~et up witb the ckar aim of achic\'ing the {revolutionary) overthrow of the 
present apartheid Government, of ensuring that it wa" n~l\ n:pl..tced by similar tyranny in a different 
form. and of positioning it:r.elf so as to inlluence future [al (;u,crnmcnt constantly towards carrying out 
the original socialist. democratic aand egalitarian aim~ of the- revolution. As the controlling force in a 
strong, central Government, the members of the National Commiucc for Liberation aim to ensure that 
the aims of the revolution are not betrayed, either tO\\ards the acceptance of a rigid {doctrinaire 
textbook} Communist system, with its concomitant Cold War commitment, or towards an expedient, 
unprincipled relaxing into the capitalist swcm wbieh is the root of South African e.,·j). 
ECONOMIC. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AIMS 
Ao exact itemisation of economic policy is altogether undcsirabk at thh point. The new South Africa 
may nationalise its gold mines or not (a!i in Ghana) it may nationalise its land or not (as in 
(Y]ugoslavia), but the basis of its economic system will be, as it is in those two countries, socialist. As 
regards the political system, it5 aim will he towards true democracy, with the value of the vote 
becoming equal as the voters themselves become equal in their rights and welfare ( + economics?}. 
Tbe immediate object v.ill be to give every adult man and woman the \'ote, to build up their 
parrkipation in local go\·ernment {thus combating democratic centralism'!}, and to allow the freedom 
of political parties or independent candidates to compete f11r the \·otes of the ek('toratc, subject only to 
cecessary statutes outlawing 
I II: I 
the fostering, by any mcilns, of racial or religious hatred or ~trifc. 
Social changes will follow from the political and economic developments, but here again social equality 
will be encouraged by a realistically nonracial educational '>VStcm. and by state promotion of technical 
training, higher and state education, purposefully to make up the ground lost to nonwhites by 
generations of "colour bar" retardation. The concept of indi\·idual liberty ( -- seen in tc rms of the new 
social + economic order} will be chc:ri~hed, and prmected by an independent judiciary charged to 
uphold the right of all citizens to a fair trial under the rule of law. Within the social context, due 
awareness \l.iJl eonstantly be paid to the peculiar compo!i.ition of the South African people with their 
manifold genetic and cultural origins. Cultural freedom will be upheld while a unified patriotism 
recognising diversity will be built up. In this patriotism of the new South Africa will be no narrow 
sectional nationalism, but a pride in South African citizenship, in African eontinental fellowship and an 
allegiance to the ideal of world brotherhood, 
TOWARDS A NATIONAL FREEDOM ARMY 
It remains only to ~ay that the road to militar:v overthrow of the present regime in South Africa will be 
hard and '.llill demand very great ~acrifice and heroism. The armed forces at the disposal of the regime 
are powerful and constantly poi5.cd for the crushing of any rising. A peasant revolt was bloodily 
crushed in ~ hours in mountainous, forested East Pondoland in 1%1, and this bdore the real build-
up of South Africa's 
7 
8 
internal security forces was really under way. The manufacture of arms and ammunition in South 
Africa v.;ll \cry largely make good the lossc<. brought abnut hy the United ~ations' arms embargo. 
Furthermore, the NCl does not overc5timatc the logistic rcadinec,~ of the free African stales to invade 
South Africa successfully in the coming pt::riod. least of all do we depend on the hope that the other 
world powers will intervene between the white regime and its victims through military action or naval 
blockade. In its projected launching uf a National Frel·dom Arnty the NCL will be constantly guid~d 
by the certainty that the liberation of South Africa is the task of the people of South Africa. however 
severe their disabilities, however overwhelming may seem the forces of opression ranged against them. 
To our fellow African states and to all our {progressive} allies throughout the v.urld we shall constantly 
look for aid-- in finance , training facilities, technical aid, equipment, in their moral support and in the 
harassment their combined action can cause to the regime. But we see the mortal struggle to come as 
our own responsibility, which, on behalf of the opressed people of ~outh Africa we accept to the full. 
Document 10: State v Hirson and others: Exhibit M4(51 
Harsh counter measures to the 1%0 campaign of th~ PAC and tht! 1961 strike called by tht: African 
National Congress brought 10 an end the 50 y~ar old non violent political struggle for democracy and 
social justice in South Africa. The banning of Congresses and crippling of other liberatory 
organizations by proscription of members and by laws removing freedom of assemhly and spe~ch 
effectively forced the leaders of the opressed majority uf the people to seek military and violent means 
of liberation for ~stablishing a new South African socit!ty. 
There had been differences in das5 attitude and ideology which had made for the fragmentation of the 
anti-government forces into mutually hostile groupings. But the end >lf the political struggle tended to 
render such division meaningless, either through the self-eliminating of cenain groups, or through the 
objective need for coop~ration { amongst groups} . The first move to organise military action against the 
South African Government was made by a group of SoU[h Africans of various political allegiances, 
who, in the second half of 1%1 formed a national committee to plan military action . 
The group was named the National Committee for Liberation, it~ members being drawn from town~ 
and rural areas {throughout} the country and organi~ed regionally, coordinated through a central 
committee. 
Succes~f ul. yet isolated acts of sabotage were carried out h~.: tween Hwo-ff*ftlitl.ion-of -~~-gf'OUfH~nti-~1! 
t}fl~ of-l %~ ~ the end of 1% l} , and a I so esc a p~: and transport work for im pri~oned and confined lea de r5> 
{was succe:>~f u lly u ndert.tkc n} . As t 9M com me nc.:: s. the nrgan ilat ion, strc ngt he ned by c xperience and 
intact thus far from detection by the police and ,·ast nclwork of informer!>, plans to launch a massive 
violent assault on the forces of oppression. 
De cern be r 1%1 saw I he launching of the military wing of t h c 
ANC und~r the name Umkonto we Sizwc, although approaches had been made by the NCL to 
Congress Alliance leaders with the aim of forming one unitt:d military force. The career of Umkonto 
""·as halted by the capture of the high command at Rimnia in August J%3, after many heroic acts in 
the first sabmage phase of Umkonto\ campaign. Meanwhile the rank and file of Umkonto members, if 
thc:y t:scapcd the police net that Rivonia made possible, are scattered and if not leadcrle~s then 
{unable, for the moment, to act}. 
The PAC meanwhile remained ph:dged to its promise of ""freedom in 1'.163"", but March t%3 <;aW a 
fierce and brutal crushing of the projected rising and the imprisonment of many hundreds of PAC men, 
among whom were; lh~ bulk of rhc countrywide leadership . 
Smaller groups also launched military activity, retaining their outdated mutual hostilit;.-. But { ruthlc:s~ I 
use or {lillegible?Jl powers enabled {the. police), 1hrough torture and indefinit~ solitary confinement 
to destroy these groups, whtloit (had} sm~g1K-~~-..~»o -t~p -~H"ltll-ltJcal ~lre ngt h, with the dangers in here nt 
in recruitment within a particular local community. 
J 
The temporary crushin~ of the UWS. the PAC and smaHer groups has taught tragic and terrible 
lessons to all who compete and fight \:ach other and thus play into the hands of the common enemy, 
and has also shown thew prer.~nt might and effectiYcncss of the regim~ . It has left, in activ~: term5, only 
the original NCL in the field, itself formed on the ha5is of national unity, a degree of ideological 
flexibility based on a will for actual unity amongst the military groups. 
It is dea~ that the PAC and ANC group~ will rc\'ive again. for the spirit has not been broken. {In the 
mean time) the {immediate} aim of the NCL wi!J he to fill the \acuum and to strength~n its own 
organi5ation, increase its supplie5 of arms. ammunition and explosi\'es and equip itself with skills, and 
to build cadres of highly trained and acti\·e fighters, constantly allacking both state and private 
installations, factories and key targets. (It is hoped that thi~ will lead up to co·op~ration with the other 
re-emerging (~ic) which will come together in the NFA which it is the NCL'~ chid bu~in~ss to recruit, 
train and jointly lead} . 
THE IMPQSSIBILITY OF EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 
The NCL holds it as ~etf-e-..ident that rc\·oJutionary social. political and econom1c change 1s 
{fundamental} to the e5tablishmenl of the new society based on the broad principles of socialism. 
The ruling group -- the "white~ " of Westo.;rn Eumpcan origin. ha\·c tntal power over the indigenou~ 
and mixed population. Any thought of gradual phased trilnsfcr of power in the sClcial. political and 
economic contc~t of rhe society is {out nf the que stion} . Such thoughts would indicate a gross 
misunderstanding of the nature of the capitalist society in which we live. The vested economic 
interests of the white group, backed and bolstered by the capitalist pauerns Europe and America, 
to~ether with their total political and social privileges. makes for complett: entrenchment of the ruling 
class. In order not only to dislodge the ruling group, but abo to fW€.r.f-hrow-l-fte.·5J~em {institute the 
new socialist system}, revolutionary violence and military means will be used and revolutionary change 
will be subsequently applied. 
Tbe purpose of the NCL: In order tCl achieve the new society, {the NCL aims at} the proper and 
~lralcgic use of violence. sabotage, terrorism and guerilla warfare, believing that the more firmly , 
tt:solutcly and speedily ~ueh force is used, the more quickly can be ended the current stagnation of 
South Africa's growth to nationhood as a free African state, and the more rapidly can be i.ichievcd the 
{subsequent} liberation of all its people from slavery in its 20th-century capitalist form. 
A NEW SOClAL. POLITICAL. ECONOMIC ORDER FOR SOUTH AFRICA. 
Tbe consiMent goal of the NCL is to overthrow the whole apartheid system and the basis of capitalist 
exploitation in South Africa and to institute a re\'olutionary social, political and economic ordt:r in 
South Afric<l hased on the principles of Socialism las tht:~ can hi! hcst applied to SA). The inhcrit;..nce 
of hundreds of years of exploitation, colonialism. unbridled capitali~m and its offshoots of racialism 
and prejudice lie at the root of the SO£tal-tii~a~-and-oormr-•lf-mH"-"'•OE:tet~ { e\·ils of our socit:ty ). 
The liberation l)f SA from the grip of capitalism and imperial ism will mean the end of these reactionary 
forces, and the release and development of the immeasurable human ami physical potential of our 
country. 
The overthrow of the present system must not he followed by a similar system; wt want total 
revolutionary change. The NCL aims to [position] so as to affect these aims. As the controlling force 
i.n a strong central provisional government prior to a national convention of the people, the NCL will 
aim to ensure that the Revolution is carried out to the full ami not betrayed 
{by forces such as tho~e representing doctrinaire Communi~m, nor by bourgeoi~ middle class 
conservatism (and reformism)-- ~hich may allow an expedient relaxing back into the capitalist ~y~tem, 
We will not be involved in Cold War dbputes and will not align our!.ehes with dthcr camp.} 
{Economic. Political and Social Aims}. 
h 
The conliequence!'. uf the Revolution and [he Jmmediatc demands resulting from it in tenn~ of 
administration, resources, human potential and producti\·ity cannot at this stage be predicted. It is thus 









l · ,, 
The ~Cl will aboli5h discrimination in all it~ form~ . 
The ~Cl will cstabli<,h a socialist <C"conomic systt!m ba~cd on democratic planning over which 
tne people will have the decisive control and will cnsur<C" th<C" equitable redistribution of wealth 
in all its forms. 
The NCL will embark on an extensive programme of nalionali~a!ion to en:o.ur..: an efficient and 
expanding national economy with r u II employment {and the elirn ination of monopolies and 
private capital} 
The ~CL will re-distribute the land for the overall benefit or lhe society, and provide for 
agricultural {growth + improve mt: n l} through the e OCllllt age m ent and establishment of {such 
means as} co-ops, communal farms, collectivisation and consolidation of the land, {as well as 
wide-scale agricultural education at primary and secondary levd}. 
The NCL will establish free and compulsory ~ducation for all, with free tuition in nigher { + 
sec} education for those who qualify for it. A~ an initial move a nation-wide crash programme 
of aduh education will be embarked upon by the Rev Go.,.t. 
The NCL will establish a th.orough network of social services for all , 
The NCL will ensure an independent judiciary ( + fair public trial}. {It i~ our view that the 
court:. can be an important fore~:: in moulding values of society} . 
The :'liCL believes that in atime of revnlutionary change a stmng central government is both. 
necessary and desirable. It believt:s that the people, in wh.ose name the Go\t seeks to acl, must 
have an effective check on th.e Governenl. 
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The NCL has as its aim rhe grov.-1h of political institutions which in the perilld of change will 
concentrate power in the hand~ of the ct:ntral (juvt {but which will incorporate machinery wich will 
make pm.sible fnr the people to exercise dfc:ctive checks on abu~e of power by the gm1. but which do 
not render Ike essence of power of the central go\1. so limited as to make it unable to fulfill its 
revolutionary goal). Jn.-Hie--e~JtHJ~-swk-i~~iftitioos- rtal- ~iHg-wOI'katH€- or-manageable.---Yo~e- be.1ie~Je-if 
llet:&.iS~-1-&- Nf-OtHit6-side-ef-<:-e RI:Nll-f'IOW~-.- ~afltt.g- .ffi -lfli fKI-thtc>- ukimaU~-demec-RIK-pti£pO!it! -of:4@ 
su~le;4ekoed-ttt-~alioR--l:-o-the-eet.HI.oFRi£--aFtd-<;Ot:tal. I i !lt:gible ). For we believe 1 hat civil Iibert its and 
rights ;:w.e-l~-wbt<:8--omy have relevance and meaning in an egalitarian society, where a certain 
level of material well-being ha5 bc:t:n achieved {for all. We set as our aim the effective implementation 
of {illegible I} 
The immediate adult suffrage that will be introduced will be coupled with active encouragemt:nt of 
participation in local governmenl. Also indu:;trial democracy through an energetic and effective TU 
movement "ill be encouraged. The NCL believes thallhe stage of full democracy can be more quickly 
reacbed in SA than in the rest of Africa, and hc:nce we ~el as our goal the rapid achicvemt:nt of thi~ 
through tbe speedy and df~ctive in5titution of the new society, based on the already advanced 
economy. 
Social changes {will} naturally follow and be encouraged. {The dfecb of) colour bar retardation of 
the mass of tbe people in spheres such as education, will be actively 
{The effects of the cok1ur bar have crt:atcd vast inequalities in \·aricty o[ fidds such as education. 
buusing and ~ocial sen·ices. The state will pursue an actin~ policy to make goud lht! dclicit to rhc mass 
of the people before the revolution . } 
Cultural freedom will be upheld while a unill<:d patriotism rccog.nising diversity will b• built up and. 
recognising di"versi[y, a pride in the wuntry, a--f~"t'lt~tg~-hn-.H:I~oeJ {will be encouraged as part of a 
feeling of solidarity} and fellowship with the peoples of Africa and an allegiance to the brotherhood 
throughout the world. 
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The overthrow of the regime will require great and determined effort and sccrifice. The crushing of the 
Pondo revolt in 1961 is evidence of the organised and t\·er-ready might of the regime. We do not 
overestimate the logistic readinr~s of the free African states 111 invade SA in the near future. nor do we 
see any purpose to hope for physical aid from the rest of the world. In its projected launching of 
National Freedom Army the NCL will be guided by the certainty that the liberation of SA is the task of 
the people of SA, however severe their disahilities and however overwhelming may be the forces of 
ranged against us. 
In order to achieve these aims the NCL regards unity with other military groups as essential, and is 
anxious to enter negotiations to this end, and our sole criteria for such unif1ed co-operation will he :.~) 
security b) {adherence} Jtol our basic sodalisl principles. The ~CL recognises the artificial division or 
Africa and the vast burden which our continent has to O\ercome as a result of years of imperialist 
exploitation. In order to achieve its goals of genuine frt:edom. Africa must unite. 
We ~hall look to our colleagLJes in Africa for help. guidance and sacrifice; we offer them the same. 
Finance. training facilities ~ +} arms are needed. The NCL regards the AA conference as the first step 
{towards the goal of effective Pan-African co·oprerationl} and gives the ConQcrcncej and the 
committees set up by it, its full support. The NCL supports all people ~truggling not only against 
imperialist rule but also against all forms of capitalist oppression. 
{We see the struggle tor our freedom from opres.sion in South Africa as our own responsibility -· a 
responsibility which We accept to I he [ul\} . 
ll 
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The shall consist of all those who adopt th.: prngramme <~nd the discipline of the 
mm·ement 
The_ shall work democratically, safeguarding the intere~ts of every member. At every stage 
there must be protection against bureaucratic contwl, while at the same time, once decisions 
are taken they shall be carried out by every member. 
n The supreme authority of the shall be the National Central Committee (N.C.C.) which 
'Nill be the active political centre and will direct th~ action and the organisation of the 
membership. 
The members of the NCC will be drawn from e\·ery centre of the country. The membership 
ofthc NCC will be changed only by such conference as can be convened, or by a majority 
decision of the committee who may suspend a member. The suspension will be revieewd by 
the !irs! full meeting of the NCC thereafter. 
The SCC shall meet at least once C\'ery three months. 
Between full meetings, tbc work shall be carried out by the members of the NCC r.::siding on 
the Witwatersrand wgether with such members from other centre~ who can attend. This will 
be the working committee. 
The- working committee shall meet as frequently as is necessary and shall be convened by a 
secretary at the request of any member. 
The NCC shall appoint all ful!-timc organisers in consultation with the regional committees. 
The NCC 5hall appoint 5uch sub-committees as necessary to ensure that the work is carried 
OUL 
These shall include: 
(a) the action commitee who will have the right to take any decisions relating to action, and 
Y.ho shall take precedence over all other bodies in the movement in time of crisis. 
(b) a secretary and a treasurer who shall see to the cfficic nt running of the organi~ation. 
t c) A publication committee which shall publish regu Ia r bulletins. journals and books. 
All !ouch sub-committees will report regularly on !ill mauers of principle to the NCC or the 
working committee. 
The NCC shall appoint alternate members to ensure replacements if these become necessary. 
The NCC shaJI akc no major decisions affecting basic policy without referring the matter 
through the region.al committees to the entire membership. 
III Each region shall haYe its own Regional Committee (RC) of at least 5 and not more than 7 
members. 
The RC shall be completely autonomous as far as is compatible with the above. 
The RC shall meet at least once a fortnight. 
The RC shall be in charge of all recruitment in the area. 
They will raise any monies which will pay for all local expenses. Any exces!i money !>hall be 
transferred to the NCC. 
The RC shall set up any sub-committees needt:d and shall rake all decisions affecting the 
region in maHers of political acti\·ity, lcalleting, actilm etc., when~ possible in collaboration 
with the NCC. 
The RC shall report to the NCC through the membt:r who represents them on the NCC. 
The RC shall see that all members receive full reports of the work of both the RC and the 
NCC regularly. They shall also see that e\·ery document of the ts received by every 
member. 
lV The basic unit of the _ shall be the cell, consisting of not more than 4 members and one 
contact. 
The contact shall be a member of the RC or of the. local committee if such exists in any area. 
Such local committees shall be set up at the direction of the RC and will be directly 
represented on the RC by at least one. person. 
No member shall meet with members of the other than of his cell. nor shall he disclose 
membership to any other member of the NCL -;;less brought into contact with such members 
for the working of the movement. 
The cells shall receive and discuss all documents issued bv bodies of the which ;.hail be 
fully discussed and then destroyed in front of the cell. E~·ery mt:mber ha;ti\e right and the 
duty to suggest changes in the direction of the mo,·ement, to criticise all documents and 
policies. 
Such comment!> shall be immediately reported through the conjtact back to the relevant 
committee verbaUy or in writing if the member wishes. 
Any member of a cell may be suspended by a majority decision of a ceil. The member shaH 
have the full right to appeal to the next higher committee where the full charge shall be 
comidered. 
The Working of the Cell. 
The cell is the smallest unit for action and is centred in residential or industrial areas, in trade 
unions, or in political groups. 
The cell must give its first attention to proposed action where it will function as a group. 
The cell shaJJ meet regularly and l'lhall get reports from each of its members of their political 
and industrial activities. 




Political resolution of NCC 
In tho: last months of 1961 the political situation in South Africa has mm·ed into a new srage. 
FoUowing the shootings in Sharpe\r·illc and the failure of the stay-at-home organised for the end of 
May 1961, new thoughts for militant action have emerged amongst the peopie which eventuated in the 
recent bombing attempts in Johannesburg, Durban and Port Elizabeth. 
The two main National Liberation movements. the ANC and PAC have found themselves disorganised 
by their bannings. In many areas. however, the ANC has managed to reorganise itself to &orne extent. 
The sympathy of the: pc:oplc: has remained for cithc:r of those two organisations. 
The white population is largely united, and as there is little chance of outside: intervention in the 
foreseeable future, the three million whites, with technical knowledge, education and its armed force 
are a very powerful force, and if this force is not split, it may actively help to keep the present 
government in power. To this extent the emerhgencc of the Progressive Party, though it can n.:ver be 
considered as an ally, it may help by splitting the: white block. 
In the light of this situation our tasks in the forthcoming months can be: summarised as foUows: 
1. To work. in~ide the National Liberatory mo\·ements where the hulk of recruits will be found. 
2. To identify ourselves with militant aclion while not losing sight of our political objectives. 
3. Consolidation and organisational increase: or our existing membership. especially in rural 
areas. 
4. lntensification of the political education of our militants. 
5. Support for any attempt to bring a section of lhe white population dose to the :1ims of the 
liberatory movement. 
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Draft for di:;cussion 
Tlte is a ma\:ement of the workers in the tnwn and country who participate in the "truggle to 
establish a Socialist Society. 
The members of the_ are drawn from the most ad\·anced workers and other progressive elements of 
society who will devote their lives to the establishment or socialism. 
The _ acts together "'ith the workers in their struggle and formulates their demands in the most 
conscious form. 
The democratic Struiv;Je 
The :o.rruggle for socialism is inseperable from the struggle to break the colour bar and the 
cstablishement of full democracy. To this end we demand: 
a) The vote for every adult man and woman. 
b) Compulsory and free education for every child. 
c) Freedom of movement speech and organisation. 
d) The formation of Free Trade Unions and the opening up of at! jobs, 
Because political freedom will be meaningless \vithout economic freedom we demand equally: 
a) The ending of the reserve system and the reallocation of land. 
b) The taking over of the wealth of the country so that the banks mines and large industries can 
serve the interests of the people. 
The _ declare.s that it will co-operate withh all groups who are prepared lO conduct a struggle to 
achieve any of these democratic demands. At the same time it reserves the right to independent action 
in order to continue the struggle ror socialism. 
Socialism 
Political freedom will be an empty shell if the economic system of South Africa is not altered. The 
control of the means of production by capitalism must be broken and the working class must take 
controJ of the resources of the country. For this reason the_ will organise the worker.s and labourers 
as an independent force and prepare the way for a new socialist .society. 
The struggle for democratic rights must grow unintaruptt:Jly inw a fight for socialism. This implies: 
a) The ending of aU opression of workers. 
n) The organisation an dplanning of the economy of the country so thai the wealth shall belong to 
those who work. 
c) The control of the government by the worker!> ~o thai rhe above shall he hrought into dfect. 
.., 
d) Th.c: planning of society ~o that the workers .-.hall have the full utilisation of all re~ources of 
society and so build a ne'-'·\ife of human dignity and culture. 
The complete victory of the working class shall be our victory and we will work alongside the entire 
working class in both town and countryside to achieve this end. 
Internal ion alb' 
We recognise that our rask cannot be fulfi\lt:d in our country alone and and that there must be a dose 
economic and political link with other peoples of South Africa. 
We will establish this link now in order to allow for the unification of the :<.truggle ami the eventual 
unification of Africa as a Sociali5t continent. 
We will at all times support the struggles of the working class throughout the world in their effnrts to 
achieve and build Socialism. We will support and co-operate with all such groups in their efforts to 
destroy capitalism, imperialism and colonialism in any form. 
We recognise that only world-..vide socialism can end the threat of war and allow the people~ of the 
world to build a free society U/ithour exploitation. 
WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE - WE HAVE A NEW WORLD TO BUILD 
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